Raleigh v. Patton et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge Greg N. Stivers on 11/29/17: This matter is before the Court on initial screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the action. cc: Plaintiff(pro se), Defendants, General Counsel (DJT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER RALEIGH

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:17CV-P90-GNS

U.A. MR. JOSH PATTON et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Christopher Raleigh, a prisoner incarcerated in the Kentucky State Penitentiary
(KSP), filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 1). This matter is before the
Court on initial screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that
follow, the Court will dismiss the action.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff sues the following KSP officers in their individual capacities: Josh Patton, Unit
Administrator (U.A.) of 7-cellhouse; Chris Vincent, Lieutenant “over Property Room”; Steven
Birdsong, Sergeant; and James Corley, Correctional Officer.
In the complaint, Plaintiff claims that on January 19, 2017, “They refused to give me a
seized property form, and threw my personal property away, under 8th Admendment . . . .” He
further claims, “Upon being stripped out and placed in Observation Cell #2, I saw [Defendants]
Sgt. Birdsong and C/O Corely inventory my personal property and set certain Item’s aside to be
seized, but were thrown away instead!”
Plaintiff reports that he filed a grievance regarding the issue on January 20, 2017; that
Defendant Patton “said on the Informal Resolution that it was in the 7C/H Property Room, but it
wasn’t there at all”; that Plaintiff wrote Warden Randy White about the situation; that Plaintiff
informed U.A. Mitchell, who is “over 7C/H of the problem he’s the one who had made me file a

theif report also”; and that the grievance process was “completed and they said they counselled
[Defendant] C/O Corley on this matter!!” Plaintiff additionally claims that he wrote Defendant
Vincent “about the problem and filled out numerous Property Escort Form’s to Inventory my
property that is in the Yard Property Room, but I was denied!!”
As relief, Plaintiff requests, “Damage’s of personal property being thrown away Book’s,
Magazine’s, and ‘Family 29-count Photo’s that were of sentimental Value to me,’ I am asking
for $2,500.00!!!!”
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Under § 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint
and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court determines that it is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
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570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although courts are to hold pro se pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), this duty to be less
stringent “does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require courts “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the
strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that his personal property was thrown away in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.

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“Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim”
under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “Not every
unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955
(6th Cir. 1987). “[P]rison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing,
shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 526-27 (1984)).
A viable Eighth Amendment claim must satisfy both an objective component and a
subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 834; Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,
102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). The objective component requires that the deprivation be
“sufficiently serious.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). An inmate must show that he
was deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The subjective component requires the defendant to act with “deliberate
indifference” to a prisoner’s health or safety. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. at 302-03. “‘[A]cting or
failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the
equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.’” Street, 102 F.3d at 815 (quoting Farmer v
Brennan, 511 U.S. at 836). “Implicit in this standard is the recognition that the plaintiff must
allege that he has suffered or is threatened with suffering actual harm as a result of the
defendants’ acts or omissions before he can make any claim with an arguable basis in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.” Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 1998).

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Here, there is no indication that Defendants’ conduct deprived Plaintiff of the minimum
civilized measure of life’s necessities or implicated Plaintiff’s health or safety. See Hunter v.
Sherman, 49 F. App’x 611, 612 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[The plaintiff] cannot state a claim under the
Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to the security of his property.”); Jones v. Caruso,
No. 2:11-cv-65, 2011 WL 3740579, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2011) (holding that confiscation
of an inmate’s property does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation).
Consequently, the destruction of Plaintiff’s property does not rise to the level of an
Eighth Amendment violation, and his claim will be dismissed.
Further, as to any Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim Plaintiff may be attempting
to assert, the Supreme Court has held that where adequate remedies are provided by state law,
the negligent or intentional loss or destruction of personal property does not state a claim
cognizable under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other grounds by
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). In order to assert a constitutional claim for
deprivation of property, a plaintiff must allege that the state post-deprivation procedures are
inadequate to remedy the deprivation. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 543-44. The law of this
Circuit is in accord. For example, in Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth
Circuit held that “in § 1983 damage suits claiming the deprivation of a property interest without
procedural due process of law, the plaintiff must plead and prove that state remedies for
redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Id. at 1066. The Sixth Circuit has found that Kentucky’s
statutory remedy for such losses is adequate within the meaning of Parratt. See Wagner v.
Higgins, 754 F.2d 186, 191-92 (6th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff does not allege any reason why a state5

court action would not afford him complete relief for the deprivation of his personal property.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim, and that claim
will be dismissed.
The Court will enter a separate Order dismissing this case.
Date:

November 29, 2017

Greg N. Stivers, Judge
United States District Court
cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
General Counsel, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, Office of Legal Counsel
4416.005

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