Bruin v. White et al

Filing 165

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 8/21/2020 granting 145 Motion for Summary Judgment. The claims against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The state law claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendants are terminated as parties. cc: Counsel; Plaintiff, pro se(MNM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:16-cv-00105-TBR
BRANDON R. BRUIN

PLAINTIFF

v.
WARDEN RANDY WHITE et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Karen (Vickery) Ramey, Kelly
Neely, Nancy Raines, Charles Davis, and Bruce Bauer’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for
Summary Judgment. [DN 145.] Pro se Plaintiff Brandon Bruin (“Bruin”) has responded. [DN
151.] Defendants have replied. [DN 152.] As such, this matter is ripe for adjudication. For the
reasons that follow, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [DN 145] is GRANTED.
I. Background
Bruin is a convicted prisoner currently incarcerated at Eastern Kentucky Correctional
Complex. His claims in this action, however, concern his incarceration at the Kentucky State
Penitentiary (“KSP”). Bruin filed a series of complaints, supplemental complaints, and
amendments to complaints whereby he raises numerous claims against more than forty defendants.
Several of these defendants have been terminated from the action. His claims generally arise from
seven separate events: (1) the cutting of his dreadlocks; (2) being assaulted by another inmate; (3)
the denial of a “Vegan/Ital” diet; (4) excessive force during a cell extraction; (5) allegedly deficient
medical care regarding high blood pressure, headaches, and numbness; (6) claims arising from

Plaintiff’s fasting and hunger strike; and (7) alleged interference with Plaintiff’s access to the
courts and medical records.
On initial review [DN 48] of the complaint [DN 1] pursuant to § 1915A, the Court allowed
the following claims to continue: (1) Bruin’s First Amendment free-exercise and Fourteenth
Amendment due-process and equal-protection claims arising out of the May 2016 cutting of his
dreadlocks and refusal to allow Bruin to send the cut dreadlocks home against Defendants Charles
Crick, Roger Mitchell, James Smith, James R. Beeler, and Randy White in their official capacities
for injunctive relief and in their individual capacities for damages and injunctive relief; and (2)
Bruin’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim arising out of an assault by another inmate in
June 2016 against Defendants Bruce Von Dewingelo, Jill Roberts, and Micah Melton in their
individual capacities for damages.
On initial review [DN 97] of Bruin’s first wave of amended and supplemental complaints
[DNs 20, 23, & 26], the Court allowed the following claims to continue: (1) the First Amendment
free-exercise and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claims regarding denial
of a “Vegan/Ital Diet” against Defendants Melton, White, Terry Griffith, and Charles “Aaron”
Davis in their official capacities for injunctive relief and in their individual capacities for damages
and injunctive relief; (2) the First Amendment free-exercise claim regarding the cutting of
dreadlocks against Defendant John Gibbs in his official capacity for injunctive relief and in his
individual capacity for damages and injunctive relief and the RLUIPA claim regarding the cutting
of dreadlocks against Defendants Charles Crick, Mitchell, James Smith, Beeler, White, Belt, Skyla
Grief, Melton, Griffith, and Gibbs in their official capacities for injunctive relief and in their
individual capacities for damages and injunctive relief; (3) the Eighth Amendment excessive-force
claims regarding the July 30/August 1, 2016 cell extraction against Defendants Jonathan Ruch and

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Griffith in their individual capacities for damages; and (4) the Eighth Amendment claim of
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need regarding Plaintiff’s claims of untreated high
blood pressure, migraine headaches, loss of vision, tingling in limbs/fingers/toes, and episodes of
loss of consciousness against Defendants Davis, Karen Vickery, and Shastine Tangilag in their
individual capacities for damages and injunctive relief.
On initial review [DN 112] of Bruin’s second wave of amended and supplemental
complaints [DNs 34, 54, 57, & 89] this Court allowed the following claims to continue: (1) the
First Amendment free-exercise claim regarding the May 2016 cutting of dreadlocks against
Defendant Duncan; (2) the various First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims and state-law
medical negligence claims arising from a “Religious Fast” Plaintiff began on December 14, 2016,
which turned into a hunger strike requiring multiple cell extractions for blood work and eventual
forced hydration in January 2017 against Defendants White, Ramey, Neely, Raines, Bruce Bauer,
Grief, Burkett, Edmonds, Mitchell, James Smith, Michael Alexander, Inglish, Ruch, Corley,
Lauren N. Hawkins, Rodriquez, Coombs, Hope, Beeler, and Von Dewingelo; and (3) the Eighth
Amendment excessive-force claims against Defendants Swank and DeBoe, the Eighth
Amendment failure-to-protect claim against Defendant Grief, the First Amendment free-exercise
claim against Defendants Coombs and Rodriquez, and the retaliation claims against Defendants
Rodriquez, Coombs, DeBoe, Swank, and Grief. The Court also dismissed the RLUIPA claim it
previously allowed to proceed against Defendant Davis.
Defendants now move the Court to dismiss all claims against them and terminate them
from this action.

II. Legal Standard

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Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all
ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matshushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
“[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue of material fact.”
Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir. 1989). The test is whether the party
bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as to each element in the case. Hartsel
v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of
evidence in support of his position; the plaintiff must present evidence on which the trier of fact
could reasonable find for the plaintiff. See id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 252 (1986)). The plaintiff may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts of materials in
the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence…of a genuine
dispute…” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Mere speculation will not suffice to defeat a motion for
summary judgment, “the mere existence of a colorable factual dispute will not defeat a properly
supported motion for summary judgment. A genuine dispute between the parties on an issue of
material fact must exist to render summary judgment inappropriate.” Monette v. Electronic Data
Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996).
III. Discussion
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") bars a civil rights action challenging prison
conditions until the prisoner exhausts "such administrative remedies as are available." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) ("There is no question that exhaustion

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is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court."). In order
to exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must complete the administrative review process in
accordance with the deadlines and other applicable procedural rules established by state law.
Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-19. "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines
and other critical procedural rules." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). However, "failure
to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is an affirmative defense that must be
established by the defendants." Napier v. Laurel Cty. Ky., 636 F.3d 218, 225 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing
Jones, 549 U.S. at 204).
1. Bruin’s Eighth Amendment Claim Against Defendants Ramey and Davis Regarding
Untreated High Blood Pressure
Bruin claims from April 7, 2016 to August 20, 2016 he had high blood pressure readings
and Defendants Davis and Ramey failed to treat him. [DN 26-2 at PageID 232.] Bruin initially
filed this action on July 5, 2016. [DN 1.] On September 8, 2016, Bruin filed a grievance stating he
was improperly prescribed lisinopril and clonidine to take simultaneously and his blood pressure
bottomed out as a result. [DN 145-2 at PageID 1257.] Bruin appealed the informal resolution to
the Health Care Grievance Committee on October 12, 2016. [Id. at PageID 1274.] However, he
filed this claim against Defendants Davis and Ramey in his supplemental complaint on October 4,
2016. [DN 26.] On October 11, 2016, the Heath Care Grievance Committee concurred with the
informal resolution. [DN 145-2 at PageID 1275.] Bruin then appealed the Health Care Grievance
Committee’s findings to the Medical Director. On October 17, 2016, the Medical Director
concurred with the decision of the Health Care Grievance Committee. [DN 145-2 at PageID 1275.]
Defendants claim Bruin did not fully exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing this
claim. Bruin does not dispute this fact but does argue he was not required to fully exhaust due to
noncompliance by KSP.
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Corrections Policy & Procedure (“CPP”) requires a medical authority to respond to a
grievance within fifteen business days after receipt of the grievance at the informal resolution
stage. [DN 145-3 at PageID 1389.] Bruin submitted his grievance on September 8, 2016 and did
not receive a response until September 28, 2016. Defendants do not deny Bruin received resolution
outside of the fifteen-day requirement. However, they rely on two provisions that state:
1. “If the health care staff member responsible for the informal resolution of health care
grievances at an institution receives more than ten (10) grievances and they are due
within two weeks of each other, then the Grievance Coordinator may call a moratorium
on the time limits for those grievances.”
4. “If a moratorium on time limits is called, the affected grievances shall be processed
within a reasonable time given the other duties of the health care staff and the affected
grievants shall be notified in writing.”
[Id. at PageID 1391.] Defendants do not present any evidence that a moratorium was called by the
Grievance Coordinator or that the individual responsible for the informal resolution received more
than ten grievances due within two weeks of each other. “[A]dministrative remedies are exhausted
when prison officials fail to timely respond to a properly filed grievance.” Boyd v. Corr. Corp. of
Am., 380 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 2004). When Bruin filed his amended complaint, October 4, 2016,
a response to his grievance had been filed but was untimely. Although Bruin continued with the
grievance process after filing suit, at the moment of filing, he had exhausted his administrative
remedies. Without evidence that a moratorium was entered or there were more than ten grievances
filed, Defendants have not met their burden.
2. Eighth Amendment Claim Against Defendant Raines Regarding Pepper Spray
Defendant Raines next argues Bruin did not file a grievance on this issue. Bruin states he
attempted to give his grievance to another Prisoner to mail to the Grievance Coordinator, but that
inmate was disciplined. On December 28, 2016, an officer stopped at inmate Garfield Evans’ cell
“to collect the mail that was sticking out of his door.” [DN 151-1 at PageID 1589.] The mail
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contained three letters addressed to the grievance committee and one outside letter. [Id.]
Grievances that are addressed to the Grievance Committee are appeals of previously filed
grievances. [DN 145-2 at PageID 1065.] The form to file an initial grievance differs substantially
from the appellate form. [Id. at PageID 1064.] Although Bruin states he attempted to file a
grievance regarding this issue, the evidence shows otherwise. Therefore, without evidence that
Bruin was prevented from filing a grievance, his failure to file a grievance on this issue warrants
dismissal of the claim. Bruin was on a grievance restriction during this time. However, he was
allowed to file a grievance every ten business days during this time. [See DN 151-1 at PageID
1588.]
3. Eighth Amendment Claim Against Defendants Neely and Raines Regarding
Withholding Special Diet
Defendants argue Bruin failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to asserting this
claim. On December 15, 2016, Bruin filed a grievance concerning his request for a dairy free diet.
[DN 145-2 at PageID 1185.] On December 19, 2016, Dan Smith found Bruin was “not sincere” in
requesting a non-dairy diet and there was no evidence to support Bruin’s request. [Id. at PageID
1185-1186.] On March 7, 2017, the Warden received the grievance and after a review, sent the
grievance back to be processed as a medical grievance. [Id. at PageID 1199.]
On March 15, 2017, Defendant Raines found Bruin was not entitled to a dairy free diet at
the informal resolution stage. [Id. at PageID 1187.] Bruin appealed the informal resolution to the
Health Care Grievance Committee on March 22, 2017. [Id. at PageID 1201.] The Committee
concurred with the informal resolution. [Id. at PageID 1202.] Bruin appealed the Committee’s
decision to the Medical Director and the Director stated allergy testing was requested for Bruin.
[Id. at PageID 1204.]

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Bruin filed a supplemental complaint alleging these facts on February 13, 2017. [DN 571.] This is clearly before he had fully exhausted his administrative remedies. Therefore, Bruin did
not properly exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing this claim and this claim is
barred.
4. Eighth Amendment Claim Against Defendants Neely, Ramey, and Bauer Regarding
Forced Hydration
Bruin claims he received forced hydration on January 25 and 26. Bruin filed his
supplemental claim on this issue on February 13, 2017. [Id. at PageID 491-497.] However, he did
not file a grievance regarding this issue until February 15, 2017. [DN 145-2 at PageID 1177.] Bruin
argues the fact that he was on a grievance restriction and filed a grievance on January 24, 2017
excuses this fact. Defendants cite to McDougald v. Esham, to support their position.
In McDougald, McDougald was placed on a grievance restriction. 2018 WL 1010214, *5
(S.D. Ohio Feb 21, 2018). The Court found McDougald failed to exhaust his remedies despite this
restriction. Id. at 7. The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility had a policy that an inmate on
grievance restriction had “unlimited access to the kite system to communicate with administrative
personnel and also could have contacted corrections officers to obtain a grievance form and address
medical concerns through the inmate grievance procedure.” Id. Here, Defendants have not pointed
to any policy that allows for grievances to be made while on grievance restriction. In the cases
Defendants cite to, each institution pointed to a policy allowing for an inmate on a grievance
restriction to seek review. See Thompson v. Zwikler, 2013 WL 5538882, *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 8,
2013). Without more evidence, Defendants have not met their burden.
B. Eighth Amendment Claims
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Bruin’s claims. It is well
established that “[t]he Eighth Amendment forbids prison officials from unnecessarily and
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wantonly inflicting pain on an inmate by acting with deliberate indifference toward [his] serious
medical needs.” Jones v. Muskegon Cty., 625 F.3d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). A claim for deliberate indifference “has both objective and subjective
components.” Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011). The objective
component mandates a sufficiently serious medical need. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d
890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004). The subjective component regards prison officials' state of mind. Id. The
prison official must “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 896 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “[A] plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference must show more than
negligence or the misdiagnosis of an ailment.” Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 875 (6th Cir.
2005) (quoting Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Sixth Circuit has also noted that in the context of deliberate-indifference claims:
[W]e distinguish between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical
care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical
treatment. Where a prisoner alleges only that the medical care he received was inadequate,
federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments. However, it is
possible for medical treatment to be so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment
at all.
Alspaugh, 643 F.3d at 169 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “[M]edical proof is
necessary to assess whether the delay caused a serious medical injury” where the injury is nonobvious. Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898.
1. Treatment of High Blood Pressure
Bruin argues he had high blood pressure from April 7, 2016 until August 20, 2016. [DN
2602 at PageID 232.] He states Defendants Davis and Ramey neglected to treat him. [Id.]
However, he did not respond to Defendants’ argument on the merits of this claim.

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Bruin submitted a sick call request on August 20, 2016 complaining of high blood pressure.
[DN 148 at PageID 1547.] On August 20, 2016 an ECG was performed on Bruin and the results
were normal. [Id. at PageID 1505.] The request was received on August 22, 2016 and Bruin was
treated that same day by Defendant Davis. [Id.] Defendant Davis prescribed Bruin 5 mg of
Lisinopril. [Id.] From April to August, Bruin submitted three other sick call requests. [Id. at PageID
1537, 1542, 1543.] In these requests, Bruin did not make any complaint of issues with his blood
pressure.
Defendants cite to Powell v. Humphrey to support their position. In Powell, Powell argued
Defendants denied him pain and high blood pressure medication. 2017 WL 3302664 *1 (W.D. Ky.
Aug. 2, 2017.). Defendants provided records that they did in fact treat Powell for his pain and high
blood pressure. Id. at 2. The Court granted summary judgment because the record contradicted
Powell’s claims. Id.
Here, it is clear that Bruin did receive prompt treatment for his high blood pressure after
his request. The same day he made the complaint, an ECG was performed, and he was seen in
person by Defendant Davis two days later for this complaint.
At the informal resolution stage of the grievance process regarding this issue, it was noted
that there was a medication error regarding his high blood pressure. [DN 145-2 at PageID 1258.]
However, “a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.
Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a
prisoner.” Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 105-106 (1976)).

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Here, Bruin has not provided any evidence that Defendants unnecessarily and wantonly
caused him pain or suffering. Bruin’s bare assertions are not enough. Therefore, medication error
is not enough to sustain a claim of deliberate indifference.
Further, Bruin has not provided medical evidence of any detrimental effect the alleged
delay in treatment caused. “[M]edical proof is necessary to assess whether the delay caused a
serious medical injury” where the injury is non-obvious. Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898. Therefore,
this claim must be dismissed.
2. Claim Against Defendant Raines Regarding Pepper Spray
Defendant Raines argues she is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because no
reasonable jury could conclude she was deliberately indifferent to Bruin’s medical needs. Bruin
does not respond to this argument.
Bruin alleged Defendant Raines poured water into his eyes to decontaminate after pepper
spray was used. [DN 57-1 at PageID 481.] Bruin states the water “trickled to the back area of
Plaintiff head area, re-activating the burning sensation and causing the excess residue of mace
administered into Plaintiffs head to stream from its current location to the lower extremities of
Plaintiff”. [Id.] However, Bruin also stated he request the decontamination. [Id.]
“[T]he effects of OC spray, standing alone, fail to indicate an objective, “sufficiently
serious” medical need giving rise to constitutionally-mandated medical treatment where the inmate
has access to soap and water to decontaminate.” Woodard v. Winters, 2018 WL 3020336, at *11
(S.D. Ohio June 18, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4610511 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 26, 2018). Bruin has not alleged any sufficiently serious medical need ignored or inflicted
by Defendant Raines. Further, he has not alleged a “serious medical need beyond the normal

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effects of OC spray.” Id. Bruin has provided no evidence to show Defendant Raines acted wantonly
or indifferently by decontaminating Bruin. Therefore, this claim must be dismissed.
3. Claim Against Defendants Neely and Raines Regarding Withholding Special Diet
Dr. Forte approved a diet of “6 packs of crackers, peanut butter, and a banana” for breakfast
on January 28, 2017. [DN 57-3 at PageID 540.] Bruin received this meal as ordered for breakfast.
[DN 57-1 at PageID 497.] Bruin states he received the same modified meal at approximately 10:10
a.m. [Id.] However, Defendants Neely and Raines determined Bruin did not need a special diet.
Bruin alleges Defendants Neely and Raines showed a deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs by terminating his special diet with no medical justification. [Id. at PageID 498.] Defendants
argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Bruin was not entitled to the special diet.
Bruin does not respond to this argument.
“In the dietary context, the Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials provide
inmates with meals that are nutritionally adequate to sustain the prisoner’s health.” Blau v.
Fortescue, 2019 WL 2612932, at *4 (E.D. Mich. June 26, 2019) (citing Cunningham v. Jones, 567
F.2d 653, 656 (6th Cir. 1977). “Prison officials will be liable under § 1983 where they make dietary
decisions on prisoners’ behalf with deliberate indifference to their health and safety.” Id.
Although Bruin alleges Defendants had no medical justification for not providing his
special diet, the change in Bruin’s diet was made after a review of Bruin’s medical records. [DN
145-2 at PageID 1187.] Bruin’s medical records revealed he had never been diagnosed as lactose
intolerant nor had he previously alleged he was lactose intolerant. [Id. at PageID 1187,1202.] Bruin
does not refute the fact that he had never previously been diagnosed or claimed to be lactose
intolerant.

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Further, Bruin has not provided any evidence that Defendants acted wantonly in changing
his diet. Defendants Neely and Raines disagreed with Dr. Forte’s order and subsequently changed
Bruin’s diet. This act alone is not enough to indicate deliberate indifference. “To the extent
[Bruin’s] allegations constitute a difference of opinion between himself and medical personnel
regarding his need for a special diet, he has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim.” Miller v.
Cleek, 198 F. 3d 246 (6th Cir. 1999). Without further evidence, this claim must be dismissed.
4. Claim Against Defendants Neely, Ramey, and Bauer Regarding Forced Hydration
Bruin argues Defendants Neely, Ramey, and Bauer were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs by forcefully hydrating him. Defendants argue forced hydration was only used when
it became medically necessary.
Bruin engaged in a lengthy fast beginning in December 2016. Bruin had several visits with
medical professionals and was consistently observed by guards. [See generally DN 148.] On
January 23, 2017, Bruin was seen by Defendant Ramey. She noted that Bruin had missed his 90th
meal but appeared to be “clinically stable.” [Id. at PageID 1461-1462.] He was drinking orange
juice and tea when offered. [Id. at 1462.] Bruin alleges on January 24, 2016, Defendant Neely
issued a memorandum ordering Bruin’s intake of tea and orange juice to be limited without
medical justification. [DN 57-1 at PageID 490; DN 57-3 at PageID 528.] The memorandum Bruin
provides does not list a date. Defendant Ramey suggested on January 3, 2017 that Bruin not be
given tea as an option “based on urine and exam”. [DN 148 at PageID 1485.] Bruin further alleges
he only passed out on January 26, 2017 due to this restriction on liquids.
On January 26, 2017, Bruin passed out while walking in his cell. [DN 148 at PageID 1453.]
Defendant Ramey recommended IV fluids because Bruin was showing signs of dehydration. [Id.
at PageID 1453-1454.] Medical Director Denise Burkett agreed with Ramey’s recommendation.

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[Id. at PageID 1454.] Defendant Bauer placed Bruin on an IV drip. [DN 57-1 at PageID 492.]
Defendant Raines then allegedly adjusted the IV drip to give a rapid drip of fluids. [Id.at
PageID493.] In addition to Bruin arguing the act of giving him IV fluids was medically
unnecessary, he argues hydration only become necessary due to the liquid restriction.
Here, it is clear Defendants Ramey, Bauer, and Raines administered the IV to treat Bruin’s
dehydration. There is no evidence that Defendants acted wantonly when administering the IV drip.
Bruin conclusively states it was done in a malicious manner. However, the evidence proves
otherwise. Medical records show Bruin passed out after engaging in a long hunger strike. [DN 148
at PageID1453.] He was showing signs of dehydration and his blood pressure was low. [Id.] As
such, Defendant Ramey recommended an IV and Defendant Bauer administered it. Without more,
Bruin has not provided evidence that these Defendants acted deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs.
These facts also do not give rise to a constitutionally cognizable claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Davis v. Agosto, the Court adopted an Eighth Circuit Opinion rejecting a
constitutional challenge to a decision by prison officials to force-feed an inmate after a hunger
strike. 89 Fed. App’x. 523, 528 (6th Cir. 2004). “While ‘[t]he Supreme Court has held that
individuals in state custody enjoy [a] protectable liberty interest[ ] ... to refuse medical treatment.’
Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 161 (6th Cir.1996), that right is not absolute and is particularly
susceptible to regulation in the prison setting.” Id. The Court further stated, “[h]ad [the officials]
opted not to provide the treatment, the officials could have subjected themselves to a deliberateindifference claim and would of course have remained responsible for providing any further
medical treatment”. Id. Here, Defendants only acted when necessary. Had they not hydrated Bruin,

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they may have acted with deliberate indifference. Therefore, the claim against them must be
dismissed.
Bruin argues Defendant Neely’s act of limiting his orange juice and tea led to his
dehydration. Bruin was not restricted from drinking all fluids. His fluid intake was limited to a
drink with each meal and water every hour. [DN 57-3 at PageID 528.] Bruin’s argument ignores
the fact that on January 25, 2017, he stated “he was not going to drink any water that is offered to
him” since his orange juice intake was limited. [DN 148 at PageID 1455.] He further stated, “they
might as well have the IVs on stand-by.” [Id.] Bruin refused to drink the offered fluids. He has not
provided any evidence that the plan suggested by Defendant Neely, if followed, would have made
him dehydrated. Defendants cannot be punished for Bruin’s choice to limit his fluid intake
completely. Therefore, this claim must also be dismissed against Defendant Neely.
C. Bruin’s State Law Claims
Bruin has also asserted state law medical negligence claims against Defendants. 18
U.S.C. § 1367(c) states in relevant part:
“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under
subsection (a) if—
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction”.
Since this Court has dismissed Bruin’s federal claims, it will decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims See Wee Care Child Ctr., Inc. v. Lumpkin, 680
F.3d 841, 849 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Polk v. Jones, 2020 WL 2203839, * 6 (W.D. Ky. May 6,
2020). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Bruin’s state-law claims without prejudice.
IV. Conclusion

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For the above stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [DN 145] is GRANTED. The claims against Defendants pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The state law claims against Defendants
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendants are terminated as parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

August 21, 2020

cc: Brandon R. Bruin
240651
Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex
200 Road to Justice
West Liberty, KY 41472
PRO SE

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