Byas v. Commonwealth of Kentucky et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 4/6/17: For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this action by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff(pro se), Defendants (DJT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
MICAH M. BYAS

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:16CV-121-TBR

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Micah M. Byas1 filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the Court on initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons that follow, the action will be dismissed.
I.
Plaintiff names numerous Defendants. He sues the following governmental entities:
Commonwealth of Kentucky; Ballard County Court; Carlisle County Court; Graves2 County
Court; Ballard County Board of Education; Ballard County Detention Center (BCDC); Cabinet
for Health and Family Services (CHFS); and the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA). He
sues the following Defendants in their official capacity only: Leigh Ann Wiggins, a CHFS
supervisor; and Vickie Hayden, Ballard County Attorney. He sues the following Defendants in
both their individual and official capacities: Erica Hobbs-Mathis, a CHFS social service worker;
Ashlee Richardson, a CHFS social service clinician; Unknown Secretary at Ballard County
Board of Education; Kevin Hoskins, Carlisle District/Circuit Court Clerk; Amanda Brahnam,
Assistant Ballard County Attorney; Donnie Hall, Ballard County Jailer; Christina Harvell, a
BCDC lieutenant; Michael Hogancamp, Carlisle County Attorney; Timothy A. Langford,

1

At the time Plaintiff filed his complaint, he was incarcerated in the Ballard County Detention
Center. Shortly thereafter, he filed a notice of change of address indicating his release from incarceration.
2
Plaintiff spells this Defendant as “Grave.” The Court takes judicial notice, however, of the fact
that the proper spelling of this Kentucky county is “Graves.”

Ballard and Carlisle Circuit Court Judge; Angela Troutman, attorney at Public Advocacy of
Paducah; and an Unknown Defendant at the Graves County Circuit Court.
Plaintiff alleges various incidents involving Defendants that occurred primarily in 2015
and 2016. He also mentions an incident occurring in 2002. These incidents will be detailed
greater when the Court performs its analysis of Plaintiff’s claims later in this Memorandum
Opinion. See Section III.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and the following
injunctive relief: “Purge and Educate all Kentucky agencies of discrimination.”
II.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). On review, a district court
must dismiss a case at any time if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
2

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
Although courts are to hold pro se pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), this duty to be less
stringent “does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518
F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require courts “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the
strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III.
“Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for
deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d
340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502,
504 (6th Cir. 1991).
3

A. Claims against the County Defendants
The claims against BCDC are actually claims against Ballard County. See Matthews v.
Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Since the Police Department is not an entity which
may be sued, Jefferson County is the proper party to address the allegations of Matthews’s
complaint.”); Marbry v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov.
6, 2000) (holding that a jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983). Ballard County Board
of Education, as a division of local government,3 may be sued directly. Banks v. Breathitt Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 925 F. Supp. 2d 856, 860 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (citing Memphis Police Dep’t v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985)).
Further, because “[o]fficial-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [] another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent,’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165-66 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55
(1978)), Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against the Unknown Secretary of the Ballard County
Board of Education are actually against the Board, and the official-capacity claims against
BCDC Jailer Hall and Lt. Harvell are actually against Ballard County.
When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality or its school board, this Court must
analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional
violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City
of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). “[A] municipality cannot be held liable
solely because it employs a tortfeasor -- or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable
under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Searcy v. City of

See, e.g., Baar v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 2d 699, 704 n.3 (W.D. Ky. 2010), aff’d, 476
F. App’x 621 (6th Cir. 2012) (indicating that in a § 1983 suit, the Jefferson County Board of Education
“is deemed a division of local government, not a department of state government”) (citing Ghassomians
v. Ashland Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F. Supp. 2d 675, 682 (E.D. Ky. 1998)).
3

4

Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir.
1994). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality
from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is
limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80
(1986)). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or
custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was
incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)); see also Richardson v.
Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cty. Kentucky, No. 3:04-CV-386R, 2006 WL 2726777, at *7 (W.D. Ky.
Sept. 22, 2006) (“A municipality or school board may be held accountable for the actions of their
employees only if these actions stem from officially executed policy, or the toleration of a
custom that leads to, causes, or results in the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.”)
(citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege a policy or custom of Ballard County or the Board of
Education that caused his alleged harm. For this reason, the claims against BCDC and the
Ballard County Board of Education and the official-capacity claims against the Unknown
Secretary, Jailer Hall, and Lt. Harvell must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.

5

B. Claims against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Ballard County Court,4 Carlisle
County Court, Graves County Court, CHFS,5 and DPA6 and the Official-Capacity Claims for
Damages against the Commonwealth’s Officers and Employees
The Eleventh Amendment7 “bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or
monetary relief, against the state and its departments,” Thiokol Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, State
of Mich., Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993), unless Congress has validly abrogated
the state’s immunity or the state has waived its immunity. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 78l, 782 (1978). The Commonwealth of
Kentucky has not waived its immunity, see Adams v. Morris, 90 F. App’x 856, 857 (6th Cir.
2004), and in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override the traditional sovereign
immunity of the states. Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 193-94 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Quern
v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979)). The Eleventh Amendment, therefore, bars this § 1983
action against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Ballard County Court, Carlisle County Court,
Graves County Court, CHFS, and DPA.
“This [Eleventh Amendment] bar remains in effect when State officials are sued for
damages in their official capacity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 169. Consequently, the
official-capacity claims for damages against the following Defendants also are barred by the
The Kentucky courts are a constitutional arm of government. See Ky. Const. § 109 (“The
judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice which shall be
divided into a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the
Circuit Court and a trial court of limited jurisdiction known as the District Court. The court shall
constitute a unified judicial system for operation and administration.”).
5
CHFS is an agency of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, created and organized by Kentucky
statute. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 211.015.
6
DPA is also an agency of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31.010
(establishing “as an independent agency of state government . . . the Department for Public Advocacy”).
7
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “Although the amendment does not address the possibility of suit against
a state by one of its own citizens, unassailable case law has interpreted the amendment in such a way as to
close that gap.” Barton v. Summers, 293 F.3d 944, 948 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890)).
4

6

Eleventh Amendment: CHFS workers Hobbs-Mathis, Richardson, and Wiggins; Carlisle County
Circuit/District Court Clerk Hoskins; Ballard County Attorney Hayden and Assistant County
Attorney Brahnam; Carlisle County Attorney Hogancamp; Ballard and Carlisle Circuit Court
Judge Langford; and the Unknown Defendant at the Graves County Circuit Court.
In addition, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’
under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Thus, the claims against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, its courts, CHFS, DPA, and
their officers and employees are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
C. DPA Attorney Troutman
Plaintiff also fails to state a § 1983 claim against Defendant Troutman because his
allegations are based upon her role of representing him in a criminal proceeding. While the DPA
is an independent agency of state government, it is firmly established that a defense attorney,
regardless of whether she is a public defender or private attorney, is not a state actor for purposes
of § 1983. Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act
under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a
defendant in a criminal proceeding.”); Otworth v. Vanderploeg, 61 F. App’x 163, 165 (6th Cir.
2003) (“A lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state
actor under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.”). Although an exception exists if a
defense attorney has engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of federal
rights, Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920-23 (1984), Plaintiff makes no such allegation and,
therefore, his claims against Defendant Troutman must be dismissed.

7

D. Individual-Capacity Claims
1. CHFS Employees Hobbs-Mathis and Richardson
Plaintiff’s allegations against these two Defendants are as follows:
September 4, 2015 Commonwealth of Kentucky CHFS and Michelle
Rene Key-Byas made a lot of false statements. But the one she made in her
Response to Motion of Respondent For Joint Time-Sharing Custody and/or
Visition disturbed me the most was stated in outline 11. After reading that I
call CHFS September 9, 2005 to get my daughter the help she needed.
Erica Hobbs-Mathis Social Service Worker Helped me until she talked to
Michelle and immdiately started to show and react partisanly and
perjudicely. All evidence can be seen or heard in court record and her own
investigation That I had to call Ombudsman to find out why my case was
not closed. Shortly after that call I got a letter January 6, 2016 stateing that
allegation have been found to be unsubstantiated. 90 day pass the standerd
45 day rule. Equal protection from discrimination 5, 14 Amendment.
November 4, 2015 Another case was open on me that Erica HobbsMathis testified that she called in on me at my hearing. Ashlee Richardson
instantly discrimanted me without even hear a word out of my mouth. I told
her that I wanted to be treated fairly and equally on fact and not her creed
and or personal doctrin. She responded in the manner as all racist do. By
saying “you will.” You can read her open record investigation. Had to call
Ombudsman to find out why my case was not closed. Again shortly after
the same call about Erica too. January 7, 2016 letter stated that allegation
have been found to be unsubstantiated.
*****
Dec. 4, 2015 Leigh Ann Wiggins8 was at my custody hearing and
told me I had another case open on me the was called in on Nov 4, 2015. Is
someone is goin to come talk to me since its almost 45 day until she will
have to close the case. I let her know the way things are being done under
her supervision seem odd to me. She assure me that her office will not be
partial. Ashlee Richardson came and see me at my house and talked about
my criminal past and then said that the case against you will be
unsubstantiated. Veiw the open record she wrote. and the time. I call Leigh
Ann Wiggins over and over again to ask he why the CHFS supervisor
would up hold such action did not get a call back and that why I called
Ombudsman to see if they would help me. She they did emailed Erica &
Ashlee to find out why my cases was not close. the lady from Ombudsman
8

Plaintiff sued Defendant Wiggins in her official capacity only.
8

call me back the next day and both works said just behind. Leigh Ann
Wiggins at last called me back and started to ask me something. I stop her
and said Ombudsman gave me the answer I needed. bye. Equal protection
from discrimination. 5, 14 amendment[.]
Plaintiff alleges discrimination. “The Equal Protection Clause prevents states from
making distinctions that (1) burden a fundamental right; (2) target a suspect class; or
(3) intentionally treat one individual differently from others similarly situated without any
rational basis.” Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff describes no disparate circumstances. On two occasions, he broadly
states, “Equal protection from discrimination.” This is insufficient to state a constitutional claim.
Elsewhere, as to Defendant Richardson, he alleges that she “instantly discrimanted me without
even hear a word out of my mouth. I told her that I wanted to be treated fairly and equally on
fact and not her creed and or personal doctrin. She responded in the manner as all racist do. By
saying ‘you will.’” These allegations also are insufficient to state an equal-protection claim as
Plaintiff fails to show membership in a protected class or that he was treated differently than
others similarly situated. Consequently, the equal protection claims against Defendants HobbsMathis and Richardson will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
2. Judge Langford
As to Defendant Judge Langford, Plaintiff alleges that on March 9, 2016, on “Day two of
my hearing,” Judge Langford “said in open court on record. I see you as a pedophile and I need
to know what you told the Judge when you pled guilt. I said back, I couldn’t say anything
because I didn’t do anything. The rest is on the record.” Plaintiff indicates that the “outcome
was I receive limited supervised visitation. He did not care if I had sole custody of a 14 yrs old
daughter I had since she was 4 yrs old.” Plaintiff claims that Judge Langford “caught Petitioner
9

committing purgery over and over again. Plus said something about it but didn’t do anything.”
Plaintiff alleges “Equal protection from discrimination, Substantiation ‘Due’ Process. 5, 14
Amendment.”
In another section of the complaint, Plaintiff claims that on July 1, 2016, Judge Langford
“gave 180 day for Contempt of Court.” Plaintiff apparently was incarcerated in the BCDC as a
result of the finding of contempt.
With regard to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Judge Langford, judges are entitled to
absolute immunity for actions arising out of all acts performed in the exercise of their judicial
functions. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Judicial immunity is embedded in the
long-established principle that “a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him,
[should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences
to himself.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
335 (1872)). The law is clear that a judge acting within the scope of his official duties and
within his jurisdictional authority is absolutely immune from damages liability. Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000); Ireland v. Tunis,
113 F.3d 1435, 1440 (6th Cir. 1997); Watts v. Burkhart, 978 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1992). This
immunity confers complete protection from a civil suit. Tulloch v. Coughlin, 50 F.3d 114, 116
(2d Cir. 1995).
A judge is subject to liability only for non-judicial actions or for acts which were judicial
in nature but were taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. at
11-12; Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d at 1440. Whether or not an act is judicial depends on the
nature and function of the act. Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d at 1440. Two factors are examined to
perform this analysis. Id. at 1441. The Court must first determine whether the act is “a function
10

normally performed by a judge.” Id. (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 362). The Court
must also look at “whether the parties dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity.”
Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d at 1441. Moreover, a judge acts in clear absence of all jurisdiction
only if the matter acted upon is clearly outside the subject matter of his court. Ireland v. Tunis,
113 F.3d at 1441; King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 965-66 (6th Cir. 1985); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d
262, 271 (6th Cir. 1984). Acting in error, maliciously, or in excess of his authority is not
enough. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 356.
The factors used for the functional analysis indicate that the alleged acts by Defendant
Judge Langford were judicial in nature. He presided over the cases, ordered limited visitation,
and found Plaintiff in contempt of court. These are actions normally performed by a judge, and
he dealt with Plaintiff only in his judicial capacity. Further, the complaint gives no indication
that Defendant Judge Langford lacked jurisdiction in presiding over Plaintiff’s cases.
Consequently, the claims against Judge Langford are barred by judicial immunity and
must be dismissed.
3. Prosecutors Brahnam and Hogancamp
Plaintiff complains that sometime in November 2015, with respect to a criminal case
against him, “I stated that Ballard County Attorney Vickie Hayden9 had a conflict in the [] case
and requested Carlisle County Attorney Micheal Hogancamp prosecution the criminal summons;
sign by Hon. Hunter B Whitesell.” However, according to Plaintiff, on the next court date, on
December 4, 2015, “Hayden offerd me a pley . . . How can Vickie Hayden offerd me a pleay and
she has a conflict.” He continues that on December 14, 2015, on the next court date, his public
defender, Troutman, told him that “Amanda Brahnam offerded a deal and I should take it and I

9

Plaintiff sued Defendant Hayden in her official-capacity only.
11

said No.” Plaintiff further alleges that on July 18, 2016, Hogancamp “did show up for the first
time and walked in and said ready for trial I said yes and a bench trial to but some new attorney
said that not even got his first docket ask me to just take it and it will be easy on you if you did.”
Plaintiff claims that “The judge did not show up so my still waitting for justice[.]” Finally, he
claims, “While this was going on [] I wanted to put charges on a gruop of people and Amanda
Brahnam said there is no chargers to fit the crime. that was a lie. Back the County attorney in
Paduach gave it to me.”
Similar to the doctrine of judicial immunity, prosecutors are entitled to “absolute
immunity from civil liability related to their performance of ‘prosecutorial’ functions.’” Koubriti
v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486
(1991)). “Functions that serve as an ‘integral part of the judicial process’ or that are ‘intimately
associated with the judicial process’ are absolutely immune from civil suits.” Id. (quoting Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). “[P]lea bargains are ‘so intimately associated with the
prosecutor’s role as an advocate of the State in the judicial process as to warrant absolute
immunity.’” Rouse v. Stacy, 478 F. App’x 945, 951 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cady v. Arenac
Cty., 574 F.3d 334, 341 (6th Cir. 2009)). In addition, “deciding to initiate a prosecution is
subject to absolute immunity.” Howell v. Sanders, 755 F. Supp. 2d 789, 796 (E.D. Ky. 2010),
aff’d, 668 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431). “As the line of absoluteimmunity cases make[s] clear, . . . a prosecutor’s allegedly improper motive alone is not enough
to defeat absolute immunity, so long as the general nature of his actions falls within the scope of
his duties as an advocate for the state.” Cady v. Arenac Cty., 574 F.3d at 341.
Nothing in the complaint suggests that Defendants Brahnam and Hogancamp were acting
in any capacity other than in their roles as advocates for the state in the judicial process.
12

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against them are barred by prosecutorial immunity and will be
dismissed.
4. Carlisle County Circuit/District Clerk Hoskins
Plaintiff alleges that he had to be at court on November 4, 2015. He states, “I get there an
Kevin Hoskins the Clerk to me I don’t have to be there. I told him that I’m stay until the Judge
tell me different.” He continues, “The Judge came out and said . . . Mr. Byas You case has been
moved to Ballard. I don’t know why and don’t ask me why, and I will not be the Judge. Have a
good day. a few days later I got in the mail Order to Transfer.”
Plaintiff’s allegations against Clerk Hoskins fail to state a constitutional claim. Even if
Plaintiff had stated a viable claim, Clerk Hoskins would be protected by the doctrine of quasijudicial immunity, which “extends to those persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined
with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is
immune.” Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Lyle v. Jackson, 49 F.
App’x 492, 494 (6th Cir. 2002) (two court clerks who did not provide prisoner with copies of
previous filings and transcripts were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity). For these reasons, the
claims against Clerk Hoskins must be dismissed.
5. BCDC Jailer Hall and Lt. Harvell
At the time Plaintiff filed his complaint, he was incarcerated in BCDC. He was released
shortly thereafter. Plaintiff alleges that while at the detention center, “I asked to sign up to go to
the law library and it states Ballard County jail does not have a Law library. DOC Rules Pre
Donnie Hall.” He further alleges, “I ask for mental Health care and Christina Harvell Lieutenant
told me in front of Debora Smith. If you don’t want to hurt yourself or anyone esle you will be
ok, and there is nothing to do for you.”
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Regarding Plaintiff’s claim that BCDC had no law library, prisoners have a constitutional
right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). However, meaningful
access will vary with the circumstances, and officials are to be accorded discretion in
determining how that right is to be administered. Id. at 830-31; John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228,
233-34 (6th Cir. 1992). An inmate who claims his access to the courts was denied merely
because he was denied access to the prison library, or certain books, fails to state a claim.
Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 932 (6th Cir. 1985). Rather, the inmate “must go one step
further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program
hindered his efforts to pursue a [non-frivolous] legal claim.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351
(1996). In other words, a plaintiff must demonstrate an actual injury. Id. He must show, “for
example, that the inadequacy of the prison law library or the available legal assistance caused
such actual injury as the late filing of a court document or the dismissal of an otherwise
meritorious claim.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996); Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. at 356 (advising that no actual injury occurs without a showing that such a claim “has been
lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is currently being prevented”).
Plaintiff fails to allege any injury to past or present litigation as a result of not having
access to a law library at BCDC. He, therefore, fails to state a constitutional claim.
As to Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied mental health care, prison officials violate a
prisoner’s civil rights under the Eighth Amendment if they are deliberately indifferent to the
prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976). “An Eighth
Amendment claim has two components, one objective and one subjective.” Comstock v.
McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702-03 (6th Cir. 2001). To satisfy the objective component, “‘the
inmate [must] show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
14

harm.’” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 896 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). “[T]he evidence need only show that ‘the medical need at
issue is sufficiently serious.’” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 896 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
To satisfy the subjective component, the plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, would show
that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the
prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk. Comstock,
273 F.3d at 702-03.
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts indicating a serious medical need requiring mental
health care, and he fails to allege any injury resulting from the alleged denial of treatment. For
these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
6. Unknown Ballard County Board of Education Secretary
Plaintiff claims that in September 2015 and April 2016, “Ballard County Middle school10
secratary told and withheld information that would put me as a bad guy and Michelle as the good
one. It is all on CHFS open record report. 5, 14, amendment.”
This broad allegation against the Unknown Secretary wholly fails to state a constitutional
claim upon which relief may be granted. The claims against this Defendant, therefore, must be
dismissed.
7. Unknown Individual Employed at the Graves County Circuit Court
While Plaintiff lists this Unknown Defendant in the “Parties” section of the complaint
form, he fails to allege facts against such an individual. He does allege that in 2002, “Grave
County charge me with 5 felony.” He states, “I was looking a my history of crime and it said

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While Plaintiff names a secretary of the Ballard County Board of Education as a Defendant in
the “Parties” section of the complaint form, he fails to make any allegations against a secretary for the
Board. The Court presumes that the secretary of the Ballard County Middle School is the same secretary
Plaintiff is referring to in the “Parties” section.
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that I was in jail for 2 days and that is so untrue because I was lock up in May of that same year
and not release until Oct. that same year.” He alleges that “they change the paper work because I
stated in court that if this court do not find me guilty of these charges I will sue Commonwealth
of Kentucky. So if I did sue I was only in jail for 2 day Have Commonwealth of Kentucky
teneder to prove this a to show how much they lied. 5, 14 amendment.”
Even construing these allegations in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, they are
insufficient to state a claim of constitutional magnitude, and he fails to allege any harm as a
result of the erroneous paperwork. The claims against the Unknown Individual, therefore, must
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this action by separate Order.
Date:

April 6, 2017

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4413.005

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