Wiley v. KDOC et al
Filing
101
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 12/16/2021. Granting 93 Motion for Reconsideration re 93 filed by Allen Wiley. Telephone Conference set for 1/5/2022 at 11:00 AM before Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to reinstate all claims against Defendants J. Knight, Stephen Mitchell, Willard OBryan, Randy White, Chase Byrum, and Brendan Inglish. cc: Counsel(KJA)
Case 5:17-cv-00160-TBR-LLK Document 101 Filed 12/17/21 Page 1 of 6 PageID #: 625
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:17-cv-00160-TBR
ALLEN WILEY
PLAINTIFF
v.
KDOC, et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Allen Wiley’s Motion to Reconsider pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(b). [DN 93]. Plaintiff also filed a supplement to this motion. [DN 94].
Defendants responded. [DN 97]. Plaintiff replied. [DN 98; DN 100]. As such, this matter is ripe
for adjudication. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.
I.
Background
A full recitation of the facts can be found in the Court’s previous Memorandum Opinion
and Order [DN 92]. A condensed version is as follows: Wiley filed a civil rights case against
Kentucky Department of Corrections and numerous KSP employees. [DN 1]. After initial review,
the Court allowed Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims to proceed against
Defendants Randy White, Terry Griffin, Stephen Mitchell, James Knight, Chase Byrum, and
Brendan Inglish in their individual capacities. [DN 11]. The Defendants filed and the Court granted
a motion for summary judgment, [DN 22; DN 35], which the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded.
[DN 53]. Wiley amended his complaint adding an excessive force claim against Willard O’Bryan
in his official capacity and a claim of supervisor liability against Inglish. [DN 67]. Defendant
O’Bryan then filed a motion for summary judgment, [DN 82], which the Court granted and sua
sponte terminated Randy White, Stephen Mitchell, James Knight, Chase Byrum, and Brendan
Inglish because Wiley failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to the defendants who were
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not specifically named in his grievance. [DN 92]. Wiley now brings a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Court’s previous grant of summary judgment and termination of said defendants. [DN 93].
II.
Legal Standard
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide expressly for “motions for
reconsideration,” Plaintiff's instant motion seeks relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b), which provides that:
any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the
action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the
entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and
liabilities.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Indeed, the Court has “inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders and
reopen any part of a case before entry of a final judgment.” Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273,
1282 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47–48
(1943)). Further, “district court[s] may modify, or even rescind, such interlocutory orders” for
cause seen by it to be sufficient. Id. (citing Simmons Co. v. Grier Brothers Co., 258 U.S. 82, 88
(1922)); see also Lellanau Wine Cellars Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., 118 Fed.Appx. 942, 946 (6th
Cir. 2004). Still, reconsideration is disfavored, and the Court will reconsider an interlocutory order
only if: (1) there is an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a
need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Johnson, 2019 WL 236720, at *2;
Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F. App'x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004). “The
moving party has the burden of showing that reconsideration is warranted, and that some harm or
injustice would result if reconsideration were to be denied.” Adkins v. Kroger Ltd. P'ship, No.
5:18-156, 2018 WL 6613786, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 18, 2018) (quoting Shah v. NXP
Semiconductors USA, Inc., 507 F. App'x 483, 495 (6th Cir. 2012)).
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III.
Discussion
Upon review, the Court finds that reconsideration is warranted for the granting of
Defendant O’Bryan’s motion for summary judgment and the termination Defendants Randy
White, Stephen Mitchell, Chase Byrum, James Knight, and Brendan Inglish. Reconsideration is
appropriate because the Court finds a need to correct a clear error and prevent manifest injustice
in light of newly available evidence. Previously, the Court granted summary judgment for these
defendants because Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies by not specifically
naming them in his grievance. [DN 92]. Plaintiff did fail to exhaust this requirement, however, “in
some limited circumstances an inmate is relieved of his duty to exhaust administrative remedies
because the remedies are effectively unavailable.” Frazier v. Dollar, No. 2:19-CV-00102-JRGCRW, 2021 WL 1238275, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 1, 2021) (citing Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859-60).
“These circumstances include (1) when there is no possibility for relief through use of the
procedure; (2) when the rules are so confusing as to render them essentially unknowable; and (3)
when prison officials ‘thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through
machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.’” Id. (quoting Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859-60).
Applying this same law in its prior Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court determined
that Wiley failed to show that the administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him.
[DN 92]. Previously, Wiley incorrectly argued that there was no policy requiring identification of
all involved individuals, however, in his motion to reconsider, Wiley explains that he was actually
unaware of such a policy due to the guards denial of his request for the grievance handbook and
because “the factual circumstances of this excessive force event prevented him from being able to
reasonably know, observe, or identify the officers involved.” [DN 98 at 13; DN 93]. The Court
previously held that “Wiley’s allegation that the grievance form did not include an explicit
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direction that an inmate should identify all individuals does not demonstrate that the grievance
procedures were unknowable or unavailable,” but with Plaintiff’s newly explained argument and
affidavit the Court finds that Wiley now sufficiently demonstrates that the grievance procedures
were both effectively unknowable and unavailable. [DN 92].
After reviewing the parties’ briefs for the present motion for reconsideration as well as
some relevant case law, the Court finds that it erred by granting summary judgment and
terminating the defendants, because the alleged unavailability of the required grievance procedures
should defeat Defendants’ previous motion for summary judgment. Defendants argue that “there
is no question that Plaintiff was aware of the grievance procedure” because “during intake, the
Inmate handbook was discussed with Plaintiff” and “Plaintiff signed an acknowledgement that he
had an opportunity to receive information on the topics, which included the grievance procedure,
and discuss and understand them.” [DN 97 at 4]. Though Wiley might have been aware of the
requirements when he went through orientation and signed the paperwork saying as much, that
does not mean that he retained that information to accurately fill out his grievance form when he
did not have assistance nor access to the Corrections Policy and Procedure (CPP). [DN 98].
Further, Plaintiff provides new evidence, previously unavailable due to Covid-19 restrictions, of
Wiley’s sworn affidavits stating that he was in fact unaware of the grievance procedure
requirement and that he asked for but was denied a copy of CPP 14.6 which stated that all
individuals must be listed. [DN 94]. As Defendants point out in their response, the Sixth Circuit
simply requires that inmates “have a fair, reasonable opportunity to apprise [themselves] of the
procedures.” [DN 97, DN 53 (citing Davies v. Hernandez, 798 F. 3d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 2015))].
Denying Wiley’s requests for a copy of the CPP, however, unequivocally denied him the
opportunity to be informed of the required procedures. Requiring an inmate to remember all twenty
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plus pages of the CPP months, or years, after reading them is neither “reasonable” nor “fair.” The
Court, unaware of Plaintiff’s true arguments at the time of the prior opinion, must vacate said
opinion to prevent a clear error and manifest injustice.
Defendants contend that “[t]o accept an argument that [informing Wiley of the grievance
procedure requirements at orientation] was insufficient the court would have to find that the prison
must make sure that each time an inmate sets about drafting a grievance, a copy of CPP 14.6
beyond the copy on the Department of Corrections website that is available to the public at large,
is available.” [DN 97 at 6]. Conversely, Plaintiff argues that “the Court must decide whether a onetime ‘discussion’ of the [the relevant documents] constitutes a ‘fair, reasonable opportunity’ for
Plaintiff to apprise himself of the requirements of CPP 14.6.” [DN 98]. The Court agrees with the
later. Denying an inmate access to the CPP requirements practically revokes the “possibility of
relief” and makes the rules “essentially unknowable.” Providing an inmate a copy of the CPP when
requested should not be too large of a burden for the prison to bear.
Though the Court agrees with Plaintiff’s conclusion that the grievance procedures were
effectively unavailable to him, his argument that the Court erred in application of Browder v.
Ankrom, No. CIV.A. 4:05CV-P9-M, 2008 WL 3850380 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2008), is flawed. As
Plaintiff points out, the Court previously distinguished the present case from Browder stating:
A key difference between Browder and this case is that Wiley does not claim that
he was actually unaware of or misinformed of the policy requiring him to name all
involved individuals in his grievance. . . . [The Browder court’s point] was that if
the inmate did not know about a particular grievance policy because the
correctional facility provided incorrect or misleading directions to the inmate, his
unawareness could not be held against him.
[DN 92; DN 93] (emphasis added). The Court reiterates this distinction below. Wiley was unaware
of the grievance procedure because the prison guards failed to provide Wiley with a copy of the
CPP requirements when asked. Browder’s unawareness stemmed from confusion and
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misinformation provided on the instructions of the grievance form. These differences are
distinguishable, however, just like in Browder, Wiley’s newly explained unawareness cannot be
held against him. As such, the Court does not agree with Plaintiff’s argument that “circumstances
in this case are exactly the same as those in Browder,” nevertheless, reconsideration is warranted
because effectively “no grievance procedure was available to Plaintiff.” [DN 93 at 10]. Upon
clarification by the Plaintiff explaining why Wiley was unaware of the requirements, the Court
finds that “injustice would result if reconsideration were to be denied.” Adkins, No. 5:18-156, 2018
WL 6613786, at *3. As such, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reinstate claims against the terminated defendants.
IV.
Conclusion
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, for the reasons stated above, that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration, DN 93, is GRANTED. This Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order, DN 92,
granting Defendant O’Bryan’s motion for summary judgment and termination of additional
defendants is hereby VACATED.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to reinstate all claims against Defendants J. Knight,
Stephen Mitchell, Willard O’Bryan, Randy White, Chase Byrum, and Brendan Inglish.
A telephonic conference is set January 5, 2022 at 11:00 a.m. Central Time. The Court
shall initiate the call.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
December 16, 2021
cc: counsel
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