Grzelak et al v. Catalogne et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 11/3/2016; a separate order dismissing case will be entered.cc: plaintiff pro se, defendants (KJA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
BROOK GRZELAK
v.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:16-CV-P125-TBR
THOR CATALOGNE et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Brook Grzelak,1 a prisoner presently incarcerated in the Carson City
Correctional Facility in Carson City, Michigan, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This matter is before the Court for initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss this
action.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff identifies the following four Defendants in this action: (1) Thor Catalogne,
President of Prisoner Transport Services (PTS); (2) “Currently Unknown,” Vice President of
PTS; (3) Coleman, a driver for PTS; and (4) Carpenter, also a driver for PTS.
Plaintiff states that on January 20, 2016, he was picked up from the Waupaca County Jail
in Waupaca, Wisconsin, for transport to the Saginaw Correctional Facility in Freeland,
Michigan. According to Plaintiff, after a stop at the Mississippi County Jail in Missouri, the
inmates in the transport van were told by Defendant Coleman that they would be hitting bad
weather by the time they arrived in Kentucky and, “although [Coleman] had received
authorization to wait out the bad weather at a County Jail, he was not going to stop.” Plaintiff
1
Plaintiff Grzelak originally brought this action on behalf of himself and seven other prisoners who did not sign the
complaint or provide their addresses to the Court. By Order (DN 9) entered August 17, 2016, this Court dismissed
all of the Plaintiffs except Plaintiff Grzelak from this action.
states that Defendant Coleman bragged about his driving skills, about the fact that he does not
stop in bad weather, and about how he had previously driven in a blizzard and arrived safely at
his destination.
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Carpenter was driving when the van was nearing
Kentucky. Plaintiff states that Defendant Carpenter asked Defendant Coleman when he would
take over. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Coleman stated that he needed more rest, and he
told the prisoners to be quiet and to be prepared in case they had to “hit the ditch.” Plaintiff
states that as the van entered Ballard County, Defendant Carpenter “lost control of the van on the
icy road and crashed into the ditch.” Plaintiff states that he “felt the crash coming so he dropped
down between the bench seats and braced for the crash.” Plaintiff states that he was not injured,
although some other inmates sustained “minor injuries,” and a pregnant inmate suffered a
dislocated shoulder. Plaintiff states that they were all taken to the “Jenni Stewart Medical
Center” in Hopkinsville, Kentucky, where they were looked at by medical staff. Those who
were injured were treated.
According to Plaintiff, the van in which he was being transported had been “revamped”
to carry 14 passengers and did not have seat belts for each passenger in violation of “Kentucky
Seatbelt law.” Plaintiff contends that transporting the inmates “without any safety restraints was
a clear violation of state laws as well as an equal rights violation upon all plaintiffs because all
plaintiffs were deprived of their rights to be safe as a passenger on the highways in like-manner
of all other passengers on said highways.” Plaintiff further contends that he was “discriminated
against because when police and federal personnel transport prisoners, seatbelts are manatory.”
Plaintiff contends that he was “placed in an unreasonable situation.” He asserts that Defendants
subjected him to “unreasonable safety hazards” and “disregard[ed] the risk of harm of which
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they clearly knew exist[ed].” Thus, Plaintiff states Defendants are “liable under the standard of
‘Deliberate Indifference.’” As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, injunctive relief in the
form of “order[ing] all plaintiffs to never be subjected to the services of PTS in the future,” and
“Ancillary Awards (amount to be determined).”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2 Under
§ 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 608.
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a
claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,
561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
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In the present case, the Court need not determine whether or not Plaintiff may bring a § 1983 action against a
private prisoner transportation corporation or its employees for allegedly unconstitutional actions taken against him
because Plaintiff has not alleged facts stating any actionable § 1983 claim.
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(citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.’” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Nat.
Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). The court’s duty “does not require [it]
to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create
a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975). To command otherwise would require the court “to explore exhaustively all potential
claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate
advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments
and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Eighth Amendment Claim
The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause requires prison
officials to ensure the “reasonable safety” of inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 822
(1994). An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both an objective and subjective component.
Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 2010). The objective component requires that the
deprivation alleged must be sufficiently serious and pose a substantial risk of serious harm.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 834. This component is contextually driven and is responsive to
“contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). The
subjective component requires that the official’s state of mind is one of deliberate indifference to
the inmate’s safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 834. “[D]eliberate indifference is a difficult
standard to meet.” Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 1999).
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With regard to Plaintiff’s claims concerning unsafe transportation, failure to transport
inmates without seatbelts, does not, standing alone, violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. See Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the failure of
prison officials to provide inmates with seatbelts does not, without more, violate the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendments); Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d at 906 (finding that
placement of pretrial detainee in a van without a seatbelt does not implicate the Eighth
Amendment where the driver otherwise was cautious and auto accident was not the driver’s
fault). More specifically, a failure to provide seatbelts does not, by itself, constitute a substantial
risk of serious harm rising to the level of a constitutional violation. Id.; Smith v. Sec’y for the
Dep’t of Corrs., 252 F. App’x 301, 303-04 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that failure to fasten an
inmate’s seatbelt in converted utility van does not constitute a substantial risk of serious harm);
Dexter v. Ford Motor Co., 92 F. App’x 637, 643 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that “failure to
seatbelt an inmate does not violate the Constitution”); Walls v. Kaho, No. 5:06cv188-MTP,
2009 WL 901917, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2009) (finding that a policy of refusing to seatbelt
inmates during transport does not give rise to a cognizable constitutional claim); Ingram v.
Herrington, No. 4:06-CV-P65-M, 2007 WL 2815965, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sep. 26, 2007) (stating
that failure to seatbelt prisoner does not constitute constitutional violation); Young v. Dep’t of
Corrs., No. 04-10309, 2007 WL 2214520, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 27, 2007) (finding that refusing
to seatbelt shackled prisoner does not constitute an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or
safety); Mojet v. Transp. Driver, No. 1:06-CV-321 TS, 2006 WL 3392944, at *2 (N.D. Ind.
Nov. 22, 2006) (finding that transporting inmates in vehicles without seatbelts does not meet
deliberate indifference standard).
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Plaintiff does not allege that the van’s driver drove recklessly or that he was injured in
any way. He does appear to contend that Defendants Carpenter and Coleman should have waited
and not driven through the bad weather. Many people choose to drive in winter weather
conditions. Defendant Coleman had driven in winter weather in the past without problem .
Defendants Carpenter and Coleman’s choice to continue driving through winter weather does not
rise to the level of deliberate indifference needed to make out a constitutional violation.
Further, the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly found Eighth Amendment claims for monetary
relief precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) absent a showing of physical injury. See Jennings v.
Weberg, No. 2:06-CV-235, 2007 WL 80875, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2007) (collecting cases).
The physical injury need not be significant, but it must be more than de minimis for an Eighth
Amendment claim to proceed. See Adams v. Rockafellow, 66 F. App’x 584, 586 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997)). In his complaint, Plaintiff
specifically states that he was not injured when the van “crashed into the ditch.” Having failed to
sustain any physical injury from the van crash, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking damages for
some sort of emotional or mental injury which would be precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B. Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff alleges that he was denied equal protection of the law because he was
transported in a van without seat belts which was a violation of state law and deprived him of his
right “to be safe as a passenger on the highways in like-manner of all other passengers on said
highways.” Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against because he was
“deprived of safety from injury of which other prisoners similarly situated, enjoy.”
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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” which essentially
means that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. U.S. Const., amend. XIV;
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). A claim that the
plaintiff was treated one way and everyone else was treated another way, by itself, is insufficient
to state an equal protection claim. Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 1992). “‘To
state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege that a state actor
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of membership in a protected class.’”
Henry v. Metro. Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Johnson v. Morel,
876 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc)); see also Wagner v. Higgins, 754 F.2d 186, 194
(6th Cir. 1985) (Conte, J., concurring) (stating that the plaintiff must show that the law was
applied differently to him because of his race, gender, age, or some other improper classification
in order to make out an equal protection claim); Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d at 887 (stating that to
make out a violation of his equal protection rights, plaintiff would have to “show that he was
victimized because of some suspect classification, which is an essential element of an equal
protection claim”) (quotations and citation omitted); Searcy v. Gardner, 3:07-0361, 2008 WL
400424, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 11, 2008) (“A prison inmate cannot support a claim that his
equal protection rights were violated simply by showing that other inmates were treated
differently. He must establish that a government official intentionally discriminated against him
because of his membership in a protected class.”).
Plaintiff fails to establish an equal protection violation because he has not shown that he
is a member of a protected class or that he was purposefully discriminated against. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s equal protection claim fails to state a claim, and it will be dismissed.
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C. Violations of State Statutes
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.125 by
not providing seatbelts in the van in which he was being transported. Violations of state statutes
are not actionable under § 1983. See Harrill v. Blount Cty., Tenn., 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.
1995) (“The violation of a right created and recognized only under state law is not actionable
under § 1983.”); Williams v. Van Buren Twp., 925 F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(“Obviously, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a state official for a
violation of state law.”).
Accordingly, the § 1983 claims alleging a violation of a Kentucky statute will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Further, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim. . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because the Court will dismiss the
federal claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it will decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims and dismiss them without prejudice. See Runkle v.
Fleming, 435 F. App’x 483, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen, as here, ‘all federal claims are
dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law
claims.’”) (quoting Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55
(6th Cir. 1996)).
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will enter a separate Order dismissing this action.
Date:
November 3, 2016
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4413.003
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