Stokley v. Christian Co. Jail et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION granting 26 Motion for Summary Judgment; signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 1/11/17 cc: Counsel, Plaintiff (pro se)(DJT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-CV-00130-TBR
JOHN STOKLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.
CHRISTIAN COUNTY JAIL, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
John Stokley, a state inmate proceeding pro se, filed this action against the
Christian County Jail, Jailer Brad Boyd, Chief Deputy Jailer Steve Howard, and Deputy
Jailer Chris Zander, as well as Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc., Supervising
Physician Charles Paulius, and Supervising Nurse Jane Doe.

He brings an Eighth

Amendment claim for inadequate medical care in addition to common-law claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and medical negligence.

With discovery

closed, the jailers and medical staff move for summary judgment. Because there are no
genuine disputes of material fact, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.
Accordingly, the Jailers’ Motion for Summary Judgment, [R. 25], along with the Medical
Staff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, [R. 26], are GRANTED.
I.
A.
During the period of time relevant to this action, John Stokley, a state inmate, was
incarcerated at the Christian County Jail in Christian County, Kentucky. [R. 1-1 at 10, ¶¶
3–4 (Complaint).] On the evening of May 6, 2014, Deputy Jailer Chris Zander gave John
Stokley a 75mg dose of Effexor, which had been prescribed for a different inmate, in
error. [See R. 26-3 at 1 (Medication Error Form).] Sometime after Deputy Jailer Zander
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noticed that mistake, he returned to Stokley’s cell and gave him a 200mg dose of
Wellbutrin as the doctor had, in fact, ordered. [R. 1-1 at 12, ¶ 12.] Later on that evening,
Stokley says, he became “extremely dizzy and disoriented,” symptoms he attributes to the
medication mishap. [See R. 26-3 at 1; R. 26-4 at 1 (Sick Call Request Form).] He fell
that night and struck the left side of his jaw on a shelf adjacent to his bed. [See R. 26-4 at
1.]
Six days after the medication error occurred, Stokley complained of jaw pain, [see
id.], and Supervising Nurse Lindsay Harper of Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc.
examined him,1 [see R. 26-5 at 1 (Medical Progress Note); R. 26-12 at 4, ¶ 15 (Jane
Doe’s Responses to First Set of Interrogatories).] Nurse Harper noticed bruising and
swelling on Stokley’s jawline and notified Dr. Charles Paulius. [See R. 26-5 at 1.] Dr.
Paulius, in turn, ordered an x-ray of Stokley’s jaw, which Dr. Dan Wunder performed
that same day. [R. 26-6 at 1 (First X-Ray).] The x-ray indicated nothing out of the
ordinary. [Id.]
After Stokley continued to complain of jaw pain, jail medical staff prescribed him
a 500mg dose of Tylenol twice daily for five days. [See R. 26-7 at 1 (Sick Call Request
Form).] Stokley refused to take that medication, however, on at least two occasions.
[See R. 26-8 at 1 (Refusal of Treatment Form); R. 26-9 at 1 (Refusal of Treatment
Form).] He requested to see Dr. Paulius on May 22. [R. 26-9 at 1 (Sick Call Request
Form).] Dr. Paulius examined Stokley on May 27 and not only prescribed Stokley a
800mg dose of Motrin twice daily for ten days, but also ordered a second x-ray of
Stokley’s jawline. [R. 26-10 at 1 (Medical Progress Note).] Again, the x-ray indicated
1

The Christian County Fiscal Court has contracted with Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc.
to provide medical care to inmates at the Christian County Jail.

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nothing out of the ordinary. [R. 26-11 at 1 (Second X-Ray).] Roughly two weeks later,
Stokley was transferred to a different facility. [R. 1-1 at 17, ¶ 25.]
B.
Stokley filed this action in Christian Circuit Court against the Christian County
Jail,2 Jailer Brad Boyd, Chief Deputy Jailer Steve Howard, and Deputy Jailer Zander,
along with Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc., Dr. Paulius, and Supervising Nurse
Jane Doe3 on May 11, 2015, [see id. at 9–12, ¶¶ 2, 5–11], bringing an Eighth Amendment
claim for inadequate medical care, as well as common-law claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and medical negligence, [id. at 19–21, ¶¶ 31–41.]
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), the jailers and medical staff removed that action, [see R.
1 at 1–4, ¶¶ 1–6 (Notice of Removal)], and the Court subsequently denied Stokley’s
motion to remand, [see R. 11 at 5 (Memorandum Opinion)]. With discovery now closed,
the jailers and medical staff move for summary judgment. [See R. 25 at 1 (Jailers’
Motion for Summary Judgment); R. 26 at 1 (Medical Staff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment).] Stokley opposes those motions.4 [See R. 30 at 4–12 (Response).]

2

The Christian County Jail is not a legal entity. Instead, it is a facility owned and operated by
Christian County, Kentucky.
3

During discovery, Jane Doe was identified as Supervising Nurse Lindsay Harper, but John
Stokley never moved to amend his complaint to reflect that fact.
4

Before discussing the merits of the motions for summary judgment, the Court must first address
a few procedural issues. In the main, Stokley has filed two self-titled “responses” to the outstanding
motions for summary judgment. Upon closer examination, the first of these is, in fact, a motion for an
extension of time to file a responsive brief. [See R. 27 at 1 (Motion for Extension of Time).] Construing it
as such, the Court will GRANT that request. Stokley’s response is, therefore, timely. [See R. 30
(Response to Motions for Summary Judgment)], and the motions to strike that response, [see R. 31 (Jailers’
Motion to Strike); R. 32 (Medical Staff’s Motion to Strike)], are DENIED.
To the extent that Stokley seeks a further extension, [see, e.g., R. 30 at 4], however, such relief is
unwarranted. On two prior occasions, this Court afforded Stokley additional time to complete discovery.
[See R. 19 at 1–2 (Order of October 12, 2015); R. 24 at 1–2 (Order of February 1, 2016).] Stokley was
warned that no more extensions would be forthcoming. Consequently, Stokley’s informal request for
additional time to further respond to the outstanding motions for summary judgment is DENIED. 

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II.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists where “there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court “may not make credibility
determinations nor weigh the evidence when determining whether an issue of fact
remains for trial.” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing
Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001); Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d
365, 369 (6th Cir. 1999)). “The ultimate question is ‘whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Back v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 694 F.3d 571, 575
(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52).
As the parties moving for summary judgment, the jailers and medical staff must
shoulder the burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to at
least one essential element of Stokley’s claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Laster,
746 F.3d at 726 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). Assuming
the jailers and medical staff satisfy their burden of production, Stokley “must—by
deposition, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file—show specific
facts that reveal a genuine issue for trial.” Laster, 746 F.3d at 726 (citing Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 324).

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III.
The jailers and medical staff move for summary judgment on Stokley’s Eighth
Amendment claim for inadequate medical treatment, as well as his common-law claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and medical negligence. [See R. 25-1 at 3–
8 (Jailers’ Memorandum in Support); R. 26-2 at 3–10 (Medical Staff’s Memorandum in
Support).] The Court will address the substance of each claim in turn. Ultimately, none
merit relief, and judgment for the jailers and medical staff is appropriate as a matter of
law.
A.
“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of ‘cruel and unusual
punishments’ upon prisoners.” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014)
(quoting U.S. Const. amend. VIII).

In order to establish liability under the Eighth

Amendment for a claim based on a failure to provide adequate medical care, an inmate
must demonstrate that correctional officers acted, or failed to act, with “deliberate
indifference” to the inmate’s serious medical needs. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390
F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004). The concept of “deliberate indifference” encompasses
both an objective and a subjective component. To satisfy the objective component, an
inmate must show “the existence of a ‘sufficiently serious’ medical need.” Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). The subjective component requires an inmate to “allege facts
which, if true, would show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from
which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and
that he then disregarded that risk.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.

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2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The latter requirement is “meant to prevent the
constitutionalization of medical malpractice claims,” and so an inmate must “show more
than negligence or misdiagnosis of an ailment” before liability attaches. Id. (citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Analyzing Stokley’s claim against Deputy Jailer Zander for dispensing the wrong
medication, [see R. 1-1 at 19, ¶¶ 33–34], under that framework, it fails as a matter of law.
As discussed above, the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is “meant
to prevent the constitutionalization of medical malpractice claims.” Comstock, 273 F.3d
at 703 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). In this case, the record
contains no evidence to suggest that Deputy Jailer Zander’s incorrect administration of
Effexor was anything other than negligent. “It thus constituted medical malpractice at
most and cannot constitute an Eighth-Amendment violation.” Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F.
App’x 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Dominguez, 555 F.3d at 550). Summary judgment
on that claim is, therefore, warranted. See Dumas v. Ducatt, No. 12-15262, 2013 WL
1340698, at *2–4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2013).
Stokley’s claim against Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc., Dr. Paulius, and
Nurse Doe for providing inadequate medical treatment after his fall, [see R. 1-1 at 20–21,
¶¶ 36–39, 41], fares no better. Even assuming Stokley’s jaw injury rises to the level of an
“objectively serious medical need,” the record does not indicate that any of the jail’s
medical professionals acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind for liability to
attach. It is undisputed that Stokley was seen by Nurse Harper on the same day he
complained of experiencing jaw pain. [See R. 26-4 at 1; R. 26-5 at 1.] Over the course
of the next fifteen days, Dr. Paulius examined Stokley, prescribed him two regimens of

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pain medicine, and ordered two x-rays of his jawline. [See R. 26-6 at 1; R. 26-7 at 1; R.
26-10 at 1; R. 26-11 at 1.] Stokley’s “disagreement with and dispute over the diagnosis
and treatment he received” is insufficient to show “deliberate indifference” on the part of
Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc., Dr. Paulius, or Nurse Doe. Brock v. Crall, 8 F.
App’x 439, 440 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir.
1976)). Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Advanced Correctional Healthcare,
Inc., Dr. Paulius, and Nurse Doe as to Stokley’s Eighth Amendment claim is appropriate
too.
B.
Next, Stokley’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known
as outrage, [see R. 1-1 at 20, ¶ 40], falls short of the mark. In order to establish a
common-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
[1] the wrongdoer’s conduct must be intentional or reckless; [2] the
conduct must be outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against the
generally accepted standards of decency and morality; [3] there must be a
causal connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the emotional
distress; and [4] the emotional distress must be severe.
Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 788 (Ky. 2004), abrogated on other
grounds by Toler v. Sud-Chemie, Inc., 458 S.W.3d 276 (Ky. 2014), as corrected (Ky.
Apr. 7, 2015), and reh’g denied (Ky. May 14, 2015); see also Childers v. Geile, 367
S.W.3d 576, 579 (Ky. 2012). The Court must decide, as to the second element, “whether
the conduct complained of can reasonably be regarded to be so extreme and outrageous
as to permit recovery” unless reasonable minds could differ on the subject. Keaton v.
G.C. Williams Funeral Home, Inc., 436 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting
Goebel v. Arnett, 259 S.W.3d 489, 493 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007)). The bar is set high, for,
under Kentucky law, “a claim for the tort of outrage requires the plaintiff to prove
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conduct which is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
a civilized community.” Hume v. Quickway Transp., Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00078-JHM,
2016 WL 3349334, at *9 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2016) (quoting Futrell v. Douglas Autotech
Corp., No. 5:09-CV-21, 2010 WL 1417779, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 2, 2010)); see also
Mineer v. Williams, 82 F. Supp. 2d 702, 706 (E.D. Ky. 2000) (“The standards for this tort
are strict.”).
Even when viewed in the light most favorable to him, Stokley has identified no
“outrageous and intolerable” conduct approaching that threshold. He merely alleges that
the actions of the jailers and medical staff “caused [him] emotional distress.” [R. 1-1 at
20, ¶ 40.] A bare allegation of that sort falls far short of anything rising to the level of
extreme and outrageous conduct as Kentucky defines that concept. See Stringer, 151
S.W.3d at 789–91 (listing examples of actionable and nonactionable conduct);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmts. d to f (Am. Law Inst. 1977) (same). Therefore,
Stokley’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails as a matter of law.
C.
Last but not least, Stokley’s assorted negligence claims are unavailing too. To
state a claim for negligence, Kentucky law requires “proof of (1) a duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) injury to the plaintiff, and (4) legal
causation between the defendant’s breach and the plaintiff’s injury.” Wright v. House of
Imports, Inc., 381 S.W.3d 209, 213 (Ky. 2012) (citing Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113
S.W.3d 85, 88–89 (Ky. 2003)). In a medical negligence case, such as this one, “proof of

8

causation requires the testimony of an expert witness.”5 Baylis v. Lourdes Hosp., Inc.,
805 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ky. 1991). In the absence of expert testimony on that element,
“summary judgment is proper.” Andrew v. Begley, 203 S.W.3d 165, 170 (Ky. Ct. App.
2006) (citing Turner v. Reynolds, 559 S.W.2d 740, 741–42 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977)).
Here, Stokley’s various negligence claims are of the kind discussed above. For
example, Stokley alleges that Deputy Jailer Zander negligently dispensed the wrong
medication to him, ultimately causing his jaw injury. [See R. 1-1 at 19, ¶¶ 32–34.]
However, Stokley has come forward with no competent expert medical proof to establish
causation between the alleged breach (administration of the incorrect medicine) and
claimed damages (the injury to his jaw). The same holds true for Stokley’s other theories
of negligence. [See id. at 19–20, ¶¶ 33–34, 36.] Consequently, summary judgment as to
Stokley’s final claim is warranted as well. See Romines v. Walkup, No. 1:08-CV-179,
2010 WL 411475, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 29, 2010).
IV.
John Stokley’s Motion for Extension of Time, [R. 27], is GRANTED; the
Christian County Jail, Jailer Brad Boyd, Chief Deputy Jailer Steve Howard, and Deputy
Jailer Chris Zander’s Motion to Strike, [R. 31], and Advanced Correctional Healthcare,
Inc., Supervising Physician Charles Paulius, and Supervising Nurse Jane Doe’s Motion to
Strike, [R. 32], are DENIED; and the Christian County Jail, Jailer Brad Boyd, Chief
5

To that general principle, Kentucky law recognizes two exceptions. First, expert medical
testimony is not required if the circumstances are such that “any layman is competent to pass judgment and
conclude from common experience that such things do not happen if there has been prior skill and care,”
such as when a “surgeon leaves a foreign object in the body.” Andrew v. Begley, 203 S.W.3d 165, 170 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Ky. 1992)). Second, a plaintiff need
not come forward with his own expert when an otherwise qualified witness lays “a sufficient foundation for
res ipsa loquitur on more complex matters,” such as, for example, where a doctor “makes admissions of a
technical character from which one could infer” negligence. Id. at 170–71 (quoting Perkins, 828 S.W.2d at
655). The facts of this case, however, fit neither exception.

9

Deputy Jailer Steve Howard, and Deputy Jailer Chris Zander’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, [R. 25], and Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc., Supervising Physician
Charles Paulius, and Supervising Nurse Jane Doe’s Motion for Summary Judgment, [R.
26], are GRANTED.
A separate order and judgment shall issue.
Date:
cc:

January 11, 2017

Counsel of Record
Plaintiff, pro se

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