Webb v. Crounse Corporation

Filing 58

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER denying 27 Motion in Limine. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 6/10/2016. cc: Counsel(KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:14-CV-00133-TBR-LLK
WILLIAM WEBB,

Plaintiff,

v.
CROUNSE CORPORATION,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
William Webb filed this Jones Act and general maritime law action against
Crounse Corporation after sustaining injuries aboard its vessel, the M/V Yvonne Conway.
With the prospect of trial approaching, Webb asks the Court to conduct a Daubert
hearing and to preclude Crounse’s medical expert, Dr. Arthur F. Lee, from offering
certain testimony. Having reviewed Webb’s papers, the Court finds a hearing to be
unnecessary and Dr. Lee’s testimony to be unobjectionable.

Accordingly, Webb’s

Motion for a Daubert Hearing and to Preclude Dr. Lee’s Testimony, R. 27, is DENIED.
I.
A.
William Webb worked as a deckhand for Crounse Corporation aboard its river
towing vessel, the M/V Yvonne Conway. See R. 1 at 2, ¶¶ 4–5 (Complaint). On July 14,
2011, during the course of performing his regular duties, Webb lifted a lock line from the
deck of the M/V Yvonne Conway “in order to tie off an empty tow to a loaded tow.” Id.,
¶ 9. According to Webb, he injured his thoracic spine in the process. Id.
B.
On July 1, 2014, William Webb filed this action against Crounse Corporation,
asserting claims under the Jones Act, and for unseaworthiness and negligence under
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general maritime law. See id. at 6–11, ¶¶ 16–27. Now, Webb asks the Court to conduct a
Daubert hearing and exclude a handful of opinions offered by Crounse Corporation’s
medical expert, Dr. Arthur F. Lee. See R. 27 at 1 (Motion for Hearing and to Preclude
Testimony of Dr. Lee).
II.
When a party challenges an opponent’s expert witness, this Court must assume “a
gatekeeping role” to ensure the reliability and relevance of the expert’s testimony.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993); see also Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (extending Daubert to nonscientific expert
testimony). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 guides the Court through this inquiry. The
plain language of Rule 702 says, first, that an expert must be qualified to testify on
account of his “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702;
see also Bradley v. Ameristep, Inc., 800 F.3d 205, 208 (6th Cir. 2015). The Court does
“not consider ‘the qualifications of a witness in the abstract, but whether those
qualifications provide a foundation for a witness to answer a specific question.’” Burgett
v. Troy-Bilt LLC, 579 F. App’x 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Berry v. City of Detroit,
25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir. 1994)). A qualified expert may then testify so long as his
opinions will aid the factfinder and are reliable, meaning the opinions are based on
sufficient data, reliable methods, and the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702(a)–(d); see
also Clark v. W & M Kraft, Inc., 476 F. App’x 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2012); Adler v. Elk
Glenn, LLC, 986 F. Supp. 2d 851, 854 (E.D. Ky. 2013).
There are a number of factors typically considered to resolve questions
concerning the reliability (and admissibility) of expert testimony, but no list is

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exhaustive. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94; see also Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v.
Raymond Corp., 676 F.3d 521, 527 (6th Cir. 2012); Powell v. Tosh, 942 F. Supp. 2d 678,
686–88 (W.D. Ky. 2013). In any case, the Court has considerable leeway over where to
draw the line. Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 671–72 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“[W]here one person sees speculation, we acknowledge, another may see knowledge,
which is why the district court enjoys broad discretion over where to draw the line.”
(citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997))). The proponent of the expert
testimony must establish its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Sigler v.
Am. Honda Motor Co., 532 F.3d 469, 478 (6th Cir. 2008).
Under normal circumstances, the Court may resolve a Daubert motion without
holding a hearing. See Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 249 (6th Cir.
2001). Instead, a hearing is required only if the “record is not adequate” to decide the
motion. Jahn v. Equine Servs., PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2000). Ultimately, the
decision as to the necessity of a hearing is entrusted to this Court’s discretion. See In re
Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 532 (6th Cir. 2008); Clark, 476 F. App’x at
616.
III.
Given the adequacy of the record, the Court finds it unnecessary to hold a
Daubert hearing. There is no dispute that Dr. Lee is qualified to offer medical testimony
in this case. Instead, Webb objects to Dr. Lee’s opinion—that Webb is physically
capable of returning to work as a vessel cook—as conclusory.1

1

See R. 27-1 at 2

In addition, Webb objected to Dr. Lee’s opinion insomuch as it relied on papers not produced
prior to the discovery deadline. See R. 27-1 at 2 & n.5 (Memorandum in Support). Subsequent to Webb’s
motion, however, the Court extended the discovery deadline to January 29, 2016. See R. 34 at 1, ¶ 2

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(Memorandum in Support); see also R. 27-4 at 1–3 (Dr. Lee’s Second Supplemental
Report). In principal part, Webb critiques Dr. Lee for reaching his conclusion without
considering an earlier functional capacity evaluation, which discussed Webb’s inability
stand for prolonged periods. See R. 27-1 at 2–4, 6; see also R. 27-5 at 10–17 (Functional
Capacity Evaluation). Had Dr. Lee considered that evaluation in his second supplemental
report, Webb argues, he could not reliably opine that Webb was fit to serve as a vessel
cook, since that position requires standing for “long periods of time with minimum rest
periods.” R. 27-1 at 4 (quoting R. 27-6 at 3, § 3.9.2 (Description of Cook’s Duties)).
The Court disagrees. Dr. Lee reviewed Crounse’s description of a vessel cook’s
duties and concluded, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, that Webb was
fit for the task. See R. 27-4 at 1. As Crounse points out, see R. 29 at 2–4 (Response), Dr.
Lee discussed the functional capacity evaluation in his prior reports, see R. 27-2 at 6 (Dr.
Lee’s Report); R. 27-3 at 10, ¶ 27 (Dr. Lee’s First Supplemental Report). Though Dr.
Lee made no particular reference to the functional capacity evaluation in his second
supplemental report, he did opine that nothing in his prior review of Webb’s medical
records caused him to doubt Webb’s fitness to work as a vessel cook. See R. 27-4 at 1. It
is not unreasonable to say, then, that Dr. Lee considered the functional capacity
evaluation when arriving at his conclusion since the evaluation is contained in the
referenced records. See R. 27-5 at 10–17. To the extent Dr. Lee’s conclusions might be
subject to criticism, Webb remains free to make his case on cross-examination. See
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and

(Amended Scheduling Order). Accordingly, Webb’s argument as to the timeliness of Crounse’s disclosure
is moot.

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appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” (citing Rock v. Arkansas,
483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987))).
IV.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that William Webb’s Motion for a Daubert Hearing
and to Preclude Dr. Lee’s Testimony, R. 27, is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:

June 10, 2016

cc:

Counsel of Record

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