McGranahan v. Kentucky Department of Corrections et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 7/31/2018. Randy White, Kentucky Department of Corrections and Dan Smith terminated. Within 30 days from the entry date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may amend the complaint to sue Defendants Rodriguez, Burnette, Larue, and Rasmussen in their individual capacities and to describe the facts surrounding how each of those Defendants allegedly violated his rights. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to place the instan t case number and word Amended on a § 1983 complaint form and send it to Plaintiff for his use should he wish to amend the complaint.cc: Plaintiff, pro se, Defendants, General Counsel, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, Office of Legal Counsel (KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
JOSEPH MCGRANAHAN

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:18CV-P37-TBR

KDOC et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Joseph McGranahan, a prisoner at the Kentucky State Penitentiary (KSP), filed a
pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 1). This matter is before the Court on initial
screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that follow, the Court
will dismiss some claims, allow other claims to continue, and allow Plaintiff to amend the
complaint.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff brings suit against the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC) and the
following KSP officers and employees: Warden Randy White, Sgt. Jesse Coombs, Grievance
Coordinator Dan Smith, Sgt. Rodriguez, C/O Burnette, C/O Larue, and Lt. Rasmussen. He sues
Defendants White, Coombs, and Smith in their individual and official capacities but does not
indicate the capacity in which he sues Defendants Rodriguez, Burnette, Larue, and Rasmussen.
In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges:
on 5/14/17, while I was in 3C/H Segregation unit Sgt. Jesse Coombs came to
my cell and told me to pack up my belongings to be moved to another cell. I
then asked him where would I be moving to and what for? Sgt. Coombs
assembled an extraction team, came back to my cell and said I was refusing
to move and comply with his orders and I seen him aiming the OC pepper
spray at my face and I said f*** you Coombs come and get me as he
immediately began spraying me with mace. I was extracted from the cell and
cuffed and restrained in a chair. I refused medical treatment but the nurse

poured water over my head and I was being shocked several times with a
shock shield.
Plaintiff asserts that the “force was applied in a bad-faith effort, not to maintain or restore
discipline, it was used maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” He claims that Defendants
“Warden and KDOC knew or reasonably should have known Sgt. Coombs’ illegal actions of
excessive use of force because it is all on camera.” He also claims that Defendant Smith
“t[h]warted my grievance process by abrogating and errecting a senseless rule to thwart the
process.”
Plaintiff alleges violations of the First and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
and of Sections 1 and 17 of the Kentucky Constitution.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Under § 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint
and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court determines that it is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327.

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In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although courts are to hold pro se pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), this duty to be less
stringent “does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518
F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require courts “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the
strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

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III. ANALYSIS
“Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for
deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d
340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502,
504 (6th Cir. 1991).
A. Claims Against Defendant KDOC and Official-Capacity Claims
for Damages Against Defendants White, Coombs, and Smith
The Eleventh Amendment1 “bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or
monetary relief, against the state and its departments,” Thiokol Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, State
of Mich., Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993), unless Congress has validly abrogated
the state’s immunity or the state has waived its immunity. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 78l, 782 (1978). The Commonwealth of
Kentucky has not waived its immunity, see Adams v. Morris, 90 F. App’x 856, 857 (6th Cir.
2004), and in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override the traditional sovereign
immunity of the states. Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 193-94 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Quern

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
Const. amend. XI. “Although the amendment does not address the possibility of suit against a state by
one of its own citizens, unassailable case law has interpreted the amendment in such a way as to close that
gap.” Barton v. Summers, 293 F.3d 944, 948 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890)).
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v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979)). The Eleventh Amendment, therefore, bars this § 1983
action against the KDOC.
“This [Eleventh Amendment] bar remains in effect when State officials are sued for
damages in their official capacity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Thus, the
official-capacity claims for damages against Defendants White, Coombs, and Smith also are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
In addition, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’
under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, the claims
against the KDOC and the official-capacity claims for damages against Defendants White,
Coombs, and Smith additionally fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Individual-Capacity Claims Against Defendants White, Coombs, and Smith
1. Defendant White
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant White liable based on his supervisory
position as KSP Warden, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees,
does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisors. Monell v. New York City
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80-81
(6th Cir. 1995); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). “[A] plaintiff must plead
that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Loy v. Sexton, 132 F. App’x 624, 626 (6th
Cir. 2005) (“In order for supervisory liability to attach, a plaintiff must prove that the official
‘did more than play a passive role in the alleged violation or showed mere tacit approval of the
goings on.’”) (quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999)); Shehee v.
Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that supervisory liability “must be based on
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active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon ‘a mere failure to act’”) (quoting
Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998)). “[S]imple awareness of
employees’ misconduct does not lead to supervisor liability.” Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888,
903 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant White was directly involved in any of the alleged
wrongdoing. The Court, therefore, will dismiss the individual-capacity claims against Defendant
White for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. Defendant Coombs
Upon consideration, the Court will allow the Eighth Amendment, excessive-force claim
to proceed against Defendant Coombs in his individual capacity and will allow the state-law
claim under Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution to proceed against him as well.
3. Defendant Smith
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Smith “t[h]warted my grievance process by abrogating
and errecting a senseless rule to thwart the process.” However, there is “no constitutionally
protected due process interest in unfettered access to a prison grievance procedure.” Walker v.
Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005). By the same token, a plaintiff
cannot maintain a claim against a prison official based solely on his or her denial of the
plaintiff’s grievance. “The mere denial of a prisoner’s grievance states no claim of constitutional
dimension.” Alder v. Corr. Med. Servs., 73 F. App’x 839, 841 (6th Cir. 2003); Grinter v. Knight,
532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The ‘denial of administrative grievances or the failure to act’
by prison officials does not subject supervisors to liability under § 1983.”) (quoting Shehee v.
Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)). A plaintiff’s claim is against the subjects of his
grievances, not those who merely decided whether to grant or deny the grievances. See Skinner
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v. Govorchin, 463 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2006). Thus, where the only allegation against a
defendant relates to the denial/rejection of a grievance, a plaintiff fails to allege any personal
involvement by the defendant in the alleged constitutional violation.2
Therefore, the Court will dismiss the claims against Defendant Smith for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
C. Claims Against Defendants Rodriguez, Burnette, Larue, and Rasmussen
Plaintiff fails to state the capacity in which he sues Defendants Rodriguez, Burnette,
Larue, and Rasmussen, and he further fails to mention them in his statement of his claims.
Individual-capacity “suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official
for actions he takes under color of state law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 165. “Officialcapacity suits, in contrast, ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Id. at 166 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 n.55).
“[Section] 1983 plaintiffs must clearly notify defendants of the potential for individual liability.”
Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc). “When a
§ 1983 plaintiff fails to affirmatively plead capacity in the complaint, we then look to the course
of proceedings” to ascertain whether the defendant has been notified of the potential for personal
liability. Id.

Section 1 of the Kentucky Constitution provides for the following rights: “enjoying and defending their
lives and liberties”; “worshipping Almighty God according to the dictates of their consciences”; “seeking
and pursuing their safety and happiness”; “freely communicating their thoughts and opinions”; “acquiring
and protecting property”; “assembling together in a peaceable manner for their common good, and of
applying to those invested with the power of government for redress of grievances or other proper
purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance”; and “bear arms in defense of themselves and of the State,
subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed
weapons.” Ky. Const. § 1. The Court presumes Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Smith violated Section 1
in thwarting his grievances. This state-law claim fails for the same reason his constitutional claim fails.
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Upon review, the Court finds that the complaint fails to indicate that Plaintiff intends to
impose individual liability on Defendants Rodriguez, Burnette, Larue, and Rasmussen, and none
of Plaintiff’s other filings pertain to that issue. The Court, therefore, will not construe this action
as asserting a claim against Defendants Rodriguez, Burnette, Larue, and Rasmussen in their
individual capacities but will construe it only as asserting claims against them in their official
capacities. The official-capacity claims against these state officers/employees will be dismissed
for the same reasons the Court dismissed the official-capacity claims against Defendants White,
Coombs, and Smith.
The Court, however, will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his claims to sue
Defendants Rodriguez, Burnette, Larue, and Rasmussen in their individual capacities and to
describe the facts surrounding how each of those Defendants allegedly violated his rights. See
LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (allowing amendment under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)).
IV. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, and being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED that all claims against the KDOC; the official-capacity claims against
Defendants White, Coombs, Smith, Rodriguez, Burnette, Larue, and Rasmussen; and the
individual-capacity claims against Defendants White and Smith are DISMISSED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and/or
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) for seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief.

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As all claims against Defendants KDOC, White, and Smith have been dismissed, the
Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Defendants KDOC, White, and Smith from this
action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment, excessive-force
claim against Defendant Coombs in his individual capacity and the state-law claim under
Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution against him shall proceed. In permitting these
claims to proceed, the Court passes no judgment on their merit and ultimate outcome.
Finally, IT IS ORDERED that within 30 days from the entry date of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may amend the complaint to sue Defendants Rodriguez, Burnette,
Larue, and Rasmussen in their individual capacities and to describe the facts surrounding how
each of those Defendants allegedly violated his rights. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
place the instant case number and word “Amended” on a § 1983 complaint form and send it to
Plaintiff for his use should he wish to amend the complaint.
Should Plaintiff file no amended complaint within 30 days, the Court will enter an
order regarding service and scheduling order to govern the development of the continuing
claims against Defendant Coombs.
Date:

July 31, 2018

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
General Counsel, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, Office of Legal Counsel
4413.005

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