Pembroke Health Facilities, L.P. et al v. Ford et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell. Defendants' motion to dismiss (DN 7 ) is denied. Plaintiff's motion to compel arbitration (DN 11 ) is granted in part and denied in part as set forth. Parties compelled to arbitrate certain claims as set forth. Proceeding stayed until conclusion of arbitration. Parties to inform Court when arbitration complete. cc: Counsel(JAC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION 5:16-CV-00158-TBR
PEMBROKE HEALTH FACILITIES, L.P.
d/b/a CHRISTIAN HEIGHTS NURSING AND
REHABILITATION CENTER, et al.

PLAINTIFFS

v.
NANCY FORD, et al.

DEFENDANTS
Memorandum Opinion and Order

This matter is before the Court upon two motions.

Defendants move to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint, and Plaintiffs move to compel arbitration and enjoin
Defendants from further pursuing related state court litigation.

[DN 7; DN 11.]

Both motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for adjudication.

For the

following reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [DN 7] is DENIED, and Plaintiffs’
motion to compel arbitration [DN 11] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
I. Facts and Procedural History
The

facts

relevant

to

the

instant

motions

are

undisputed. For

approximately twenty-one days in 2015, Ondice Eugene Ford resided at Christian
Heights Nursing and Rehabilitation Center in Pembroke, Kentucky.

[DN 7-1 at 1.]

During his stay, Nancy Ford and Tammy Jones, Eugene’s wife and daughter, allege
Eugene “suffered physical and emotional injuries due to inadequate care, and [his]
health and physical condition deteriorated beyond that caused by the normal aging
process.” [Id. at 2.]

Sadly, Eugene passed away.

Nancy and Tammy filed suit in

Christian County, Kentucky Circuit Court against various persons and entities
associated with Christian Heights.

That case is styled Ford, et al. v. Pembroke

Health Facilities, L.P., d/b/a/ Christian Heights Nursing and Rehabilitation
Center, et al., Civil Action No. 16-CI-00846.

See [DN 1-3.] In their state suit,

Nancy and Tammy assert negligence, loss of spousal consortium, and wrongful
death claims. See [id.]
In turn, Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court, naming Nancy and Tammy as
defendants.1

See [DN 1.]

They claim that a document executed by Nancy,

Eugene’s power of attorney, requires all of Defendants’ claims in the Christian
Circuit Court action be sent to arbitration. That document, entitled the
“Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement – Kentucky,” states that Eugene and
the nursing home “voluntarily agree that any disputes covered by this Agreement . .
. that may arise between the Parties shall be resolved exclusively by an ADR
process that shall include mediation and . . . binding arbitration.”

[DN 1-2 at 1.]

The Agreement was signed by Nancy Ford and Ashley West, the nursing home’s
business manager.

[Id. at 5.]

In pertinent part, the Agreement provides that it applies to “any and all
disputes arising out of or in any way relating to this Agreement or to the Resident’s
stay at the Center that would constitute a legally cognizable cause of action in a
court of law sitting in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.”

[Id. at 2.]

Any

arbitration “shall be conducted by a Neutral and administered by an independent,
The plaintiffs in this action are Pembroke Health Facilities, L.P., d/b/a Christian Heights Nursing
and Rehabilitation Center; Kentucky Partners Management LLC; Preferred Care Partners
Management Group, LP; and Preferred Care of Delaware, Inc., d/b/a Preferred Care, Inc.
1

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impartial entity” pursuant to “the Extendicare Health Services, Inc. Alternative
Dispute Resolution Rules of Procedure . . . then in effect.” [Id. at 2-3.]

Further,

the fourth page of the Agreement contains conspicuous language regarding the
waiver of a right to a jury trial:
THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND, ACKNOWLEDGE, AND AGREE
THAT BY ENTERING INTO THIS AGREEMENT THEY ARE
GIVING UP THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE
THEIR DISPUTES DECIDED BY A COURT OF LAW OR TO
APPEAL ANY DECISION OR AWARD OF DAMAGES
RESULTING FROM THE ADR PROCESS EXCEPT AS
PROVIDED
HEREIN. THIS
AGREEMENT
GOVERNS
IMPORTANT LEGAL RIGHTS. YOUR SIGNATURE BELOW
INDICATES YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF AND AGREEMENT
TO THE TERMS SET OUT ABOVE. PLEASE READ IT
COMPLETELY, THOROUGHLY AND CAREFULLY BEFORE
SIGNING.
[Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).]
after this passage.

Nancy Ford initialed the Agreement immediately

Signing the Agreement was not a condition of Eugene’s

admission to Christian Heights.

[Id. at 1.]

Nancy signed the Agreement on Eugene’s behalf pursuant to a 2006 general
durable power of attorney (POA). See [DN 1-4.] By executing the POA, Eugene
vested Nancy with “full power . . . to transact, handle, and dispose of all matters
affecting me and[/]or my estate in any possible way.”

[Id. at 1.]

The POA goes on

to list several specific delegations of authority, including the power “[t]o make
contracts” and “to make all decisions regarding my health care and medical
treatment.”

[Id. at 1-2.]

After Nancy and Tammy filed suit in Christian Circuit Court, Plaintiffs
initiated this action.

They seek to enforce the Agreement and compel Defendants’
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claims in the state action to arbitration.

Defendants oppose arbitration and seek

dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint.
II. Discussion
As this Court recently recognized, Defendants’ arguments are not novel.
GGNSC Louisville Mt. Holly, LLC v. Turner, No. 3:16-CV-00149-TBR, 2017 WL
537200, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2017). Rather, each argument has been raised
before, and rejected by, multiple federal district judges sitting in this
Commonwealth.

See id. (listing cases).

Defendants have presented the Court

with no compelling reason why it should depart from this precedent.

Therefore, as

more fully explained below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss must be denied.
However, under Kentucky law, Defendants’ wrongful death and loss of consortium
claims belong to Defendants rather than Eugene Ford’s estate, and are therefore
not subject to arbitration.
A. Motion to Dismiss
In their motion, Defendants assert several grounds for dismissal.

Many of

their arguments overlap with those raised in their response to Plaintiffs’ motion to
compel arbitration.

The Court will address Defendants’ jurisdictional arguments

in considering their motion to dismiss, as Defendants’ arguments regarding the
Agreement’s validity are more appropriately considered as they relate to Plaintiffs’
motion.

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(1) Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
First, Defendants argue the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this
action.

The parties agree that Plaintiffs’ complaint does not state a cause of action

giving rise to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. They also agree
that the parties before the Court are completely diverse.

Defendants claim,

however, that Plaintiffs failed to join a necessary party – Tammy Workman, the
nursing home administrator at Christian Heights.

Workman is a named

defendant in the state suit and a Kentucky resident. [DN 1-3 at 2.]

Citing Vaden

v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009), Defendants argue the Court should “look
through” to the underlying dispute between the parties.

And because Workman

owed Eugene Ford common-law and statutory duties of care, Defendants say, she is
also an indispensable party to this action that destroys diversity jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
In Vaden, the Supreme Court held that in considering petitions to compel
arbitration arising under § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the district court
possesses jurisdiction “only if, ‘save for’ the [arbitration agreement], the entire,
actual ‘controversy between the parties,’ as they have framed it, could be litigated in
federal court.”

Vaden, 556 U.S. at 66.

However, the Court limited its holding to

cases involving federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 62. As this Court and
numerous others have held, the “look through” doctrine does not apply when
diversity of citizenship supplies the basis for the district court’s jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Northport Health Servs. of Ark. v. Rutherford, 605 F.3d 483, 489-91 (8th Cir.

5

2010); GGNSC Louisville Hillcreek, LLC v. Watkins, No. 3:15-cv-902-DJH, 2016 WL
815295, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 29, 2016); GGNSC Frankfort, LLC v. Tracy, No. 14-30GFVT, 2015 WL 1481149, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2015); Sun Heathcare Grp., Inc.
v. Dowdy, No. 5:13-CV-0169, 2014 WL 790916, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2014).
Neither must this case be dismissed for failure to join Workman as an
indispensable party to this case.

Workman’s mere presence in the state court

action does not make her indispensable here. See PaineWebber, Inc. v. Cohen, 276
F.3d 197, 203-04 (6th Cir. 2001).

Further, Workman is not an indispensable party

under Rule 19, because here, the Court is able to “accord complete relief among
[the] existing parties,” and her interest in the case is the same interest possessed by
the named Plaintiffs.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A)-(B).

Because Workman is not an

indispensable party to this action, the Court need not address Rule 19(b). Sch.
Dist. of City of Pontiac v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 264-65 (6th Cir.
2009).

This action may proceed in Workman’s absence. See, e.g., GGNSC

Louisville St. Matthews v. Madison, No. 3:16-CV-00830-TBR, 2017 WL 2312699, at
*4 (W.D. Ky. May 26, 2017); Watkins, 2016 WL 815295, at *2-3; Diversicare of
Nicholasville, LLC v. Lowry, 213 F. Supp. 3d 859, 862-65 (E.D. Ky. 2016); GGNSC
Louisville Hillcreek, LLC v. Warner, No. 3:13-CV-752-H, 2013 WL 6796421, at *3-4
(W.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2013).
(2) Colorado River Abstention
Defendants next argue that even if the Court possesses subject-matter
jurisdiction over this action, it should abstain from exercising that jurisdiction

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pursuant to Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976).

In Colorado River, the Supreme Court recognized that while “the

pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the
same matter in the Federal court,” the “general principle is to avoid duplicative
litigation” between parallel suits in federal and state court. Id. at 817.

However,

the Court characterized this doctrine as “an extraordinary and narrow exception to
the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.”

Id. at

813.
The Sixth Circuit has set forth eight factors to be considered by the Court in
determining whether it should exercise Colorado River abstention.2

Great Earth

Cos., Inc. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 886 (6th Cir. 2002). Other courts have
thoughtfully considered these factors in this same context, concluding they weigh
heavily against abstention. See, e.g., Madison, 2017 WL 2312699, at *4-5;
Preferred Care, Inc. v. Howell, 187 F. Supp. 3d 796, 805-07 (E.D. Ky. 2016);
Watkins, 2016 WL 815295, at *3-4; Tracy, 2015 WL 1481149, at *7-9.3

This case is

no different.

2

The eight factors to be considered are
(1) whether the state court has assumed jurisdiction over any res or property; (2)
whether the federal forum is less convenient to the parties; (3) avoidance of
piecemeal litigation; . . . (4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained[;] . . . (5)
whether the source of governing law is state or federal; (6) the adequacy of the statecourt action to protect the federal plaintiff's rights; (7) the relative progress of the
state and federal proceedings; and (8) the presence or absence of concurrent
jurisdiction.

Great Earth, 288 F.3d at 886.
3 On this point, Defendants rely upon Preferred Care of Delaware, Inc. v. Vanarsdale, 152 F. Supp.
3d 929 (E.D. Ky. 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-5209 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 2016), where this Court’s
sister court abstained in a similar case based upon Colorado River. While this Court respects the

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The Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction and need not abstain from
exercising it.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [DN 7] is DENIED.
B. Motion to Compel Arbitration

Plaintiffs move to compel arbitration pursuant to § 4 of the Federal
Arbitration Act.

The FAA codifies “a national policy favoring arbitration when the

parties contract for that mode of dispute resolution,” Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346,
349 (2008), and puts arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as other
contracts,” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (quoting Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).

The statute establishes a

procedural framework applicable in both federal and state courts, and also
mandates that substantive federal arbitration law be applied in both. See AlliedBruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
Section 3 of the FAA permits a party seeking to enforce an arbitration
agreement to request that litigation be stayed until the terms of the arbitration
agreement have been fulfilled.

9 U.S.C. § 3.

Before compelling arbitration, the

Court “must engage in a limited review to determine whether the dispute is
arbitrable.” Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624, 627 (6th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2003)).

This

review requires the Court to determine first whether “a valid agreement to
arbitrate exists between the parties,” and second whether “the specific dispute falls

decision reached by the Vanarsdale court, the overwhelming weight of authority in both the Eastern
and Western Districts of Kentucky is to the contrary.

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within the substantive scope of the agreement.” Id. (quoting Javitch, 315 F.3d at
624).

“Because arbitration agreements are fundamentally contracts,” the Court

must “review the enforceability of an arbitration agreement according to the
applicable state law of contract formation.”

Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs.,

Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938, 943-44 (1995)).
(1) Interstate Commerce
Defendants first claim the Agreement fails to satisfy the FAA’s requirement
that the arbitration contract must evidence a transaction involving interstate
commerce.

9 U.S.C. § 2.

The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase

“involving commerce” in the FAA as signaling the broadest permissible exercise of
Congress’ Commerce Clause power. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52,
56 (2003).

Based upon that interpretation, this Court has found on multiple prior

occasions that nursing home admission agreements implicate interstate commerce
because the food, medicine, and supplies used by nursing homes travel through
interstate channels. See Life Care Centers of Am., Inc. v. Estate of Neblett, No.
5:14-CV-00124-TBR, 2014 WL 5439623, at *6-7 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 22, 2014); Dowdy,
2014 WL 790916, at *11-12; Warner, 2013 WL 6796421, at *7-8. Additionally,
Defendants’ argument is belied by the allegations contained in their state court
complaint, wherein they claim foreign entities owned, operated, managed,
controlled, and provided services for the nursing home. See [DN 1-3.] The

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arbitration agreement at issue in this case plainly reflects a transaction in
interstate commerce.
(2) Power of Attorney
Next, Defendants argue the Agreement is unenforceable because Eugene
Ford’s power of attorney did not grant Nancy Ford the authority to enter into
arbitration agreements on Eugene’s behalf.

Their argument is based upon the

Kentucky Supreme Court’s holding in Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478
S.W.3d 306, 237 (Ky. 2015), that powers of attorney must contain language
specifically authorizing the representative to waive the principal’s right to a trial by
jury.

However, this Court (and others) subsequently recognized that the rule

announced in Whisman violated the FAA by singling out arbitration agreements for
differential treatment. See, e.g., Preferred Care of Delaware, Inc. v. Crocker, 173 F.
Supp. 3d 505, 519-20 (W.D. Ky. 2016). The United States Supreme Court recently
adopted this view in Kindred Nursing Centers L.P. v. Clark, 581 U.S. ___ (2017).
In Kindred, the Court held that “[t]he Kentucky Supreme Court’s clear-statement
rule . . . fails to put arbitration agreements on an equal plane with other contracts.”
Id., slip op. at 5.

“Such a rule,” the Court said,” is too tailor-made to arbitration

agreements . . . to survive the FAA’s edict against singling out those contracts for
disfavored treatment.”

Id., slip op. at 6.

Following Kindred, then, the proper inquiry is whether the grant of authority
contained in the power of attorney is “sufficiently broad to cover executing an
arbitration agreement.”

Id., slip op. at 9.

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Here, the POA vests Nancy with “full

power . . . to transact, handle, and dispose of all matters,” including the power “[t]o
make contracts.” [DN 1-4 at 1-2.]

This language unquestionably encompasses the

power to enter into an arbitration agreement.
(3) Unconscionability
Defendants next contend the Agreement is procedurally and substantively
unconscionable because it was “likely presented . . . within a lengthy stack of
admissions paperwork,” because “there is an obviously gross disparity of bargaining
power between the parties,” and because the arbitration rules of procedure allow for
only limited discovery.

[DN 12 at 8-9.]

procedural and substantive.

Unconscionability comes in two varieties,

Procedural unconscionability “pertains to the process

by which an agreement is reached.” Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d
335, 341 n.22 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).

In contrast, substantive unconscionability

“refers to contractual terms that are unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side
and to which the disfavored party does not assent.” Id. (citing Harris v. Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999)).
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has said that “[a]dhesion contracts,”
including ones containing arbitration clauses, “are not per se improper.” Schnuerle
v. Insight Commc’ns Co., L.P., 376 S.W.3d 561, 576 (Ky. 2012).

In previous cases,

this Court has considered and rejected the same arguments raised by Defendants.
See Preferred Care of Delaware, Inc. v. Hopkins, No. 5:15-CV-00191-GNS-LLK, 2016
WL 3546407, at *4-5 (W.D. Ky. 2016); Arnold v. Owensboro Health Facilities, L.P.,
No. 4:15-CV-00104-JHM, 2016 WL 502601, at *4-5 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 8, 2016)

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(collecting cases).

Rather, Defendants’ arguments, at their core, “are nothing more

than objections to arbitration agreements in general, and therefore directly
contradict the policy embodied in the FAA.”

Brookdale Sr. Living, Inc. v. Stacy, 27

F. Supp. 3d 776, 788 (E.D. Ky. 2014) (emphasis in original).

The arbitration

agreement at issue in this case is neither procedurally nor substantively
unconscionable.
(4) Lack of Complete and Definite Terms
In passing, Defendants argue the Agreement “does not sufficient [sic] state
the parties who are alleged to be bound.”

[DN 12 at 7.]

They point out, correctly,

that the Agreement does not explicitly name any of the Plaintiffs in this case. See
[DN 1-2.]

Under Kentucky law, a contract, including a contract to arbitrate, must

contain “definite and certain terms” to be enforceable.
S.W.2d 251, 254 (Ky. 1997).

Kovacs v. Freeman, 957

The identity of the parties is, of course, an essential

element of a contract. See Cox v. Ford, No. 2014-CA-000961-MR, 2015 WL
9413404, at *2 (Ky. Cr. App. Dec. 23, 2015) (citing King v. Ohio Valley Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 280 S.W. 127, 129 (Ky. 1926)).

In Cox, the Kentucky Court of

Appeals held that “[i]n situations where an authorized agent signs a written
agreement in the name of a company, but the company's name does not appear in
the body of the contract, it is improper for the trial court to determine, as a matter
of law, that the company was not a party to the contract.” Id. (citing Miller v.
Johns, 163 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Ky. 1942)).

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Here, the Agreement says it “is entered into by KYCH (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Center’), a nursing facility, and Eugene Ford, a Resident at the Center.”
[Id. at 1.]

Plaintiffs state (and Defendants do not contest) that “KYCH” is an

abbreviation for Kentucky Christian Heights, the doing-business-as name of
Pembroke Health Facilities, L.P. – a named Plaintiff in this case.

Ashley West, the

nursing home’s business manager, signed on the facility’s behalf.

[Id. at 5.] The

Court is satisfied that West’s signature bound Plaintiffs, as their agent, to
arbitration.

The parties are sufficiently identified and definite as a matter of law.

See Crocker, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 528.
(5) Wrongful Death and Loss of Consortium
Lastly, Defendants claim that their wrongful death and Nancy Ford’s loss of
spousal consortium claims may not be compelled to arbitration.

In Ping v. Beverly

Enterprises, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 600 (Ky. 2012), the Kentucky Supreme Court
held that because a wrongful death claim belongs to the beneficiary under
Kentucky’s wrongful death statute, KRS 411.130(2), wrongful death beneficiaries
are not bound by the decedent’s agreement to arbitrate.

Furthermore, the Sixth

Circuit concluded in Richmond Health Facilities v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192, 197-99
(6th Cir. 2016), that the rule announced in Ping does not run afoul of the FAA.
Defendants’ wrongful death claim in state court belongs to defendants, not Eugene
Ford’s estate.

The Agreement does not bind them to arbitration on that claim.

Likewise, a claim for loss of consortium accrues directly to the spouse and it may be
asserted directly by him or her.

KRS 411.145; Martin v. Ohio County Hosp. Corp.,

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295 S.W.3d 104, 108 (Ky. 2009). Nancy Ford’s loss of spousal consortium claim is
also not subject to arbitration.
C. Remedy
As explained above, all of Defendants’ claims against Plaintiffs are subject to
arbitration, save for the wrongful death and loss of spousal consortium claims.
The remaining question, then, is the proper remedy.

Plaintiffs seek an injunction

barring Defendants from further pursing the underlying litigation in Christian
Circuit Court, including the wrongful death and loss of spousal consortium claims.
Defendants argue that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, prohibits such an
order.
The Federal Arbitration Act “does not specifically authorize federal courts to
stay proceedings pending in state courts.”

Great Earth Cos., Inc. v. Simons, 288

F.3d 878, 894 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Accordingly, “the district court’s
authority to enjoin state-court proceedings is subject to the legal and equitable
standards for injunctions generally, including the Anti-Injunction Act.” Id.

In

turn, the Anti-Injunction Act provides, “[a] court of the United States may not grant
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.”

28 U.S.C § 2283.

In Great Earth, after a trial court concluded that the parties’ dispute was
subject to arbitration, the Sixth Circuit held that “[a]n injunction of the state
proceedings [was] necessary to protect the final judgment of the district court.”

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Great Earth, 288 F.3d at 894.

Such is the case here.

Having concluded that

Nancy Ford entered into a binding arbitration agreement with Christian Heights on
Eugene Ford’s behalf, the injunction Plaintiffs request “properly falls within the
exception for injunctions ‘necessary to protect or effectuate [this Court’s]
judgments.’”

Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283). “Otherwise, [Defendants] would be

permitted to circumvent [the] arbitration agreement and in doing so, circumvent
this Court’s judgment that [Defendants] be compelled to arbitrate [their] claims.”
Stacy, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 792.

This Court has often taken this same approach in the

past, and it does so again today. See, e.g., GGNSC Louisville Mt. Holly LLC v.
Stevenson, No. 3:16-CV-00423-JHM, 2016 WL 5867427, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 6,
2016); Watkins, 2016 WL 815295, at *7; Warner, 2013 WL 6796421, at *10. Of
course, Defendants are not enjoined from further pursuing the wrongful death and
loss of spousal consortium claims, because those claims are not subject to
arbitration.
IV. Conclusion and Order
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
Defendants’ motion to dismiss [DN 7] is DENIED.

Plaintiffs’ motion to

compel arbitration [DN 11] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Defendants are ENJOINED from further pursuing their negligence, medical
negligence, and corporate negligence claims against Plaintiffs in the Christian
Circuit Court action styled Ford, et al. v. Pembroke Health Facilities, L.P., d/b/a/
Christian Heights Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, et al., Civil Action No. 16-CI-

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00846.

The parties are COMPELLED to arbitrate those claims.

Counsel shall

promptly inform the Christian Circuit Court of this Memorandum Opinion and
Order.
This proceeding is STAYED until the conclusion of the ordered arbitration.
The parties shall inform the Court when arbitration is complete.

June 7, 2017

CC: Counsel of Record

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