Allen v. Cain et al
Filing
48
ORDER & REASONS denying 47 Motion for Relief from Judgment Under Rule 60(b). Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 11/16/12. (sek, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALLEN
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 10-4507
CAIN ET AL.
SECTION: J
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Relief from
Judgment Under Rule 60(b) (Rec. Doc. 47). Having reviewed the
motion, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that
Petitioner’s motion should be DENIED for the reasons set forth
more fully below.
DISCUSSION
Rule 60(b) provides that a court may reconsider a judgment
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by
reasonable diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move
for
a
new
trial
under
Rule
59(b);
(3)
fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct; (4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or
it
is
based
on
a
prior
judgment
that
has
been
reversed
or
vacated, or it is no longer equitable for the judgment to have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason that justifies
relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). A district court has considerable
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discretion to grant or deny relief under Rule 60(b), and its
decision
will
be
reversed
only
for
an
abuse
of
discretion.
Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2005).
A district court abuses its discretion only if it bases its
decision on an erroneous view of the law or clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence. Id.
In
his
motion,
Petitioner
requests
that
this
Court
reconsider its August 1, 2011 Judgment dismissing with prejudice
Petitioner’s petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
(Rec. Doc. 39) Specifically, Petitioner requests that this Court
revisit
its
prior
dismissal
with
respect
to
his
ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner argues that a recent
United States Supreme Court decision, Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct.
1309
(2012),
presents
new
grounds
for
evaluating
his
habeas
petition. In particular, Petitioner argues that Martinez
held
that habeas claims for ineffective assistance of counsel cannot
“be barred for procedural default when there was no counsel at
the initial-review-collateral-proceeding.” (Rec. Doc. 47, p. 1, ¶
5).
Petitioner
contends
that
because
his
habeas
claim
was
dismissed for procedural default, he falls under the Martinez
holding,
and
the
Court
should
therefore
grant
him
leave
to
proceed on the merits of his habeas petition with respect to his
2
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.1
The Court finds that Petitioner’s argument is misplaced. In
Martinez, the Supreme Court issued a narrow holding which found
that when state law requires ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims to “be raised in an initial review collateral
proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas
court from hearing” the claim on federal review, as long as there
was no counsel or the counsel in the proceedings was ineffective.
132 S.Ct. at 1320. The Court’s holding is limited only to state
procedural defaults that are directly related to the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, i.e. a defendant’s failure to raise
the claim on collateral review. See id. (“It does not extend to
attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the first occasion the
State
allows
a
prisoner
to
raise
a
claim
of
ineffective
assistance at trial, even though that initial-review collateral
proceeding may be deficient for other reasons.”). Moreover, the
holding does not require that the federal district court evaluate
1
Louisiana does not permit defendants to raise ineffective assistance of
counsel claims on direct appeal. (See Report and Recommendation, Rec. Doc. 33,
pp. 5-6, 9 (discussing the fact that claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel may not be raised until post-conviction collateral review). Rather, it
requires that all defendants wait until post-conviction collateral review to
raise the claim. In this case, Petitioner did raise his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel at post-conviction review; however, he proceeded pro se and
was not provided an attorney. (See Rec. Doc. 47, p. 1, ¶¶ 2-3) The state courts
found on the merits that Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of
counsel at the trial level. (See Report and Recommendation, Rec. Doc. 33, p. 9)
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the claim on the merits if there is a procedural default; rather,
it merely allows the petitioner to raise the issue of ineffective
assistance/no assistance of counsel on habeas review as a for
cause showing for the default. See id. at 1316 - 20.
In the instant case, the Court did not dismiss Petitioner’s
habeas claim because of a state procedural default. Rather, the
Court
dismissed
Petitioner’s
habeas
petition
because
it
was
untimely. The Court found that petitioner had filed his habeas
petition almost two and a half years after the Anti-Terrorism and
Death Penalty Act filing period had expired. The Court’s judgment
did
not
rest
on
any
findings
that
Petitioner’s
ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was barred due to procedural default,
nor does Petitioner present any arguments that indicate to the
Court that the untimely filing of his habeas petition was somehow
connected to his lack of counsel on initial collateral review. As
such, the Court declines to grant Petitioner’s requested relief.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 16th day of November, 2012.
____________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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