Moore et al v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board et al

Filing 1323

ORDER AND REASONS denying 1314 Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle. (ijg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JOYCE MARIE MOORE, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 65-15556

TANGIPAHOA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD,
ET AL.

SECTION "B"(1)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Tangipahoa Charter School Association’s
(TCSA) Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. (Rec. Doc. No. 1314). TCSA
seeks a stay of the provision of this Court’s prior Order which
requires TCSA to forfeit the local portion of its 2015-16 Minimum
Foundation Program (MFP) funds and permits the Tangipahoa Parish
School Board (TPSB) to re-urge such forfeiture annually. TPSB filed
a Response Memorandum in Opposition. (Rec. Doc. No. 1318).
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 27, 2015, this Court issued an Order granting TCSA’s

Motion for Authority to Operate a Charter School in Tangipahoa
Parish subject to five conditions. (Rec. Doc. No. 1297). One of
those conditions was that TCSA forfeit the 2015-16 “local portion”
of MFP funds. (Rec. Doc. No. 1297 at 3). Moreover, the Order gave
TPSB the right to re-urge such forfeiture annually. (Rec. Doc. No.
1297 at 3). In support of the condition, this Court relied on
Cleveland v. Union Parish School Board, 2009 WL 2476562, No. 6712924, (W.D. La. Aug. 12, 2009), where the United States District
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Court for the Western District of Louisiana previously imposed
such a condition.

It is this

forfeiture condition that TCSA

contests on appeal and that TCSA seeks to have stayed pending
outcome of the appeal.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

To obtain a stay pending appeal, a party must first move for
such a stay in the district court. Fed. R. App. P. 8(a). “A stay
is

not

a

matter

of

right,

even

if

irreparable

injury

might

otherwise result. It is instead an exercise of judicial discretion,
and the propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances
of the particular case.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Four factors
govern: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing
that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the
applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties
interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest
lies.” Id. at 434 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776
(1987). The first two factors are the most critical. Nken, 556
U.S. at 434.
a. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
TCSA presents five arguments to support the contention that
it is likely to succeed on the merits: (1) TPSB is not entitled to
MFP funds covering students not enrolled in TPSB schools; (2) not
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all local MFP funds allocated to TCSA would constitute a loss; (3)
that this Court is without authority to disregard the State’s MFP
formula; (4) this Court has other alternatives to accomplish the
same goal without requiring forfeiture of MFP funds; and (5) this
Court’s reliance on Cleveland was misplaced. (Rec. Doc. No. 13141 at 3-7. TCSA’s arguments boil down to one essential contention:
that this Court is not authorized to divert TCSA’s MFP funds to
TCSB even if this Court believes such diversion is necessary to
fulfill the constitutional duty to desegregate schools.
For the movant to succeed on this prong, it is not enough to
show that the chance of success on the merits is “better than
negligible.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (quoting Sofinet v. INS, 188
F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1999). Instead, the movant must make a
strong showing that success is likely. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.
Success in this context means TCSA must convince the Fifth Circuit
to reverse this Court’s decision regarding the forfeiture of local
MFP funds. At the appellate level, this Court’s findings of fact
are reviewed for clear error, and conclusions of law are reviewed
de novo. Moore v. La. Bd. Of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 743
F.3d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 2014). Thus, in order to succeed, the
movant must make a strong showing that this Court does not have
the legal authority to override Louisiana’s funding statutes. If
movant cannot meet that test, then it can still overcome its burden
by making a strong showing this this Court was clearly erroneous
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in concluding that diversion of funds was necessary to further the
desegregation of the Tangipahoa Parish School System (TPSS).
1. Likelihood of Success in Challenging Conclusions of Law
School

districts

are

“legally

obligated

to

provide

educational opportunities to all children of every race in the
elementary and secondary grades residing within” their districts.
Taylor v. Coahoma Cty. Sch. Dist., 330 F. Supp. 174, 183 (N.D.
Miss. 1970). “Local conditions, separate legal entities, state
laws and statutes cannot frustrate the implementation of [such]
constitutionally protected rights.” Id. (citing United States v.
Indianola Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 410 F.2d 626, 630-31 (5th Cir.
1969)). “The remedial power of the federal courts under the
Fourteenth Amendment is not limited by state law.” Taylor, 330 F.
Supp. at 183 (citing Haney v. Cty. Bd. Of Educ. Of Sevier Cty.,
429 F.2d 364, 368 (8th Cir. 1970). Accordingly, this Court has the
power to refuse to implement Louisiana state laws if those laws
frustrate desegregation of the Tangipahoa Parish School System.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §17:3955 governs charter school funding.
Section 3955 states that Type 2 charter schools such as the one
here, Tangi Academy, “shall receive a per pupil amount each year
authorized by the state board each year as provided in the approved
[MFP] formula. The per pupil amount provided . . . shall be
computed annually and shall be equal to the per pupil amount . .
. received by the school district in which the student resides
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from the following sources:” the state-funded per pupil allocation
and local revenues. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §17:3955. Thus, the MFP
funding for charter schools has both state and local sources, and
this Court has defied the state mandate that charter schools
receive funding form both sources by allowing TPSB to retain the
local MFP funds allocated to TCSA. However, as referenced above,
this Court’s remedial power is not limited by state law when state
law frustrates constitutionally protected rights.
This Court has the power to defy Louisiana state law regarding
MFP funds when it finds that following such laws will prove
detrimental to the desegregation effort. Movant’s arguments to the
contrary lack merit. Moreover, that power is explicitly recognized
in Cleveland, 2009 WL 2476562, at *4. Though the underlying reason
for the reallocation of funds was arguably different, the case
demonstrates that federal courts can reallocate MFP funds. Id.
Accordingly, TCSA has not made the requisite showing that this
Court lacks the power to permit TPSB to retain locally-sourced MFP
funds. The next issue is whether this Court clearly erred with its
factual conclusion that diversion of local MFP funds was necessary
to further the desegregation order.
2. Likelihood of Success in Challenging Findings of Fact
In assessing the appropriateness of the challenged condition,
this Court must consider the impact on the overall school system,
including the loss of funding. In the Order granting TCSA’s Motion
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to Operate a Charter School, this Court specifically stated that
the required forfeiture was based “upon a finding that TPSB would
otherwise be subject to serious financial constraints.” (Rec. Doc.
No. 1297 at 7). Movants contend that this statement did not suffice
to

show

that

diminished

diminished

quality

of

funding

education,

to
and

TPSB

would

therefore,

result
this

in

a

Court’s

forfeiture condition was erroneous. (Rec. Doc. No. at 7). Aside
from

the

obvious

contradiction

to

its

argument

regarding

irreparable injury,1 movants overlook the evidence relied upon by
the Court.
The Court considered the testimony of Mr. Schnadelbach, the
CFO for TPSB, and Ms. Chapman, the CEO of TCSA. Based on those
testimonies, the Court found that TPSB’s anticipated loss over the
next 4 years of over $9,000,000 in funding due to the operation of
the charter school would cause significant hardship, including the
reduction of magnet services. As TPSB’s expenditures would only
decrease minimally, the Court determined that the total loss of
MFP funds to TCSA was too great of a burden to bear. Nevertheless,
the Court did observe that TCSA could not adequately serve its
students

if

it

forfeited

the

entirety

of

its

MFP

revenue.

Accordingly, the Court partitioned the funds between the two
entities.

As discussed below, TCSA contends that Tangi Academy students are suffering
irreparable harm from a lack of funding, but, for some reason, the movants
cannot understand why TPSB’s lack of funding could have a detrimental impact.
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6

TCSA contends that even if some local MFP funds should remain
with TPSB, a blanket forfeiture is inappropriate because not all
local MFP funds allocated to TCSA students would constitute a
“loss” of TPSB funding. This may be true, as TPSB would not have
previously received funding for current TCSA students who do not
live in TPSB or those who are entering school for the first time,
but such a fact does not affect the Court’s ultimate conclusion.
This Court concluded that the total aggregate loss suffered by
TPSB due to the operation of Tangi Academy would inhibit the
Board’s ability to move toward unitary status. Thus, whether
specific local funds would constitute a loss or not is irrelevant.
The Court divvied up the MFP funds by allowing TPSB to retain
local MFP funds not because that was the only source of “loss” for
TPSB, but because it provided a clear-cut method for partitioning
the funds; a method supported by the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana in Cleveland. Accordingly,
TCSA has failed to make a strong showing that this Court clearly
erred in its factual finding that TPSB’s retention of the local
portion of MFP funds is necessary to provide a “[properly-funded]
public

education

free

of

the

vestiges

of

discrimination.”

Cleveland, 2009 WL at *5. TCSA’s arguments do not tend to show a
likelihood of success on the merits.
b. Irreparable Injury

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“[S]imply showing some possibility of irreparable injury
fails to satisfy the second factor.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, “[a]n
injury is ‘irreparable’ only if it cannot be undone through
monetary remedies.” Deerfield Med. Ctr., City of Deerfield Beach,
661

F.2d

328,

338

(5th

Cir.

1981).

TCSA

contends

that

its

forfeiture of MFP funds cannot simply be undone by the recovery of
those

funds

because

“[e]ach

day

that

passes

without

a

stay

constitutes further irreparable harm to TCSA and the children it
educates, [and] no subsequent monetary relief would permit TCSA to
provide educational services with the benefit of local MFP funding
for those days.” (Rec. Doc. No. 1314-1 at 7). However, as TPSB’s
opposition points out, TCSA moved forward with opening Tangi
Academy for the 2015-16 school year knowing of TPSB’s requested
forfeiture condition. (Rec. Doc. No. 318 at 10).
If the lack of local MFP funds is truly causing irreparable
injury to the Tangi Academy students, then TCSA’s decision to open
the school without those funds was evident of a total disregard
for student well-being. This Court does not believe that TCSA would
proceed in such a reckless manner, and thus is not persuaded that
the lack of funds is causing irreparable injury. Moreover, TCSA’s
motion fails to identify any concrete harms relating to student
instruction or safety that could indicate irreparable injury. For
these reasons, the second factor for a stay is not met either.
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The third and fourth factors essentially boil down to whether
the issuance of a stay would negatively affect the TPSB and the
public in general. However, as TCSA’s Motion fails to demonstrate
a likelihood of success on the merits or an irreparable injury—
the two most critical factors, this Court need not proceed further.
III. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED as movants have
failed to make the requisite showing for this Court to order a
stay pending appeal.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10th day of November, 2015.

____________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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