Teele v. Davis Petroleum Corp et al

Filing 43

ORDER AND REASONS denying 22 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant Royal Production Company, Inc. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle. (ijg, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHARLIE TEELE

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 10-1807

DAVIS PETROLEUM CORP., ROYAL
PRODUCTION COMPANY, INC. (OF
DELAWARE), AND MACK OIL CO.

SECTION: B(3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant Royal Production Company, Inc.’s (“Royal”) Motion
for Summary Judgment, (Rec. Doc. No. 22), opposed by Plaintiff
(Rec. Doc. No. 28), is hereby DENIED.
While Plaintiff conceded that Royal is not liable for the
negligence of its independent contractor, Plaintiff argues that
Royal is nevertheless liable to Plaintiff for its negligence under
Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2315 and 2317.1.

Indeed, “while one

who employs an independent contractor escapes liability for the
negligence of such contractor, he is nevertheless answerable for
his own negligence.”

Ellis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 650 F.2d 94,

97 (5th Cir. 1981).
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has found
that Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code “imposes upon a
property owner the duty, owed to all persons rightfully on his
property, to discover a reasonably discoverable defect on his
property and either to warn the invitee or correct them; breach of
this duty is regarded as negligence.”
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Id.

Furthermore, while it

may be true that principals are not liable for the negligence of
their independent contractors, “the owner of a facility has an
independent duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of
those

on

the

contractors.”

premises,

including

employees

of

independent

Terese v. 1500 Lorene LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL

4702369 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2010) citing Dupre v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 20 F.3d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1994).

The material facts that

pertain to Royal’s liability for its own negligence in failing to
warn of, or correct, an allegedly dangerous condition, are in
dispute.

Plaintiff

specifically

asserts

in

his

deposition

testimony that he was injured due to the lack of a bleed of valve
on the downcomer pipe.

(Rec. Doc. No 39-1 at 7).

Whether or not

a downcomer pipe without a bleed-off valve amounts to a dangerous
condition is a genuine issue of material fact.
juror

could

find

that

the

lack

of

bleed-off

As a reasonable
valves

in

the

downcomers was a reasonably discoverable defect on Royal’s property
which Royal negligently failed to warn Plaintiff of or correct,
summary judgment based upon Royal’s first contention that the
downcomer was not unfit because there was no bleed off valve should
be denied.
Additionally, article 2317.1 of the Louisiana Civil Code
provides:
The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for
damage occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon
a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have known of the ruin, vice, or defect
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which caused the damage, that the damage could have been
prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he
failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nothing in this
article shall preclude the court from the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case.
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated
that “an owner who transfers possession, but not ownership, of a
thing to another party nonetheless retains custody of the thing for
purposes of Article 2317.”

Pickett v. RTS Helicopter, 128 F.3d

925, 930 (5th Cir. 1997). Therefore, Royal may be held liable under
2317, regardless of the independent contractor’s later alleged
negligence.
In applying 2317.1 to the case at bar, it is clear that the
material facts are in dispute.

In Plaintiff’s deposition, he

asserts that there is no safe way to relieve the pressure within a
downcomer pipe without a bleed-off valve; you just have to “hope to
God it don’t blow off.”

(Rec. Doc. No. 42-1 at 5).

Whether the

lack of a bleed-off valve or other safe means of depressurization
amounts to a vice or defect; whether Royal should have known of the
defect through the use of reasonable care; and whether the damage
could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care which
Royal failed to exercise are questions for a jury to decide.

A

reasonable juror could determine that the elements of 2317.1 are
satisfied.

Summary judgment based upon movant’s contention that

Royal is insulated from liability is not appropriate.
Finally,

Royal

argues

that

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Plaintiff’s

knowledge

of

the

pressure in a different downcomer pipe from previously supervising
a co-worker earlier in the day, coupled with Plaintiff’s decision
to perform the act of opening the cam lock to check for pressure
after Plaintiff readily admitted that he knew it was not safe,
amounts to operational negligence.

(Rec. Doc. No. 39 at 4).

The

Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the “defect
must be of such a nature as to constitute a dangerous condition
which would reasonably be expected to cause injury to a prudent
person using ordinary care under the circumstances.”

Penton v.

Schuster, 98-1068 La. App. 5 Cir. 3/30/99, 732 So. 2d 597, 601 (La.
Ct. App. 1999).

Royal thus asserts that Plaintiff was not acting

as a prudent person using ordinary care under the circumstances at
the time he was injured.
However, Plaintiff has provided minimally sufficient evidence
that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether his
actions amounted to the care expected of a reasonably prudent
person under the circumstances.

Plaintiff testified that even

after Monte informed him that the only pressure contained within
the pipe was not enough to cause injury, he nevertheless opened the
ear of the camlock slowly to check the pressure before completing
the assigned task of disassembling the pipe, at which point the
injury occurred.
witnessing

the

(Rec. Doc. No. 39-1 at 12).
pressure

in

a

different

Moreover, merely

downcomer

pipe

is

insufficient to conclude at this time that Plaintiff did not

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exercise the proper standard of care at the time of his injury,
particularly in light of Monte’s assurance regarding the amount of
pressure in the specific pipe to which Plaintiff was assigned.
While

the

evidence

at

a

trial

on

the

merits

may

support

a

conclusion that Plaintiff did not exercise the ordinary care called
for by the circumstances, genuine issues of material fact exist
regarding this issue, which are more appropriately reserved for the
trier of fact.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of July, 2011.

United States District Judge

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