Heebe et al v. United States of America

Filing 74

ORDER & REASONS denying 31 Motion for Evidentiary Hearing; denying 36 Motion to Enforce Judgment. Signed by Judge Helen G. Berrigan on 7/1/11. (plh, ) Modified doc type on 7/1/2011 (plh, ).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

FREDERICK R. HEEBE, ET AL

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 10-3452

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECTION: “C” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Rule 41(g) Evidentiary Hearing in
Reconsideration of Order to Return Seized Documents. (Rec. Doc. 31). Plaintiffs oppose the
motion. (Rec. Doc. 42). Also before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Judgement. (Rec.
Doc. 36). Defendant opposes the motion. (Rec. Doc. 41). On February 24, 2011 the Court held an
evidentiary hearing on both motions. Having considered the evidence and testimony presented at
the evidentiary hearing, the record, the memoranda of counsel, and applicable law, the motion for
reconsideration is DENIED and the motion to enforce judgment is DENIED for the following
reasons.

I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from the September 23, 2010 search of 2000 Belle Chasse Highway. That
search was conducted pursuant to a search warrant for the “offices of River Birch Landfill... located
at 2000 Belle Chasse Highway, Gretna, Louisiana, 70056.” (Rec. Doc. 3-3). Members of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) executed the warrant and seized documents, computers, and
materials from almost every office on the third floor of 2000 Belle Chasse Highway, and many of
the offices turned out to belong to various businesses not described in the warrant, including those
now Plaintiffs in this case. On October 13, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a motion for return of property
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under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), arguing that the Government did not have authority
to search six of the seven businesses from which property was seized, that it knowingly seized items
outside the scope of the warrant, and that it impermissibly reviewed attorney-client privileged
documents. (Rec. Doc. 3). The Government maintained that the search was lawful, that all items
seized were within the scope of the warrant, and that its agents in no way violated an attorney-client
privilege. This Court granted Plaintiff’s motion and ordered:
“the Government [to] immediately return all seized property of tenants other than
River Birch, Inc. In the case of property shared between River Birch, Inc. and other
tenants, the Government shall provide to petitioners copies of all documents it
intends to retain by Monday, December 27, 2010. Likewise, the Government shall
complete its ‘clean team’ review and return all privileged documents to the
petitioners by Monday, December 27, 2010.” (Rec. Doc. 22 at 8).
Defendants now argue that when this Court issued the above order it had a mistaken
understanding of the facts underlying the search of 2000 Belle Chasse Highway. (Rec. Doc. 31-1
at 1). Plaintiffs argue that this Court was not mistaken in issuing its prior order. (Rec. Doc. 42).
Plaintiffs further argue that the Government should be found in contempt for failing to comply with
this Court’s order. First, Plaintiffs argue that the Government has failed to return property that
clearly belongs to tenants other than River Birch, Inc. (Rec. Doc. 36 at 2). Second, Plaintiffs
maintain that the Government has retained copies of all the non-River Birch property that it has
returned. Id. Third, they claim that the Government has not returned all privileged documents as
ordered. Id.
On February 24, 2011 the Court held an evidentiary hearing on both motions. At that
hearing the Court heard testimony from Malcolm Bezet, Peter Smith, Scott Downie, and Michael
Zummer all from the FBI. The Court also heard testimony from Plaintiffs’ counsel, Kyle Schonekas,
and Assistant U.S. Attorney James Mann. (Rec. Doc. 62 at 2). At the hearing the Government

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indicated that it had no objection to providing Plaintiffs with copies of everything taken during the
search and therefore the Court ordered them to do so by March 3, 2011. Id. The Court then took
both motions under submission.

II. THE GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
A.

Legal Standard for a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not formally recognize a “Motion for

Reconsideration.” Out of judicial necessity, our courts have developed an approach to evaluate such
a motion. The Fifth Circuit treats a motion for reconsideration as “either a motion ‘to alter or
amend’ under Rule 59(e) or a motion for ‘relief from judgment’ under Rule 60(b).” Id. at 173. The
Fifth Circuit holds that, “if the motion is served within ten (10) days of rendition of judgment, the
motion falls under Rule 59(e); if it is served after that time, it falls under Rule 60(b).” Id. Here
Defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration within 10 business days of the December 21,
2010 Judgment, so shall be treated as a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend.
Alteration or amendment of a previous ruling under Rule 59(e) “calls into question the
correctness of a judgment.” Tremplet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 2004). This
specific motion serves “the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or
fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th
Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted). It may also be used to prevent manifest injustice. Flynn
v. Terrebonne Parish School Bd., 348 F.Supp.2d 769, 771 (E.D.La. 2004). As such, it must be used
sparingly. Clancy v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 101 F.Supp.2d 463, 465 (E.D.La. 2000).

B.

The Government’s Arguments in Support of its Motion for Reconsideration
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Here the Government argues that the Court’s previous order contained several errors of fact
and law regarding the circumstances of the search of 2000 Belle Chasse Highway, which the
Government argues would have been corrected if the Court had held an evidentiary hearing before
issuing its previous order.
1.

The FBI never saw the directory.

The Government contends that the FBI agents conducting the search did not ignore the first
floor directory because they used the stairs and never saw the directory. (Rec. Doc. 31 at 5).
However, this argument is unconvincing for three reasons. First, as the Court has visited the site,
the directory is quite visible from the stairs that the FBI used on the day of the search. (Rec. Doc.
38). Second, FBI agents clearly used the elevator over the course of the lengthy search, and the
elevator is directly next to the directory. (Rec. Doc 42 at 8). Third, the affidavit of Special Agent
Bezet indicates that the only occupied office space in 2000 Belle Chasse Highway was on the third
floor; however, having visiting the site, the only access to the first floor office space is directly next
to the directory on the first floor. So in order for Agent Bezet to have ascertained that the first floor
was unoccupied, he must have looked into the office window, which was less than one foot away
from the directory he claims he never saw. In light of the above, the Court finds it very unlikely that
none of the FBI agents saw the directory over the course of the search.
2.

There was no third-floor directory.

The Government further argues that this Court committed an error in fact when it held that
the FBI had ignored a third-floor directory. (Rec. Doc. 31 at 5). The Government claims that there
was no directory on the third floor, and therefore the Court’s decision was based on an erroneous
understanding of the facts of the search. Id. However, a review of this Court’s Order and Reasons
quickly reveals that the Government has simply misunderstood this Court’s order. The order states
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that, “[d]espite the third floor directory, discussions with Mr. Manzella and Petitioner Heebe’s
counsel, and labels indicating separate and distinct businesses on the same floor, the Government
failed to limit its search in any way and seized numerous documents and other property from parties
not described in the warrant.” (Rec. Doc. 22 at 5). In this context, the “third floor directory” does
not refer to a directory on the third floor, but rather the directory on the first floor, which lists the
businesses on the third floor. As a result, this Court was not mistaken about the presence of a third
floor directory, the Government simply misunderstood this Court’s Order.
3.

There were no clearly marked documents or file cabinets,

The Government also argues that the Court erred by holding that, “[the FBI] also ignored the
clearly marked documents and file cabinets.” The Government points to Agent Bezet’s affidavit,
which states that none of the offices had any separate identifying information. (Rec. Doc. 31 at 5).
Having visited the site, it is clear that while the offices themselves were not labeled, the filing
cabinets and files typically were clearly labeled. Moreover, the law office of Peter Butler was
clearly separate from the “offices of River Birch Landfill” and yet the FBI searched his offices
anyway.
In fact, the Government has admitted that the entire reason a “privilege team” was present
at the search was because they knew that Peter Butler maintained an office at 2000 Belle Chasse
Highway and were concerned that information seized from his office would likely contain privileged
files relating to his other clients. (Rec. Doc. 48 at 8). Therefore it is obvious that to the extent that
the Government seized materials from that office, they ignored clear signs that the law office of
Peter Butler was not “the offices of River Birch Landfill.”
Finally, there were several boxes that were clearly labeled “confidential attorney-client
privileged information,” which were nevertheless seized from room “O”. (Compare Gov. Photo 64
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with Photo 126; see also Rec. Doc. 51-1).
4.

Credibility determinations were made without an evidentiary hearing.

The Government further argues that this Court erred by giving credence to the affidavit of
Mr. Manzella without a full evidentiary hearing. (Rec. Doc. 31 at 6). Mr. Manzella was the
computer specialist who informed the FBI of the distinct contents of the various computer servers
at 2000 Belle Chasse Highway. However, the Government does not dispute the fact that Mr.
Manzella informed them of the distinct nature of the servers, and the FBI technical team
independently confirmed Mr. Manzella’s information. (Rec. Doc. 31 at 6). So, in fact, there is no
factual dispute that Mr. Manzella informed the FBI that several companies other than River Birch
Landfill used the servers in 2000 Belle Chasse Highway. Therefore it was perfectly acceptable for
the Court to rely on undisputed affidavits in holding that the FBI was on notice that there were other
tenants at 2000 Belle Chasse Highway. (See e.g., U.S. v. Fontenot, 2009 WL 3785712 *1 (W.D.La.
2009)(“an evidentiary hearing is not a prerequisite for a ruling on every Rule 41(g) motion”); U.S.
v. Albinson, 356 F.3d 278, 282 (3d Cir. 2004)(holding that while Rule 41(g) directs a district court
to “receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion,” affidavits and
documentary evidence can be sufficient to support such a determination)). Despite this knowledge,
the FBI did not limit its search to “the offices of River Birch Landfill,” which justifies a finding of
“callous disregard.”
5.

Garrison does not support a finding of “callous disregard.”

The Government argues that this Court committed an error of law in holding that Garrison
supports a finding of “callous disregard.” (Rec. Doc. 31 at 7). The Government reiterates that there
were no labels or signs to indicate different offices except for the self-serving statements of
employees.
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In Garrison the Supreme Court specifically held that “if the officers had known, or even if
they should have known, that there were two separate dwelling units...they would have been
obligated to exclude respondent’s apartment from the scope of the requested warrant.” 480 U.S. at
86. Unlike the police in Garrison, in this case the FBI took no specific steps to determine the
identity of the occupants on the third floor of 2000 Belle Chasse Highway before obtaining a search
warrant listing the entire building. 480 U.S. at n.10. Special Agent Smith testified that the FBI
searched the business records maintained by the Louisiana State Secretary of State, which clearly
indicate the presence of other businesses located at 2000 Belle Chasse Highway. (Rec. Doc. 65 at
6). Despite learning this information, the FBI failed make any further inquires to determine the
identities of these tenants. Id. at 10. Had the FBI conducted even a basic search of the Louisiana
Secretary of State’s records, it would have discovered several businesses located at 2000 Belle
Chasse Highway that were not described in its search warrant. Id. at 7. Moreover, Agent Smith
testified that he knew that Peter Butler maintained a law office at 2000 Belle Chasse Highway and
yet his business was not listed on the search warrant. Id. at 8. Agent Smith testified that the FBI
believed that Mr. Butler worked as an in-house attorney for River Birch and was therefore covered
by the warrant as issued. Id. at 9. However, no independent efforts were taken to determine whether
Mr. Butler was in fact employed by River Birch, or whether he was merely leasing space in order
to run an independent legal practice. Id. Moreover, the Government knew beforehand that Willow,
Inc. was also a tenant of 2000 Belle Chasse Highway, but did not exclude that office from the scope
of the requested warrant. Id. at 8.
In light of the clear indications available to the FBI that there was more than one tenant at
2000 Belle Chasse highway, combined with the FBI’s lack of effort in verifying which tenants
occupied the third floor, this Court finds no reason to amend its previous finding of “callous
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disregard.” See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 86 n. 10 (justifying the police’s “honest mistake” in part by
noting that the police officer in that case had gone to the length of checking with Baltimore Gas and
Electric Company to verify who was listed for the third floor and was given only one name, despite
the fact that there were two apartments on the third floor).
Furthermore, in Garrison the Supreme Court held that the validity of the execution of a
search “depends on whether the officers’ failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was
objectively understandable and reasonable.” 480 U.S. at 88. Here it is clear that the FBI’s failure
to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively unreasonable in light of the circumstances
of the search. While the Government adamantly claims that the offices at 2000 Belle Chasse
Highway were not clearly distinguished, they clearly knew that Peter Butler had a separate law
office at 2000 Belle Chasse Highway. They also knew that Willow, Inc. also had offices there.
Despite this knowledge, the FBI has provided no evidence that it took any steps whatsoever “to
ascertain and identify” the place to be searched. Furthermore, during the search the FBI was warned
by various employees about the presence of several distinct companies on the third floor. While the
Government argues that these self-serving statements of employees did not put the FBI on
reasonable notice of the overbreadth of its warrant, Garrison seems to suggest otherwise. 480 U.S.
at n. 12 (noting that the failure of the tenant to inform the police of the presence of a separate
apartment contributed to police’s reasonable belief that there was only one apartment on the third
floor).
Finally, in holding the search in Garrison valid, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that the
police limited their search once they discovered the presence of a second apartment on the third
floor. 480 U.S. at 87. In United States v. Perez, the Fifth Circuit confronted a search quite similar
to the one of 2000 Belle Chasse Highway. 484 F.3d 735. In Perez, the FBI obtain a search warrant
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for a home that they believed housed a child pornographer. While executing that warrant the FBI
discovered that the house was shared by three house mates. Because the FBI only had evidence
implicating one of the house mates, they limited their search to areas used by that house mate. 484
F.3d at 742. As in Perez, the FBI only had evidence implicating one of the businesses at 2000 Belle
Chasse Highway, but unlike Garrison or Perez, the FBI has produced no evidence suggesting that
it took any steps to limit its search to those areas used by River Birch Landfill.
6.

No AUSA was present during the search.

The Government also argues that the Court erred by suggesting that the AUSA should have
been on notice that there were potential defects in the warrant. (Rec. Doc. 31 at 7). The
Government points out that no AUSA was present during the search and therefore he could not have
known that the search had exceeded the scope of the warrant. (Rec. Doc. 31-1). While it may be
true that no AUSA was present at the search, this factual error does not change the legal conclusion
that someone in a supervisory position, be it an AUSA or a supervising FBI agent, had sufficient
evidence to realize that a general search of the entire third floor could be unconstitutionally
excessive.

7.

Plaintiffs were not irreparably damaged because the FBI used a “taint team.”

Finally, the Government argues that the Court erred by holding that Plaintiffs were
irreparably injured by the seizure of attorney-client privileged documents. (Rec. Doc. 31 at 8). The
Government argues that Plaintiffs have suffered no injury because the investigators have used a
“taint team” similar to the one used in In the Matter of the Search of 5444 Westheimer Road Suite
1570, Houston, Texas. 2006 WL 18881370.
However, the “taint team” procedure used by the FBI in this case is quite distinguishable
from that used in In the Matter of the Search of 5444 Westheimer Road. In that case the “taint team”
reviewed all of the materials and returned the materials it found privileged. 2006 WL 1881370 *2.
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Critically, before the taint team turned over any materials to the prosecution team, the plaintiffs in
that case were allowed to review and challenge the taint team’s privilege determination. Id. Here
the investigation team and clean team conducted the search simultaneously. The “taint team”
primarily searched the offices of Peter Butler and also reviewed materials given them by the
investigatory team. (Rec. Doc. 48 at 10). However, as Agent Bezet testified, individuals not on the
“taint team” were responsible for identifying privileged materials and instructed to bring such
materials to the “taint team” only after they had determined that the materials were potentially
privileged. Critically, these individuals were not instructed on how to identify privileged documents
without reading the content of those documents. As a result, the initial determination that a
document was potentially privileged involved the examination of the document by individuals not
on the “taint team,” thus threatening any privilege contained in those documents.
The facts of the present case are also distinguishable from those in In Re: Search of Law
Office, Residence and Storage Unit of Alan Brown. 341 F.3d 404. In that case the Fifth Circuit held
that because the Government had given the plaintiff unfettered access to all seized records, the
plaintiff could not rely on vague allegations of violations of attorney-client privilege to show the
irreparable injury required for granting a motion for return of property under Rule 41(e).1 In Re:

1

Rule 41(e) was amended in 2002 to become Rule 41(g). That amendment did not
change the substance of Rule 41(e), with the exception that Rule 41(g) omits that last sentence of
Rule 41(e): “[i]f a motion for return of property is made or comes on for hearing in the district of
trial after an indictment or information is filed, it shall be treated also as a motion to suppress
under Rule 12.” That sentence was moved to Rule 41(h), which now provides, “A defendant
may move to suppress evidence in the court where the trial will occur, as Rule 12 provides.”
As a result of this change, the Fifth Circuit has held that Rule 41(g) does not authorize
the suppression of evidence in all but the most exceptional cases of irreparable harm. In Re:
Search of Law Office, Residence and Storage Unit of Alan Brown, 341 F.3d 404, 412-14 (5th
Cir. 2003)(Citing as an example, a case where the FBI has created a file on someone based on
illegal evidence, and the presence of the file itself caused irreparable harm).
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Search of Law Office, Residence and Storage Unit of Alan Brown, 341 F.3d 404, 414 (5th Cir.
2003). However, in this case the Government had not given Plaintiffs any access to the seized
evidence until after the evidentiary hearing. As a result of Plaintiffs’ involuntary ignorance as to
the full extent of privileged information seized by the FBI, and in light of serious deficiencies with
the FBI’s “taint team” procedure, Plaintiffs have shown irreparable injury sufficient to justify the
return of their property, or at least copies of their property.
It should be noted that the Court also based its finding of irreparable injury on the fact that
the seizure of various documents and computers would interrupt legitimate business operations of
the various companies with offices in 2000 Belle Chasse Highway. (Rec. Doc. 22 at 7). This
conclusion is supported by In Re: Search of Law Office, Residence and Storage Unit of Alan Brown,
which held that since the Government had returned the originals of the seized documents at issue
in that case, the plaintiff could not complain of irreparable injury due to his inability to conduct a
legitimate business. 341 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 f.2d 29,
35 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 199 F.3d 276, 278 (5th Cir. 2000)
(pointing out the lack of a business need for return of property when copies of seized items had
already been provided). Here the FBI had not provided Plaintiffs with copies of the documents and
computers that had been seized, which resulted in disruption to Plaintiffs’ legitimate business
operations, necessitating an order for a return of copies of all seized items in order to avoid
irreparable injury.

C.

The Court’s Conclusion
The Government has not shown that this Court needs to correct any manifest errors of law

or fact or consider any newly discovered evidence. There was ample evidence before the Court to
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justify the its earlier Judgment. The new evidence presented has only provided further support for
this Court’s original decision. For instance, it is now clear that the “taint team” was only present
because the Government knew that Peter Butler maintained a law office at 2000 Belle Chasse
Highway. They then searched his offices, despite their not being “the offices of River Birch
Landfill.” It is also clear that the FBI officers used the elevator and therefore were in direct
proximity to the directory on the first floor, which provided even more notice that the search needed
to be limited.
It should be noted that this order does not take any position on the question of whether any
of the evidence seized at 2000 Belle Chasse Highway should be suppressed at any eventual trial.
The Fifth Circuit has been clear that an order of suppression is very rarely justified under Rule 41(g),
and this case is not one of those rare circumstances.

III. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO ENFORCE JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs request that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70, this Court order the
Government to comply with its earlier Judgment, hold the Government in contempt for failing to
comply with this Court’s order, and award Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs. (Rec. Doc. 36).

A.

Legal Standard for Rule 70 Motion to Enforce Judgment
Rule 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(a) Party's Failure to Act; Ordering Another to Act. If a judgment requires a party to
convey land, to deliver a deed or other document, or to perform any other specific
act and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may order the
act to be done--at the disobedient party's expense--by another person appointed by
the court. When done, the act has the same effect as if done by the party.
...
(e) Holding in Contempt. The court may also hold the disobedient party in contempt.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 70(a). A finding of contempt is appropriate when a movant shows by clear and
convincing evidence that: 1) a court order was in effect, 2) that the order required certain conduct
by the respondent, and 3) that the respondent failed to comply with the court's order. Whitcraft v.
Brown, 570 F.3d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Martin v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 959 F.2d 45, 47 (5th
Cir. 1992)).

B.

Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Support of their Motion to Enforce Judgment
1.

The Government has failed to return all non-River Birch property.

Plaintiffs claim that as the Government has only returned four out of 25 boxes of seized
evidence, then it must still retain non-River Birch material. (Rec. Doc 36-1 at 5). As further
evidence that the Government retains non-River Birch evidence, Plaintiffs list several documents
that are still unaccounted for. Id. Finally, Plaintiffs point out that it is difficult for them to know
if the Government has returned all non-River Birch property because the Government’s search
warrant receipt is both vague and inaccurate. Id. The Government claims that it has not retained
any non-River Birch property and that the small percentage of returned documents attests to the fact
that the FBI did their best to seize documents that belonged only to River Birch in the first place.
(Rec. Doc. 41 at 3).
The Court agrees that it is very difficult to tell if the Government had in fact retained any
non-River Birch material. There are just too many documents and too many companies to keep
straight. However, the fact that the Government has only returned four of 25 boxes of material does
not in itself mean that the government held back documents that it should have returned. As a result,
Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Government is in violation of this Court’s order. The
Court also notes that any issues about the Government’s vague search warrant receipt are moot in
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light of this Court’s order requiring the Government to produce copies of everything seized during
the search of 2000 Belle Chasse Highway.
2.

The Government has improperly retained copies of Non-River Birch material

Plaintiffs maintain that the Government has violated this Court’s order by retaining copies
of non-River Birch material. As mentioned earlier, under Rule 41(g), suppression of evidence is
very rarely authorized. The Fifth Circuit has specifically held that the Government can retain even
illegally seized materials because the victims of such seizure have other adequate remedies at law,
such as Bivens actions and motions to suppress in any eventual criminal trial. Therefore, Rule 41(g)
only authorizes the return of property, it does not require the Government to refrain from keeping
copies of that property. While this Court ordered the Government to return Plaintiffs’ property it
also allowed the Government to retain copies of seized materials. (Rec. Doc. 22 at 7) (“By copying
all seized, unprivileged documents and data, and returning originals, the Government can resume
its investigation while mitigating further irreparable injury to Petitioners.”). As this Court has
already ordered the return of Plaintiffs’ property, and Plaintiffs have not shown that their property
has not been returned, then the Government is not in violation of this Court’s order.
3.

The Government has failed to return clearly privileged documents.

Plaintiffs complain that the Government has not returned attorney-client privileged material
that was prepared in response to the Government’s current investigation. (Rec. Doc. 36-1 at 7).
Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that although this Court ordered the Government to complete its “taint
team” review, the Government has not followed its own clean team procedures. Id.
The Court finds this argument premature. The Government has been ordered to provide
copies of everything seized during the search of 2000 Belle Chasse Highway. Indeed this disclosure
is one step of the Government’s “taint team” procedure. If Plaintiffs can find privileged documents
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and the Government refuses to return those documents after a specific request to do so, then
Plaintiffs are free to file a new motion. However, without specific documents to examine the Court
is unable to render a decision on this matter.

C.

Conclusion
As Plaintiffs have not presented any clear and convincing evidence that the Government has

violated a specific order of the court, the Government should not be found in contempt. The
Government is now following the “taint team” procedure by giving Plaintiffs access to all retained
materials so that Plaintiffs have an opportunity to challenge the Government’s privilege
determinations. Moreover, the Government did not violate this Court’s order by keeping any copies,
because under Rule 41(g), and this Court’s order, it is entitled to keep copies of seized materials.

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Rule 41(g) Evidentiary Hearing in
Reconsideration of Order to Return Seized Documents is DENIED. (Rec. Doc. 31).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Judgement is DENIED.
(Rec. Doc. 36).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 1st day of July, 2011.

______________________________
HELEN G. BERRIGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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