Serigny
Filing
206
ORDER granting 124 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Mary Ann Vial Lemmon on 5/28/14. (cbn)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JACKIE B. SERIGNY
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF THE ESTATE OF WAYNE
SERIGNY
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 10-3205
LAFOURCHE PARISH
GOVERNMENT THROUGH
CHARLOTTE RANDOLPH PARISH
PRESIDENT, ET AL.
SECTION: "S" (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Sheriff Craig
Webre, Alan Abadie and Cortrell Davis (Doc. #124) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against
Sheriff Craig Webre, Alan Abadie and Cortrell Davis under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 19881 are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Louisiana state law claims against Sheriff
Craig Webre, Alan Abadie, Cortrell Davis, Correcthealth Lafourche, LLC, Stacy Rembert, Delisyee
Morris, Kathy Walker and Dr. Stacey Greene are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants, Craig
Webre, the Sheriff of Lafourche Parish; Warden Allen Abadie; and, Assistant Warden Cortrell
Davis. They argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff, the widow of a
former Lafourche Parish inmate, did not demonstrate the deliberate indifference required to sustain
1
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants are liable for attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Because
plaintiffs’ claims for violations of Wayne A. Serigny's constitutional rights have been dismissed, this claim
is also DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
a claim under the Eighth Amendment, they were not responsible for providing medical care to
inmates, and the facts of the case demonstrate that plaintiff does not have a cause of action (Doc.
#124).
Plaintiff, Jackie B. Serigny, filed this action on behalf of herself and the estate of her late
husband Wayne A. Serigny. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants, Sheriff Craig Webre, Alan Abadie,
Cortrell Davis, Correcthealth Lafourche, LLC (the medical provider hired by Lafourche Parish to
treat inmates), Stacy Rembert, Delisyee Morris, Kathy Walker, Dr. Stacey Greene, and the
Lafourche Parish Government through Parish President Charlotte Randolph, are liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violating her husband’s rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.2 She also alleges that they are
liable under Louisiana law for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, medical
malpractice, wrongful death and lost chance of survival.
On September 21, 2009, Wayne Serigny, after being convicted of driving under the influence
for the third time, was sentenced to serve 30 days in the Lafourche Parish Detention Center. At the
time of sentencing, the judge ordered the sheriff's deputy to make sure that Serigny was taken to a
scheduled doctor’s appointment with Dr. Duplechain, a gastroenterologist, on September 22, 2009,
but Serigny was not taken to the appointment. The defendants contend that Serigny declined to
attend the appointment because he was embarrassed to be taken there as an inmate.
2
Plaintiff mentions the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in passing and does not allege any
facts to support such claims. The crux of her claim is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the
other claims are deemed waived and will not be addressed. See Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 n. 2
(5th Cir. 2009).
2
When Serigny was incarcerated, Delisyee Morris, a Correcthealth Medical Assistant,
conducted an intake screening. According to the report, Serigny did not show any signs of illness,
injury, bleeding or pain that suggested a need for immediate medical referral, and he denied fever,
chills, night sweats, or weight loss. A progress note from September 21, 2009, states that Serigny
requested that his appointment with Dr. Duplechain be rescheduled by his family and the nurse told
him to report any rectal bleeding, which he stated he understood.
On September 24, 2009, Serigny complained of aches, neck pain, and a tooth ache. The next
day, the Correcthealth nurses received orders from Dr. M. Becnell to administer to plaintiff one
gram of Tylenol for the next seven days. On September 27, 2009, Serigny again complained of
headaches, neck pain and toothache. The nurse asked to see the tooth, and discovered that Serigny
had no teeth. Serigny asked for Vicodin and Ambien, and the nurse informed him that the jail
protocol prevented the administering of those medications.3 The nurse prescribed Tylenol and
referred Serigny to Physician's Assistant Brittany Booth. On September 29, 2009, Serigny reported
neck pain, headache and the inability to sleep. Walker, a Licensed Practical Nurse, noted that he
was already receiving medication for his pain.4
On September 30, 2009, Booth examined Serigny, and noted that his headaches and neck
pain began after an accident in 2006. Serigny also told Booth that he had an aneurysm and took
migraine pills. He stated that his pain was in the right neck and head. Booth recorded Serigny's
vital signs, conducted an examination, noted a limited range of motion in his neck, and diagnosed
3
Serigny had a history of substance abuse, including exhibiting drug-seeking behavior by obtaining
pain pill prescriptions from multiple doctors at the same time. He also tested positive for marijuana in April
2009.
4
Plaintiff argues that the sheriff has not produced any documentation from the jail, apart from the
medical records, to document that Serigny received any medication in the prison in September.
3
musculoskeletal pain and a headache. She ordered that the Tylenol be discontinued and prescribed
percogesic for pain, twice daily, for fourteen days.
On October 1, 2009, Serigny reported that he "came in with an abscess in my mouth and the
pain is getting worse," and that "the right side of my throat is swollen and I'm in constant pain and
it's very hard for me to swallow." Because of these complaints, he was referred to Dr. Stacey
Greene, physician who is board certified in internal medicine with a sub-specialty in infectious
diseases.
On October 2, 2009, Dr. Greene examined Serigny and noted swelling of the right side of
his neck, with a history of chronic neck pain, and treated him with Amoxicillin due to possible
infection. Dr. Greene also prescribed Neurontin for Serigny's chronic neck pain and instructed him
to return for a follow-up in two weeks.
On October 10, 2009, Serigny requested to see a dentist due to the alleged pain in his wisdom
teeth. The medical personnel noted that Serigny was already receiving pain medication and referred
him to the dentist.
On October 11, 2009, Serigny complained of a tooth growing sideways in his gums and
cutting his tongue, making it hard for him to eat and speak. Walker, a licensed practical nurse
employed by Correcthealth, informed him that he was to receive pain medication for two more days
and was on the list to see the dentist.
On October 15, 2009, Serigny noted that the Amoxicillin he received for his throat and neck
was starting to work, but ran out, and reported that pain returned at the end of the medication.
Walker informed Serigny that he was on the list to see the doctor and started him on percogesic for
his pain.
4
On October 16, 2009, Dr. Greene examined Serigny, who was complaining of pain with
swallowing and pain in the right neck area. Dr. Greene observed that Serigny had a hard cervical
lymph node on the right side of the neck. He performed an examination and noted a whitish exudate
in Serigny's mouth. Dr. Greene prescribed antibiotics and an anti-fungal medication, and ordered
additional testing, with a follow-up appointment in two weeks. Serigney was released from jail on
October 20, 2009, before the follow-up appointment.
Plaintiff alleges that Serigny requested medical treatment daily, but that most of his requests
were ignored by the correctional officers or medical personnel. Plaintiff alleges that the above
outlined medical care was inadequate, because after two weeks, he could not eat, drink, walk, or
talk, and he lost 27 pounds while incarcerated. He was not taken to an outside doctor.
After his release from the jail, on October 21, 2009, Serigny sought medical treatment from
his personal physician, and a specialist. Serigny was diagnosed with throat and lung cancer. He was
treated at Terrebonne General Medical Center until he was released to hospice where he died on
December 16, 2009. Plaintiff alleges that Serigny’s treating physicians stated that his chances of
survival would have been greatly increased if he had been diagnosed and treated sooner.
The Lafourche Parish Government filed a motion to dismiss arguing that plaintiff did not
state a cause of action for violations of the Eighth Amendment (Doc. #15). The court denied the
motion finding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a claim regarding whether prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to Serigny’s serious medical needs when they refused to treat Serigny,
ignored his complaints, or intentionally treated him incorrectly (Doc. #25).
The healthcare defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against them
(Doc. #27). The individual healthcare defendants argued that they were entitled to qualified
5
immunity in their individual capacities.
Also, the individual healthcare defendants and
Correcthealth argued that plaintiff did not plead a policy, custom, or practice sufficient to sustain
§ 1983 claims against them in their official capacities. The court granted the motion as to the
defendants' individual capacities finding that plaintiff did not allege any specific acts by Rembert,
Morris, Walker or Greene, much less that any of those defendants acted with a culpable state of
mind to unnecessarily and wantonly inflict pain on Serigny (Doc. #34). However, the court denied
the motion as to the official capacity claims because those claims were essentially claims against
the Lafourche Parish Government, whose motion to dismiss had been denied. Id.
On
reconsideration, the court granted the motion to dismiss as to the individual capacity claims, finding
that "[w]ithout evidence of subjective deliberate indifference, the court cannot find that the
healthcare defendants are liable in their official capacities, and the healthcare defendants are entitled
to summary judgment on plaintiff's official capacity claims against them" (Doc. #42). Based on that
ruling, the Lafourche Parish Government moved for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the
court's order denying its motion to dismiss (Doc. #45), but the court denied leave (Doc. #55).
Thereafter, Charlotte Randolph, in her capacity as Lafourche Parish President, and the
Lafourche Parish Government moved for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims, arguing that they
fulfilled their statutory duty to provide healthcare to inmates by contracting with Correcthealth (Doc.
#69). The court granted the motion, finding that the Lafourche Parish Government complied with
Louisiana Revised Statute § 15:703 by contracting with Correcthealth because all of the healthcare
providers were properly qualified and licensed (Doc. #82). The court denied the plaintiff's motion
for reconsideration (Doc. #94). Plaintiff appealed those decisions, and the United States Court of
6
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this court's decisions dismissing plaintiff's claims against
Randolph and the Lafourche Parish Government.
Thus, plaintiff's remaining claims against Webre, Abadie and Davis are § 1983 and 1988
claims for violations of Serigny's rights guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States and Louisiana state law claims. Plaintiff's remaining claims against the
healthcare defendants are Louisiana state law claims. Webre, Abadie and Davis moved for summary
judgment on all of plaintiff's claims against them.
ANALYSIS
A.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-movant, “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Amburgey v. Corhart Refractories Corp., 936 F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir.
1991); FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c). If the moving party meets the initial burden of establishing that
there is no genuine issue, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence of the
existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celeotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). The
non-movant cannot satisfy the summary judgment burden with conclusory allegations,
unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). If the opposing party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving
party does not have to submit evidentiary documents to properly support its motion, but need only
point out the absence of evidence supporting the essential elements of the opposing party’s case.
Saunders v. Michelin Tire Corp., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1991).
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B.
Plaintiff's § 1983 Official Capacity Claims Against Abadie and Davis
Plaintiff alleges that Webre, Abadie and Davis are liable under § 1983 for violating Serigny's
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in their official and
individual capacities because they were "endowed with responsibility regarding the provision of
security, health and medical services to persons in the custody of the Lafourche Parish Detention
Center and [were] charged with responsibility to ensure that all prisoners under [their] jurisdiction
were protected and received timely and adequate medical treatment." She alleges that each of them
was "responsible for the policies, practices, and customs of the Lafourche Parish Detention Center,
as well as the hiring, training, control, supervision, and discipline of its correction officers and other
personnel."
1. Section 1983
Section 1983 provides a remedy against “every person,” who under color of state law,
deprives another of any rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). Section 1983 is not itself a source
of substantive rights; it merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.
Olabisiomotosho v. City of Hous., 185 F.3d 521, 525 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1999).
To pursue a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must: (1) allege a violation of rights secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and; (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Hous., 529
F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2008); see also West v. Atkins, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2255-54 (1988).
Plaintiff alleges that Webre, Abadie and Davis violated Serigny's rights guaranteed by the
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and were "acting under the color of law
8
and pursuant to their authority as sheriff's personnel" while Serigny was incarcerated. Therefore,
plaintiff has alleged a claim under § 1983. However, the defendants argue that they did not violate
Serigny's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because there is
no evidence that they acted with deliberate indifference to Serigny's serious medical needs.
2. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment. The Eighth Amendment is violated when prison officials show deliberate indifference
to a prisoner’s serious medical needs, which constitutes an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291 (1976) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2925
(1976)). Further, to violate the Eight Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently
culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter,
111 S.Ct. 2321, 2323 (1991)). Deliberate indifference is “an extremely high standard to meet,” and
incorrect medical diagnosis or disagreement with a course of medical treatment are insufficient.
Chapman v. Pace, 353 Fed. Appx. 955, 957 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). “To survive
dismissal, [a plaintiff] must come forward with a triable issue of fact that officials ‘refused to treat
him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct
that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’” Id. (quoting Johnson
v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985)).
3. Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Webre, Abadie and Davis violated Serigny's Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in their official capacities by failing to provide proper
medical care to address his complaints.
9
a. Abadie and Davis
Under Louisiana law, the sheriff is the keeper of and the policy maker for the parish jail. LA.
REV. STAT. § 33:1435; Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 402 So.2d 669 (La. 1981).
Because Abadie and Davis were not policy makers, as plaintiff alleges, plaintiff cannot maintain
official capacity claims against them under § 1983, and those claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
b. Sheriff Webre
Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Sheriff Webre is governed by the Monell doctrine. See
Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 98 S.Ct.
2018, 2035 n.55 (1978)). A local governmental body is liable for damages under § 1983 for
constitutional violations resulting from official municipal policy. See Monell, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36.
A municipality or government body cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the
constitutional torts of its employees or agents. Id. at 2037.
To establish liability for a constitutional violation against a governmental body, the plaintiffs
must prove three elements: (1) a policy maker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a violation of
constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom. Monell, 98 S.Ct. at 2037.
Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability predicated on respondeat superior. Bd. of Comm’rs
of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997). “Consequently, the unconstitutional conduct
must be directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur;
isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability.
Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001).
10
Plaintiff argues that Webre, the policymaker, was deliberately indifferent to Serginy's
serious medical needs because he did not supervise the medical personnel, did not know where the
medical unit was in the jail, and his deputies disregarded Serginy's medical requests. These
arguments fail to establish an official policy that was the moving force behind a violation of
Serginy's Eighth Amendment right. This court has already dismissed plaintiff's § 1983 Eight
Amendment claims against the healthcare defendants finding that she did not allege any specific acts
by Rembert, Morris, Walker or Greene, nor that any of those defendants acted with a culpable state
of mind to unnecessarily and wantonly inflict pain on Serigny, and that there was no subjective
evidence of deliberate indifference. Considering the number of times Serginy received requested
medical attention during his short incarceration, there is no evidence that Webre had a policy of
directing the deputies to refuse medical requests or failing to provide medical care to inmates, and
plaintiff's claims against the healthcare defendants are more akin to claims for medical malpractice
or negligence, not a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, Sheriff Webre is entitled to
summary judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against him, and that claim is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
4. Individual Capacity Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Webre, Abadie and Davis are liable in their individual capacities.
However, she has failed to state a proper claim against them in their individual capacity. “Plaintiffs
suing governmental officials in their individual capacities . . . must allege specific conduct giving
rise to a constitutional violation. This standard requires more than constitutional assertions: The
plaintiff must allege specific facts giving rise to the constitutional claims.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d
736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Additionally, “[p]ersonal involvement is an essential
11
element of a civil rights cause of action.” Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983).
Here, plaintiff makes no factual allegations against Webre, Abadie or Davis, and has not alleged that
any of them was in any way personally involved in the events giving rise to her claims. Therefore,
plaintiff has not properly stated individual capacity claims against Webre, Abadie and Davis, and
any such claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
C.
Plaintiff's State Law Claims
Plaintiff asserts claims under Louisiana state law against Sheriff Webre, Abadie, Davis,
Correcthealth, Rembert, Morris, Walker, and Dr. Greene. Because plaintiff's federal claims have all
been dismissed, the court declines to exercise jurisdiction over her state law claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
. . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); see also
Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 246 (5th Cir.1999) (“When a court dismisses all federal
claims before trial, the general rule is to dismiss any pendent claims.”) Accordingly, plaintiff's state
law claims against Sheriff Webre, Abadie, Davis, Correcthealth, Rembert, Morris, Walker, and Dr.
Greene are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Sheriff Craig
Webre, Alan Abadie and Cortrell Davis (Doc. #124) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against
Sheriff Craig Webre, Alan Abadie and Cortrell Davis under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
12
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Louisiana state law claims against Sheriff
Craig Webre, Alan Abadie, Cortrell Davis, Correcthealth Lafourche, LLC, Stacy Rembert, Delisyee
Morris, Kathy Walker and Dr. Stacey Greene are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of May, 2014.
28th
____________________________________
MARY ANN VIAL LEMMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13
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