Melton v. Troutman

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell. On initial review of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will dismiss the action by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendant (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15CV-P138-TBR

CHRISTOPHER DALE MELTON

PLAINTIFF

v.
ANGELA TROUTMAN

DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Christopher Dale Melton filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on his
own paper. The Clerk of Court issued a notice of deficiency directing Plaintiff to re-file his
complaint on this Court’s approved § 1983 form. In response, Plaintiff re-filed his complaint on
the approved form. This matter is now before the Court on initial review of the action pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Upon review, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will dismiss the
action.
I. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee at the Ballard County Jail. He sues Angela Troutman in
her individual and official capacities. He identifies Defendant as an Assistant Public Defender in
the Ballard and Carlisle County Courts. He states that Defendant violated his “constitutional
rights to effective assistance of counsel and due process of law.” Plaintiff maintains that
Defendant represented him at a Carlisle County Circuit Court pre-trial conference. He states that
Defendant represented to that court that she had not received Plaintiff’s discovery in his criminal
case when she had in fact received it. He states that he “had an absolute right to this hearing and
did not have it due to Ms. Troutman’s false representation to the Court.” As relief, Plaintiff

seeks compensatory and punitive damages and requests the Court to “forever dismiss and vacate
all criminal matters filed, pending or under investigation.”
II. STANDARD
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604
(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). When
determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court
must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual
allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)).

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Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’
with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a
claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975).
To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a
pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to
the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful
strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, under color of state law,
causes the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. A
claim under § 1983 must therefore allege two elements: (1) the deprivation of federal statutory
or constitutional rights by (2) a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Absent either
element, no § 1983 claim exists. Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983. Public defenders are not liable to suit under
§ 1983 because public defenders do not act under color of state law when representing indigent
clients in criminal proceedings. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“[A] public
defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions
as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against
Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

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In addition, as to Plaintiff’s request that the Court “dismiss and vacate” all criminal
matters pending against him, this Court has no authority to interfere in state-court criminal
proceedings, except in very limited circumstances not present in the instant case. See Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 743 (6th Cir. 1996).
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed by separate Order.
Date:

October 22, 2015

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendant
4413.010

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