Flores v. United States Attorney General et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell. For the reasons set forth herein, on initial screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the action will be dismissed by separate Order. cc: Petitioner, pro se (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
ERIC FLORES

PETITIONER

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-CV-85-TBR

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL et al.

RESPONDENTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner, Eric Flores, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint (DN 1). This matter is
before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and McGore v. Wrigglesworth,
114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
For the reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Petitioner filed a 64-page complaint entitled “Petition to Challenge the Constitutionality
of the First Amendment.” A review of PACER reveals that Petitioner recently filed the same
complaint in many other district courts throughout the country. He names as Respondents the
U.S. Attorney General, with an address in Washington, D.C., and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, with an address in Texas. Petitioner’s address is also in Texas. None of the
allegations in the complaint appear to have anything to do with the Western District of Kentucky.
Petitioner states that he is proceeding in this matter on behalf of “a protected class of
mexican american citizens of the United States that is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.” He names seventeen “parties of interest,” some of whom are deceased.
Petitioner alleges that “executive employees of the federal government” used “advanced
technology with a direct signal to the satellite in outerspace that has the capability of calculateing
genetic code to cause the petitioner[’]s Uncle Jorge Salas severe heart pain for long durations”

and then used their official capacity to influence the county forensic laboratory to “fabercate
frivolous documents resembleing legitimate adtopysy reports” that his uncle died of natural
causes. He also alleges that the “organized group of executive employees” used the direct signal
of a satellite to cause him severe mental pain which impaired his thought process in order to
prevent him from pursuing his appellate remedies. He further alleges that the “advanced
technology with a direct signal to the satellite in outerspace that has the capability of calculateing
a genetic code” to cause suffering and to control mental states has been used on various of his
family members.
As relief, Petitioner requests that this Court determine that Petitioner’s and his family’s
right to free exercise was violated by unjustified governmental interference; determine that
Petitioner’s right to freedom of speech with regard to communication to the federal court was
interfered with; convene a federal grand jury to conduct an investigation to reveal the identity of
executive employees of the federal government who are responsible for committing mail theft
and torturing to death Jorge Salas and Vincent E. McDaniel; and issue an injunction prohibiting
the unjustified governmental interference described in the complaint.
II. ANALYSIS
This Court must review the instant action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604-05. Upon review, this Court must dismiss a case at any time if
the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may,
therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory

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or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a
petitioner has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the
complaint in a light most favorable to the petitioner and accept all of the factual allegations as
true. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A complaint, or portion
thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted “only if
it appears beyond a doubt that the [petitioner] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
that would entitle him to relief.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). While a
reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007).
First, the Court determines that Petitioner’s request for this Court to certify this action as
a class action must be denied. As a pro se litigant, Petitioner lacks the qualifications to represent
a class. See, e.g., Ziegler v. Michigan, 90 F. App’x 808, 810 (6th Cir. 2004) (“non-attorneys
proceeding pro se cannot adequately represent a class”); Giorgio v. Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
No. 95-6327, 1996 WL 447656, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 1996) (“Because a layman does not
ordinarily possess the legal training and expertise necessary to protect the interests of a proposed
class, courts are reluctant to certify a class represented by a pro se litigant.”); see also Oxendine
v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
Second, the Court finds that the instant action must be dismissed as frivolous. An action
has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or “rise to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992); see also
Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1199 (6th Cir. 1990). The Court need not accept as true

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factual allegations that are “‘fantastic or delusional’” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328). Here,
Petitioner’s claims “contain[] no legal theory upon which a valid federal claim may rest” and, to
the extent they may be deciphered, are “delusional”; dismissal is appropriate. Abner v. SBC
(Ameritech), 86 F. App’x 958, 958-59 (6th Cir. 2004).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will, by separate Order, dismiss the instant action.
Date:

April 30, 2015

cc:
Flores, pro se
4413.009

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