Williams v. Lockheed Martin Corporation et al
Filing
64
ORDER AND REASONS denying 54 Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle. (ijg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TARSIA WILLIAMS, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 09-65
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, ET AL.
SECTION “B”(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
I.
NATURE OF MOTION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’, Breck Williams and Tarsia
Williams,1 “Motion to Remand” (Rec. Doc. 54), Defendant’s, Lockheed
Martin Corporation (“Lockheed Martin”), opposition thereto (Rec.
Doc. 59), as well as Plaintiffs’ reply (Rec. Doc. 63). Plaintiffs
seek to have the remaining claims in this case remanded to state
court in light of the dismissal of Defendant Lockheed Martin, the
only defendant with a potential federal defense so as to warrant
federal jurisdiction. For the reasons below, IT IS ORDERED that
Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case was originally filed in Civil District Court for
the Parish of Orleans on November 12, 2008. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 2).
The
suit
was
initiated
by
the
late
Frank
J.
Williams,
Jr.
(“Williams”), alleging various theories of recovery for exposure
to asbestos during his employment under Lockheed Martin as a
mechanical engineer at the NASA Michoud Assembly Facility. (Rec.
1
The only children of decedent, Frank J. Williams, Jr., the initial Plaintiff
in this case.
Doc. 1-1 at 3). Named as Defendants in this suit were Lockheed
Martin, Owens-Illinois, Inc., Viacom, Inc. (later replaced by its
successor, CBS Corporation), Foster Wheeler Corporation, General
Electric Company, Uniroyal, Inc., McCarty Corporation, Eagle,
Inc., Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc., Reilly-Benton Company, Inc., CSR,
Ltd., Advocate Mines, Ltd., and NORCA Corporation. (Rec. Doc. 1-1
at 1-3). Defendant Lockheed Martin removed the case to this Court
on January 8, 2009, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442, after discovery
revealed that a federal defense might be available. (Rec. Doc. 1
at 3).
On February 6, 2009, Plaintiff Williams filed a motion to
remand. (Rec. Doc. 10). This Court did not decide that motion
because the action was soon after transferred to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania for inclusion in Multidistrict Litigation
No. 875. (See
Rec. Doc. 23) (noting that Plaintiff Williams
objected to transfer prior to a ruling on the motion to remand,
but that the transferee judge could decline to rule on pending
motions and allow the transferor judge that ability). On April 9,
2012, Judge Eduardo Robreno, Senior United States District Judge
for
the
Eastern
District
of
Pennsylvania,
denied
Plaintiff
Williams’s Motion to Remand, after determining that Defendant
Lockheed Martin had a colorable government contractor defense so
as to proceed in federal court pursuant to the federal officer
removal statute. (Rec. Doc. 59-1).
2
Current
Plaintiffs,
Breck
and
Tarsia
Williams,
were
substituted as parties on May 7, 2012, as the only children of
decedent Williams. (Rec. Doc. 59-6 at 3). Plaintiffs again filed
a
motion
to
remand
after
the
close
of
discovery,
which
was
similarly denied by Judge Robreno on December 2, 2013, who noted
that the court would not lose subject matter jurisdiction over the
case even if the court were to later determine that Defendant
Lockheed Martin’s federal defense failed. (Rec. Doc. 59-2 at 2).
Subsequently, on June 23, 2014, Judge Robreno granted Defendant
Lockheed Martin’s motion for summary judgment based on state law
claims. (Rec. Doc. 59-3).
On August 20, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their “Motion Requesting
the Suggestion of Remand and Status Update,” requesting the case
be remanded to the Eastern District of Louisiana for trial. (Rec.
Doc.
59-5).
Plaintiffs
represented
that
“[t]here
[were]
no
outstanding motions remaining in the case” and that “Plaintiffs
[were] prepared for trial without delay once on the transferor
Court’s normal docket.” (Rec. Doc. 59-5). The case was remanded
shortly thereafter on September 22, 2014 and Defendant Lockheed
moved for entry of judgment pursuant to the previous grant of
summary judgment in its favor, which this Court granted and entered
accordingly. (Rec. Docs. 26, 28-30).2 Plaintiffs thereafter filed
2
The same motion was also filed by Defendant Reilly-Benton Company, Inc., as
it similarly prevailed on its motion for summary judgment, and the Court
likewise granted that motion and entered judgment in its favor. (Rec. Docs. 31,
35, 38).
3
an
appeal
with
the
Fifth
Circuit,
challenging,
among
other
decisions, the order denying the initial motion to remand, the
order denying the latter motion to remand, and the order granting
Defendant Lockheed Martin’s motion for summary judgment. (Rec.
Doc. 33).
On June 1, 2015, the Fifth Circuit’s judgment was filed in
the
record,
which
dismissed
Plaintiffs’
appeals
for
lack
of
jurisdiction due to prematurity. (Rec. Doc. 47). Subsequently, no
action was taken in the case for over seven months, until this
Court ordered on January 21, 2016 that Plaintiffs show cause why
remaining defendants had not been served. (Rec. Doc. 48). On March
2, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to remand. Of the
remaining
defendants,
none
have
filed
oppositions.
However,
Defendant Lockheed Martin opposes the motion in light of the fact
that the judgment in its favor “is not yet final.” (Rec. Doc. 59
at 1).
III. CONTENTIONS OF MOVANT
Plaintiffs first argue that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction
because
there
is
no
diversity
of
parties
and
incomplete diversity destroys original jurisdiction with respect
to all claims. Plaintiffs additionally aver that this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction because there are no federal questions
to be adjudicated. Plaintiffs further maintain that this Court
never had valid subject matter jurisdiction because Defendant
4
Lockheed Martin could not provide any evidence to support its claim
of government contractor immunity. Finally, Plaintiffs state that,
according to jurisprudence established by new cases in the Eastern
District of Louisiana, the case must now be remanded.
IV.
CONTENTIONS OF OPPONENTS
Defendant Lockheed Martin first argues that its judgment is
not yet final such that it should be permitted to oppose what is
Plaintiffs’ third attempt at divesting this Court of subject matter
jurisdiction,
a
conclusion
that
has
been
confirmed
twice
previously. Defendant then points out that, prior to remand to
this Court, Plaintiffs stated that there were no outstanding
motions and that they were prepared for trial without delay, making
a motion at this time inappropriate. Defendant maintains that
Plaintiffs’ contention that the federal courts “never had subject
matter
jurisdiction”
is
inaccurate
and
improperly
seeks
reconsideration of multiple orders affirming that jurisdiction.
Finally, Defendant avers that its judgment does not divest this
Court of subject matter jurisdiction in light of the Court’s
supplemental jurisdiction.
V.
STANDARD OF LAW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
[I]n any civil action of which the district
courts
have
original
jurisdiction,
the
district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of
5
the same case or controversy under Article III
of the United States Constitution. Such
supplemental
jurisdiction
shall
include
claims
that
involve
the
joinder
or
intervention of additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). The Court is not deprived of this
jurisdiction when the primary cause of action is dismissed, whether
on the merits or due to settlement, as long as the case was not
disposed of for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See IMFC
Prof'l Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Latin Am. Home Health Inc., 676
F.2d 152, 159 (5th Cir. 1982). This is true even when a case is
removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442. See Bartel v. Alcoa S.S.
Co., 805 F.3d 169, 172 n.2 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting IMFC Prof'l
Servs. of Florida, Inc. v. Latin Am. Home Health, Inc., 676 F.2d
152, 159 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1982)) (“[E]limination of the federal
officer from a removed case does not oust the district court of
jurisdiction.”).
If
the
claim
that
created
original
subject
matter
jurisdiction is no longer part of the suit, the exercise of
supplemental
1367(c)(3)
jurisdiction
(“The
is
district
discretionary.
courts
may
See
28
decline
to
U.S.C.
§
exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district
court
has
dismissed
jurisdiction[.]”).
all
The
claims
Fifth
over
Circuit
which
has
it
has
original
interpreted
this
discretion as limited, such that “it is [the] ‘general rule’ that
courts should decline supplemental jurisdiction when all federal
6
claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated from a case.” Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London & Other Insurers Subscribing to
Reinsurance Agreements F96/2922/00 & No. F97/2992/00 v. Warrantech
Corp., 461 F.3d 568, 578 (5th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, it is
required that the district court dismiss the ancillary claim unless
doing so would unduly prejudice the parties. See Waste Sys., Inc.
v. Clean Land Air Water Corp., 683 F.2d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1982).
The Supreme Court provided that prejudice would not be found if
the
dismissal
of
the
original
claim
occurred
early
in
the
litigation. See Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
(1988). Conversely, the Fifth Circuit has found that the district
court abused its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when a significant
amount of judicial resources were invested in a case. See Batiste
v. Island Records Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1999).
VI.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert an array of arguments in their motion, the
majority of which are insult to Judge Robreno, as the presiding
judge over this MDL prior to remand. The remainder of Plaintiffs’
arguments improperly misconstrue the relevant law and fail to
acknowledge the discretion of the district courts to determine
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Despite the instant
7
motion’s
near
frivolity,3
this
Court
will
address
each
of
Plaintiffs’ arguments more fully in the order they are presented.
A. Lack
of
Diversity
Jurisdiction.
does
not
Destroy
Subject
Matter
Plaintiffs are mistaken in alleging that lack of diversity
destroys subject matter jurisdiction.4 Though federal jurisdiction
exists
under
28
U.S.C.
§
1332
when
there
is
diversity
of
citizenship and an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000,
this
is
not
the
only
manner
of
establishing
subject
matter
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs maintain that “[t]here is no diversity of
parties, therefore this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”
(Rec. Doc. 54-1 at 4). In support of this, Plaintiffs state that
“[t]he mandate is clear: Incomplete diversity destroys original
jurisdiction with respect to all claims.” (Rec. Doc. 54-1 at 4)
(citations omitted). Although this Court does not deny the veracity
of that “mandate,” Plaintiffs’ selective recitation is misleading.
Specifically, Plaintiffs have cited to precedent where the
court was unable to maintain supplemental jurisdiction over any
claim in an action due to incomplete diversity, because there was
no other basis for federal jurisdiction such that subject matter
jurisdiction had to be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Here, that is
3
It should be noted that Plaintiffs’ reply to Defendant Lockheed Martin’s
opposition either seeks to deny making such arguments or attempts to withdraw
them. (Rec. Doc. 63).
4 Plaintiffs again mention this argument in their reply, but clarify that lack
of diversity destroys subject matter jurisdiction only because there is no
federal question present. (See Rec. Doc. 63 at 2).
8
not at issue because jurisdiction was initially based on 28 U.S.C.
§
1442(a)(1),
the
federal
officer
removal
statute.
Lack
of
diversity does not destroy subject matter jurisdiction if federal
jurisdiction was not based on the existence of diversity at the
outset. To maintain that all federal actions must have complete
diversity is asinine.
B. Dismissal of Federal Claims does not Destroy Subject Matter
Jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs incorrectly state, “There are no federal questions
to be adjudicated herein, therefore this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.” (Rec. Doc. 54-1 at 5). While Plaintiffs accurately
submit that there are no federal questions remaining in this case,
there is no law to support the conclusion that this Court now lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, as has already been stated,
this Court has the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)
and 1442(a)(1).5 In this instance, it is not proper to decline
supplemental jurisdiction.
When a case is removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1),
there is “independent authority for a discretion to remand from
the nature of the ancillary jurisdiction created by” that statute.
IMFC, 676 F.2d at 160. “[T]he district court's power to consider
5
In Plaintiffs’ reply, they correct their mistake and acknowledge the discretion
of the district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction (Rec.
Doc. 63 at 2-5), yet still maintain that “the dismissal of Lockheed Martin by
summary judgment now requires remand to state court.” (Rec. Doc. 63 at 1)
(emphasis added).
9
the nonfederal aspects of this case results from the ancillary
jurisdiction created by the authority in [28 U.S.C. §] 1442(a)(1)
to remove the entire action.” Id. Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1),
“through
its
creation
of
an
ancillary
jurisdiction,
confers
discretion on the district court to decline to exercise continued
jurisdiction over [nonfederal] claim[s] once [the federal officer
has] dropped out of the case.” Id.; see also Spencer v. New Orleans
Levee Bd., 737 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, this
Court has the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
“Whether the supplemental claims should be remanded if the
federal officer's ‘anchor’ claim is dismissed or settled, or if
the supplemental claims have been asserted against non-federal
parties, depends on considerations of comity, federalism, judicial
economy, and fairness to litigants.” 14C Charles Alan Wright et
al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3726 (4th ed. 2015).6 In
weighing these considerations, Batiste is instructive; although in
6
This Court references Fifth Circuit law, but notes that the framework for
determining whether a district court should decline to exercise jurisdiction
over remaining state law claims after the dismissal of the claim giving rise to
jurisdiction specifically under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) has not been addressed
in the Third Circuit since the 1990 enactment of the current version of 28
U.S.C. § 1367. See Lovell Mfg., a Div. of Patterson-Erie Corp. v. Exp.-Imp.
Bank of the U.S., 843 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1988), superseded by statute, Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5113, as recognized in
Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995). The amended 28
U.S.C. § 1367 states that federal courts shall exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over pendent claims after the basis for original jurisdiction no
longer exists, but have discretion to decline that jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
the Third Circuit has applied the identical framework when jurisdiction is
originally based on a federal question. See, e.g., Sarpolis v. Tereshko, 625 F.
App'x 594 (3d Cir. 2016). The relevance of this notation will be explained more
fully in a subsequent section.
10
that case original federal jurisdiction was obtained under 28
U.S.C. § 1331, not 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). See 179 F.3d 217. In
Batiste, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court abused
its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over pendent
state law claims after the dismissal of all federal claims. Id. at
227-28.
Specifically,
in
weighing
“the
factors
of
judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties[,]” the court
stated:
The case had been pending in the district
court for almost three years when the court
[declined jurisdiction], and the trial was
scheduled to begin one month later. . . . The
instant case has produced more than sixteen
volumes of record over the course of three
years, numerous depositions and discovery
disputes, and significant consideration by the
district court of multiple motions to dismiss
claims or grant summary judgment. . . . The
familiarity of the district court with the
merits
of
the
[plaintiffs’]
claims
demonstrates that further proceedings in the
district court would prevent redundancy and
conserve scarce judicial resources, and we
therefore conclude that principles of judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to the
parties weigh heavily toward our determination
that the district court abused its discretion
in dismissing the [plaintiffs’] remaining
claims.
Id. (citations omitted). The court also pointed out in its analysis
“that the remaining claims [did] not involve any ‘novel or complex’
issues of state law” and “[t]he district court here had already
granted defendants summary judgment on some state-law claims[,]”
so as to further “weigh[] heavily toward [the] conclusion that the
11
district
court
abused
its
discretion
in
refusing
to
retain
jurisdiction over the remaining claims.” Id. at 227.7
This case bears striking resemblance to Batiste. This case
has been pending in the district court for over seven years, a
timespan over double that in Baptiste. (Rec. Doc. 1). Likewise,
“[a]ll discovery has been completed” and Judge Robreno previously
found that “this case is prepared for trial without delay once on
[the instant Court’s] docket[.]” (Rec. Doc. 28 at 3-4). Further,
“[t]he deadline to file summary judgment motions has passed” and
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania “adjudicated all outstanding
motions, including dispositive motions.” (Rec. Doc. 28 at 3). As
in
Baptise,
the
district
court
already
granted
defendants,
including Lockheed Martin, summary judgment on some state law
claims. (See Rec. Docs. 26, 29-31, 35, 38). In addition, Plaintiffs
have not presented any evidence that the remaining state law claims
are novel or complex so as to demand remand. Finally, this Court
points out that Plaintiffs waited to file the instant motion almost
eighteen
months
after
remand
from
the
Eastern
District
of
Pennsylvania and over nine months after the Fifth Circuit denied
its appeal. (See Rec. Doc. 28, 47). Plaintiffs likewise represented
that “[t]here [were] no outstanding motions remaining in the case”
and that “Plaintiffs [were] prepared for trial without delay once
7
As previously stated, the Third Circuit applies the same factors when
determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
after the dismissal of the federal claim giving rise to jurisdiction. See
Sarpolis, 625 F. App'x at 598-601.
12
on the transferor Court’s normal docket.” (Rec. Doc. 59-5). Remand
was not warranted previously and, after such extensive delay, it
is certainly not justified now.
C. The Court Has Maintained Valid Subject Matter Jurisdiction
throughout the Pendency of this Action.
This
argument
Court
that
declines
“[t]his
to
Court
consider
never
had
Plaintiffs’
valid
outrageous
subject
matter
jurisdiction.” (Rec. Doc. 54-1 at 6).8 “As most commonly defined,
the doctrine [of the law of the case] posits that when a court
decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern
the
same
issues
in
subsequent
stages
in
the
same
case.”
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815-16
(1988) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983),
decision supplemented, 466 U.S. 144 (1984)) (internal quotations
omitted). “[T]he doctrine applies as much to the decisions of a
coordinate court in the same case as to a court's own decisions.”
Id. at 816 (quoting 1B James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal
Practice ¶ 0.404[1], p. 118 (2d ed. 1984)). The purpose of the
doctrine is to “promote[] the finality and efficiency of the
judicial process by ‘protecting against the agitation of settled
issues.’” Id. (citation omitted).
8
Plaintiffs seem to deny ever making this argument in their reply, as they aver
that they “do not seek to revisit the decisions of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania the [sic] MDL with this Motion to Remand.” (Rec. Doc. 63 at 1).
13
Judge Robreno in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has
already confirmed the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in
this
case
on
two
prior
occasions
in
2012
and
2013,
denying
Plaintiffs’ previous Motions to Remand. (Rec. Docs. 59-1, 59-2).
The instant motion, insofar as it suggests that this Court never
had subject matter jurisdiction, mirrors the arguments that were
already rejected by Judge Robreno. This Court should not revisit
or disturb those opinions. To do so would be insult to the
coordinate court and waste judicial resources, and Plaintiffs’
Motion has already accomplished both of these goals.
D. Jurisprudence does Not Warrant Reversal or Vacatur
Previous Denials of Plaintiffs’ Motions to Remand.
Finally,
this
Court
does
not
believe
that
more
of
recent
decisions justify reversal of Judge Robreno’s holding. Again,
“when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should
continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the
same case.” Christianson, 486 U.S. at 816. Traditional principles
of law of the case similarly counsel against the transferee court
reevaluating the rulings of the transferor court. See In re Cragar
Indus., 706 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1983); Hayman Cash Register
Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 168–69 (3d Cir. 1982). Nonetheless,
a court has the authority “to revisit prior decisions of its own
or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule
courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances such as where the initial decision was ‘clearly
14
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’”
Id.
at 817
(quoting Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n.8).
Though
this
Court
believes
its
recent
decisions
are
consistent with Judge Robreno’s affirmation of subject matter
jurisdiction,
it
is
likewise
of
the
opinion
that
it
has
no
authority to revisit a rule of law decided under the umbrella of
the Third Circuit, and any act to the contrary would be to defy
the purpose of MDLs. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that remand is
required under Ross v. Reilly Benton, Inc., No. CV-14-1161, 2014
WL 3514668 (E.D. La. July 15, 2014) (Engelhardt, J., presiding)
and Addotto v. Equitable Shipyards, LLC, No. CV-13-5807, 2014 WL
1389632 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2014) (Lemelle, J., presiding). These
cases both rely heavily on a decision of the Fifth Circuit in
Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387 (5th Cir.
1998).
As was already mentioned, Judge Robreno already ruled on this
motion when the case was in the same posture (as this argument is
not based on the dismissal of Defendant Lockheed). In deciding the
previous motions, Judge Robreno had the discretion to choose which
interpretation of federal law to apply as the presiding judge over
the transferee court in MDL No. 875. See In re Korean Air Lines
Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
aff'd sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989)
(citing Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers
15
Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 Yale L.J. 677, 721 (1984)).
Judge Robreno consistently applied law of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit, and the Supreme Court in his
orders denying Plaintiffs’ motions to remand. (See Rec. Docs. 591, 59-2).9 It would not make sense to now relitigate the issue
pursuant
to
transferor
the
Fifth
court,
Circuit’s
regardless
of
framework,
whether
the
that
law
of
framework
the
is
different.10 To do so would defeat the purpose of MDLs.
The principle purpose of MDL is to avoid piecemeal litigation
and to coordinate pretrial proceedings, prior to returning the
case to the transferor court for trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407. To
reconsider Judge Robreno’s decision under Fifth Circuit precedent
would undermine this purpose. Essentially, parties would then be
able to proceed in MDL, receive an unfavorable ruling, and then
relitigate their position under another circuit’s jurisdiction.
This would lead to the exploitation of judicial resources rather
than promote efficient resolution of conflict as MDL was intended.
Further,
there
is
case
law
to
9
suggest
that
courts
should
“As a general rule, questions of federal law in MDL-transferred cases are
governed by the law of the transferee circuit.” U.S. ex rel. Hockett v.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 25, 40 (D.D.C. 2007) (citations
omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
10 As Justice Ginsburg once pointed out:
The federal courts spread across the country owe
respect to each other's efforts and should strive to
avoid conflicts, but each has an obligation to engage
independently in reasoned analysis. Binding precedent
for all is set only by the Supreme Court, and for the
district courts within a circuit, only by the court of
appeals for that circuit.
In re Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1176.
16
consistently employ the same law when reconsidering the same
issues. See, e.g., In re Air Disaster, 819 F. Supp. 1352, 1371
(E.D. Mich. 1993) (transferee court applied law of the transferor
court to a motion for reconsideration because the initial order on
the motion sought to be reconsidered was decided pursuant to the
transferor court’s law). Finally, Plaintiffs’ motion directly
contradicts their representation that “[t]here are no outstanding
motions remaining in the case” and that “Plaintiffs are prepared
for trial without delay once on the transferor Court’s normal
docket.” (Rec. Doc. 59-5). Accordingly, this Court declines to
apply its law to an issue already resolved by Judge Robreno.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’
Motion is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 31st day of March, 2016.
_________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17
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