Cox v. Fulton County Detention Center Staff

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell. On initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court dismisses all claims but allows Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint within 30 days from the entry date of this Order. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send a § 1983 complaint form to Plaintiff. Plaintiff is WARNED that his failure to file an amended complaint within 30 days will result in dismissal of the entire action with prejudice for the reasons stated herein. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendants; Fulton Co. Atty. (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
RANCE LEON COX
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15CV-P111-TBR

FULTON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER STAFF et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff Rance Leon Cox’s pro se
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss all
claims but allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff is a convicted inmate incarcerated in the Fulton County Detention Center
(FCDC). He brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against FCDC “Staff”; Fulton
County Jailer Ricky Parnell; FCDC physician Dr. Charles Paulius; and FCDC Captain Thomas
Daniels. He sues Defendants Parnell, Dr. Paulius, and Daniels in their individual and official
capacities but does not indicate the capacity in which he sues “Staff.”
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a handwritten letter alleging that he is being
refused access to a mental health doctor and medication; that he and others are separated from
the general population “because we are diabetic”; and that he has asked to be placed into
protective custody “because I fear for my life but no one does any thing about that either.”
In response to a Court Order, Plaintiff filed his complaint on a § 1983 form. Therein, he
asserts four claims. First, he again claims that he is being denied access to a mental health doctor
and reports that he draws “SSI for Mental Problems.” He alleges that he has been trying to get
an appointment for nearly six months without success. Second, Plaintiff states, “Need my COPD

Neubilizer and inhalers two hospitals say I have COPD But this place say’s I Don’t! Refuse to
give me my inhalers and Breathing treatment!” Third, Plaintiff states, “I am a Diabetic and this
place has cut my food to 1800 cals a Day, But still feed me white Bread, white Rice, potatoes
etc., that a Diabetic Aren’t supposed to Eat!” Plaintiff “believe[s] all three of these complaints
are Cruel And Unusal” and also constitute discrimination.
Finally, Plaintiff claims that he asked to be placed in protective custody but that “They
have no PC! I’ve Been in the hole since 12th of June when they learnt of this lawsuit!”
As relief, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
§ 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a
claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

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Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A]
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Official-Capacity Claims
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [] another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166
(1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)).
Thus, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants are actually against Fulton County.
See Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2008).
When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two distinct
issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so,
whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992).
As to the second issue, “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor -- or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282,
286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). “[T]he

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touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of
employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action
for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)) (emphasis in
original). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy
or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was
incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
To the extent that Fulton County may have a policy of separating diabetic inmates from
the general population, Plaintiff fails to state a constitutional claim. He fails to allege any harm
or injury or any denial of treatment as a result of being separated and thus fails to state an Eighth
Amendment claim. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976). Plaintiff also fails to
state a Fourteenth Amendment claim because the law is clear that a prisoner has no constitutional
right to be incarcerated in a particular institution or a particular part of an institution. See
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1986);
Dancy v. George, Civil Action No. 07-CV-97-GFVT, 2007 WL 2251926, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Aug.
2, 2007) (“Well-settled law establishes that prisoners have no inherent constitutional right to
placement in any particular prison; transfers to any particular prison; any particular security
classification; or housing assignment.”). Further, Plaintiff fails to show that his placement away
from the general population “imposes atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

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None of Plaintiff’s remaining claims in the complaint allege that any wrongdoing or
injury occurred as a result of a policy or custom implemented or endorsed by Fulton County.
Accordingly, the complaint fails to establish a basis of liability against the municipality and fails
to state a cognizable § 1983 claim. Therefore, the official-capacity claims against all Defendants
will be dismissed.
B. Individual-Capacity Claims
Plaintiff also sues Defendants Jailer Parnell, Dr. Paulius, and Capt. Daniels in their
individual capacity. While the Court has a duty to construe pro se complaints liberally, Plaintiff
is not absolved of his duty to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by providing
Defendants with “fair notice of the basis for [his] claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 514 (2002). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a pleading to contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” To state a
claim for relief, Plaintiff must show how each Defendant is accountable because the Defendant
was personally involved in the acts about which he complains. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362, 375-76 (1976).
Plaintiff fails to state in the complaint the grounds for seeking relief against Defendants
Jailer Parnell, Dr. Paulius, and Capt. Daniels. In fact, other than listing Jailer Parnell, Dr.
Paulius, and Capt. Daniels as Defendants, Plaintiff fails to mention them elsewhere in the
complaint. Because Plaintiff fails to set forth any specific facts with respect to the named
Defendants, the individual-capacity claims must be dismissed against them for failure to meet the
pleading standards of Rule 8(a). Moreover, even if Plaintiff sued Defendant FCDC “Staff” in

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his/their individual capacity, those claims would be dismissed under Rule 8(a) as well because he
fails to state any facts involving “Staff.”
Despite Plaintiff’s failure to meet Rule 8(a) standards, however, the Court will give him
an opportunity to file an amended complaint to state specific allegations against each individual
Defendant named in the complaint and to state specific allegations against any other individuals
who were involved in the claims alleged in the complaint. See LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d
944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[U]nder Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his
complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA.”).
IV. ORDER
For the reasons set forth herein, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED that the official-capacity claims against all Defendants are
DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that that individual-capacity claims against all
Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to meet the pleading requirements of
Rule 8(a).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 30 days from the entry date of this
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint to state specific
allegations against each individual Defendant named in the complaint and to state specific
allegations against any other individuals who were involved in the claims alleged in the
complaint. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to place the case number and word “Amended”

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on a § 1983 complaint form and send it to Plaintiff for his use should he wish to amend the
complaint.
Plaintiff is WARNED that his failure to file an amended complaint within 30 days
will result in dismissal of the entire action with prejudice for the reasons stated herein.
Date:

February 1, 2016

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Fulton County Attorney
4413.005

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