Southern United States Trade Association v. John Doe 1 et al

Filing 101

ORDER & REASONS denying 77 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Eldon E. Fallon on 2/22/12. (ala, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SOUTHERN UNITED STATES TRADE ASSOCIATION
VERSUS
UNIDENTIFIED PARTIES

*
*
*
*
*

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 10-1669
SECTION “L” (4)

ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Sumit Guddh’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc.
No. 77). The Court has reviewed the submitted memoranda and the applicable law. For the following
reasons, the motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND AND PRESENT MOTION
This case arises out of allegedly defamatory statements posted by Defendant Sumit Guddh
on various Internet websites. In its Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Southern United States Trade
Association (SUSTA) states that it is a Louisiana nonprofit corporation that provides assistance to
U.S. businesses in exporting food and agricultural products. Plaintiff Jerry Hingle is identified as
the executive director of SUSTA, and Plaintiff Bernadette Wiltz is identified as the deputy director.
Plaintiffs allege that since April 2010, Defendant has posted numerous defamatory statements about
them on several websites, all with the intent to tarnish their reputation. Plaintiffs have filed suit in
this Court, seeking damages and an injunction barring Defendant from engaging in the alleged
tortious conduct.
On April 14, 2011, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Defendant argued that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984),
he does not have the minimum contacts with Louisiana for this Court to assert personal jurisdiction
over him. Defendant emphasized, among other things, that the contents of the allegedly defamatory
1

statements are not focused on Louisiana and that SUSTA’s operations extend to a number of states
other than Louisiana. Plaintiffs opposed the motion. Plaintiffs asserted that Defendant’s prior
dealings with SUSTA, and the contents of his statements, make it clear that his statements were
expressly aimed at Louisiana and that therefore, personal jurisdiction is proper under Calder.
On June 16, 2011, this Court denied Defendant’s motion. Applying the Supreme Court’s
decision in Calder and Fifth Circuit precedent explaining the requirements of that case, the Court
found that Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. The Court noted
that the material presented by the parties, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
supported the finding that the focal point of the statements was Louisiana. The Court also concluded
that the material, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, supported the finding that
the focal point of the alleged harm was Louisiana. Accordingly, the Court held that Plaintiffs had
made prima facie case for specific jurisdiction.
Defendant has now filed for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. No. 77). In his brief, Defendant
argues that he should be granted summary judgment because he did not author, authorize, or post
the derogatory messages at issue. In support of this contention, Defendant has provided two
affidavits: in the first, Defendant avers that he did not make the postings of which Plaintiffs
complain; in the second, Defendant’s employee, Juyasis Mata, swears that he had access to a
computer that used Defendant’s IP address, and he posted the derogatory messages. In light of these
affidavits, Defendant argues that the Court must grant him summary judgment, as there is no factual
question regarding the author of the postings.
Plaintiffs have filed an opposition to the motion. Plaintiffs argue that a motion for summary
judgment cannot be granted on the basis of self-serving affidavits. Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend
that Defendant’s credibility is a central issue to this case, and therefore the weight that should be
given his affidavit is properly determined by a jury. Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue, Defendant’s
2

motion should be denied.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party can show "there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). "A factual dispute is 'genuine' where a reasonable party would return a verdict for the
non-moving party." Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 339 F.3d 273, 282 (5th Cir. 2003). "An issue
is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Weeks Marine, Inc., v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 233, 235 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
when considering a summary judgment motion. United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hixson Bros., Inc., 453
F.3d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2006). "Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported
speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Brown v. City of Houston,
337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003).
B. Analysis
It is well-settled law that affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions
of law are insufficient to sustain a motion for summary judgment. Stradley v. Lafourche Commuc'ns,
Inc., 869 F. Supp 442, 445 (E.D. La. 1994) (Clement, J.) ("[s]elf-serving affidavits . . . have been held
insufficient to sustain motions for summary judgment."); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Philly
Family Practice, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 718, 726 (E.D. Pa. 2007) ("[S]elf-serving affidavit [] is an
unreliable foundation to support his motion for summary judgment.") (citing I.V. Servs. Of Am., Inc.
v. Trs. Of Am. Consulting, 136 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[A] finder of fact need not have
believed [the] self-serving affidavit.")); Strum v. Ross, 11 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (the

3

court denied summary judgment because the defendants "erroneously relie[d] exclusively on . . .
self-serving affidavits."); Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1430 (8th Cir. 1994)
(overruled on other grounds) (holding that a self-serving affidavit "alone is insufficient" at summary
judgment.).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is instructed to "review all of the
evidence . . . but mak[e] no credibility determinations of weighing any evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000). In the instant case, the issues in controversy are
factual, and depend largely on the credibility of Plaintiff. This court has explained, "[w]ithout
observing the demeanor of witnesses, and hearing cross-examination or attempts at impeachment, the
court can hardly grant summary judgment on the ground that one affidavit is more believable than
another." Blanke v. Time, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 378, 381 (E.D.La. 1970) (Rubin, J.). Further, this Court
agrees, "it is trial by jury that is guaranteed by the Constitution, not trial by affidavit." Id. at 379.
Therefore, because Defendant’s motion for summary judgment relies solely on his self-serving
affidavits for support, and because the Defendant’s credibility is a fact issue to be decided by the jury,
the Court must conclude that summary judgment is inappropriate at this time. Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion must be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Rec. Doc. No. 77) is hereby DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 22nd day of February, 2012.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4