Anderson v. City of Fulton, Kentucky et al

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 11/26/2018. Granting 28 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 29 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 27 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to remove Defendants Payne, Sanders, Tilley, and Stacy from the docket of this action. cc: Counsel(KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:18-CV-032-TBR
BOB ANDERSON,
Administrator of the Estate of Charles Christopher McClure,
Deceased, and Next Friend of S.M., B.M., and C.M., Minor
Daughters of Mr. McClure

PLAINTIFF

v.
CITY OF FULTON, KENTUCKY, et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on motions to dismiss by Defendants William Payne and
Richard Sanders, [R. 27], John Tilley, [R. 28], and Michael Stacy, [R. 29]. Plaintiff Bob
Anderson has responded to each motion to dismiss. [R. 31; R. 32; R. 33]. Defendants Payne and
Sanders replied, [R. 34], as did Defendant Stacy, [R. 35]. The deadline for Defendant Tilley to
reply has passed. This matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons stated herein,
Defendants William Payne and Richard Sanders’s Motion to Dismiss, [R. 27], is GRANTED.
Defendant John Tilley’s Motion to Dismiss, [R. 28], is GRANTED. Defendant Michael Stacy’s
Motion to Dismiss, [R. 29], is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The factual allegations as set out in the First Amended Complaint, [R. 25], and taken as
true are as follows.1 On January 16, 2017, Charles McClure was allegedly experiencing mental
health issues and began striking vehicles in Fulton, Kentucky with a 3’6” long square metal tube

1

See Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008)
(“All factual allegations in the complaint must be presumed to be true, and reasonable inferences must be made in
favor of the non-moving party.”).

1

with a knife affixed to it. [R. 25 at 3.] Fulton Police Chief Terry Powell arrived on the scene,
followed by Lieutenant James Buckingham. [Id. at 4.] Anderson alleges that Buckingham shot
McClure without warning, causing McClure to drop the pole and fall to the ground. [Id.]
Anderson states that Buckingham then approached McClure and shot him a second time from
“less than arm’s length away” before McClure could stand up. [Id. at 5.] Anderson claims that all
material events at the scene of the shooting were captured on Buckingham’s bodycam. [Id.]
Lonnie Bell, a member of the Critical Incident Response Team (“CIRT”),2 was assigned
the task of investigating the shooting.3 During the course of his investigation, Bell interviewed
Powell, Buckingham, and Fulcher (another officer at the scene), reviewed the footage from
Powell’s dashcam, and reviewed the footage from Buckingham’s bodycam. [Id. at 7.] Anderson
claims that although the camera footage refutes any justification by the police officers for the
fatal shooting, Bell nonetheless concluded that Mr. McClure “continued to swing the post at a
police … officer in a threatening manner, which resulted in Mr. McClure being shot and killed
by a police officer.” [Id.] Bell then took the conclusions of his investigation to Commonwealth
Attorney Michael Stacy, who presented the case to a Grand Jury. [Id.]
Anderson alleges that the Grand Jury was never informed of the camera footage or shown
the footage, “despite Defendants Bell and Stacy’s knowledge of its existence and what it
showed.” [Id.] Furthermore, Anderson alleges that Bell explicitly or implicitly made several,

2

Anderson explains that the CIRT was “formed by KSP solely for the purpose of investigating police shootings.”
[R. 25 at 6.]
3
In the First Amended Complaint, Anderson cites the opinions of three of the defendants on CIRT:
According to Defendant Tilley, the purpose of the CIRT is to promote transparency and
accountability when responding to police-related shootings. According to Defendant Sanders, the
CIRT is composed of “six of the best investigators KSP has to offer”, which presumably includes
Defendant Bell. Defendant Payne said that the KSP “want[s]... people to have the confidence in us
that we have our best people doing those investigations."
[Id. at 6-7.]

2

factual misrepresentations to the Grand Jury about what occurred at the scene. [Id. at 8.]
Anderson alleges that Stacy “made no effort to correct these misrepresentations to the Grand
Jury,” and the one-sided misrepresentation of evidence by Bell and Stacy essentially caused the
Grand Jury to find that there was no activity involved in McClure’s death that warranted
prosecution. [Id.]
Anderson states that he “believes, and anticipates that he will be able to prove in
discovery, that there exists a custom and practice of covering up unwarranted shootings of
unarmed Kentucky citizens that pervades the culture of the Fulton Police, the KSP, and the office
of the Commonwealth Attorney of Fulton County,” which “effectively encourages unwarranted
police shootings.” [Id.] On October 4, 2018, Anderson filed the First Amended Complaint, in
which he alleged eight causes of action, including “[v]iolation of Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” “negligence/gross negligence,” battery,
wrongful death, loss of consortium, hindrance of prosecution, perjury, and abuse of public office,
against nine defendants. [Id. at 9-11.]4
LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), a party must “plead enough ‘factual matter’ to raise a ‘plausible’ inference of
wrongdoing.” 16630 Southfield Ltd. P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir.
2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A claim becomes plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

4

The Court notes that the cause of action for perjury is only alleged against defendants Stacy, Tilley, Payne, and
Bell. [See R. 25 at 11.]

3

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
Court must presume all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v.
Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Great Lakes Steel
v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1983)). “The court need not, however, accept
unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. (citing Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12
(6th Cir. 1987)). Should the well-pleaded facts support no “more than the mere possibility of
misconduct,” then dismissal is warranted. Iqbal, 556 U.S at 679. The Court may grant a motion
to dismiss “only if, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the complaint
in favor of the plaintiff, the complaint still fails to allege a plausible theory of relief.” Garceau v.
City of Flint, 572 F. App’x. 369, 371 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–79).
DISCUSSION
In response to Anderson’s First Amended Complaint, four of the defendants have filed
motions to dismiss, all pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Although the
motions involve four defendants, there are only three motions, as Sanders and Payne (hereinafter
“the Commissioners”) jointly filed a motion to dismiss, [R. 27]. The Court will address each
motion in turn.
I.

Sanders and Payne Motion to Dismiss
As an initial matter, the Court recognizes Anderson’s observation that the Commissioners

have relied on matters outside the pleadings in arguing that their specific positions with
Kentucky State Police (“KSP”) do not allow direct supervision over Bell. [R. 31 at 1 (Anderson
Response to Commissioners).] For example, the Commissioners reasoned in their Motion to

4

Dismiss that Sanders and Payne would not have supervised Bell because they “are not direct
supervisors of any Lieutenants.” [R. 27-1 at 7.] Furthermore, the Commissioners stated:
Commissioner Sanders and Dep. Commissioner Payne were, at all times relevant
to this action, in overall command of more than 850 sworn police officers and
approximately 900 civilian employees. There is no conceivable situation in which
the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner could have been in direct supervision
of Lieutenant Bell. It must also be understood that a State Police Trooper is an
independent unit. He is trained to make independent, discretionary judgment calls
and has to be free to do that. There are very few situations in which a Trooper will
be under the direct supervision of anyone.
[Id. at 7-8.]
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) states:
If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). This decision rests within the discretion of the district court, which
“remains free to refuse to accept materials outside the pleadings.” Max Arnold & Sons, LLC v.
W.L. Hailey & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 494, 503 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 1371 (3d ed. 2004)). Here, the statements by the
Commissioners claiming Sanders and Payne had no direct supervision over Bell due to their
position in the hierarchy of KSP involve matters outside the pleadings. Thus, these statements
are excluded and were not considered by the Court, and this motion remains one to dismiss,
rather than a motion for summary judgment.
In his First Amended Complaint, Anderson alleges against the Commissioners claims of
“[v]iolation of Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983,” “negligence/gross negligence,” battery, wrongful death, loss of consortium, hindrance of
prosecution, perjury, and abuse of public office. [R. 25 at 9-11.] Anderson states that the

5

Commissioners were “responsible for the establishment of policies either formally or by custom
for, and [were] responsible for the employment, training, supervision and conduct of, Defendant
Bell, or those responsible for the employment, training, supervision and conduct of, Defendant
Bell.” [Id. at 3.]5 Under the section labeled “Nature of Defendants’ Conduct,” Anderson alleges
the following in regard to all nine defendants as a group:
Defendants, individually and in conspiracy with one another, engaged in the
misconduct described above under color of the law of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, and knowingly participated or acquiesced in, contributed to,
encouraged, implicitly authorized, approved, or ratified such misconduct. This
misconduct described above resulted from the failure of Defendants to employ
qualified persons for positions of authority, and/or to properly and conscientiously
train and supervise the conduct of such persons after their employment, and/or to
promulgate appropriate policies and procedures either formally or by custom to
protect the constitutional rights of citizens like Mr. McClure whom they are
sworn to protect, and/or to implement, follow, and enforce existing policies and
procedures that would have prevented Mr. McClure’s death. Defendants' conduct
was intentional and grossly negligent, indicated active malice toward Mr.
McClure and others like him and a total, deliberate and reckless disregard for
and indifference to his life, his constitutional and common law rights and those of
his estate and minor daughters, and to the principles of transparency and
accountability in law enforcement, and justifies an award of actual and punitive
damages.
[Id. at 8-9.] However, in the facts section, the Commissioners are scarcely mentioned. In fact,
they are only mentioned in the following passage:
Investigation of the shooting was assigned to Defendant Lonnie Bell. Defendant
Bell is a member of the Critical Incident Response Team (“CIRT”) formed by
KSP solely for the purpose of investigating police shootings. According to
Defendant Tilley, the purpose of the CIRT is to promote transparency and
accountability when responding to police-related shootings. According to
Defendant Sanders, the CIRT is composed of “six of the best investigators KSP
has to offer”, which presumably includes Defendant Bell. Defendant Payne said
that the KSP “want[s] . . . people to have the confidence in us that we have our
best people doing those investigations."
[Id. at 6-7.]

5

Anderson alleges Sanders was also responsible for the “employment, training, supervision and conduct of” Payne.
[R. 25 at 2-3.]

6

A. Federal Law Claims
The Commissioners argue that Anderson’s violation of Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,6 and
Fourteenth Amendment claims should be dismissed because Commissioners are entitled to
qualified immunity under federal law, [R. 27-1 at 9], and/or Anderson’s claims fail as a matter of
law, [Id. at 11].
Although it is not entirely clear from the First Amended Complaint, Anderson appears to
allege supervisory liability. [See R. 25 at 3.] The Sixth Circuit has stated:
“[A] supervisory official's failure to supervise, control or train the offending
individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” We have
interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show
that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly
acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”
Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, “[a]s part of this inquiry, this court also considers whether there is a causal
connection between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the violation alleged.” Id.
In considering qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage of litigation, the Sixth
Circuit has stated:
The Supreme Court has repeatedly “stressed the importance of resolving
immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (per
curiam)). However, “[w]hen qualified immunity is asserted at the pleading stage,
the precise factual basis for the plaintiff’s claim or claims may be hard to
identify.” Id. at 238–39, 129 S.Ct. 808 (citation omitted). Thus, we have held that
it is “generally inappropriate for a district court to grant a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity,” preferring instead that courts resolve
the issue at summary judgment.

6

The Court notes that even if it were to consider Anderson’s federal law claims, the Eighth Amendment would not
apply to Mr. McClure as the “Eighth Amendment applies to convicted prisoners.” Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 300
(6th Cir. 2002).

7

Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 344 (6th Cir. 2017). The Court goes on to say that “certain
immunity questions can still be resolved at the pleading stage with a sufficiently developed
record,” such as when there are “exhibits attached to the complaint, public records, [and] items
appearing in the record of the case.” Id. Here, however, there are no such records before the
Court.
Even if Anderson’s federal law claims are not barred by qualified immunity, the Court
finds that it may still grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Here, Anderson makes no mention of supervisor liability under the § 1983 cause of action in the
First Amended Complaint. [See R. 25 at 9-10.] However, in his Response, Anderson claims that
Bell lied to a Grand Jury without consequences, which “would evidence at least the implicit
approval or the knowing acquiescence of Bell’s superiors, Payne and Sanders, in his
misconduct.” [R. 31 at 5.] Anderson then argues that the generic quotes listed from Sanders and
Payne show their “direct involvement in the creation of the CIRT.” [R. 31 at 3.] The
Commissioners retort that this amounts to conclusory allegations. The Court agrees with the
Commissioners.
Although Anderson claims broadly that all of the defendants, including Sanders and
Payne, “knowingly participated or acquiesced in, contributed to, encouraged, implicitly
authorized, approved, or ratified” the conduct contained in the facts, [R. 25 at 8-9], these amount
to labels and conclusions that cannot defeat a motion to dismiss alone. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Anderson must provide factual allegations that allow the Court to make the reasonable inference
that the Commissioners “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other
way directly participated in it.” Peatross, 818 F.3d at 242. Granted, the quotes listed from Payne
and Sanders seem to show that they knew of and supported CIRT in its mission to gain the

8

public’s confidence in the investigatory abilities of KSP. This knowledge combined with the
conclusory statements quoted above may show a “possibility of misconduct,” but that is not
enough to survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S at 679. Thus, the Commissioners’ Motion
to Dismiss as it pertains to Anderson’s Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
violation claims is GRANTED.7
B. State Law Claims
The Supreme Court has stated: “Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial,
even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as
well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see also Experimental
Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Generally, once a federal court has
dismissed a plaintiff's federal law claim, it should not reach state law claims.”). Furthermore, it is
a matter of this Court’s discretion whether to hear supplemental jurisdiction state law claims.
Experimental Holdings, Inc., 503 F.3d at 521. Here, the Court finds that “the interests of judicial
economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation” do not “outweigh our concern over
needlessly deciding state law issues.” Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th
Cir. 2006). Thus, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Anderson’s state
law claims against Payne and Sanders.
In summary, the Commissioners’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

7

In his Response, Anderson also argues that the Commissioners are liable under federal law for “ratifying” the
actions of Bell and Buckingham. [R. 31 at 5-6.] In support, Anderson cites to St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,
127 (1988), Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 14 F.3d 1115, 1118-19 (6th Cir. 1994), and Arendale v. City of Memphis,
519 F.3d 587, 602 (6th Cir. 2008). These three cases involve municipal liability, not individual liability, which is
what Anderson appears to be pleading in the issue before us—as he references the standard for personal liability in
his Response. [R. 31 at 5.] The Sixth Circuit has stated that “a § 1983 claim of personal liability for a failure to train
and supervise differs from a § 1983 claim against a municipality for a failure to train and supervise.” Coley v. Lucas
Cty., Ohio, 799 F.3d 530, 541 (6th Cir. 2015). Thus, it appears that Anderson’s ratification argument is inapplicable
to the issue at hand.

9

II.

Tilley Motion to Dismiss
Anderson’s claims against Tilley are almost exactly the same as the claims against the

Commissioners. Against Tilley, Anderson alleges claims of “[v]iolation of Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” “negligence/gross negligence,”
battery, wrongful death, loss of consortium, hindrance of prosecution, perjury, and abuse of
public office. [R. 25 at 9-11.] Similar to the Commissioners, Anderson alleges that Tilley was
“responsible for the establishment of policies either formally or by custom for, and was
responsible for the employment, training, supervision and conduct of, Defendants Sanders,
Payne, and Bell, or those responsible for the employment, training, supervision and conduct of,
Defendant Bell.” [Id. at 2-3.] In the facts section of the First Amended Complaint, Tilley is only
briefly mentioned in the same paragraph as the Commissioners. Specifically, it stated:
“According to Defendant Tilley, the purpose of the CIRT is to promote transparency and
accountability when responding to police-related shootings.” [Id. at 6.]
Tilley argues in his Motion to Dismiss that “the factual allegations regarding John Tilley do
not meet even the liberal standard of notice pleading for any of the claims asserted by the Plaintiffs.”

In response, Anderson recycles the exact same arguments—in most places word for word—from
his Response to the Commissioners’ Motion to Dismiss. [See generally R. 31; R. 32.] The only
factual differences between the claims are the positions of the parties at KSP and the statement
attributed to each party concerning CIRT. Unlike the quotes from the Commissioners, the
statement attributed to Tilley does not appear to be a direct quote, as it is not contained within
quotation marks. Even so, like the quotes from the Commissioners, the Court finds that this
isolated statement alone does not allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for supervisor liability. Furthermore, the Court once again notes that

10

Anderson never mentions a claim of supervisor liability in his First Amended Complaint. As
neither the federal law claims within the First Amended Complaint nor the arguments of the
Response have materially changed, Tilley’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as it pertains to
Anderson’s Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment violation claims under the same
reasoning provided above regarding the claims against the Commissioners.
Also, as explained above, the Court finds that “the interests of judicial economy and the
avoidance of multiplicity of litigation” do not “outweigh our concern over needlessly deciding
state law issues.” Moon, 465 F.3d at 728. Thus, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Anderson's state law claims against Tilley.
III.

Stacy Motion to Dismiss
Like the defendants mentioned above, Anderson alleges claims of “[v]iolation of Fourth,

Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” “negligence/gross
negligence,” battery, wrongful death, loss of consortium, hindrance of prosecution, perjury, and
abuse of public office against Stacy as well. [R. 25 at 9-11.] Anderson states that Stacy was “at
all times mentioned herein the Commonwealth Attorney for Fulton County, and personally
engaged in the misconduct described” in the First Amended Complaint. [Id. at 3.] In the facts
section, Anderson describes Stacy’s actions as follows: “Defendant Bell then took the
conclusions of his ‘investigation’ to Defendant Commonwealth Attorney Stacy, who presented
the case to the Grand Jury. However, the Grand Jury was not informed of the existence of or
shown the footage from Defendant Buckingham’s bodycam despite Defendants Bell and Stacy’s
knowledge of its existence and what it showed.” [Id. at 7.] Additionally, Anderson alleges that
despite Bell making misrepresentations to the Grand Jury, “Stacy made no effort to correct these

11

misrepresentations to the Grand Jury,” causing a “one-sided misrepresentation of the evidence”
that favored the defendants. [Id. at 8.]
A. Federal Law Claims
Stacy argues that Anderson’s claims under § 1983 are barred by absolute prosecutorial
immunity because “Stacy was acting as the Commonwealth’s Attorney for the First Judicial Circuit
at all times in question . . ..” [R. 29-1 at 7 (Stacy Motion to Dismiss).] Anderson disagrees. [R. 33

at 4 (Anderson Response to Stacy).]
A prosecutor is afforded absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for damages when he acts
“within the scope of his prosecutorial duties.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976);
Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1137 (6th Cir. 1989). “Absolute immunity allows a
prosecutor to exercise his independent judgment in ‘deciding which suits to bring and in
conducting them in court’ based on his duty to the public rather than on a fear of potential
liability in a suit for damages.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Absolute immunity is granted
when the “challenged activities [were] an integral part of the judicial process.” Imbler, 424 U.S.
at 430.
The Supreme Court has established a functional approach for determining whether
government officials enjoy absolute immunity or the more general standard of qualified
immunity. Id. at 486. The court must determine “whether the prosecutors have carried their
burden of establishing that they were functioning as ‘advocates.’” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
U.S. 259, 274 (1993). State prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for their conduct “in initiating a
prosecution and in presenting the State's case, insofar as that conduct is intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 479 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). “[A] prosecutor's decision to initiate a prosecution, including the decision

12

to file a criminal complaint or seek an arrest warrant, is protected by absolute immunity.” Howell
v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 344, 351 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31); see also
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 (noting that a prosecutor's actions in evaluating evidence and preparing
for presentation at trial or to a grand jury is protected by absolute immunity). Furthermore, the
Sixth Circuit has stated:
Absolute immunity also protects a prosecutor when she evaluates evidence and
presents that evidence at trial or before a grand jury, prepares witnesses for trial,
and even elicits false testimony from witnesses. By shielding prosecutors
engaging in these activities, absolute immunity “serves the policy of protecting
the judicial process.”
Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Conversely, the
Sixth Circuit also held:
Only qualified immunity is available to prosecutors when they perform
“investigative” or “administrative” functions unrelated to judicial proceedings.
Investigative acts outside the scope of absolute immunity include giving legal
advice to the police during a pretrial investigation, conspiring to fabricate
evidence during the time before convening a grand jury, and making false
statements at a press conference.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Here, Anderson alleges that Stacy presented the case to the Grand Jury and, during that
presentation, failed to show the footage from Buckingham’s bodycam or correct the
misrepresentations made by Bell. [R. 25 at 7-8.] The Court finds that these allegations amount to
presenting evidence and eliciting testimony; in other words, “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in
preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of
his role as an advocate for the State . . ..” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. Moreover, courts have found
that both types of actions fall under prosecutorial immunity. Regarding Stacy’s alleged failure to
show bodycam footage, the Sixth Circuit has stated that “prosecutors have absolute immunity
from civil liability for the non-disclosure of exculpatory information at trial.” Koubriti v.
13

Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 34). As for
Stacy’s alleged failure to correct misrepresentations made by Bell, the Supreme Court in Burns
found the respondent to be protected by prosecutorial immunity, stating: “Like witnesses,
prosecutors and other lawyers were absolutely immune from damages liability at common law
for making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings (at least so long as the
statements were related to the proceeding), and also for eliciting false and defamatory testimony
from witnesses.” 500 U.S. at 489–90. Therefore, the Court finds that Stacy is entitled to the
protections of prosecutorial absolute immunity regarding all of Anderson’s federal law claims.
B. State Law Claims
Like federal courts, state courts in Kentucky offer absolute immunity and qualified
immunity to prosecutors, depending on the circumstances. In McCollum v. Garrett, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky relied on the findings of the United States Supreme Court in Buckley, Imbler,
and Burns, in holding that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity when he is “acting within
the scope of his authority,” but not when he “functions as an administrator or investigator.”
McCollum, 880 S.W.2d 530, 534 (Ky. 1994). As Kentucky law mirrors federal law in this area,
the absolute immunity analysis conducted above on Anderson’s federal claims also applies to
Anderson’s state claims. See, e.g., Hall v. City of Williamsburg, Kentucky, No. 6:16-304-DCR,
2017 WL 2274327, at *13 (E.D. Ky. 2017) (“Because Kentucky law appears to be based on and
mirrors federal law, the absolute immunity analysis conducted above on [plaintiff]'s federal
claims also applies to [plaintiff]'s state claims”). The Court finds that Stacy was acting as an
advocate when presenting evidence and eliciting testimony before the Grand Jury. Furthermore,
none of the allegations in the First Amended Complaint of Stacy’s misconduct amount to actions
taken in an investigative or administrative capacity. See, e.g., Burns, 500 U.S. at 494-96 (finding

14

that giving legal advice to the police during a pretrial investigation is an investigative act);
Buckley, 509 U.S. 274-78 (finding that conspiring to fabricate evidence during the time before
convening a grand jury and making false statements at a press conference are investigative acts).
Thus, the Court finds that Stacy is entitled to the protections of prosecutorial absolute immunity
regarding all of Anderson’s state law claims.
Therefore, Stacy’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.8
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendants William Payne and Richard Sanders’s Motion to Dismiss, [R. 27], is
GRANTED.
2. Defendant John Tilley’s Motion to Dismiss, [R. 28], is GRANTED.
3. Defendant Michael Stacy’s Motion to Dismiss, [R. 29], is GRANTED.
4. Defendants Payne, Sanders, Tilley, and Stacy are DISMISSED from this action as there
are no more claims remaining against them. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
remove Defendants Payne, Sanders, Tilley, and Stacy from the docket of this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

November 26, 2018

cc: Counsel of Record

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The Court finds it unnecessary to engage in further analysis of Anderson’s other arguments at this time as it has
dismissed the claims based on absolute prosecutorial immunity.

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