Mullins v. Johnson et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 1/17/17: Plaintiff's claims against Johnson and Lenniz in their official capacities are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim up on which relief may be granted. Within 30 days from the entry date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint. Plaintiff shall sue Defendants in their individual capacities and shall describe the specific facts surr ounding how each Defendant allegedly violated his rights. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to place the instant case number and the word Amended on a § 1983 complaint form and send it, along with two summons forms, to Plaintiff for his completion. Plaintiff is WARNED that should he fail to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Court will enter an Order dismissing the action for the reason stated herein. cc: Counsel, Defendants, Plaintiff (pro se) (DJT)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY AT PADUCAH CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:17CV-P1-TBR RUSSELL B. MULLINS PLAINTIFF v. MATTHEW JOHNSON et al. DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Russell B. Mullins filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court on initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the official-capacity claims and allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint. I. Plaintiff is a convicted inmate at the Christian County Jail (CCJ). Plaintiff names as Defendants Matthew Johnson, whom he identifies as a physician at CCJ, and Nurse Lenniz,1 whom he identifies as a nurse at CCJ. He sues Johnson and Lenniz in their official capacities only. Plaintiff states that, since his incarceration in the CCJ began in January 2016, “the medical staff here have failed to treat my type 2 diabetes in any way that is considered competent or professional.” He continues, “In fact they have repeatedly put my life in grave danger. Not once in all this time have they done a basic blood test which is necessary for my severity of diabetes. The AC1 level determined by these blood tests are a major factor in prescribing treatment.” He further states, “On four documented occasions I have gone into a diabetic coma 1 While Plaintiff does not list Lenniz in the caption of the complaint form, he lists him or her in the portion of the complaint form where Defendants are to be listed. as a direct result of being given the wrong type and dosage of insulin. I’ve never even been given a physical exam by the doctor. In fact, I’ve never seen a doctor.” Plaintiff asserts, “Every day I’m in fear of dying as a result of the gross incompetence of the so-called medical staff here.” As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages. II. When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 2 not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). III. The Court construes the complaint as alleging 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff sues Johnson and Lenniz in their official capacities only. “Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [] another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Suing employees in their official capacities is the equivalent of suing their employer. Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2008); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994); Smallwood v. Jefferson Cty. Gov’t, 743 F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990). Therefore, the Court construes Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Johnson and Lenniz as brought against their employer, presumably CCJ. 3 However, CCJ is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 because municipal departments, such as jails, are not suable under § 1983. Marbry v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 996706, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 28072, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (holding that a jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983); see also Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a police department may not be sued under § 1983). In this situation, Christian County is the proper defendant. Smallwood v. Jefferson Cty. Gov’t, 743 F. Supp. at 503. Further, Christian County is a “person” for purposes of § 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. The Court therefore will construe the claims against CCJ as claims against Christian County. When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The Court will first address the second issue, i.e., whether the municipality is responsible for the alleged constitutional violation. A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Deaton v. Montgomery Cty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the 4 liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)). In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges he has been denied medical treatment for his Type 2 diabetes. However, he does not allege that the action or inaction of Defendants occurred as a result of a policy or custom implemented or endorsed by Christian County. The complaint alleges an isolated occurrence affecting only Plaintiff. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1999) (“No evidence indicates that this was anything more than a one-time, isolated event for which the county is not responsible.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Moreover, while Plaintiff names Johnson and Lenniz as Defendants, he does not state specific allegations against them in the body of his complaint or state how they were directly involved in the alleged events. While the Court has a duty to construe pro se complaints liberally, Plaintiff is not absolved of his duty to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by providing Defendants with “fair notice of the basis for [his] claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” To state a claim for relief, Plaintiff must show how each Defendant is accountable because the Defendant was personally involved in the acts about which he complains. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76 (1976). Plaintiff fails to state in the complaint the grounds for seeking relief against Johnson or Lenniz, and the claims against these Defendants are subject to dismissal on this basis. “[U]nder Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act].” 5 LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013). The Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to name Defendants in their individual capacities and to describe the facts surrounding how each Defendant allegedly violated his rights. IV. For the reasons set forth herein, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against Johnson and Lenniz in their official capacities are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 30 days from the entry date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint. Plaintiff shall sue Defendants in their individual capacities and shall describe the specific facts surrounding how each Defendant allegedly violated his rights. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to place the instant case number and the word “Amended” on a § 1983 complaint form and send it, along with two summons forms, to Plaintiff for his completion. Plaintiff is WARNED that should he fail to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Court will enter an Order dismissing the action for the reason stated herein. Date: January 17, 2017 cc: Plaintiff, pro se Defendants Christian County Attorney 4413.010 6

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