Moorman v. Kentucky State Penitentiary Officers

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 5/1/2018. Plaintiff shall have 90 days to file an amended complaint in which he names the John Doe Defendants in their individual capacities and describes the excessive force each alle gedly used against him. Plaintiff's failure to timely amend his complaint to name these Defendants may result in their dismissal from the action. cc: Plaintiff, pro se, Defendants, General Counsel, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, Office of Legal Counsel (KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION

CURTIS MOORMAN

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:18-CV-P21-TBR

TROY BELT et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a pro se civil rights action brought by a convicted prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff Curtis Moorman leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
This matter is before the Court for screening of Plaintiff’s amended complaint (DN 9) pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, this action will be dismissed in part and
allowed to proceed in part.
I. SUMMARY OF AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff is incarcerated at Kentucky State Penitentiary (KSP). He brings this action
against five named KSP officials in both their official and individual capacities - KSP Unit
Administrator Troy Belt, Lieutenant Jesse Coombs, Sergeant Brandon Inglish, Officer Nathaniel
Deboe, and Officer Pillion - and “Three John Doe Officers (Unknown).”
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff writes as follows:
On June 29, 2017, excessive force was used against me by [Defendants Inglish
and Deboe] when [Defendant] Inglish shot me with an X-26 Taser and
[Defendant] Deboe activated an electric shock shield on me while I was strapped
down in a restraint chair. [Defendants Belt, Coombs, and Inglish] violated policy
by leaving me in the restraint chair for 4 hours. On June 30, 2017, excessive
force was used on me by unnamed officers while escorting me to be interviewed
by Internal Affairs when officers twisted my wrist up so bad I was forced to walk
hunched over, my head was rammed into 16 doors, I was ran headfirst into a
metal gate and pushed down a flight of stairs. On July 5, 2017, unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain was maliciously and sadistically inflicted in bad faith to
caused harm was used by [Defendants Deboe and Pillion] and several unnamed

officers while I was being escorted to be interviewed . . . when [Defendants
Deboe and Pillion] placed handcuffs on me so tight my circulation was cut off
instantly and again my wrists were twisted and brought up so high behind my
back until my head was near my ankles between my knees and I was forced to
walk in a hurried pace while my head was rammed into the 16 doors along the
walk (steel cell doors) and again I was slammed into a huge steel gate and pushed
down a flight of stairs again. The same thing was done to me on my way back to
my cell and once I was placed in my cell officers pulled my arms through the tray
slot and grabbed the handcuffs and kicked off my cell door while jerking on my
handcuffs in an attempt to break my wrists before finally uncuffing me. On July
6, 2017, the same two officers came to escort me . . . and the same identical
mentioned force was applied to me as it had been done the day before, it was
repeated.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief in the
form of “transfer to [a] different facility.”
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604
(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as

2

true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’
with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a
claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975).
To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a
pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to
the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful
strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
“Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for
deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d
340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

3

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502,
504 (6th Cir. 1991).
A. Official-Capacity Claims
Plaintiff sues the named Defendants in their official capacities. State officials sued in
their official capacities for money damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Will
v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, the claims seeking money damages
from state officers or employees in their official capacities are not cognizable claims
under § 1983. Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment1 acts as a bar to claims for monetary
damages against Defendants in their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169
(1985). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims for damages will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for seeking monetary relief from
Defendants who are immune from such relief.
The Court will, however, allow Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against the named
Defendants to proceed for injunctive relief at this time. Stevens v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 171983, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 9279, at *14 (6th Cir. Apr. 12, 2018) (“Sovereign immunity does
not apply to official-capacity actions seeking prospective injunctive relief.”) (citing Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)).
B. Individual-Capacity Claims
The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s excessive-force claims against the named Defendants
in their individual capacities. “The Eighth Amendment proscribes the unnecessary and wanton
1

“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a State by its own
citizens, [the Supreme Court] has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in
federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63
(1974).

4

infliction of pain against prisoners.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both subjective and objective components. Cordell v.
McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014). “The objective component requires the pain
inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The subjective component turns on “whether force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).
Based upon the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s amended complaint, the Court will
allow Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force to proceed against Defendants Belt, Coombs, Inglish,
DeBoe, and Pillion in their individual capacities.
C. “Three John Doe Defendants”
The Court will also allow Plaintiff’s excessive-force claims to proceed against the “Three
John Doe Officers (Unknown)” at this time. “Although designation of a ‘John Doe’ defendant is
not favored in the federal courts, it is permissible when the identity of the alleged defendant is
not known at the time the complaint is filed and plaintiff could identify [the] defendant through
discovery.” Yates v. Young, 772 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1985). Thus, the Court will allow Plaintiff
an opportunity to learn the names of the unknown Defendants through discovery and to amend
his complaint to name them as Defendants in their individual capacities and to describe exactly
what actions each took against him.
However, in so doing, the Court advises Plaintiff that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4 provides, in relevant part:
If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff - must dismiss the action
without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a

5

specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must
extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s official-capacity
claims for damages are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a
claim against relief may be granted and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) for seeking
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Plaintiff shall have 90 days to file an amended complaint in which he names the
“John Doe Defendants” in their individual capacities and describes the excessive force each
allegedly used against him. Plaintiff’s failure to timely amend his complaint to name these
Defendants may result in their dismissal from the action.
The Court passes no judgment on the merits or ultimate outcome of the claims it has
allowed to proceed in this review. The Court will enter an Order Directing Service and
Scheduling Order to govern the continuing claims.
Date:

May 1, 2018

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
General Counsel, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, Office of Legal Counsel
4413.011

6