Sanders, et al v. City of Pembroke, et al
Filing
170
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 1/26/2022. Denying 159 Motion for Sanctions; denying 160 Motion for Protective Order. cc: Counsel(KJA)
Case 5:19-cv-00023-TBR-LLK Document 170 Filed 01/26/22 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 1977
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:19-CV-023-TBR
LEONIA N. SANDERS,
PLAINTIFF
v.
CITY OF PEMBROKE, KY et al.,
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Verified Motion for Sanctions Against the City of
Pembroke for Witness Tampering (“Motion for Sanctions”), [DN 159], and Motion for
Protective Order Limiting Inquiry in the Deposition of the Plaintiff Leonia Sanders (“Motion for
Protective Order”), [DN 160], both filed by Plaintiff Leonia N. Sanders, individually and as
parent and guardian of Ronald D. Sanders. Defendants have responded, [DN 164; DN 165], and
Plaintiff has replied, [DN 166; DN 167]. This matter is therefore fully briefed and ripe for
review. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions,
[DN 159], without prejudice and will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order, [DN 160].
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Leonia Sanders lives in Pembroke, Kentucky with her adult son, Ronald. [DN 51
at 3–4]. Mr. Sanders suffers from mental illness, and Ms. Sanders worked with the Kentucky
Cabinet for Health and Family Services (“CHFS”) and Pennyroyal Mental Health Center
(“PMHC”) to manage her son’s medications. Id. On February 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed the current
action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defamation, abuse of
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process, assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, and outrage. [See DN 1 (Original
Complaint); DN 51 (Amended Complaint)]. More specifically, she claims that CHFS and PMHC
“betrayed her and Ronald, and with the help of county and municipal law enforcement, []
conspired to kidnap her son” by making him a ward of the state. [DN 51, p. 4]. These allegations
are set forth in more detail in the Court’s prior orders. See, e.g., [DN 107; DN 131].
Plaintiff has now filed two motions, one seeking sanctions against the city of Pembroke,
[DN 159], and one seeking a protective order, [DN 160]. In the Motion for Sanctions, Plaintiff
alleges that the current Chief of Police for the City of Pembroke, Montgomery Strode,
“surreptitiously interviewed Ronald Sanders, who has a measured full-scale IQ in the 50s,
outside his mother’s presence and without the knowledge of Plaintiffs’ counsel, in which Chief
Strode discussed the lawsuit, include the parties, their claims, and their settlement prospects.”
[DN 159, p. 2]. Plaintiff has provided a recording of a portion of that interview and argues that
“Chief Strode attempted to influence Ronald Sanders’ testimony on a number of other material
subjects in the lawsuit” during unrecorded portions of the interview. Id. Plaintiff seeks sanctions
for these allegedly improper actions, which Plaintiff characterizes as witness tampering. Id. In
the Motion for Protective Order, Plaintiff also asks the Court to limit the scope of Ms. Sanders’s
upcoming deposition and prohibit any questioning related to Mr. Sanders’s meeting with Chief
Strode. [DN 160].
II.
ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, [DN 159]
District courts have the inherent authority to impose sanctions “‘when a party has acted in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,’ or when the conduct is ‘tantamount
to bad faith.’” Metz v. Unizan Bank, 655 F.3d 485, 489 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal citations
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omitted); see also Greene v. Independent Pilots Assoc., No. 18-5296, 2018 WL 9651540, *3 (6th
Cir. Oct. 4, 2018). The use of such inherent powers “must be exercised with restraint and
discretion.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff asks this Court to invoke its inherent powers to impose sanctions against
defendants, arguing that “[w]itness tampering constitutes bad faith conduct.” [DN 159, p. 9]. In
response, the City of Pembroke argues that (1) communication between two parties to a lawsuit
is not prohibited; (2) the meeting between Mr. Sanders and Chief Strode was initiated by Mr.
Sanders; and (3) the meeting included discussions about Ms. Sanders’s care of Mr. Sanders and
was not related to this lawsuit. [DN 165].
The Court has reviewed the recording of the meeting between Mr. Sanders and Chief
Pembroke. Plaintiff has also provided a “statement of facts” in her brief, which she represents is
“based on her knowledge of the unrecorded portions of the interview.” [DN 159, p. 2–6]. In fact,
the statement of facts is apparently based off a phone conversation between Ms. Sanders, Mr.
Sanders, and counsel in which Mr. Sanders discussed the interview. Id. at p. 2–3, n.2. The City
of Pembroke disputes Plaintiff’s description and characterization of the interview and asserts that
Mr. Sanders initiated the conversation with Chief Strode in an attempt to discuss his mother’s
attempts to care for him. [DN 165]. Having reviewed these arguments and the recorded
interview, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, [DN 159], is premature and
discovery is necessary if Plaintiff wishes to proceed with this request. Therefore, as explained in
more detail below, the Court will allow the parties to depose Ms. Sanders and Chief Strode about
the allegedly improper meeting between Mr. Sanders and Chief Strode. Once more information
is gathered during discovery, Plaintiff may refile her request for sanctions, if warranted.
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Accordingly, at this time, the Court will deny the Motion for Sanctions, [DN 159], without
prejudice.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order, [DN 160]
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an
order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
or expense including,” among other things, “forbidding inquiry in to certain matters, or limiting
the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(D). When
seeking a protective order to prevent the taking of a deposition, the moving party bears a “heavy
burden.” Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, 302 F.R.D. 472, 476 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (quoting
EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT-09-2573, 2012 WL 2370122, *1 (D. Md. June 21, 2012)).
Plaintiff asks this Court for a protective order under Rule 26 to limit the scope of Ms.
Sanders’s deposition in light of the allegedly improper meeting between Mr. Sanders and Chief
Strode. [DN 160]. Specifically, she seeks to prohibit any deposition questions about that meeting
or about any statements that Mr. Sanders made during that meeting. Id. She explains, “Good
cause for limiting inquiry in Mrs. Sanders’s deposition is that asking Leonia Sanders about her
son’s inappropriately obtained statements would cause annoyance, embarrassment, and
oppression.” Id. at 10. She further states that she “should not be forced to re-live Chief Strode’s
predatory and surreptitious manipulation of her severely intellectually impaired son, who is
dependent on her.” Id. She also anticipates filing several motions in limine if such questioning is
allowed. Id. However, Plaintiff clearly anticipates deposing Chief Strode about the meeting
between himself and Mr. Sanders. Id. at 11.
The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion. While the Court understands that Ms. Sanders
may find Defendants’ questioning to be annoying or embarrassing, that reason alone is
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insufficient to limit her deposition testimony. This is particularly true considering Plaintiff’s own
motion seeking sanctions against Defendants for the allegedly improper meeting between Chief
Strode and Mr. Sanders, the very subject matter that she now seeks to exclude from her
deposition. Simply put, any questioning about the allegedly improper meeting would not be for
the sole purpose of annoyance or harassment; rather, it would be in response to Plaintiff’s own
allegations against the City of Pembroke. Stated another way, by filing her Motion for Sanctions,
Plaintiff has opened the door to further discussion of the meeting between Mr. Sanders and Chief
Strode. As the Court has already explained, discovery would aid in the Court’s resolution of that
Motion for Sanctions. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order,
[DN 160].
Lastly, to the extent that Defendants argue that Ms. Sanders’s deposition should take
place in person, [DN 164], the Court notes that Magistrate Judge Lanny King has already
addressed that issue. He previously held that “[t]he deposition of Ms. Leonia Sanders shall
proceed via Zoom in light of her legitimate health concerns.” [DN 158].
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions,
[DN 159], is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order,
[DN 160], is DENIED.
January 26, 2022
cc: Counsel of Record
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