Henson v. Blankenship et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Greg N. Stivers. The Court construes Plaintiff's Notice (DN 2) as a motion to amend the complaint and GRANTS the motion. The action will be dismissed upon initial screening for the reasons stated. cc:Plaintiff, pro se; Defendants (ERH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15CV-P101-GNS
NATHAN LEE HENSON

PLAINTIFF

v.
MARK BLANKENSHIP et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Nathan Lee Henson filed this pro se action proceeding in forma pauperis. This
matter is now before the Court on initial review of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other
grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
On the same day that Plaintiff filed his original complaint, he filed a document which he
captioned as a “Notice of Intent Habeas Corpus” (DN 2). Because the filing alleges additional
facts, the Court construes the filing as a motion to amend the complaint and GRANTS the
motion (DN 2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). Plaintiff also filed an amended complaint
(DN 5). The Court will review the complaint and both amendments in conducting initial
screening pursuant to § 1915A. For the reasons that follow, the instant action will be dismissed.
I.
Plaintiff states that he is a convicted inmate at the Calloway County Jail. He sues Mark
Blankenship, the Commonwealth’s Attorney for Calloway and Marshall Counties; James
Burking, his public defender; and Matt Hilbrecht, a detective with the Marshall County Sherriff’s
Office. He sues each Defendant in his individual and official capacity.
Plaintiff states that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by obtaining a defective
search warrant against him. He states that the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant was

based on hearsay. He states, “Clearly your honors will see upon Review that the Search Warrant
was and is invalid on face which clearly violates Mr. Hensons Sixth and Thirteenth United States
Constitution Amendment Right to Due Process of Law.” He states that Defendant Hilbrecht also
violated his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure. Plaintiff further
maintains that Defendant Blankenship allowed evidence to be used against him that Blankenship
knew or should have known was obtained illegally. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Burking
violated his constitutional rights in acting as his public defender by allowing the “search warrant
to stand, unchallenged even though it was obtained by heresay statements of a third party.” He
states that Defendant Burking further violated his rights when he “advised Mr. Henson to enter a
plea of guilty although he knew or should have known that evidence was obtained illegally and a
motion to suppress and dismiss should have been filed.”
Plaintiff also states that on April 13, 2015, he “entered several pleas of guilty.” He states
that he was never arraigned, that he received no preliminary hearing, and that there was no case
number for the case in which he pleaded guilty.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and costs, and he requests
his state-court charges be dismissed.
II.
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604.
When determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the

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court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the
factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)).
III.
Plaintiff states that he pleaded guilty to the state-court charges and states that he is a
convicted inmate. His claims are, therefore, barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484
(1994), wherein the Supreme Court recognized that a plaintiff may not mount a constitutional
challenge to his conviction or sentence if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render the
conviction or sentence invalid, until and unless the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by Executive Order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Moreover, “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) – no
matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit

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(state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) – if success in that action
would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
Plaintiff has not alleged that his conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.
In fact, the complaint and amendments make clear that he pleaded guilty to the charges and is
currently incarcerated under the conviction he is challenging. Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983
action must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Furthermore, “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his
physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate
release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas
corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Barnes v. Lewis, No. 93-5698,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32652, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 1993) (concluding that dismissal is
appropriate where § 1983 action seeks equitable relief and challenges the fact or duration of
confinement). Because Plaintiff cannot seek release through this § 1983 action, his claims for
habeas corpus relief will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. If Plaintiff believes that his guilty plea and conviction were unconstitutional, he must
pursue his claims through the state trial and appellate courts. A federal court may not grant
habeas corpus relief unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies or
demonstrated their inadequacies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 603
(6th Cir. 2002) (“Habeas corpus relief is available only if the applicant first exhausts remedies
available in state court.”).

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IV.
The Court will enter an Order dismissing the action consistent with this Memorandum
Opinion.
Date:

May 19, 2015

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4416.010
cc:

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