Ryan v. Kentucky Department of Corrections Western Regional Traning Center
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell denying 24 Motion to Dismiss. cc: Counsel(JAC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:14-CV-89-TBR
ROSEMARY RYAN
Plaintiff
v.
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
WESTERN REGIONAL TRAINING CENTER,
AND LADONNA THOMPSON, COMMISSIONER
Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Kentucky Department of
Corrections, Western Regional Training Center, and Ladonna Thompson’s Motion to Dismiss.
(Docket No. 24.) Plaintiff Rosemary Ryan has responded, (Docket No. 26), and Defendants
have replied, (Docket No. 30). Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons
enumerated below, the Court will DENY Defendants’ Motion.
Factual Background
Plaintiff Rosemary Ryan was a Corrections Training Instructor at the Western Region
Training Center for the Department of Corrections, Division of Training for more than twentyfive years. (Docket No. 1 at 1-2.) Ryan initiated this litigation alleging sexual harassment, sex
discrimination, age discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Id. at 5-10. She alleges that her
immediate supervisor made sexual comments and sent her inappropriate text messages regarding
her exposure to a Taser around August of 2011. Id. at 2. After the incident, Ryan filed a sexual
1
harassment complaint against her immediate supervisor, and she states that as a result, he
received a written reprimand for his behavior on or about December 29, 2011. Id. at 3.
Additionally, around November 2012, Ryan found a letter written by her supervisor’s
attorney on a work computer; the letter contained confidential and allegedly slanderous
information and described Ryan’s supervisor’s attempts to have Ryan removed from her
position. Id. Ryan notified the second line evaluator and the Director of Training. Id. After doing
so, she was subjected to “continuous retaliatory actions by her supervisor” as well as a reduction
in work duties. Id. Ryan was also placed on “medical certification,” meaning that she was
required to have a physician complete a medical certification sheet each time she was absent
from work for medical reasons. Id. at 4. Finally, she alleges that she was subjected to comments
about her age and was denied a promotion. Id.
As a result of the aforementioned event, Ryan filed four grievances with the Kentucky
Personnel Board on March 11, 2013. (Docket No. 26 at 2-3.) “The first grievance filed stated
plaintiff’s grievance for the issuance of medical certification without just cause for alleged abuse
of sick leave . . . . The second grievance related to the plaintiff’s reprimand of retrieving and
violating confidential information from a private attorney letter stored on the state’s computer . .
. . The third grievance concerned the plaintiff’s reprimand for release of confidential information
from a private attorney letter creating a libelous letter about Ms. Ryan . . . . The fourth grievance
stated breach of the plaintiff’s confidentiality the plaintiff’s peer was in the same room during a
disciplinary matter.” (Docket No. 26 at 2-3.)
The Deputy Commissioner’s Office received the four grievances on April 2, 2013. Id. at
3. Ryan appealed the decision to the Kentucky Personnel Board with receipt dated May 22, 2013.
Id. Ryan filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
2
(“EEOC”) on June 11, 2013. Id. Ryan received her Right to Sue letter from the EEOC on
February 13, 2014. Id. Ryan states that her grievance appeals were dismissed by the Kentucky
Personnel Board on June 18, 2014 “without an evidentiary hearing or final determination.” Id.
Defendants previously filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Ryan’s grievances with
the Kentucky Personnel Board raised the same or substantially similar claims and that they were
decided on the merits and dismissed, and therefore, res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Ryan
from religitating her claims. (Docket No. 9.) This Court denied Defendants’ previous Motion to
Dismiss as it concluded the following:
At this stage of litigation, the Court is required to “presume all of the
factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” See Total Benefits Planning
Agency, Inc., 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). There is no evidence
that procedures in the earlier proceedings were sufficient to render these
claims barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata. Additionally,
Defendants have provided no evidence to show that the claims at issue
were actually litigated fully by the Personnel Review Board, and Ryan
alleges that they were not.
Ryan v. Kentucky Dep't of Corr., No. 5:14-CV-00089-R, 2015 WL 339597, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Jan.
23, 2015). Now, Defendants have filed a second Motion to Dismiss arguing that Ryan has failed
to state a claim upon which relief can granted. The Court will analyze Ryan’s claims for Sexual
Harassment, Sex Discrimination, Age Discrimination, and Retaliation below.
Legal Standard
As the Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure after filing their answer, their Motion is untimely. Williams v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 781 F. Supp. 2d 519, 522 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (quoting 5B Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004) (“[A] post-answer Rule
12(b)(6) motion is untimely and . . . some other vehicle, such as a motion for judgment on the
3
pleadings . . . must be used”). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has permitted untimely
motions to dismiss to be construed as motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Satkowiak v. Bay Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 47 Fed. Appx. 376,
377 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002); Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 n.1 (6th
Cir. 1988). According to established precedent, motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and
motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) are adjudicated using the same standard.
Wells Fargo Fin. Leasing, Inc. v. Griffin, 970 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (first citing
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2007); then citing Roger Miller
Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ'g, LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 389 (6th Cir. 2007)). Thus, this Court will
construe Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as a Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c).
“For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material
allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be
granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Southern Ohio Bank v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir. 1973)). The Sixth Circuit has
stated that a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, “is granted when no material issue
of fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
(quoting Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm'n, 946 F.2d 1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991)).
“In reviewing the motion, [this Court] must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, accept all of the complaint's factual allegations as true, and determine whether the
plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim that would entitle [her] to
4
relief.” Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ziegler v.
IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Importantly, when reviewing a plaintiff’s claims under Title VII or the ADEA, a Court
cannot require a plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609 (6th
Cir. 2012) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002)). “In Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” Id. (citing Swierkiewicz, 534
U.S. at 510). “Thus, a plaintiff need not plead facts to support a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas in order to survive a motion to dismiss [or a motion for judgment on the
pleadings].” Bargo v. Goodwill Indus. of Kentucky, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 2d 819, 823 (E.D. Ky.
2013) (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510). The Supreme Court has concluded that the ordinary
rules of notice pleading pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) apply. Keys, 684 F.3d at
609 (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514). Under Rule 8(a), Ryan’s Complaint must provide “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that [she] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Therefore, “although [Ryan’s] Complaint need not present detailed factual allegations, it must
allege sufficient factual content from which a court, informed by its judicial experience and
common sense, could draw the reasonable inference” that the Defendants discriminated against
her because of her sex and age. Keys, 684 F.3d at 610 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678, 679 (2009)).
5
Discussion
I.
Claim for Sexual Harassment
In her Complaint, Ryan does not clarify whether she seeks to bring her claim for sexual
harassment pursuant to the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KRCA”) or pursuant to Title VII.
However, this does not affect this Court’s analysis as precedent is clear that “[a] sexual
harassment claim brought under the [KCRA] is to be analyzed in the same manner as a claim
brought under Title VII, its federal counterpart.” Clark v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 400 F.3d
341, 347 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Ammerman v. Bd. of Educ. of Nicholas County, 30 S.W.3d 793,
797-98 (Ky. 2000)).
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating “against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “A plaintiff may
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that the discrimination based on sex created a hostile
or abusive work environment.” Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir.
1999) (citations omitted). “Title VII offers employees protection from a workplace permeated
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.”
Berryman v. SuperValu Holdings, Inc., 669 F.3d 714, 717 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But conduct that
is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—
an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII's
purview.” Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Likewise, if
the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not
6
actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation.”
Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S at 21–22).
In her Complaint, Ms. Ryan alleges that “[b]eginning on or about August 2011, [her]
immediate supervisor subjected [her] to several sexual comments and text messages regarding
her exposure to a Taser, referring to a sexual reaction experienced by some females who have
been exposed to the Taser” (Docket No. 1 at 2.) She also asserts that her supervisor “engage[d]
in conversations involving sexual topics in [her] presence” which made her “uncomfortable.” Id.
at 5. Ryan contends that her supervisor’s conduct was “sufficiently severe and pervasive so as to
unreasonably interfere with [her] physical health [and] work performance.” Id. Additionally,
according to Ryan, her supervisor’s actions created a hostile and offensive work environment. Id.
As support, Ryan contends that her fellow employees filed written complaints about her
supervisor’s actions. Id. at 6. After reviewing Ryan’s factual allegations and considering them all
as true, this Court concludes that Ryan’s Complaint provides sufficient factual content for this
Court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendants discriminated against her based on
her sex and created a hostile or abusive work environment.
II.
Sex Discrimination
Under Title VII, it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex.” Risch v. Royal Oak Police
Dep't, 581 F.3d 383, 390 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
In Ryan’s Complaint, she alleges that she applied for a promotion and did not receive it.
(Docket No. 1 at 4.) Ryan also states that she “declined the interview because her [immediate]
supervisor was the individual who would be making the decision for the promotion,” and he had
7
stated to other employees that he wanted the “new person to be in the office with him because he
didn’t want the [new] person to be in the office with [her].” Id. Ryan contends that she “had
more experience and training than the individual hired for the position.” Id. Lastly, she alleges
that the Defendants promoted male employees over female employees. Id. at 8. After reviewing
Ryan’s factual allegations and considering them all as true, this Court concludes that Ryan’s
Complaint provides sufficient factual content for this Court to draw the reasonable inference that
the Defendants discriminated against her based on her sex. The Defendants are not clearly
entitled to judgment at this stage of litigation.
III.
Age Discrimination
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) makes it unlawful for an
employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623.
In her Complaint, Ryan alleges that the Defendants “discriminated against [her] in the
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment in various ways, in substantial part because of
her age.” (Docket No. 1 at 6.) Ryan states her supervisor repeatedly asked when she planned to
retire, and she overheard him tell other employees that she was going to retire soon due to her
age. Id. at 4. According to Ryan, her supervisor went so far as to ask other employees if they
would be interested in her position. Id. Lastly, in her Complaint, Ryan alleges that her “[f]ellow
employees approached [her] and indicated [that] her supervisor stated that [she would] retire in
August [of] 2013” even though she had no intention of retiring for several more years. Id. After
reviewing Ryan’s factual allegations and considering them all as true, this Court concludes that
Ryan’s Complaint provides sufficient factual content for this Court to draw the reasonable
8
inference that the Defendants discriminated against her based on her age and, therefore, the
Defendants are not clearly entitled to judgment at this time.
IV.
Retaliation
“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains a potent anti-retaliation provision.”
Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir. 2013). The statute states that “[i]t
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
In her Complaint, Ryan contends that the Defendants “illegally retaliated against [her] by
unjustly subjecting her to unjust scrutiny, false allegations of misconduct, and unwelcome and
derisive comments solely because she had reported . . . sex discrimination.” (Docket No. 1 at 9.)
She alleges that since her report of sex discrimination, she has been treated differently than other
employees and prevented from attending annual work events that she previously always
attended. Id. at 3. Furthermore, she states that she was placed on medical certification for the first
time in her twenty-five year career. Id. at 3-4. Medical certification requires an employee “to
have a physician complete a medical certification sheet each time she [is] absent from work for
medical reasons.” Id. at 4. Ryan contends that until her report of sex discrimination, she “had
never had any verbal, written, or any other form of comment except for high ratings for use of
personal time in her evaluations.” Id. When Defendants placed the medical certification
requirement on Ryan, she alleges that she had approximately 1,100 hours of sick time
accumulated. Id. Lastly, Ryan claims that her supervisor “repeatedly” told her that it was her
fault he received a reprimand for the text messages relating to a Taser and that he blamed her for
9
his not receiving another promotion.” Id. at 4-5. After reviewing Ryan’s factual allegations and
considering them all as true, this Court concludes that Ryan’s Complaint provides sufficient
factual content for this Court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendants retaliated
against her.
Conclusion and Order
The arguments presented in Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings are more
appropriate for a Motion for Summary Judgment. When considering a Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, this Court must consider all of Ryan’s factual allegations as true and view the
Complaint in the light most favorable to her. Having done so, the Court finds that Ryan has
pleaded sufficient facts for all of her claims to survive Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion, (Docket No. 24), is DENIED.
June 30, 2016
cc: Counsel
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?