Peart v. Cosco, Inc. et al

Filing 54

ORDER AND REASONS denying 48 Motion for Reconsideration of 47 Judgment, 46 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Mary Ann Vial Lemmon. (ecm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

YOLANDA PEART

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 09-7463

DOREL JUVENILE GROUP, INC.

SECTION: "S" (3)

ORDER AND REASONS
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial or Alternatively for
Reconsideration and/or for Relief from Judgment (Doc. #48) is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On October 17, 2008, plaintiff, Yolanda Peart, a Stein Mart employee, was injured when she
fell from a step stool while shelving purses at a Stein Mart department store in Metairie, Louisiana.1
Plaintiff filed this suit against Durel Juvenile Group, Inc., the manufacturer of the step stool, alleging
that the it is liable under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”), Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:2800.51, et seq..
The step stool was a two step, Cosco Model #11-302 folding step stool, manufactured by
defendant Dorel.

It had a label on the front right leg stating: “CAUTION KEEP BODY

CENTERED BETWEEN THE SIDE RAILS. DO NOT OVER-REACH. SET ALL FOUR FEET
ON FIRM LEVEL SURFACE. WEAR SLIP-RESISTANT SHOES.” The label also stated “Light

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Plaintiff settled her worker’s compensation claim against Stein Mart. Stein Mart and its insurer,
Travelers Property Casualty Company of America are intervenors in this suit.

Household Duty Rating Working Load: 200 lbs.” Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she did
not read the labels on the stool before using it. At the time of the accident, plaintiff weighed more
than 250 pounds, and the step stool had been used in a commercial setting for five to ten years.
Plaintiff claims that the bottom step broke under her foot and she fell to the ground, injuring her left
arm and shoulder.
On April 7, 2011, the court granted Durel’s motion for summary judgment, finding that
plaintiff could not prevail on her LPLA failure to warn claim because the evidence demonstrated she
cannot prove that an inadequate warning caused her injury. On April 14, 2011, plaintiff filed a
motion to reconsider that ruling. Plaintiff argues that Durel’s motion for summary judgment should
have been denied because it was untimely, and that there are issues of material fact regarding the
size of the warning label; whether plaintiff would have read a different warning label, whether the
stool was subjected to use in excess of what would have been light household use in the commercial
setting; and whether the manufacturer had an obligation to provide warnings regarding the useful
life of the stool.
ANALYSIS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a motion for reconsideration. Bass
v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 211 F.3d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit has held nonetheless
that if such a motion is filed within twenty-eight days after entry of the judgment from which relief
is being sought, the motion will be treated as motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e). Hamilton
Plaintiffs v. Williams Plaintiffs, 147 F.3d 367, 371 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Rule 59(e).

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Because plaintiffs filed the instant motion on April 14, 2011, the motion will be subject to the
standards for Rule 59(e).
A Rule 59(e) motion calls into question the correctness of a judgment. In re Transtexas Gas
Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581 (5th Cir. 2002). The court has considerable discretion in deciding whether
to reopen a case in response to a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Lavespere v. Niagara
Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1990). “Rule 59(e) is properly invoked to
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” In re Transtexas Gas
Corp., 303 F.3d at 581. “A Rule 59(e) motion should not be used to relitigate prior matters that
should have been urged earlier or that simply have been resolved to the movant’s dissatisfaction.”
In re Self, 172 F. Supp. 2d 813, 816 (W.D. La. 2001).
In her motion for reconsideration, plaintiff reasserts arguments that she made in opposition
to Durel’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has not shown an manifest errors of law or new
evidence. Therefore, her motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial or Alternatively for
Reconsideration and/or for Relief from Judgment (Doc. #48) is DENIED.

1st
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of June, 2011.

____________________________________
MARY ANN VIAL LEMMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3