Ridgeway v. Telle et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell. Because Petitioner failed to comply with a straightforward Order of this Court, the Court concludes that he has abandoned any interest in prosecuting this action. Therefore, by separate Order, the Court will dismiss this action. cc: Petitioner, pro se (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
THOMAS G. RIDGEWAY

PETITIONER

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15CV-P82-TBR

HON. LARRY JACK TELLE et al.

RESPONDENTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Thomas G. Ridgeway, a pro se prisoner at the Marshall County Detention
Center, initiated this action by filing, on his own paper, a handwritten document styled “Motion
For Order” (DN 1). By Order entered April 9, 2015 (DN 4), the Court construed the motion as a
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and directed Ridgeway to file his
petition on a court-supplied § 2241 form and to file an application to proceed without
prepayment of fees and affidavit. The Court warned Ridgeway that his failure to comply within
30 days from the entry date of the Order would result in dismissal of the action for failure to
prosecute and for failure to comply with an Order of this Court. The compliance period has
expired, and Ridgeway has failed to comply or show cause for said failure.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal
of an action if a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the court. See Jourdan
v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) recognizes the power of the
district court to enter a sua sponte order of dismissal.”). “[W]hile pro se litigants may be entitled
to some latitude when dealing with sophisticated legal issues, acknowledging their lack of formal
training, there is no cause for extending this margin to straightforward procedural requirements
that a layperson can comprehend as easily as a lawyer.” Id. “[T]he lenient treatment of pro se
litigants has limits. Where, for example, a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily
understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more generously than

a represented litigant.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Additionally,
courts have an inherent power “acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars of cases
that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief.”
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962).
Because Ridgeway failed to comply with a straightforward Order of this Court, the Court
concludes that he has abandoned any interest in prosecuting this action. Therefore, by separate
Order, the Court will dismiss this action.
Date:

May 21, 2015

cc:
Petitioner, pro se
4413.005

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