Edwards v. Beavers et al

Filing 53

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 7/11/2018. The Court will enter a separate Order Regarding Service and Scheduling Order to govern the claims that have been permitted to proceed.cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendants; General Counsel, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, Office of Legal Counsel (MNM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:18CV-P26-TBR

KAREEM M. EDWARDS

PLAINTIFF

v.
JAMES BEAVERS et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kareem M. Edwards filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding
in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court upon initial review of the amended complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss some of
Plaintiff’s claims and allow other claims to proceed for further development.
I. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff is a convicted inmate at the Kentucky State Penitentiary (KSP). He names the
following KSP personnel as Defendants: James Beavers, identified as an “IA Supervisor”;
Melvin O’Dell and Brendan Inglish, identified as sergeants; Jess Coombs and Anthony Hale,
identified as lieutenants; Darren Larue, Michael Alexander, Nathaniel Deboe, Charles Conner,
and Perry Sanders, identified as corrections officers; and Brian Neely, identified as “Internal
Affairs/Correctional Officer.”2 He sues each Defendant in his official and individual capacities.
Plaintiff states that on June 29, 2017, while he was walking to the yard office, he
witnessed a commotion and saw KSP officers beating up inmates. He states, “As I turned to
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By prior Memorandum and Order (DN 42), the Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint on the Courtapproved § 1983 form. The Court directed Plaintiff to include all claims and Defendants he wished to assert in this
action because the complaint filed on the Court-approved form would supersede the original complaint, the motions
to amend and supplement, and any other filings asserting new claims Plaintiff had filed previously in this action.
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Plaintiff does not list Defendants Larue, Alexander, Deboe, Conner, Sanders, and Neely in the complaint form but
indicates in the form that he ran out of room to list them, names them as Defendants in the body of his complaint,
and tenders summons forms for each of them. Construing the complaint broadly, the Court construes the complaint
as naming these six officers as Defendants.

leave the area, Sgt. Melvin O’Dell and Lt. Anthony Hale were running towards me screaming,
cursing, and calling me racial slurs. I panicked out of fear.” Plaintiff continues as follows:
I then was attacked and beaten the ground with vicious violent blows. I was
maced, then slammed face first onto concrete while in restraints. In the process of
being escorted to 3ch/unit to segregation, “Sgt. O’Dell and Lt. Hale” continued to
deliver their violent assault on me. Rec. Aide c/o Tucker instructed both staff to
remove themselves from the situation, “there is no need to continue beating
Edwards, this type is not forcefully needed, he is already restrained and calm.”
Plaintiff further asserts that he was repeatedly “punched in the face/head with close fists,
rammed into concrete, steel bars, and walls.” He reports that non-Defendant Corrections Officer
Tucker instructed O’Dell to stop a second time. He states, “However, Sgt. O’Dell continued on
his hostile rampage screaming obscenities to all wall stands, towers to ‘shoot and kill, get your
live rounds out, and start shooting.’”
Plaintiff states that once he was in front of the segregation unit, Defendant Deboe
slammed him to the ground even though he was in full restraints. Plaintiff asserts, “He
proceeded to kick, punch, and knee me in the back, and head, until I started bleeding from the
nose and mouth, causing me to cough up blood. He told me I better not get any blood on him or
he would kill me.” Plaintiff reports that he was placed in the “‘stripe cage’” and that when he
exited in full restraints he was “attacked and beaten” by Defendants Deboe, Alexander, Neely,
Larue, Coombs, and Inglish. He goes on to state as follows:
I was kicked, punched, slammed, face/head rammed into steel, concrete, then
tased repeatedly with several taser devices. I lost consciousness a few times,
collapsed to the floor, where staff had to pick me up to my feet. Lt. Coombs
continually tased again, and again. C/o Charles Conner and Perry Sanders
included.
Plaintiff reports that he was then escorted to a segregation unit shower stall “where the
above stated defendants continued to beat and torture me.” He states that Defendants Coombs
and Inglish “observed” while Defendants Deboe, Larue, Alexander, Conner, Sanders, and Neely
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“started smashing, twisting, and contorting my arms, elbows, wrist, feet, ankles, fingers, neck, as
they continued to try and break my nose and back violently with malicious intent.” Plaintiff
asserts that, after he was placed in a restraint chair for several hours, “the tortured acts continued
with the stated officers ramming my face/head into the metal shower stall.” He states, “I was
forcibly held under running water” by Defendants Alexander, Neely, Larue, Conner, and
Sanders, “as [Defendant] Deboe deployed shock after shock after shock, with the electronic
shield device. I lost consciousness again from the continuous shocking and trauma, then lost
control of my bile movements. The above smashing, twisting, and contorting my extremities
would not stop, as my face/head bled.”
Plaintiff asserts that he was then placed back into the restraint chair and Defendant
Alexander “started re-shocking me with the shield device while I was sitting in the chair. I just
sat there strapped/cuffed/shackled, as they/(he) administered this shock for minutes at a time in
shock.” He states, “Nurse Karen Sue Smith came in to take vital signs, but was so disgusted that
she said ‘I know you all did not just run water on him, then electrocute him, why is he all wet.’
She then instructed staff to losen the metal cuffs, shackles and strapped contraption, so that I
could have circulation.”
Plaintiff further maintains that he filed grievances but that Defendant Beavers “issued
disciplinary infractions, as a recourse of action (chilling effect) to deter my efforts in accessing
the courts.” He continues, “However, after a lengthy and thorough investigation ‘headed by
James Beavers, it was found that most allegation(s) I stated in my July 24, 2017, letter/redress
were found to be true, after interviewing several staff witnesses.’ The infraction(s) were given in
retaliation and bad faith.”

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Beavers violated his rights under the First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments by “denying me access to the courts for redress/grievance, subjecting
me to cruel & unusual punishment, by issuing several bogus disciplinary infractions in retaliation
for a redress/grievance to the Commissioner/Ombudsman’s Office in which punishments I had to
serve.” He continues, “This defendant failed to protect me under equal protection of law, as a
sworn official. He has made threats to my life/safety.”
Plaintiff alleges that the other ten Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by using excessive force against him and/or by failing to protect him.
As relief, Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief.
II. STANDARD
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604
(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as

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true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’
with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a
claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975).
To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a
pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to
the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful
strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Official-capacity claims
Plaintiff sues all Defendants in their official capacities. “Official-capacity suits . . .
‘generally represent [] another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is
an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). Defendants are employees of KSP and are

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therefore state employees. Claims brought against state employees in their official capacities are
deemed claims against the Commonwealth of Kentucky. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at
166. State officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not “persons”
subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Further, the Eleventh Amendment acts as a bar to claims for monetary damages against state
employees or officers sued in their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 169.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants for monetary damages must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for seeking monetary
relief from Defendants who are immune from such relief.
B. Individual-capacity claims
1. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent
that he is alleging claims of excessive force or failure to protect under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the claims must be dismissed. It is the Eighth Amendment, rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment, which is the source of protection for convicted prisoners complaining of
excessive force or failure to protect. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Because
Plaintiff was a convicted state inmate at the time of the facts alleged in the complaint, the
Fourteenth Amendment claims fail.
Plaintiff also makes reference to equal protection. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). To prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must
allege an invidious discriminatory purpose or intent. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976);

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Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). “‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies
more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because
of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Pers. Adm’r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. Plaintiff fails to identify his race or any other characteristic
that would implicate an equal protection violation. Nor does Plaintiff allege an invidious,
discriminatory intent on the part of Defendants to violate his constitutional rights because of his
membership in a protected class. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims must be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
2. Verbal abuse and threats
Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to racial slurs and that Defendant Beavers made
“threats to my life/safety.” The Eighth Amendment proscribes punishments which involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
However, harassing or degrading language by a prison official, while unprofessional and
despicable, does not amount to a constitutional violation. Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa, 357
F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2004); Violett v. Reynolds, 76 F. App’x 24, 27 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[V]erbal
abuse and harassment do not constitute punishment that would support an Eighth Amendment
claim.”); Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954-55 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Searcy v. Gardner, No.
3:07-0361, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118217, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 11, 2008) (“A claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be based on mere threats, abusive language, racial slurs, or verbal
harassment by prison officials.”).

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims of racial slurs and threatening or abusive language by
Defendants will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
3. Access to courts
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Beavers denied him access to the courts. Prisoners
have a constitutional right of access to the courts under the First Amendment. Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). However, in order to state a claim for interference with access to the
courts, a plaintiff must show actual injury. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir.
1999) (per curiam). “An inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing
that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense. That
would be the precise analog of the healthy inmate claiming constitutional violation because of
the inadequacy of the prison infirmary.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 351. Plaintiff fails to allege
what actual injury or prejudice to a pending legal action that he suffered.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied access to the courts will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
4. Grievance handling
To the extent that Plaintiff is alleging a claim against Defendant Beavers based on the
handling of his grievances, his claim also fails. “The mere denial of a prisoner’s grievance states
no claim of constitutional dimension.” Alder v. Corr. Med. Servs., 73 F. App’x 839, 841 (6th
Cir. 2003). A plaintiff’s claim is against the subjects of his or her grievances, not those who
merely decided whether to grant or deny the grievances. See Skinner v. Govorchin, 463 F.3d
518, 525 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Skinner’s complaint regarding Wolfenbarger’s denial of Skinner’s
grievance appeal, it is clear, fails to state a claim.”); Lee v. Mich. Parole Bd., 104 F. App’x 490,
493 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a defendant

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denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a
grievance.”); Simpson v. Overton, 79 F. App’x 117, 120 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he denial of an
appeal cannot in itself constitute sufficient personal involvement to state a claim for a
constitutional violation.”).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims concerning the handling of his grievances will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
5. Retaliation
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Beavers retaliated against him for filing grievances and
other means of redress concerning the June 29, 2017, incident by issuing false disciplinary
reports against him. Upon review, the Court will allow a retaliation claim under the First
Amendment to proceed against Defendant Beavers in his individual capacity for monetary
damages and injunctive relief and in his official capacity for injunctive relief only.
6. Excessive force and failure to protect
Finally, Plaintiff alleges excessive force and/or failure to protect claims against
Defendants O’Dell, Inglish, Coombs, Hale, Larue, Alexander, Deboe, Conner, Sanders, and
Neely. Upon review, the Court will allow Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force and/or failure to
protect under the Eighth Amendment to proceed against these Defendants in their individual
capacities for monetary damages and injunctive relief and in their official capacities for
injunctive relief only.
However, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Beaver also subjected him to cruel
and unusual punishment or failed to protect him, the claim fails. To state a claim for relief,
Plaintiff must show how each Defendant is accountable because the Defendant was personally
involved in the acts about which he complains. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76

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(1976). Nothing in the complaint suggests that Defendant Beavers was involved or even present
when the alleged excessive force occurred. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claim against Defendant Beavers for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
IV. ORDER
For the reasons set forth herein, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED that all official-capacity claims for monetary damages are
DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and/or for seeking relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourteenth Amendment,
claims alleging verbal abuse and threats, claims alleging denial of access to courts, and claims
concerning grievance handling are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claim under the Eighth Amendment
against Defendant Beavers only is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court will enter a separate Order Regarding Service and Scheduling Order to govern
the claims that have been permitted to proceed. In allowing the claims to proceed, the Court
passes no judgment on their outcome or ultimate merit.
Date:

July 11, 2018

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
General Counsel, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, Office of Legal Counsel
4413.010

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