Bayou Fleet Partnership LLP v. St. Charles Parish
Filing
204
ORDER AND REASONS denying 130 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 132 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle. (ijg, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BAYOU FLEET PARTNERSHIP, L.L.P.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 10-1557
ST. CHARLES PARISH
SECTION “B”(3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before
the
Court
are
Plaintiff
Bayou
Fleet
Partnership
L.L.P.’s (“Bayou Fleet”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Defendant
St.
Charles
Parish’s
(“Parish”)
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment and both parties’ respective oppositions and replies to
each
motion.
(Rec.
Docs.
No.
130,
132,
138,
151,
&
162).
Additionally, the Court heard oral argument on the motions and
ordered further post-hearing briefs.
170,
171,
173,
&
174).
(Rec. Docs. No. 167, 168,
Accordingly,
and
for
the
reasons
articulated below,
IT IS ORDERED that Bayou Fleet’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment is DENIED and the Parish’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Parish’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED as to Bayou Fleet’s Substantive Due Process
claim and DENIED as to Bayou Fleet’s Equal Protection Claim.
Cause of Action and Facts of Case:
Bayou Fleet is the owner of four tracts of Mississippi River
batture property located on the west bank of the Mississippi River
in the town of Hahnville located in the Parish.
This case arises
out of the Parish’s denial of Bayou Fleet’s applications to rezone
the property in 2009 and 2010.
132-1 at 3).
(Rec. Docs. No. 130-4, 138-1, &
Bayou Fleet’s property currently has existing barge
fleeting and sand pits, and the proposed changes include plans for
a
tower
crane,
machine
shop,
drydock,
conveyor
stockpile area, and enlargement of the sand pits.
belt
system,
(Rec. Doc. No.
162-7 at 143-44). The Parish Council asserts that it voted to deny
rezoning in part based on Parish citizens’ concerns about increased
sand on the road, truck traffic, vibrations and air pollution,
received via e-mail and letter correspondence.
(Rec. Docs. No.
130-1 at 9 & 132-1 at 8).
On May 25, 2010, Bayou Fleet filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§
1983") substantive due process and equal protection complaint
against the Parish.
(Rec. Doc. No. 1).
In its instant Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, Bayou Fleet claims that the Parish’s
refusals to rezone the property were irrational as a matter of law
and seeks summary judgment on its § 1983 Equal Protection Claim.
(Rec. Doc. No. 130-1).
The Parish seeks summary judgment on both
Bayou Fleet’s § 1983 Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection
claims, asserting that there is no genuine issue of material fact
that the Parish’s decisions were supported by a rational basis, and
were therefore constitutional.
(Rec. Doc. No. 132-1).
Law and Argument:
1. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions,
2
interrogatory
answers,
and
admissions,
together
with
any
affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). A genuine issue exists if the evidence
would
allow
a
reasonable
jury
to
return
a
verdict
for
the
nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
(1986). Although the Court must consider the evidence with all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, the nonmovant must produce specific facts to demonstrate
that a genuine issue exists for trial. Webb v. Cardiothoracic
Surgery Assocs. of N. Texas, 139 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 1998).
Because “only those disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome
of
the
lawsuit
under
governing
substantive
law
will
preclude summary judgment,” questions that are unnecessary to the
resolution of a particular issue “will not be counted.” Phillips
Oil Co. v. OKC Corp., 812 F.2d 265, 272 (5th Cir. 1987).
As to issues for which the non-moving party has the burden of
proof
at
trial,
the
moving
party
may
satisfy
its
burden
by
demonstrating the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving
party’s claim. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once
the movant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the nonmovant
to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247
3
(5th Cir. 2003).
The nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and
use affidavits, depositions, interrogatory responses, admissions,
or other evidence to establish a genuine issue. Id. Accordingly,
conclusory rebuttals of the pleadings are insufficient to avoid
summary judgment. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enter., Inc., 7
F.3d 1203, 1207 (5th Cir. 1993).
2. Substantive Due Process Claim
Zoning decisions are to be reviewed by federal courts by the
same substantive due process standards employed to review statutes
enacted by state legislatures. Shelton v. City of College Station,
780
F.2d
475,
479
(5th
Cir.
1986).
Attacks
against
zoning
decisions are not unconstitutional under substantive due process
protection of the 14th Amendment unless “clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare.”
Id. at 480, citing Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183 (1928).
Therefore, under this “rational basis” standard,
if there is least a debatable, conceivable factual basis for the
zoning decision, the standard for substantive due process has been
met.
Shelton, 780 F.2d at 480.
In Shelton, the plaintiffs sought relief in federal court
claiming they were denied substantive due process rights, after
zoning officials in Texas denied their request for a zoning
variance. Id. at 478. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment
4
in favor of the defendant, the Zoning Board for the City of College
Station.
Id. at 477.
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit noted
that the Zoning Board debated the
variance
would
create
in
plaintiffs’ requests. Id.
the
amount of traffic the zoning
area
before
twice
denying
the
The Fifth Circuit held that because the
question of whether the zoning decision was justified was “at least
debatable ... there is no denial of substantive due process as a
matter of federal constitutional law.”
Id.
at 483.
In the instant matter, both Bayou Fleet and the Parish agree
that the Parish Council’s decisions to vote against Bayou Fleet’s
requests for rezoning were based in part on public opposition.
(Rec. Docs. No. 130-1 at 9 & 132-1 at 8).
Residents located near
the property which Bayou Fleet sought to have rezoned cited
concerns about resulting increased noise and vibrations, as well
exposure to unknown chemicals and potential hazardous materials.
(Rec. Doc. No. 132-12).
Like the concerns about increased traffic
in Shelton, this public opposition created a “conceivable factual
basis” for the Parish’s denial of Bayou Fleet’s rezoning requests.
Therefore, the Parish’s decision cannot be categorized as “clearly
arbitrary and capricious” and the Parish is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law on Bayou Fleet’s substantive due process claim.
3.
Equal Protection Claim
The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment commands that
no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
5
equal protection of the laws.” City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-440 (1985).
An equal
protection analysis is triggered when similarly situated persons
are treated differently by a state actor.
Mahone v. Addicks
Utility Dist. Of Harris County, 836 F.2d 921, 933 (5th Cir. 1988).
Official action which is challenged on equal protection grounds is
presumed to be valid and must be sustained if the classification
drawn by the action is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. Id., citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-440 (emphasis
added). The rational basis test guides the analysis under both the
Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses.
Horizon Concepts,
Inc. v. City of Balch Springs, 789 F.2d 1165, 1167 (5th Cir. 1986).
The Fifth Circuit has developed a three-prong test to apply
rational basis review in an Equal Protection Clause context: 1)
Identify the classification between similarly situated persons; 2)
Identify
the
legitimate
state
purpose
the
classification
was
designed to serve; and 3) Assess whether the classification helps
to accomplish the state’s legitimate purpose.
933.
Mahone, 836 F.2d at
Therefore, although a legitimate rational basis may exist,
the “determination of a fit between the classification and the
legitimate purpose may also require a factual backdrop.”
Id. at
937 (emphasis added)(explaining Shelton’s rational basis standard
in an Equal Protection analysis context).
In Cleburne, the Supreme Court rejected the City Council’s
6
insistence on a permit for a home for the mentally handicapped as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause, when other similarly
situated residences such as apartment houses or multiple dwellings
were not subjected to a permit process.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-
450. The City Council met the second prong of the Equal Protection
analysis by identifying legitimate purposes for the permitting
process, such as its impact on a flood plan or the size of the
property and number of occupants.
Id. at 449.
However, the City
Council failed in meeting the third prong, because it provided no
rational basis for subjecting only the home for the mentally
handicapped
to
the
permitting
process,
when
other
similar
structures such as apartment houses, boarding houses, or fraternity
homes, could raise similar concerns, yet were not subject to the
permitting process.
Id. at 449-450.
The Court instead found that
the City Council’s decision was based on an “irrational prejudice”
against the mentally handicapped.
Id. at 450.
Bayou Fleet contends, and the Parish admits, that similarly
situated neighbors were granted rezoning requests which Bayou Fleet
was denied.1
(Rec. Docs. No. 162 at 2, 132-1 at 19-20).
Thus,
Bayou Fleet meets the first prong under the Equal Protection
analysis:
neighbors.
being
treated
differently
from
similarly
situated
To justify this distinction, the Parish cites the same
1
This Court has already held that Bayou Fleet was “similarly
situated” to its neighboring batture property owners. (Rec. Doc.
No. 69).
7
legitimate
purpose
identified
in
the
Court’s
Substantive
Due
Process analysis, supra: public concern about increased noise,
pollution, and vibrations resulting from the rezoning.
What remains is the third prong articulated in Mahone: whether
the classification chosen is actually rationally related to the
identified legitimate state purpose. Mahone, 836 F.2d at 937. The
Court rejects the Parish’s argument that once a legitimate purpose
has been identified, the Equal Protection analysis need not go any
further.
As the Fifth Circuit stated in Mahone: “A[n] [Equal
Protection] rationality analysis ... cannot be conducted in a
vacuum.
The purpose itself must still be found ‘legitimate,’ a
determination which may require a reference to the circumstances
which
surround
the
state’s
action.”
Id.
at
936-37,
citing
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 (1985).
Bayou
Fleet
cites
the
deposition
of
Councilwoman
Carolyn
K.
Schexneydre, a member of the Parish Council during the votes on
Bayou Fleet’s rezoning, who indicates that the Parish’s decision
might have been improperly based on politics. (Rec. Doc. No. 162-5
at 113).
This implication of an improper motive creates a genuine
issue of material fact as to the fit between the articulated
legitimate purpose (citizens’ concerns) and the actual treatment of
Bayou
Fleet
differently
from
similarly
situated
neighbors.
Consideration of the weight of this evidence is a task reserved for
trial.
Therefore, the evidence is sufficient at this stage for
8
Bayou Fleet to survive the summary judgment standard on its Equal
Protection claim.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of November, 2012.
____________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9
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