Dobson et al v. Palmer et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 2/14/2018 re 42 Joint MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Luis Palmer, Nick Rice, and Jeffrey M. Ayers, and 43 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Robert E. Jackson. The Court will enter a separate Order and Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. cc: counsel; Plaintiff, pro se (MNM) Modified on 2/15/2018 to edit docket text (MNM).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-CV-00066-TBR
ROBERT JACKSON,

PLAINTIFF

v.
LUIS PALMER, et al.,

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Luis Palmer, Jeffrey Ayres, and Nick
Rice’s motion for summary judgment. [DN 42.] Plaintiff Robert Jackson responded by filing his
own brief captioned as a motion for summary judgment, [DN 43.] Defendants responded to that
motion, [DN 44.] Fully briefed, these matters are now ripe for decision. For the reasons
discussed herein, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The Court will enter a separate Order and Judgment
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a traffic stop of the car in which Plaintiff Robert Jackson was a
passenger and the subsequent searches Defendant Jeffrey Ayres, a Kentucky State Trooper,
performed of Jackson’s person as a result. [DN 1.]1 According to Jackson’s complaint, he was a
passenger in a vehicle that Defendant Ayers pulled over on March 23, 2014. [Id. at 2.] Jackson
alleges that Defendant Ayers “removed plaintiff from the motor vehicle” and, “[w]ithout
probable cause or justification, and in violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights . . . ordered

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As the Court explains in greater detail below, Jackson’s initial case, 5:15-CV-67, was administratively dismissed
when his case was consolidated with two other Plaintiffs who were in the same car. Both cases were consolidated
into the instant case, 5:15-CV-66. However, Jackson’s complaint, DN 1 in 5:15-cv-67, was only filed in the former
case, 5:15-CV-67. Accordingly, when the Court refers to refers to Jackson’s complaint and cites to “DN 1”
throughout this opinion, the Court is referring to DN 1 in 5:16-CV-67.

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plaintiff to pull down his pants and underclothing and examined his anus in public on the side of
the Edward T. Breathitt Pennyrile Parkway . . . in the full view of passing motorists.” [Id.] In
doing so, Jackson claims that Ayers “forcibly grabbed plaintiff’s arm and ordered him to bend
over.” [Id. at 3.] According to Jackson, “[a]t no point during the aforementioned events had
[D]efendant Ayers or other law enforcement obtained a search warrant nor had plaintiff been
placed under arrest.” [Id.]
After the traffic stop and search, however, Jackson was arrested. [DN 42-3
(Commonwealth of Kentucky Uniform Citation).] The Uniform Citation form that Ayers filled
out for Jackson recites the following version of events:
During traffic stop above was front right passenger. K9 indicated a positive
presence of narcotics. While searching above above pulled away from myself and
would not put his hands behind his back. Above was drive stunned with tazer
[sic]. Approximately 7 grams of possible heroin were located in crease of above’s
buttocks along with small amount of marijuana. While above was resisting he was
trying to reach toward his buttocks. Substance field tested positive for heroin.
digital scales indicated suspected heroin in bag weighed 7 grams.
[Id.] Jackson was charged with four crimes: 1) tampering with physical evidence, 2) resisting
arrest, 3) trafficking in controlled substances, 1st degree, an amount greater to or equal to 2
grams of heroin, and 4) possession of marijuana. [Id.] Jackson pled guilty to all four charges,
however, he entered only a conditional plea of guilty as to his trafficking in controlled substances
charge pending his appeal of the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress. [DN 42-1 at 5
(citing DN 42-4).]
Jackson moved to suppress the evidence of heroin trafficking found during the search of
his body during the roadside stop in Christian County Circuit Court. [DN 42-5 (Jackson’s
Motion to Suppress).] The trial court denied Jackson’s motion, [DN 42-6 at 1–2 (Christian
County Circuit Court Decision)], and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. [DN 42-7

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(Kentucky Court of Appeals Decision).] The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied discretionary
review. [DN 42-8 (Kentucky Supreme Court Order).] Those state court decisions will be
discussed in more detail below.
Now, Jackson brings the instant lawsuit against Ayers in federal court alleging violations
of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 resulting from alleged illegal searches and
seizures during the traffic stop. [Id. at 1–3.] He also brings a pendent state law claim for “a
harmful and offensive touching [by Ayers] of plaintiff’s person.” [Id. at 3.] Jackson alleges that,
as a result of the foregoing events, he has “suffered extreme embarrassment, humiliation, and
degradation,” “and physical pain and suffering.” [Id.] Jackson seeks both compensatory and
punitive damages. [Id. at 3–4.]
Jackson initially brought his case separately from his two (now former) co-Plaintiffs.
Jackson’s complaint was initially filed in Civil Action No. 5:15-CV-67. Separately, under the
instant case number, Civil Action No. 5:15-CV-66, the two other occupants of the car in which
Jackson was a passenger, Darryl Dobson and Marion Robinson, brought suit against Defendants
Ayers, Palmer, and Rice asserting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violations of their rights under
“the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” [DN 4
(Dobson and Robinson’s Amended Complaint).] Due to the similarity of the Plaintiffs’ claims
and that fact that those claims all arose from the same traffic stop incident, this Court
consolidated Jackson’s action with Dobson and Robinson’s action into the instant case, 5:15-CV66. [DN 21 (Order Granting Motion to Consolidate).] The case number under which Jackson
initially filed his complaint, 5:15-CV-67, was administratively dismissed. [Id.] However, Dobson
and Robinson were ultimately dismissed from this action due to a failure to appear in the case.

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[DN 38 (Order Dismissing/Terminating Dobson and Robinson).] Therefore, Jackson is the only
remaining Plaintiff in this action.
DISCUSSION
In the instant motion, Ayers, Palmer, and Rice move to dismiss both Jackson’s federal
constitutional claim and his pendent state law claim. [DN 42.]
1. Defendants Palmer and Rice
First, Defendants argue that both Palmer and Rice must be dismissed entirely from this
suit because Jackson never asserted any claims against them. [DN 42-1 at 3.] Indeed, Dobson
and Robinson, who are now dismissed from this action, were the only Plaintiffs who asserted
claims against Defendants Palmer and Rice. [See DN 4 (Dobson and Robinson’s Amended
Complaint).] Jackson, however, only brought his claims against Defendant Ayers. [See DN 1.]
Specifically, Jackson styled his action only against one Defendant, Jeffrey Ayers, and only ever
refers to a single “defendant” throughout his complaint. [Id.] Accordingly, because Jackson
never asserted any claims against Palmer and Rice in his complaint, those Defendants will be
dismissed from this suit in their entirety.
2. Defendant Ayers
Next, Ayers moves for summary judgment on the federal and state law claims asserted
against him. The Court will address each of these claims in turn.
a. Claims for Violations of the U.S. Constitution Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Jackson first alleges that Ayers’ actions violated his civil rights by removing him from
the vehicle and searching him unlawfully, “[w]ithout probable cause or justification.” [DN 1 at
1–2.] In his motion for summary judgment, Ayers contends that this claim is barred both by the
Heck doctrine and the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

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i.

The Heck Doctrine

In Heck v. Humphrey, “the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could not bring a § 1983
action if a favorable judgment ‘would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence; if [so], the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated’ by executive order, reversal on direct
appeal, or writ of habeas corpus.” Harper v. Jackson, 293 F. App’x 389, 391 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)). “Specifically, we ask whether success in
a § 1983 suit would ‘negate an element of the offense.’” Id. (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 n. 6).
The Heck doctrine applies with some limitations in the Fourth Amendment context,
however. “By way of a now well-known footnote, the Heck Court observed that even if
successful, some Fourth Amendment claims brought under § 1983 ‘would not necessarily imply
that the plaintiff's conviction was unlawful’ due to doctrines like independent source, inevitable
discovery, and harmless error.” Id. (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n. 7). In 2007, the Supreme
Court stated that “a Fourth Amendment claim can necessarily imply the invalidity of a
conviction, and ... if it does it must, under Heck, be dismissed.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
395 n. 5 (2007) (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit “comports with that position, placing the
onus on the district court to assess on a case-by-case basis whether a favorable Fourth
Amendment judgment would impugn the validity of an outstanding conviction.” Harper, 293 F.
App’x at 391–92. In essence, “Heck bars § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims where the contested
search produced the only evidence supporting the conviction and no legal doctrine could save the
evidence from exclusion.” Id. at 392. However, in situations in which a conviction would not
necessarily be impugned even if the defendants succeeds on his § 1983 Fourth Amendment
claims, Heck does not bar the defendant’s suit. Id.

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Here, Ayers argues that “[i]t is beyond dispute that if the search and seizure was held to
be unconstitutional, [Jackson’s] conviction would be overturned as all of the evidence from his
criminal case would have been suppressed.” [DN 42-1 at 4.] Jackson did not respond to this
argument in his response, [see DN 43]; however, in his motion to suppress in Christian County
Circuit Court, Jackson argued that “any and all evidence resulting from the March 23, 2014 strip
search of [his person] should be suppressed.” [DN 42-5 at 8.] This would include the heroin and
the marijuana, both of which were obtained from his buttocks. Taking these arguments as true,
Heck would indeed bar Jackson’s § 1983 claims. However, if Jackson’s convictions would not
necessarily be impugned due, for example, to the inevitable discovery doctrine, then Heck would
not bar his claim. Ultimately, however, the Court need not make a final determination as to
whether Heck bars Jackson’s § 1983 claim. Rather, because the doctrine of collateral estoppel
bars his claim regardless of Heck, the Court will base its decision on those grounds.
ii.

Collateral Estoppel

Ayers argues that, even if Heck does not bar Jackson’s federal claim, the doctrine of
collateral estoppel bars Jackson’s unlawful search and seizure claim because that claim has
already been litigated in Kentucky state courts. The Sixth Circuit has indeed recognized that
“[w]here, as here, an issue was considered in a prior criminal proceeding, a plaintiff may be
estopped from relitigating that issue in a subsequent civil action.” B.R. v. McGivern, No. 164208, 2017 WL 4978681, at *6 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2017) (citing Hinchman v. Moore, 312 F.3d
198, 202 (6th Cir. 2002)). “This is because ‘a state-court judgment is given the same preclusive
effect that it would have under the law of the state in which the judgment was rendered.’” Id.
(citing Hinchman, 312 F.3d at 202 (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S.
75, 81 (1984)).

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Here, the Christian County Circuit Court denied Jackson’s motion to suppress, [DN 426], the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, [DN 42-7], and the Kentucky Supreme Court
denied discretionary review. [DN 42-8.] In the Kentucky Court of Appeals decision affirming the
Christian County Circuit Court’s denial of Jackson’s motion to suppress, the court explained
that,
[p]rior to stopping the vehicle, Trooper Ayers had received a text message from
Trooper Sean Wint with information from an informant. Trooper Ayers testified
at the suppression hearing that he received text messages with a description of the
vehicle, the vehicle license number, a picture of the rear of the vehicle and a time
window for when the vehicle would be traveling. The tip stated that Jackson and
other occupants of the vehicle were returning from Chicago after obtaining
narcotics there. Trooper Ayers also indicated that Jackson was specifically
identified as one of the occupants of the vehicle, along with two other male
subjects.
***
During Deputy Green’s search of the trunk, he made the comment that Jackson
might have narcotics between his buttocks, because another trooper, Trooper
Palmer, stated that Jackson acted very nervous when Deputy Green brought the
K9 by him. Jackson remained with Trooper Palmer at the front right tire of
Trooper Ayers' police cruiser while they were searching the vehicle.
After searching the vehicle, Trooper Ayers told Jackson that the dog had made a
positive indication of narcotics in the vehicle and that they needed to search his
person. Trooper Ayers searched Jackson's upper body, his shoes, pockets, and the
areas associated with his pockets.
Trooper Ayers asked Jackson to lower his pants, which were already halfway
down his buttocks, and Jackson complied. Trooper Ayers asked Jackson to pull
out the front of his boxers. Jackson complied and pulled his genitals to the side.
Trooper Ayers then walked around to Jackson's back and asked him to lower his
boxers. At this point, Jackson was still standing at the right front tire of Trooper
Ayers' vehicle, leaning over the hood toward the roadway. Jackson complied and
lowered his boxers to the bottom of his buttocks. As Jackson lowered his boxers,
Trooper Ayers observed Jackson place his hand underneath his buttocks like he
was trying to catch something. Trooper Ayers did not know what Jackson was
reaching for and asked him to bend over.

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At this point, Jackson clinched up, and Trooper Ayers pushed Jackson against the
hood of the car. Jackson would not place his hands behind his back. Deputy Green
observed that Jackson had begun resisting and trying to pull away from Trooper
Ayers. Deputy Green took Trooper Ayers' taser and told Jackson he was going to
dry stun him. Deputy Green told Jackson to stop resisting, but Jackson said no. At
this point Jackson was tasered.
When Trooper Ayers got Jackson on the ground, he saw the end of a sandwich
bag sticking out from between Jackson's buttocks. Trooper Ayers put on gloves
and recovered the package. Jackson was lying face down on the ground at the
right front tire of the police vehicle when Trooper Ayers recovered the baggie.
Trooper Ayers' cruiser was between the roadway and Jackson, and Trooper Ayers
testified that Jackson could not be seen from the roadway when he was lying
down. The bag that Trooper Ayers recovered contained a small amount of
marijuana and six or seven grams of heroin.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, No. 2015-CA-000411-MR, 2016 WL 833993, at *1–2 (Ky. Ct. App.
Mar. 4, 2016), review denied (Dec. 8, 2016), opinion not to be published.
According to the Court of Appeals,
In this case, the officers initially had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot. Based on the tip from the confidential informant, the officers observed
the suspected vehicle speeding on the roadway it was reported to be traveling.
Further, the occupants inside matched the descriptions given by the informant,
and Jackson was acting strangely and answering for the driver, Robinson. The
officers smelled marijuana and saw rolling papers in the front seat. They also
found residue which was suspected to be from drugs in the trunk. Finally, the K9
alerted to the portion of the car in which Jackson was located, and Jackson
behaved strangely when the K9 was close to him. This, in addition to the strange
way Jackson behaved when the officers were performing the Terry frisk, gave the
officers probable cause to search Jackson. We find no error in the trial court's
conclusion that the search was warranted under the circumstances.
Id. at *4. The Court of Appeals also found that
the scope of the particular intrusion was not overly broad. Jackson’s pants were in
fact pulled partially down, and he appeared to consent to this by pulling his
genitals aside and lowering his pants. However, when he began to act as if he
were going to catch something underneath his buttocks, he was searched further,
based on the probable cause the officers had from the K9 alerting and the drug
evidence already found in the vehicle. Jackson was not fully naked, and the scope
of the search was limited to the location where the officers suspected Jackson had
drugs hidden based upon his behaviors.

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The manner in which the search was conducted was also reasonable, given the
above circumstances and the testimony of the officers. Jackson has not made any
argument on appeal to this Court that the testimony of the officers was invalid or
not supported by the record. His only arguments have been that the trial court
improperly found that the search was warranted and was reasonable. In this case,
the search amounted to the lowering of Jackson’s boxers, which was done by
Jackson himself. The search was a visible search, and Trooper Ayers did not
manipulate any part of Jackson’s anatomy to conduct the search. There was very
minimal, if any, pain or trauma to Jackson's body. The search consisted of the
officers visibly observing the baggie sticking out from between Jackson's
buttocks. We conclude that the manner of the search was also reasonable.
As stated above, the officers had several reasons for searching Jackson’s buttocks
for drugs. As his pants were already partially down and he was behaving
strangely, the officers were justified in initiating the search based on the K9 alert
and the drug residue found in the car.
***
The record indicates that Jackson was not visible from the roadway, as he was on
the ground and a vehicle was blocking him from the sight of passersby. Jackson
does not allege that he was visible to patrons on the highway, but instead states
that he might have been observed by the two other occupants of the vehicle.
Further, Jackson argues that the strip search could have been conducted privately
at a detention center after the arrest.
We conclude that because Jackson was searched out of vision of the public and
was not able to be seen from the roadway, the place where the search was
conducted was not unreasonable under the circumstances. The search took a
couple of minutes, and Jackson already had his pants down partway and
consented to pulling them down himself. Furthermore, had the search been
performed at a detention facility, the contraband would ultimately have been
found minutes later. We cannot say that the place of the search was unreasonable.
Because the search of Jackson was supported by probable cause and was
reasonable, we affirm the Christian Circuit Court's February 13, 2015, order
denying Jackson’s motion to suppress contraband found during his arrest.
Id. at *5–6.
Under Kentucky law, “[d]efensive collateral estoppel . . . refers to a defendant’s use of a
prior adjudication to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim the plaintiff already
unsuccessfully litigated against another defendant in a prior adjudication.” In re Kennedy, 243
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B.R. 1, 9 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1997), aff'd, 249 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (citing
City of Covington v. Bd. of Trustees of Policemen’s & Firefighters’ Ret. Fund of City of
Covington, 903 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Ky. 1995), as amended (May 30, 1995), as modified on denial
of reh’g (Ky. 1995). Here, Ayers, the Defendant, seeks to prevent Jackson from reasserting his
Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim in this Court on the grounds that Jackson already
unsuccessfully litigated that claim in Kentucky state courts.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has identified five elements that must be met before
a party may assert defensive collateral estoppel: (1) at least one party to be bound
in the second case must have been a party in the first case; (2) the issue in the
second case must be the same as the issue in the first case; (3) the issue must have
been actually litigated; (4) the issue was actually decided in that action; and (5)
the decision on the issue in the prior action must have been necessary to the
court’s judgment and adverse to the party to be bound.
GATX Corp. v. Addington, 879 F. Supp. 2d 633, 660 (E.D. Ky. 2012) (citing Miller v. Admin.
Office of Courts, 361 S.W.3d 867, 872 (Ky. 2011)). As evidenced by the above excerpt from the
Kentucky Court of Appeals’ opinion, each of these elements is satisfied here. Jackson was a
party to his prior criminal case in Christian County Circuit Court, he raised the same Fourth
Amendment claim relating to the traffic stop and strip search in that case as he raises here, the
issue was actually litigated and decided by the Christian County court and the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, it was necessary to those courts’ decisions on his motion to suppress and subsequent
judgment of conviction, and it was adverse to Jackson, the party to be bound here. See id.
The United States Supreme Court has also noted with approval that numerous Courts of
Appeals have “held that collateral estoppel applies when § 1983 plaintiffs attempt to relitigate in
federal court issues decided against them in state criminal proceedings.” Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 102 (1980). The Allen Court further explained that “nothing in the language or
legislative history of § 1983 proves any congressional intent to deny binding effect to a statecourt judgment or decision when the state court, acting within its proper jurisdiction, has given
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the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate federal claims, and thereby has shown itself
willing and able to protect federal rights.” Id. at 103–04. Applying those principles here, the
Court finds that the Christian County Circuit Court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals decisions
denying Jackson relief as to the same Fourth Amendment claims he raises in this Court preclude
him from relitigating those claims here.2 Therefore, Ayers’ motion for summary judgment on
Jackson’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim is granted.
b. State Law Claim for Offensive Touching
Finally, Ayers moves for summary judgment on Jackson’s state law claim for Ayers
alleged “harmful and offensive touching of plaintiff’s person.” [DN 1 at 3; DN 42 at 7–8.] In his
complaint, Jackson contends that “[a]fter ordering plaintiff to pull down his pants and
undergarments and plaintiff having complied, defendant Ayers forcibly grabbed plaintiff’s arm
and ordered him to bend over.” [DN 1 at 3.] However, having dismissed Jackson’s federal law
claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Jackson’s remaining state
law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“[D]istrict courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim” in situations when “the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, Jackson’s state law claim for the alleged
“assault committed against his person,” [DN 1 at 3], is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, [DN 42], is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, [DN 43], is DENIED. Plaintiff’s §

2

In response to Defendants Ayers, Palmer, and Rice’s motion for summary judgment, [DN 42], Jackson filed his
own brief captioned as a “motion for summary judgment.” [DN 43.] However, therein, Jackson does not actually
argue for summary judgment. Rather, he recites the factual background of the traffic stop and strip search, requests
that “the video from the cruisers dashboard camera [be] introduced into evidence as proof of the humiliation that Mr.
Jackson had to suffer,” and requests a trial. [DN 43 at 6.] However, because the Court finds that Jackson’s claims
are subject to dismissal, Jackson’s motion, to the extent it is one, will be denied.

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1983 claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, while his state law assault claim is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court will enter a separate Order and Judgment
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
Date:
cc:

February 14, 2018

Counsel

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