Moore et al v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board et al
Filing
1498
ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that the 1475 Motion for Reconsideration of Facilities Order is DENIED, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 12/20/2017. (jls)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
M.C. MOORE, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 65-15556
TANGIPAHOA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.
SECTION "B"(1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Tangipahoa Parish School Board’s
“Motion for Reconsideration of Facilities Order.” Rec. Doc. 1475.
Plaintiffs filed an opposition. Rec. Doc. 1489. For the reasons
discussed below,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion (Rec. Doc. 1475) is DENIED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This motion to reconsider is part of a long-running school
desegregation case, the facts of which have been discussed at
length in the underlying Order and Reasons. See Rec. Doc. 1472. To
recap the most relevant history, the Board is under a desegregation
consent decree with respect to, inter alia, its facilities. See
Rec. Docs. 876, 956, 1264. In April 2017, the Board moved for
unitary status in the area of facilities. See Rec. Doc. 1455.
Plaintiffs filed an opposition (Rec. Doc. 1456) and the Board filed
a
reply
(Rec.
Doc.
1462).
In
July
2017,
the
Court
granted
provisional unitary status in the area of facilities, subject to
a two-year probationary period during which the Court Compliance
Officer will conduct semiannual compliance reviews. See Rec. Doc.
1
1472.
The
Board
subsequently
filed
the
instant
motion
for
reconsideration. Rec. Doc. 1475.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The
Board
seeks
reconsideration
of
the
Order
granting
provisional unitary status in the area of facilities (Rec. Doc.
1472) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Rec. Doc.
1475-1 at 3-4. “Rule 59(e) serves the narrow purpose of allowing
a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present
newly discovered evidence.” Templet v. HydroChem, Inc., 367 F.3d
473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). “A Rule 59(e) motion . . . is not the
proper
vehicle
for
rehashing
evidence,
legal
theories,
or
arguments that could have been offered or raised before” the order
was issued.1 Id. at 478-79. As a result, the “extraordinary remedy”
available under Rule 59(e) “should be used sparingly.” Id. at 479.
First, the Board argues that the provisional grant of unitary
status in the area of facilities, with a two year period of
continued supervision, is a “manifest legal error” stemming from
incorrect application of Youngblood v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction,
448 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1971). See Rec. Doc. 1475-1 at 4-9. The
Board asserts that it is entitled to full unitary status in the
area of facilities, without any further supervision, under an
1
Plaintiff’s motion is properly analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) because it was filed within twenty-eight days after the Court
provisionally granted unitary status in the area of facilities. See Texas A&M
Research Found. v. Magna Transp., Inc., 338 F.3d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 2003).
2
“incremental approach” to resolving desegregation cases. See Rec.
Doc. 1475-1 at 5-9. The Board’s current position is undermined by
the references in its motion for unitary status to “the three (3)
year period of [unitary status] required by this jurisdiction”
before a defendant is released from court supervision. See Rec.
Docs. 1455 at 1, 1455-1 at 25. This is the same period of time
that the Board now argues is inapplicable under the incremental
approach. Moreover, none of the cases cited by the Board hold that
the Fifth Circuit’s incremental approach is inconsistent with
imposing a temporary probationary period under Youngblood.
In fact, quite the opposite is true.2 In Overton, the district
court
imposed
a
probationary
period
under
Youngblood
before
finding that the school district had reached unitary status. See
United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1173-74, 1177 (5th Cir.
1987). The same occurred in Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 155, 157 (5th
Cir. 1990). And in United States v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., the
Fifth Circuit merely held that it was not an abuse of discretion
to grant unitary status without a final hearing when a district
court has otherwise “develop[ed] intimate knowledge of the school
2
One of the cases cited by the Board does not actually involve the termination
of a desegregation order and simply discusses the incremental approach to
achieving unitary status. See Hull v. Quitman Cty. Bd. of Educ., 1 F.3d 1450,
1454 (5th Cir. 1993) (“This appeal does not present exactly th[e] [unitary
status] issue, for [defendant] has not sought to terminate its desegregation
case.”). Another case does not address the Youngblood question because the
decision under review is from the Eleventh Circuit. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467 (1992). Moreover, in Freeman, the district court found that the school
district had reached unitary status with respect to student assignment seventeen
years prior to the end of judicial supervision. Id. at 480, 496.
3
district’s operations . . . [and] attain[ed] the same substantive
goals achievable by using the Youngblood procedures.” 48 F. App’x
102, *1 (5th Cir. 2002). Midland does not prohibit a district court
from imposing a probationary period under Youngblood before fully
releasing a defendant from part of a desegregation order. See id.
The two-year probationary period imposed in the Order and Reasons
(Rec. Doc. 1472) is consistent with Fifth Circuit doctrine and
there is no basis for reconsideration under Rule 59(e).
Second, the Board argues that the Court improperly decided to
impose the two-year probationary period by imputing the bad faith
comments of a single school board member to the whole school board.
See Rec. Doc. 1475-1 at 9-13. But the Court did not find that the
school board acted in bad faith. The Court observed that the school
board had complied with court orders and concluded that the school
board had “minimally yet sufficiently[] demonstrated a commitment
to desegregation.” Id. at 8, 13-14. In recognition of these efforts
and guided by Fifth Circuit doctrine, the Court granted provisional
unitary status in the area of facilities. See id. at 15-16. But
because the board must continue to act in good faith during the
probationary period, the Court again highlighted its lingering
concern that at least one member of the school board had expressed
a
desire
to
reverse
the
board’s
hard
work
toward
achieving
desegregation once full unitary status was achieved. See id. at
15-16.
4
Third, the Board objects (see Rec. Doc. 1475-1 at 13-15) to
the second to last sentence of the order (see Rec. Doc. 1472 at
16), which reads, “The CCO is authorized to take reasonable
measures to enforce compliance with this and related orders as he
deems
necessary.”
The
Board
argues
that
this
sentence
impermissibly expands the COO’s authority in violation of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 53. See Rec. Doc. 1475-1 at 13-15. But the
sentence does not alter the CCO’s authority. Rather, it simply
reiterates the COO’s mandate to “ensure compliance with the orders
of the court . . . [by] [(1)] monitor[ing] and insur[ing] that the
letter and spirit of case law and orders of the court are followed
regarding school board responsibility to desegregate schools and
[(2)] ensur[ing] that the court and all parties are informed of
any action which may be contrary to the orders of the court.” Rec.
Doc. 703-1 at 1. Because the Order and Reasons (Rec. Doc. 1472)
does not tread new ground with respect to the CCO’s authority,
reconsideration is inappropriate.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 20th day of December, 2017.
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5
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