Sanders, et al v. City of Pembroke, et al

Filing 140

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 12/3/2020. Denying 133 Motion to Dismiss. cc: Counsel(KJA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:19-CV-23-TBR

LEONIA SANDERS, et al.,

PLAINTIFFS

v.

CITY OF PEMBROKE, et al.,

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants Lincoln Foster and Maureen Leamy’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. [DN 28; DN 122; DN 133]. In its
Memorandum Opinion of August 7, 2020, this Court directed Plaintiffs and Defendants Lincoln
Foster and Maureen Leamy to provide supplemental briefing on two questions: (1) Does Kentucky
Rule of Civil Procedure 4.01 apply to emergency guardianship proceedings; and (2) If so, would
the prosecutors’ instructions to the clerk pursuant to Rule 4.01 constitute an administrative
prosecutorial function? [DN 131 at 1759]. Defendants filed their Supplemental Memorandum
pursuant to the Court’s request. [DN 133]. Plaintiffs have responded. [DN 135]. This matter is now
fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, [DN 133], is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Leonia Sanders lives in Pembroke, Kentucky with her twenty-seven-year-old son,
Ronald Sanders. [DN 51 at 771–72]. Mr. Sanders suffers from mental illness and Ms. Sanders

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worked with the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (“CHFS”) and Pennyroyal
Mental Health Center (“PMHC”) to manage her son’s care. Id. at 772. However, Ms. Sanders
claims that these institutions “betrayed her and Ronald, and with the help of county and municipal
law enforcement, [] conspired to kidnap her son” by making him a ward of the state. Id. The
Amended Complaint provides a detailed description of the alleged conspiracy and implicates
multiple individuals in Christian County. Given that the current motion was filed by Lincoln Foster
and Maureen Leamy, the Court will focus its recitation of the facts on these two defendants.
According to Plaintiffs, the alleged conspiracy began in February 2017. Id. at 777.
Plaintiffs had recently moved to Pembroke and Mr. Sanders became known in the community for
listening to his boombox and dancing around town. Id. On July 26, 2017, an apartment complex
manager complained to the local police chief that a man with a boombox was dancing near her
property and appeared to be intoxicated. Id. at 778. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Sanders was arrested
and charged with disorderly conduct and alcohol intoxication. Id. at 779. He spent a night in jail
and was released on July 27. Mr. Sanders was arraigned on the above charges on August 2, 2017.
[DN 53 at 860]. His mother, Leonia Sanders, brought her son to his court appearance, and she was
present when his case was called. Id. At an August 9, 2017 pretrial conference in the disorderly
conduct and alcohol intoxication case, the issue of Mr. Sanders’s competency was raised, and Mr.
Sanders’s public defender informed the court and the prosecutor, Maureen Leamy, that Mr.
Sanders had been found incompetent before. Id. Subsequently, Mr. Sanders’s attorney filed a
motion for a psychiatric evaluation pursuant to KRS 504.100. Id. On September 15, 2017, the state
court issued an order for an out-of-custody competency evaluation to be administered at Western
State Hospital (WSH), where the order was faxed. Id. at 861.

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A few months later, on October 23, 2017, Mr. Sanders was cited for Third Degree Criminal
Trespassing, an unarrestable and unjailable violation, at the personal residence of Clara Edwards.
Id. The next day, Ms. Sanders filed a petition to involuntarily hospitalize Mr. Sanders because he
was hearing voices and hallucinating. [DN 51 at 781]. Mr. Sanders was subsequently admitted to
WSH for three days from October 24 to October 27. Id. On December 13, 2017, Mr. Sanders
appeared in court for a pretrial conference on both of his pending cases. Id. at 864. Leonia Sanders
brought Mr. Sanders to his court appearance and was present when his case was called. Id.
On February 1, 2018, Assistant Christian County Attorney Lincoln Foster advised Heather
Holland of CHFS that his office would be filing a Petition for Emergency Guardianship of Mr.
Sanders. Id. at 786. Foster then downloaded the Petition for Emergency Guardianship form, and
he notified Janet Tolliver of PMHC about the guardianship plans. [DN 103 at 1356]. During his
phone call with Tolliver, Foster stated he was aware of Mr. Sanders’s diagnosis and that “none of
Ronald’s charges would stick due to his diagnosis. However, Ronald will have new charges from
trespassing at Ms. Clair’s House.” [DN 103-3 at 1383]. On February 2, Assistant County Attorney
Maureen Leamy signed an affidavit in support of her sworn belief that Ronald Sanders was “an
immediate danger to self and others.” [DN 103-4 at 1384]. Foster notarized Leamy’s signature on
this affidavit. Id. at 1385; [DN 53 at 868]. On February 2, Leamy also signed a Petition to
Determine if Disabled and an Application for Appointment of Fiduciary for Disabled Persons.
[DN 51 at 786]. The Application for Appointment of Fiduciary listed the petitioner as
“Commonwealth of Kentucky ex rel Maureen Leamy with CHFS Being Appointed” and included
Ms. Leamy’s signed affidavit stating that Mr. Sanders was in imminent harm, or a danger or a
threat of danger to himself or others. Id.; [DN 103-2 at 1281]. On February 8, Ms. Holland
contacted Jimmy Coyer at PMHC to alert him that Mr. Sanders could require placement at PMHC

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depending on the outcome of the County Attorney’s guardianship petition. [DN 51 at 787–88]. On
February 9, the guardianship petition and affidavit were filed with the court. [DN 125-2 at 1673–
74]; [DN 125-3 at 1675–76]. Also, on February 9, the Christian County District Court entered an
order appointing Clayton Adams as guardian ad litem for Mr. Sanders. [DN 51 at 788].
On February 13, 2018, the Christian County District Court conducted an emergency
guardianship hearing. Id. at 789. Mr. Sanders and Ms. Sanders claim they were not notified of the
proceeding and did not attend; however, Mr. Sanders’s previously appointed guardian ad litem
was present on his behalf. Id. First, the presiding judge entered an order appointing Ms. Leamy
and CHFS as Mr. Sanders’s emergency fiduciaries. Id. The order suspended Mr. Sanders’s right
to determine his living arrangement, to consent to medical procedures, and to handle financial
responsibilities. Id. Additionally, the court ordered a sheriff to transport Mr. Sanders to PMHC in
Madisonville, Kentucky. Id. at 790. Next, the court conducted a review of the emergency
appointment. Id. Ms. Leamy testified that Mr. Sanders’s mental illness and his mother’s lack of
supervision caused Mr. Sanders to incur the public intoxication and trespassing charges. Id.
Moreover, she claimed the emergency appointment was necessary for Mr. Sanders to avoid future
criminal charges and that CHFS was the most appropriate entity to take guardianship. Id. The court
concluded the proceedings by ruling that Mr. Sanders would reside at PMHC until a disability
hearing took place on April 4, 2018. Id.
On February 13, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the current action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C §
1985 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as defamation, abuse of process, assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, and outrage. [See DN 1]. Lincoln Foster and Maureen Leamy filed the
instant Motion to Dismiss alongside several other dispositive motions filed by other Defendants in
this case. Subsequently, in its August 7, 2020 Order, this Court dismissed all claims in the above-

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captioned action against Defendants Pennyroyal Mental Health Center, Reba Pleasant, Janet
Tolliver, Heather Holland, Lindee Monroe, Rebecca Perry, and Susan Redmond-Vaught. [DN 132
at 1774]. The following claims remain: (1) Monell claim against City of Pembroke; (2) 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 false arrest claim against Frye; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claim against Burgess;
(4) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 procedural due process claim against Foster and Leamy; (5) state law assault
and battery claim against Burgess; and (6) state law false imprisonment claim against Frye. Id.
There is currently one motion before the Court: Defendants Lincoln Foster and Maureen
Leamy’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim. In their response to
Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Sanders’s due process rights were violated when (1)
Leamy presented inaccurate and misleading information to the trial judge during the emergency
guardianship proceeding, and (2) Leamy and Foster failed to provide proper notice of the
emergency guardianship hearing to Mr. Sanders. [DN 125 at 1656.] In its August 7, 2020
Memorandum Opinion Regarding Plaintiffs’ first allegation, the Court found that by taking the
stand and testifying to the truth of facts during the guardianship proceeding, Leamy acted as a
complaining witness, not an advocate. [DN 131 at 1758]. As such, the Court determined that
Defendants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that Leamy was entitled to absolute
prosecutorial immunity for her testimony during the emergency guardianship proceeding. Id. Thus,
the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss this aspect of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. Id.
Regarding Plaintiffs’ second allegation, the Court considered whether Leamy and Foster
are entitled to absolute immunity for their alleged failure to notify Mr. Sanders of the emergency
guardianship proceedings in violation of his procedural due process rights. [Id.] After reviewing
the parties’ arguments and relevant case law, the Court determined that additional briefing was
necessary in order to properly evaluate Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court directed the

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parties to provide supplemental briefing on two questions: (1) Does Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure 4.01 apply to emergency guardianship proceedings; and (2) If so, would the prosecutors’
instructions to the clerk pursuant to Rule 4.01 constitute an administrative prosecutorial function?
[Id. at 1759.]
Given that no discovery has been conducted in this matter, the Court will analyze the instant
motion pursuant to Civil Rule 12(b)(6). Courts evaluating motions to dismiss are generally limited
to consideration of the complaint and any exhibits attached to the complaint. Father Flanagan's
Boys Home v. Donlon, No. 1:18-CV-644, 2020 WL 1469469, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2020).
“However, a court may consider certain materials outside of the pleadings without converting the
motion to one for summary judgment.” Id. These materials include “‘exhibits attached [to the
complaint], public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to
defendant's motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the complaint and are central to the
claims contained therein.’” Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 680–81 (6th Cir.
2011) (quoting Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008)). The
Court will limit its analysis according to this standard.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court looks to the legal standards for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions
to dismiss and the legal standards for absolute immunity in deciding whether to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ § 1983 failure to provide notice claim. In a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
“[t]he defendant has the burden of showing that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief.”
Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451,
454-55 (6th Cir. 1991)). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to survive a motion to dismiss

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under Rule 12(b)(6), a party must “plead enough ‘factual matter’ to raise a ‘plausible’ inference of
wrongdoing.” 16630 Southfield Ltd. P’ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir.
2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A claim becomes plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
Court must presume all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc., 552 F.3d at 434
(citing Great Lakes Steel, 716 F.2d at 1105). “The court need not, however, accept unwarranted
factual inferences.” Id. (citing Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.
1987)). Should the well-pleaded facts support no “more than the mere possibility of misconduct,”
then dismissal is warranted. Iqbal, 556 U.S at 679. The Court may grant a motion to dismiss “only
if, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the complaint in favor of the
plaintiff, the complaint still fails to allege a plausible theory of relief.” Garceau v. City of Flint,
572 F. App’x 369, 371 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–79).
The Sixth Circuit provided a concise explanation of absolute immunity in Hall v. City of
Williamsburg:
“An absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official's actions
were within the scope of the immunity.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419
n.13, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Absolutely protected acts include those
“undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings
or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State....”
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209
(1993). We have employed a “functional approach” to determine whether a
prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity, looking to “the nature of the function
performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it” when assessing whether
conduct is prosecutorial, and thus absolutely protected. Id. at 269, 113 S.Ct. 2606
(citation omitted).

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Absolute immunity protects “only ... actions that are connected with the
prosecutor's role in judicial proceedings, not ... every litigation-inducing conduct.”
Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) ).
Absolute immunity is not available to prosecutors when they perform “
‘investigative’ or ‘administrative’ functions unrelated to judicial proceedings.” Id.
In addition, a prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity when he acts as a
complaining witness by making sworn statements to the court in support of a
criminal complaint. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129-131, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139
L.Ed.2d 471 (1997).
Hall v. City of Williamsburg, 768 F. App’x. 366, 374 (6th Cir. 2019). Ultimately, Foster
and Leamy bear the burden of demonstrating that their actions were an “‘integral part of
the judicial process’ or . . . [were] ‘intimately associated with the judicial process’” in order
to claim absolute immunity.” Wendrow v. Michigan Dep’t if Human Servs., 534 F. App’x
516, 527 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir.
2010)).
DISCUSSION
In their motion to dismiss, [DN 28], Foster and Leamy argue that absolute immunity
protects them against the claim that they violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights by failing to provide
notice of the guardianship proceedings. Id. at 227–31. They support this argument by reasoning
that “the task of issuing a summons and petition was the responsibility of the clerk of court.” Id.
at 231. Had Defendants assumed responsibility of issuing a summons and petition, they argue, they
would have “shed their absolute immunity” because such a task is an administrative or
investigative activity to which absolute immunity does not apply. Id. Essentially, Defendants argue
that it was not their duty to provide notice, but if they had assumed that duty, they could be held
liable, because they would not be protected by absolute immunity. In response, Plaintiffs
acknowledge that under KRS § 387.740, the clerk of court is responsible for issuing the summons.
[DN 125 at 1659]. However, they maintain that Defendants were required by Kentucky Rule of
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Civil Procedure 4.01(1)(a) “to instruct the clerk by what method and what address to send the
summons.” Id. Subsequently, the Court requested supplemental briefing on two questions: (1)
Does Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 4.01 apply to emergency guardianship proceedings; and
(2) If so, would the prosecutors’ instructions to the clerk pursuant to Rule 4.01 constitute an
administrative prosecutorial function? [DN 131 at 1759.]
In their supplemental brief, Defendants maintain that they should be shielded by absolute
immunity because the notice requirements for guardianship proceedings are governed solely by
Chapter 387 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes and not by CR 4.01, and Chapter 387 places the
duty of providing notice of statutory guardianship hearings on the clerk of court. [DN 133 at 1776–
77]. Defendants rely on the text of Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which states, in relevant
part, “[t]hese rules govern procedure and practice in all actions of a civil nature in the court of
Justice except for special statutory proceedings, in which the procedural requirements of the statute
shall prevail over any inconsistent procedures set forth in the Rules.” Ky. R. Civ. P. 1(2).
Defendants argue that because Chapter 387 includes separate notice requirements, it qualifies as a
special statutory proceeding, and its procedures prevail over the notice requirements set out in the
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. [DN 133 at 1777]. Defendants cite two statutes in support of
their argument. Id. at 1776-77. First, KRS § 387.620(4) provides: “Notice of the time and place of
the hearing shall be given by the clerk of the court not less than fourteen (14) days prior to the
hearing to both parties and all persons named in the petition.” Second, in the instance of an
emergency guardianship proceeding, KRS 387.740(3) requires: “Notice of the time and place of
the hearing shall be given not less than forty-eight (48) hours prior to the hearing to all persons
named in the petition and to the county attorney.” Id. at 1776. Thus, according to Defendants,
because the Kentucky statutes imposed no duty upon the defendants to provide notice, and because

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those statutes alone control notice requirements in guardianship proceedings, the defendants could
not have violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights by failing to provide notice. Id.
Defendants go on to argue that even if the Court finds that CR 4.01 applies to Chapter 387
proceedings and that Foster and Leamy had a duty to provide notice, breach of that duty would be
a prosecutorial rather than administrative action, and thus, they would still be protected by absolute
immunity. Id. at 1778. The Court notes that this argument stands in contrast to Defendants’
previous explanation in their original motion to dismiss that “[b]y assuming the responsibility for
the issuance of a summons and petition, these Defendants would have risked losing absolute
immunity.” [DN 28 at 231].
Plaintiffs responded, countering that Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 4.01 does apply to
Chapter 387 proceedings. [DN 135 at 1784]. Plaintiffs contend that the proceedings contemplated
by both KRS § 387.530 and KRS § 387.740 are civil actions as defined by the Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure and Kentucky case law, and as such, are “commenced with the filing of a
complaint and issuance of a summons” under CR 4.01. Id. at 1785, n.2 (first citing West v.
Commonwealth, 887 S.W.2d 338, 344 (Ky. 1994) (overruled on other grounds) (“A civil action is
commenced by the filing of a complaint or petition under CR 3.”); and then citing Davenport v.
Norsworthy, 2003 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6 (Ky. App. 2003) (“In this Commonwealth, a civil
action (including an original action) is commenced upon the filing of a complaint (or petition) and
the issuance of summons (or warning order) in good faith under CR 3.01.”)). Plaintiffs also reason
that the provisions governing notice of the emergency guardianship hearing in Chapter 387 “do
not apply to notice of the commencement of the action itself.” Id. Instead, they apply only to notice
of the emergency guardianship hearing. Id. Therefore, regardless of Chapter 387’s notice
requirements for guardianship hearings, Defendants still had a duty to direct the clerk to provide

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notice of the filing of the emergency guardianship and disability petition pursuant to CR 4.01.
Plaintiffs further argue that the prosecutors’ duties of providing notice are administrative rather
than prosecutorial, “because any interested person can file an emergency guardianship or disability
petition.” Id. at 1787. Plaintiffs also contend that “[t]he plain language of CR 4.01 requires a
petitioner to notify the clerk to issue a summons and by which method to serve it . . . the duties to
notify the clerk to issue a summons and direct the clerk by which method to achieve service
constitute an administrative act that is not part of a prosecutor’s function as an advocate.” Id.
The Court finds that Defendants have not carried their burden in a motion to dismiss to
show that Plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim for relief. First, Defendants have not
convinced the Court that they were not obligated by the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure to
direct the clerk to provide notice of the filing of the petition. Even if the clerk was solely
responsible for providing notice of the emergency guardianship hearing pursuant to KRS §
387.740(3), the statute does not include specific notice requirements regarding the emergency
petition itself. On this point, Defendants argue that emergency guardianship proceedings are the
kind of “special statutory proceedings” referred to in Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 1. [DN
133 at 1777]. As such, Defendants argue, the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure—and thus, the
notice provisions in the rules—do not apply, because “the procedural requirements of the statute
shall prevail over any inconsistent provisions set forth in the Rules.” Id. (quoting Ky. R. Civ. P.
1(2)). On the other hand, Plaintiffs argue that “KRS 387.740 creates a statutory civil action,” and
“CR 3.01 provides that a civil action in Kentucky is commenced with the filing of a complaint and
issuance of a summons.” [DN 135 at 1786].
The Court does not find it necessary to specifically define emergency guardianship
proceedings as civil actions or special statutory proceedings. The language of Kentucky Rule of

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Civil Procedure 1 is decisive here: “These Rules govern procedure and practice in all actions of a
civil nature in the Court of Justice except for special statutory proceedings, in which the procedural
requirements of the statute shall prevail over any inconsistent procedures set forth in the Rules.”
Ky. R. Civ. P. 1(2) (emphasis added). KRS § 387.740 is silent on notice of the emergency
guardianship petition; it only specifies a procedure for notice of the subsequent emergency
guardianship hearing. Thus, the procedures of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure and the
procedures of the statute are not inconsistent with one another. Instead, the Court finds that the
notice requirements of KRS § 387.740(3) and CR 4.01 must work in tandem in the case of
emergency guardianship proceedings, the former governing notice requirements for emergency
guardianship hearings, and the latter governing notice requirements for the filing of emergency
guardianship petitions. Accordingly, Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 4.01 required Defendants
as the initiating party to direct the clerk in issuing a summons. The Court rejects Defendants’
argument that they had no duty to provide notice to Mr. Sanders or his mother.
The Court further finds that Defendants have not carried the burden of showing that the
notice responsibilities required by CR 4.01 constitute prosecutorial functions protected by absolute
immunity. Defendants themselves stated in their original motion to dismiss that “[b]y assuming
the responsibility for the issuance of a summons and petition, these Defendants would have risked
losing absolute immunity.” [DN 28 at 231]. While it was not up to the Defendants whether to
assume the notice responsibilities, the action required by CR 4.01 was an administrative function
to which absolute immunity does not apply. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that “notify[ing] the
clerk to issue a summons and by which method to serve it . . . constitute[s] an administrative act
that is not part of a prosecutor’s function as an advocate.” [DN 135 at 1787]. Defendants’ failure
to comply with CR 4.01 is not protected by absolute immunity, and thus, the Court cannot find

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that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the § 1983 failure to
provide notice allegation. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss must be DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, [DN 133], is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

December 3, 2020

CC: Attorneys of Record

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