Brown v. Harmon

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell. Upon initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court will dismiss the action by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendant; Hickman County Attorney (ERH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15CV-P128-TBR
ADRIAN DARYL BROWN

PLAINTIFF

v.
DEANDRE HARMON

DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Adrian Daryl Brown filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding
in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court on the initial review of the action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Upon initial review, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will dismiss
the action.
I. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff currently is incarcerated at the Fulton County Detention Center. His complaint
arises out of his previous incarceration as a convicted inmate at the Hickman County Detention
Center (HCDC). He sues Deandre Harmon, whom he identifies as a deputy jailer at HCDC, in
his official capacity only.
Plaintiff states that on April 8, 2015, he had “an issue about my laundry” and tried to get
the attention of the person in the control room. He reports that he kicked the door to try to get
the guards’ attention. He states that Defendant showed up with another non-Defendant deputy
and Plaintiff told them about his issue. According to the complaint, the deputies told him that
“what was taken was contraband and it didn’t matter, I asked if they placed it in my property and
they said no, they asked if this was going to continue to be a problem and I said yes because it
was still my property.” Plaintiff maintains that the deputies asked him to step out of his cell
several times and that he refused. He states that Defendant pulled out his pepper spray and tried

to spray him “so I moved out of the way and jumped up off of my bed, he rushed at me and tried
to restrain me and I continued to resist.” He states, “We ended up between the bed and the toilet
with my back against the wall and the other deputy Danny Cobb pulled out his spray and sprayed
me in the face at this point I stopped resisting . . . .” He asserts that Defendant “placed him in
handcuffs, he then took me out of the cell and into the dayroom and placed me against the first
door leading out of the entire dorm.” Plaintiff states, “As he placed me against the door . . . he
took his right hand and pushed hard against the back of my head and made my face smack
against the glass of the door.” As relief, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages only.
II. STANDARD
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604
(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). When
determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court
must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual
allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

2

alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)).
III. ANALYSIS
The Court construes the complaint as alleging a claim of excessive force in violation of
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause against Defendant. However,
Plaintiff sues Defendant in his official capacity only. “Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally
represent [] another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Suing employees in their official capacities is the
equivalent of suing their employer, in this case Hickman County. See Lambert v. Hartman, 517
F.3d 433, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2008); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994);
Smallwood v. Jefferson Cnty. Gov’t, 743 F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two distinct
issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so,
whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The Court will first address the second issue, i.e., whether the
municipality is responsible for the alleged constitutional violation. A municipality cannot be
held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a
municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694;

3

Deaton v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). Simply stated, “a
plaintiff must ‘identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself and show that the
particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.’” Garner v. Memphis
Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170,
176 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Frantz v. Vill. of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th
Cir. 2001)). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in
order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38
F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation
omitted)).
Upon review of the complaint, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant acted pursuant to a
municipal policy or custom with respect to the alleged incident. Plaintiff’s complaint appears to
allege an isolated event affecting only him. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 348 (6th
Cir. 1999) (“No evidence indicates that this was anything more than a one-time, isolated event
for which the county is not responsible.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim of
excessive force against Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against Defendant in his official
capacity must be dismissed because “a municipality is immune from punitive damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.” City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981); see also
Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he district court found the municipalities immune to punitive damages claims and properly
granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages against Defendants

4

Springboro and Clearcreek on that basis.”). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages
from Defendant in his official capacity.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff had sued Defendant in his individual capacity, the claim
would still be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. The complaint essentially alleges
two incidents of force by Defendant. The first incident occurred after Defendant refused to step
out of his cell after being ordered to do so several times and Defendant took out his pepper spray.
Plaintiff states as follows:
so I moved out of the way and jumped up off of my bed, he rushed at me and tried
to restrain me and I continued to resist. We ended up between the bed and the
toilet with my back against the wall and the other deputy Danny Cobb pulled out
his spray and sprayed me in the face at this point I stopped resisting.
Plaintiff describes the second alleged use of force by Defendant as follows: “As [Defendant]
placed me against the door . . . he took his right hand and pushed hard against the back of my
head and made my face smack against the glass of the door.”
“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). “When prison officials maliciously
and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are
violated.” Id. at 9. Of course, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a
federal cause of action,” id., and “de minimis uses of physical force” do not support a
constitutional claim “provided that the use of force is not a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.’” Id. at 10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). Furthermore, “[p]rison
administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of

5

policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and
to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
In evaluating an excessive-force claim, the Court should consider the extent of injury
suffered by an inmate in determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, although
“[t]he absence of serious injury . . . does not end [the inquiry].” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 7.
Other relevant factors in evaluating an excessive-force claim include “the need for application of
force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably
perceived by the responsible officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response.’” Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. at 321).

Plaintiff states repeatedly that he refused the commands made by the deputy jailers. With
regard to the first alleged use of force by Defendant, it is evident on the face of the complaint
that Plaintiff was resisting and that the force was used to gain control of Plaintiff and not used
“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id. at 6-7. With regard to the second alleged use
of force, Plaintiff alleges no injury. Because of Plaintiff’s repeated refusals to comply with the
deputy jailers and the lack of any injury alleged on the face of complaint, the Court concludes
that the second alleged use of force was a de minimis use of force that does not give rise to a
constitutional claim. See id. at 10; Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010) (“An inmate who
complains of a ‘push or shove’ that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a
valid excessive force claim.”) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). Therefore, had Plaintiff sued
Defendant in his individual capacity, the claim would have been dismissed for failure to state a
claim.

6

The Court will enter a separate Order of dismissal for the reasons stated herein.
Date:

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendant
Hickman County Attorney
4413.010

7
October 22, 2015