Raynes v. McMoRan Exploration Company et al

Filing 260

ORDER denying 188 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Lance M Africk. (Reference: ALL CASES)(car, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JAMIE RAYNES, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

No. 08-5018 C/W 10-1730
(REF: ALL CASES)

MCMORAN EXPLORATION
COMPANY, ET AL.

SECTION “I”

ORDER
Before the Court is McMoRan Exploration Company’s (“McMoRan”) motion1 for
summary judgment. Plaintiff, Jamie Raynes (“Raynes”), opposes2 the motion.
McMoRan argues that, pursuant to the Master Services Agreement (“MSA”)3 between it
and Raynes’s employer, Grasso Production Management, Inc. (“Grasso”), McMoRan is
Raynes’s statutory employer pursuant to Louisiana law.4 Consequently, McMoRan asserts that,
as a statutory employer, it is entitled to the tort immunity provided in La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1032
and, as such, it would only be liable to Raynes for worker’s compensation benefits.5
In Brown v. Avondale Industries, 617 So.2d 482 (La. 1993) (per curiam), the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that if a worker “received” or “elected” benefits under the U.S.
Longshoreman and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), a statutory employer may
not avail itself of the tort immunity provided by the statutory employer defense. Since the date
of his accident, Raynes has received LHWCA benefits from Grasso.6
1

R. Doc. No. 188.
R. Doc. Nos. 200, 228, 254.
3
McMoRan and Grasso entered into the original MSA on February 19, 2004, and modified the MSA via a May 1,
2006 amendment. R. Doc. No. 188-5, pp. 1-13.
4
R. Doc. No. 188-1, p. 4.
5
R. Doc. No. 188-1, p. 5.
6
R. Doc. Nos. 200, p. 7 and No. 14, p. 2.
2

Subsequently, in Kerr v. Smith Petroleum Co., 896 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. La. 1995), the
court distinguished Brown. The Kerr court reasoned that the plaintiff in Brown was entitled to
elect LHWCA benefits as a worker on a vessel. Id. at 606-07 (citing Brown v. Avondale
Industries, 612 So.2d 315, 316 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993)). Conversely, the Kerr court concluded
that the plaintiff did not meet the status and situs tests necessary to be eligible for LHWCA
benefits7 and that “apparent error” in payment of LHWCA benefits to the plaintiff did not
“preclude[] [the defendants] from claiming the statutory employer defense under Brown.” Id. at
607. See also English v. Apache Corporation, 2011 WL 3352011, at * 5 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2011)
(“Arguably, [plaintiff’s employer] may have chosen to pay benefits to Plaintiff by mistake, i.e.,
just because LHWCA benefits were paid does not mean that Plaintiff is actually covered [by the
LHWCA].”). Following Kerr, the inquiry is whether Raynes is eligible to receive LHWCA
benefits. If Raynes is eligible to receive LHWCA benefits, then Brown applies and McMoRan
may not claim tort immunity as a purported statutory employer.
Having reviewed the memoranda, the summary judgment evidence, and the applicable
law, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Raynes
satisfied the situs and status tests and whether Raynes was in fact eligible to receive LHWCA
benefits. Consequently, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that McMoRan is entitled
to tort immunity as Raynes’s purported statutory employer.
Accordingly,

7

The plaintiff in Kerr did not satisfy the status and situs tests because he was not performing any “maritime
activity” and because he was not working on the Outer Continental Shelf. Kerr, 896 F. Supp. at 606.
2

IT IS ORDERED that McMoRan’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE to McMoRan’s right to reurge its motion at trial or in a post-trial
motion after the record in the above-captioned matter has been fully developed.

12th
New Orleans, Louisiana, September _____, 2011.
__________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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