West v. Pella Corp.
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 5/4/2017 granting 10 Motion to Amend Complaint. cc: Counsel(KJA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:16-CV-00154-TBR
CHARLES WEST
PLAINTIFF
v.
PELLA CORP., INC
DEFENDANT
Memorandum Opinion and Order
This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Charles West’s motion for leave
to amend his complaint. [DN 10.] Defendant Pella Corp., Inc. has responded, [DN
12], and the time for filing a reply has passed. This matter is ripe for adjudication.
For the following reasons, West’s motion [DN 10] is GRANTED.
I. Background
Plaintiff Charles West claims that he was wrongfully discharged from his
employment at Pella Corp. in Murray, Kentucky. See [DN 1-1.] In his original
state court complaint, West alleged that Pella discriminated against him because of
his age, ultimately resulting in his termination. [Id. at 5-6.] He also claimed that
Pella interfered with his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
2615 et seq. (FMLA), and retaliated against him for his exercise of those rights. [Id.
at 6-8.] Finally, West says that Pella discharged him for filing a lawful worker’s
compensation claim.
[Id. at 8.]
Pella removed West’s suit to this Court and
answered, denying West’s allegations.
West now moves to amend his complaint to add a claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy. [DN 10 at 1.] In Count VI of his proposed
amended complaint, West claims that Pella terminated his employment “in
retaliation for Plaintiff applying for unemployment insurance benefits, in violation
of the public policy of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.” [DN 10-2 at 8.] Pella
opposes that motion. [DN 12.]
II. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), the Court should freely allow
a party to amend its pleading when justice so requires. Leave to amend is liberally
granted, except where there is “undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing
party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of the
amendment.” Brumbalough v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 427 F.3d 996, 1001 (6th
Cir. 2005) (citing Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 341-42 (6th Cir. 1998)); see also Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). A proposed amendment is futile “where it would
not withstand a motion to dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.”
Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ., 807 F.3d 768, 782 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Rose v.
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000). Ultimately, the
decision to grant or deny leave “is committed to [this Court's] sound discretion.”
Moore v. City of Paducah, 790 F.3d 557, 559 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Ruschel v.
Nestlé Holdings, Inc., 89 F. App’x 518, 521 (6th Cir. 2004).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a party must “plead
enough ‘factual matter’ to raise a ‘plausible’ inference of wrongdoing.” 16630
Southfield Ltd. P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013)
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(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A claim becomes plausible
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
Should the well-pleaded facts support no “more than the mere possibility of
misconduct,” then dismissal is warranted. Id. at 679.
The Court may grant a
motion to dismiss “only if, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the
allegations in the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, the complaint still fails to
allege a plausible theory of relief.” Garceau v. City of Flint, 572 F. App’x 369, 371
(6th Cir. 2014) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–79).
III. Discussion
West seeks leave to amend his complaint to add an additional count,
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Ordinarily, Kentucky allows “an
employer [to] discharge his at-will employee for good cause, for no cause, or for a
cause that some might view as morally indefensible.” Firestone Textile Co. Div.,
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. 1983) (citations
omitted).
But Kentucky also recognizes a limited exception to that rule for
terminations against public policy. Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985);
accord Hall v. Consol of Ky. Inc., 162 Fed.Appx. 587, 589-90 (6th Cir. 2006).
The exception is narrow: the employee's discharge must be “contrary to a
fundamental and well-defined public policy as . . . evidenced by a constitutional or
statutory provision.”
Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 401.
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Absent an express legislative
prohibition, there are “only two situations . . . where ‘grounds for discharging an
employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable.’” Id. at 402 (quoting
Suchodolski v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d 710, 711 (Mich. 1982)). Those
situations are (1) “where the alleged reason for the discharge of the employee was
the [employee's] failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment,” and
(2) “when the reason for a discharge was the employee's exercise of a right conferred
by well-established legislative enactment.” Id. (quoting Suchodolski, 316 N.W.2d at
711-12). The question of whether there is an actionable public-policy foundation is
a matter of law for the Court to determine. Id. at 401.
West does not allege his discharge was explicitly prohibited by statute.
Therefore, West must allege that Pella discharged him because he either refused to
violate the law in the course of his employment, or because he exercised a right
conferred by well-established legislative enactment. West relies on only the latter
theory.
In his proposed amended complaint, West avers he was terminated on
January 4, 2015, and applied for unemployment insurance benefits that same day.
[DN 10-2 at 3-4.] He was rehired on January 13, 2015, but then terminated a
second time on February 12, 2015. [Id. at 4.] West claims that “[i]n response to
Plaintiff’s application for unemployment benefits, Defendant reinstated Plaintiff’s
employment and then discharged Plaintiff a second time on or about February 12,
2015, citing excessive absenteeism.” [Id. at 8.]
Pella argues that West’s proposed claim is futile because it contains no
“employment-related nexus” necessary to maintain a viable wrongful termination
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claim. Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 402. However, Pella does not seem to dispute that by
applying for unemployment benefits, West “exercise[d] . . . a right conferred by a
well-established legislative enactment”; here, Kentucky’s unemployment benefits
scheme. Id. Drawing all reasonable inferences in West’s favor, and keeping in
mind its sound discretion to grant leave to amend, this Court does believe that
West’s complaint plausibly alleges Pella retaliated against West for exercising his
statutory right to apply for unemployment.
As Pella correctly points out, in
wrongful termination cases “the public policy must be defined by statute and must
be directed at providing statutory protection to the worker in his employment
situation.”
Shrout v. The TFE Grp., 161 S.W.3d 351, 355 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005)
(emphasis added). Typically, it is impossible for an employer to terminate a former
employee in retaliation for seeking unemployment benefits, because the termination
will have already occurred. However, under this particular set of circumstances,
where Pella rehired and re-fired West in rapid succession after his application for
benefits, the Court believes West has alleged “more than the mere possibility of
misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Further, none of the other relevant factors weigh against allowing West to
amend his complaint. See Brumbalough, 427 F.3d at 1001. This is West’s first
attempt to amend, and he satisfied this Court’s deadline for doing so. See [DN 8.]
There is no indication that West has engaged in bad faith, or that Pella will be
unduly prejudiced by allowing the amendment. Mindful that this case is in its
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relative infancy, the Court will allow West’s claim for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy to go forward.
IV. Conclusion and Order
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
Plaintiff Charles West’s motion for leave to amend his complaint [DN 10] is
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to FILE West’s proposed amended complaint [DN
10-2] as of the date of this Order and issue summons.
May 4, 2017
CC: Counsel of Record
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