Chandler v. Hawkins et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 4/6/2017; re 14 MOTION to Dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies filed by Hawkins, Tim Lane, Shea Holliman, William Thomas, Randy White, Ford, Kembal. Separate order and judgment shall enter.cc:counsel, plaintiff pro se (KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:16-CV-00079-TBR
HAROLD C. CHANDLER

PLAINTIFF

v.
LT. HAWKINS, et al.

DEFENDANTS
Memorandum Opinion and Order

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff
Harold Chandler’s pro se complaint.

[DN 14.]

The Court ordered Chandler to

respond to Defendants’ motion by February 13, 2017.

[DN 17.]

He did not.

Defendants’ motion is therefore ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, the
Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff Harold Chandler is an inmate who was once housed at the Kentucky
State Penitentiary (KSP) in Eddyville, Kentucky.

Accepting Chandler’s well-

pleaded factual allegations as true, on September 10, 2015, inmates on Chandler’s
walk began using their toilets to flood their cells. [DN 1 at 6.] Chandler denies that
he was one of the inmates responsible for the flooding.

[Id.]

KSP officials

responded to the situation, and Lieutenant Hawkins ordered that all inmates on the
walk have their property confiscated. [Id.] After KSP shut off the water in the
offending cells, Chandler and his fellow inmates were stripped naked and put back
in their cells. [Id. at 7.]

Throughout the next few hours, Chandler repeatedly asked prison officials to
flush the still-soiled toilets, but they refused. [Id. at 7-11.] Chandler’s complaint is
unclear regarding when the water was turned back on, but for at least some amount
of time, Chandler was without drinking water and a functioning toilet.

[Id.]

Chandler was also unable to wash his hands before meals, even though he had been
in contact with contaminated water. [Id.] Additionally, the temperature dropped
during the nights immediately following the flooding incident, causing Chandler to
be cold and sick. [Id. at 8-9.] Chandler’s property and clothes were returned on
September 14, four days after the flooding. [Id. at 11.] He was not permitted to
clean his cell until September 23. [Id.]
Chandler filed the instant suit. He alleges that Defendants, various prison
officials, violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment by turning off the water to his cell, forcing him to sleep naked in cold
weather, requiring him to remain in unsanitary conditions, and by depriving him of
exercise and proper nutrition.1 [Id. at 12.] His complaint names Defendants in only
their individual capacities. [Id. at 2-3.]
II. Standard of Review
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

In order to survive a

motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), a party must “plead enough factual
matter to raise a ‘plausible’ inference of wrongdoing.” 16630 Southfield Ltd. P’ship
Particularly, Chandler named as defendants Lieutenant Hawkins, Lieutenant Kembal, Senior
Captain William Thomas, Unit Administrator William Thomas, Unit Administrator Shea Holliman,
Deputy Warden Ford, and Warden Randy White. [DN 1 at 2-3.]
1

2

v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

A claim becomes plausible “when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

Should the well-pleaded

facts support no “more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” then dismissal is
warranted. Id. at 679. The Court may grant a motion to dismiss “only if, after
drawing all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the complaint in favor of
the plaintiff, the complaint still fails to allege a plausible theory of relief.”

Garceau

v. City of Flint, 572 F. App’x 369, 371 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 67779).
III. Discussion
Defendants claim that Chandler’s claims are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The PLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust all
available administrative remedies before filing any action “with respect to prison
conditions” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
That exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether
they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002);
accord Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999).

Exhaustion is

mandatory and the remedies provided “need not meet federal standards, nor must
they be ‘plain, speedy, or effective.’”

Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (quoting Booth v.

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Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with
[the prison's] deadlines and other critical procedural rules,” Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 90 (2006), and so “it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that
define the boundaries of proper exhaustion,” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218
(2007); accord Lee v. Wiley, 789 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 2015).
Here, Defendants are entitled to dismissal of Chandler’s suit because they
have shown that he failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him
at KSP. Chandler, a “prisoner” as defined by the PLRA, was required to exhaust
his Eighth Amendment claims using KSP’s grievance procedures before bringing
this suit. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(a), (h); Richmond v. Settles, 450 F. App’x 448, 456-57
(6th Cir. 2011) (prisoner’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim could
have properly been dismissed because he failed to exhaust administrative
remedies).

Of course, an inmate cannot be required to exhaust administrative

remedies regarding non-grievable issues. See Ross v. Blake, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct.
1850, 1858-62 (2016); Owens v. Keeling, 461 F.3d 763, 769 (6th Cir. 2006); Figel v.
Bouchard, 89 F. App’x 970, 971 (6th Cir. 2004). But pursuant to KSP’s Inmate
Grievance Procedure (IGP) Chandler’s complaints regarding prison conditions and
officials are indeed grievable. [DN 14-2 at 2.]2

On a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider the plaintiff’s complaint, as well as documents
outside the pleadings that “are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to [his]
claim[s].” Weiner v. Klais and Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds
by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Chandler references the IGP as well as his grievances in his complaint, and these items are
central to his claims, so the Court may consider them without converting Defendants’ motion into
one for summary judgment.
2

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Chandler filed three grievances following the flooding incident. In the first,
Grievance No. 15-09-085-G, Chandler complained that he was stripped of his
property during the cold weather and was deprived of water to his cell. [DN 1-1 at
4.]

He requested that Lieutenant Hawkins be suspended without pay or be

assigned to work in the guard tower. [Id.] That grievance was rejected because
Chandler asked for inappropriate action to be taken. [Id. at 2; see DN 14-2 at 8
(allowing Grievance Coordinator to reject noncompliant grievance).] Chandler did
not re-file his grievance in an appropriate manner. As this Court has previously
noted, failure to re-file a rejected grievance does not constitute exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Grimes v. Aramark Correctional Servs. Co., No. 5:10-CV43, 2011 WL 4453154, at *2 (citing Napier v. Laurel Cnty., Ky., 636 F.3d 218, 222
(6th Cir. 2011)).
Chandler’s second grievance, 15-09-086-G, was based upon KSP’s failure to
flush his toilet and its requirement that he eat his meals in the unsanitary
conditions of his cell. [DN 1-1 at 11.] This grievance was rejected as well because it
was related to the flooding incident which formed the basis of a disciplinary report
against Chandler. [Id. at 8.] As such, Chandler was required to seek relief through
the adjustment committee process.

[Id.]

However, following the disciplinary

proceedings, he did not pursue a timely administrative appeal to the warden, as
KSP’s Adjustment Procedures and Programs required him to do. See [DN 14-3; DN
14-4.] This grievance was not administratively exhausted, either.

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Finally, Chandler filed Grievance No. 15-09-087-G. See [DN 1-1 at 7.] There,
he states that he was refused a shower by a correctional officer named either “Gray”
or “Bray.” [DN 1-1 at 7.] No such person is named as a defendant in this suit.
Additionally, this third grievance was also rejected because Chandler asked for the
improper sanction of suspension or reassignment. [Id. at 5.] This grievance, like
the first, was never re-filed in an appropriate form. Chandler filed no grievance
regarding his claims of inadequate exercise and nutrition.
In sum, as to each of his four Eighth Amendment claims, Chandler either
filed a procedurally faulty grievance, a grievance not germane to this case, or no
grievance at all. Defendants have met their burden of showing that Chandler failed
to “complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable
procedural rules.”

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (internal citation

omitted); Bruce v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 389 F. App’x 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2010).
Therefore, the Court will dismiss Chandler’s claims without prejudice. See Bell v.
Konteh, 450 F.3d 651, 653 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006) (“It is well established . . . that the
appropriate disposition of an unexhausted claim under the PLRA is dismissal
without prejudice.”) (citations omitted); Brock-Butler v. Parker, No. 5:14-CV-000210TBR, 2016 WL 3676769, at *3-4 (W.D. Ky. July 6, 2016) (dismissing without
prejudice inmate’s excessive force claims for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies). The Court also notes that despite its prior Order, Chandler did not
respond to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and appears uninterested in further
prosecuting his case.

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IV. Conclusion and Order
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
Defendants’ motion to dismiss [DN 14] is GRANTED.
Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
An appropriate order and judgment will follow.

April 6, 2017

CC: Counsel of Record
Plaintiff, pro se

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