Griffith v. Louisiana State et al

Filing 353

ORDER granting 306 Motion to Amend Complaint; granting in part and denying in part 307 Motion for Reconsideration ; denying 308 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Jay C. Zainey on 6/4/13. (Reference: 11-245, 11-535)(jrc, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TAMMY GRIFFITH & STACEY
GUICHARD

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 11-245 C/W 11-535

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL.

SECTION: "A" (1)

ORDER AND REASONS
[REF: All cases]
The following motions are before the Court: Motion to Amend Complaint (2nd
Amended Complaint) (Rec. Doc. 306), Motion to Reconsider Prior [Dismissals]
(Rec. Doc. 307), and Motion to Reconsider (Rec. Doc. 308) filed by Plaintiffs
Tammy Griffith and Stacey Guichard. All motions are opposed. The motions, scheduled for
submission on March 27, 2013, are before the Court on the briefs without oral argument.1
I.

Background
This case arises out of allegations of gender-based discrimination and harassment by

former Orleans Parish Juvenile Court Judge David Bell, and other alleged retaliatory
conduct by the remaining judges on the court.
On November 2, 2012, this matter was reassigned to this Court following the prior
district judge’s recusal. (Rec. Doc. 277). Significant motion practice had occurred before the
case was reassigned and the trial date was imminent. Upon reallotment of the case to this
Court, the City of New Orleans was the sole remaining defendant in the case. Each plaintiff
had one remaining claim in the case: retaliatory discharge for Ms. Griffith and constructive

David Bell has requested oral argument but the Court is not persuaded that oral
argument would be helpful in light of the issues presented.
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discharge for Ms. Guichard.2 Although Plaintiffs had sought relief under numerous legal
theories, the only ones that had survived dismissal were Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims,
Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law (“LEDL”) claims, and what the prior district
judge had deemed to be parallel (to Title VII) § 1983 claims. (Rec. Docs. 139 [11-245]; 108
[11-535]).
On October 15, 2012, the prior judge denied the City’s motions for summary
judgment (Rec. Docs. 215 & 216) in their entirety. (Rec. Doc. 260). The memoranda in
support of those motions had included a single paragraph, without citation to any legal
authority, challenging the assertion that the City employed the Plaintiffs. (Rec. Doc. 215-1, at
15; Rec. Doc. 216-1, at 11). The City later filed a motion for reconsideration (Rec. Doc. 269)
challenging many aspects of the denial of its motions for summary judgment but in
particular the prior judge’s implicit rejection of the City’s contention that it did not employ
Plaintiffs. At a status conference held on December 4, 2012, this Court advised the parties
that it would take up the motion for reconsideration solely as to the legal question of
whether the City employed Plaintiffs, and therefore whether Plaintiffs could maintain their
causes of action against the sole remaining defendant. (Rec. Doc. 293). Plaintiffs were later
given leave to file a supplemental opposition memorandum so that they could focus their
arguments on the sole issue being taken up on reconsideration. (Rec. Doc. 297).
On January 28, 2013, the Court entered its Order and Reasons granting the City’s

The Court notes that both Griffith and Guichard alleged hostile work environment
claims under Title VII. Those claims were not specifically addressed in the prior judge’s rulings
on the motions to dismiss, either with respect to Title VII claims against the employer or with
respect to § 1983 claims against David Bell individually. The Court is persuaded that the
allegations in the complaint regarding Bell’s workplace conduct are sufficient to state a claim
under Title VII for creation of a hostile working environment. To the extent that Plaintiffs allege
that Chief Judge Gray created a “hostile” work environment because she did not adhere to the
civility code that Plaintiffs believe should govern the workplace, these complaints are not
actionable.
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motion for reconsideration on the employment status issue. (Rec. Doc. 300). On the same
day the Court entered an order giving Plaintiffs a window of opportunity to move to amend
their pleadings in light of the ruling granting summary judgment in favor of the city of New
Orleans. (Rec. Doc. 301). The Court gave Plaintiffs the option to amend, not for the purpose
of revisiting all of the prior judge’s dismissals, but rather to allow Plaintiffs to properly
identify the correct defendant(s) for their remaining claims. The Court believed this course
of action necessary as a matter of fundamental fairness given that this Court’s ruling had
effectively left Plaintiffs without an employer on the eve of trial—the prior judge had
previously dismissed the State of Louisiana and Orleans Parish Juvenile Court (“OPJC”) as
defendants and prospectively denied both Plaintiffs the opportunity to further amend their
complaints. Adding to the Plaintiffs’ prejudice was the fact that the City did not balk at its
status as employer until trial was imminent. Contrary to arguments presented by various
defendants in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motions sub judice, neither the law of the case
doctrine nor issues of finality preclude this Court from revisiting the prior dismissals or
orders.3
II.

Discussion
Motion to Reconsider (Rec. Doc. 308)—City of New Orleans
Plaintiffs move the Court to reconsider its recent ruling granting summary judgment

in favor of the City of New Orleans (Rec. Doc. 300). The State of Louisiana, which itself

The prior dismissals were interlocutory orders that were never the subject of a final
judgment. That they were dismissals with prejudice does not alter their interlocutory nature.
Therefore, the Court has inherent power to modify or rescind those orders at anytime prior to
entry of a judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 54(b). Moreover, the law of the case doctrine does not
bar a transferee judge from modifying the interlocutory orders of a transferor judge. But in doing
so, the transferee judge must exercise his discretion in such a way as to strike the balance
between maintaining stability and reaching the correct result. See Stoffels v. SBC Comm., Inc.,
677 F.3d 720, 728 n.3 (5th Cir. 2012).
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hopes to remain a dismissed defendant in this lawsuit, ardently supports Plaintiffs’ position
with respect to the City.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider the Court’s ruling with respect to the City of New
Orleans is DENIED. The motion to reconsider is for the most part a rehashing of the same
arguments that Plaintiffs originally made in opposition to the City’s motion for summary
judgment. Nonetheless, the Court believes it important to address two arguments that
Plaintiffs’ make in support of their motion.
First, Plaintiffs urge the Court to apply a type of judicial estoppel to the City of New
Orleans based upon the City’s prior acquiescence to Plaintiffs’ contention that the City was
their employer. Moreover, Plaintiffs point to affirmative representations by the City or its
employees that purport to concede employer status.
Judicial estoppel applies where a party tries to contradict in a second lawsuit his
sworn statement in previous litigation. Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651 n.2 (5th Cir.
1994). It is intended to protect the integrity of the judicial process, avoid inconsistent
results, and prevent litigants from playing fast and loose in order to secure an advantage. Id.
(citing United States ex rel. AM. Bank v. C.I.T. Constr., 944 F.2d 253, 258-59 (5th Cir. 1991);
Brandon v. InterFirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1988)). In this case, the City raised
the issue of employer status in its timely-filed motions for summary judgment (Rec. Docs.
215 & 216) before the prior judge and the issue is listed as a contested question of law in the
pre-trial order (Rec. Doc. 262). The City then re-raised the issue in its subsequent motion to
reconsider, which this Court agreed to hear in the exercise of its discretion. Thus, judicial
estoppel does not apply in this case as a means to tag the City of New Orleans with financial
responsibility for damages, that if proven, will have been sustained at the hands of state
court judges.

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Second, Plaintiffs contend that for purposes of their state law employment
discrimination claims they were employees of the City. In their prior briefing in opposition
(Rec. Docs. 270 & 297) to the City’s motion to reconsider, Plaintiffs did not distinguish
between employer status for the Title VII and LEDL claims, and therefore the Court made no
such distinction in its ruling. While the parties had previously been content to meld the Title
VII and LEDL claims,4 the Court is persuaded that the issue of employer/employee status
merits separate consideration under the two schemes.
1.

Title VII Claims

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee based on
gender and from retaliating against an employee for seeking to vindicate rights conferred by
Title VII. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(A). Title VII defines an
employer as a “person in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). A person “includes one or more individuals, governments,
governmental agencies, [or] political subdivisions.” Id. § 2000e(a). The term “employee”
means “an individual employed by an employer, except that the term ‘employee’ shall not
include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State
by the qualified voters thereof . . . .” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(f). Title VII lacks statutory
guidance on the question of who qualifies as an employee because “[w]ith magnificent
circularity, Title VII defines an employee as ‘an individual employed by an employer.’”
Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(f)).

Louisiana courts rely upon Title VII standards when addressing LEDL claims, see
Plummer v. Marriott Corp., 654 So. 2d 843 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995), and for this reason litigants
often restrict their briefing to Title VII law even though they are pursuing parallel state law
employment claims.
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This circuit has long-recognized that the question of employer/employee status
under Title VII is a question of federal law “to be ascertained through consideration of the
statutory language of the [Civil Rights] Act, its legislative history, existing federal case law,
and the particular circumstances of the case at hand.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 380 F.3d 219,
226 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Broussard, 789 F.2d at 1159-60), rev’d on other grounds, 546
U.S. 500 (2006). Courts in this circuit determine “employee” status for Title VII purposes by
applying the hybrid economic realities/common law control test adopted in this circuit in
Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1985). Id. Although other factors are
relevant, the most important factor is “the extent of the employer’s right to control the
“means and manner of the worker’s performance.” Id. (quoting Bloom v. Bexar County Tex.,
130 F.3d 722, 726 (5th Cir. 1997)). Even though federal law controls whether a person is an
employer or employee under Title VII, courts can look to state law to understand the nature
of the employment relationship. Oden v. Oktibbeha County, 246 F.3d 458, 465 (5th Cir.
2001) (citing Calderon v. Martin County, 639 F.2d 271, 273 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)).
When Plaintiffs’ case was assigned to this Section, discovery vis à vis the City was
concluded. Yet as the Court previously explained when granting the City’s motion for
reconsideration, none of the evidence in this case suggests that the City of New Orleans
exercised any control whatsoever with respect to Plaintiffs’ employment. (Rec. Doc. 300).
Plaintiffs reported either directly or indirectly to the judges of the OPJC, and it is an
undisputed fact in this case that Plaintiffs served solely at the pleasure of the judges of that
court. Plaintiffs were employed to provide support services to the judges of the OPJC not to
the City. Neither the mayor, the city council, nor or any other official employed by the City
exercised or had the right to exercise control over any aspect of Plaintiffs’ employment—all
aspects of Plaintiffs’ employment were controlled by the judges of the OPJC.

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That said, for purposes of their Title VII claims, Plaintiffs continue to attach undue
weight to the fact that the City paid Plaintiffs’ salaries. But as the Court previously explained
when granting the City’s motion for reconsideration, the City paid Plaintiffs’ salaries
pursuant to a statutory state law mandate that requires Orleans Parish to fund the OPJC.
The City did not obtain the right to control employment decisions or to demand services
rendered in return for that funding. This situation is not unheard of when a public employer
is involved. For example in Oden v. Oktibbeha County, the Title VII plaintiff was a sheriff’s
deputy who had been denied a promotion. 246 F.3d at 461. The deputy sued the county and
the sheriff, in both his individual and official capacities, under Title VII for race
discrimination. The jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor and all three defendants
were cast in judgment. Id. at 462.
The crucial issue on appeal in Oden for purposes of the cases sub judice was whether
the county could be liable under Title VII, i.e., whether the county was the Title VII
employer. In Oden the county funded the sheriff’s office and even exercised oversight over
the sheriff’s budget but the county exercised no authority concerning promotions within the
sheriff’s office. 246 F.3d at 465. The sheriff was solely responsible for hiring, promoting, and
establishing his deputies’ wages. Because the sheriff was the elected official who made all
decisions concerning promotions within his department, the sheriff in his official capacity
was the deputy’s employer for Title VII purposes. Id. The county, which funded and
budgeted for the sheriff’s office but exercised no control over employment decisions, was not
the Title VII employer. Id.; see also United States v. Matagorda County, 181 F. Supp. 2d
673, 679-80 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (concluding that the county that paid the plaintiff was not the
employee because the elected sheriff exercised all control with respect to employment). As in
Oden, Plaintiffs herein are trying to transform a public entity with no employment-related

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decision making authority into their Title VII employer based solely on funding obligations.
Oden is clear authority for the proposition that payment of salaries, and even budget
oversight authority, are insufficient in the absence of control to render the City liable under
Title VII.
Another problem with Plaintiffs’ and the State’s position regarding the City is that
these parties continue to apply the term “employer” as that term is understood in layman’s
terms as opposed to Title VII, which makes the status of the judges themselves crucial to the
analysis. The OPJC is not an agency of the City, and the judges of the OPJC are not City
employees. The Court explained this in great detail in its prior ruling and neither Plaintiffs
nor the State has impugned that conclusion because the state law authorities that the Court
cited allow for no other conclusion.5 Turning a blind eye as to the status of the OPJC judges
is problematic under Title VII because as the Court previously explained, the OPJC judges
are the persons who made and carried out the employment decisions being challenged
and/or potentially created a sexually hostile work environment. Principles of various
liability are the bedrock of Title VII, which is why the “employer,” not the offending
employee, is the potentially liable party under Title VII. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating,
Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999). Employers are liable under Title VII in accordance
with common law agency principles, for the acts of their employees. Long v. Eastfield
College, 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Moham v. Steego Corp., 3 F.3d 873, 876 (5th
Cir. 1993)). Moreover, regarding the claims of sexual harassment against David Bell, Bell
unarguably qualified as a supervisor with immediate or higher authority over Plaintiffs, so
not being subject to individual liability under Title VII, the corporation or entity for which
The Court notes that the OPJC judges’ official letterhead includes the seal of the State
of Louisiana. (Rec. Doc .210-51). Meanwhile, the mayor’s staff’s letterhead includes the seal of
the City of New Orleans. (Rec. Doc. 210-9 & 210-79).
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he served as the proxy will be potentially liable under Title VII. See Ackel v. Nat’l Comm.,
Inc., 339 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2003). But the judges of the OPJC are not proxies for the City of
New Orleans and no party can point to any law to plausibly suggest otherwise. Thus, in the
respondeat superior-laden scheme of Title VII, the City cannot be liable as Plaintiffs’
employer for any Title VII violations that Plaintiffs suffered as a result of conduct on the part
of any judge of the OPJC. In other words, for purposes of Title VII, the City of New
Orleans is not Plaintiffs’ “employer.” The motion to reconsider is therefore DENIED as to
the Title VII claims against the City.6
2.

Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law Claims

Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims under Louisiana law must be considered separately
because even though Louisiana courts look to federal standards when determining liability,
the Louisiana legislature chose to deviate from Title VII when defining the term “employer.”
The definition of an “employer” for purposes of an LEDL is narrower than the Title VII
definition and it provides in relevant part:
“Employer” means a person, association, legal or commercial entity, the state, or
any state agency, board, commission, or political subdivision of the state
receiving services from an employee and, in return, giving
compensation of any kind to an employee. The provisions of this Chapter
shall apply only to an employer who employs twenty or more employees within
this state for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:302(2) (2010) (emphasis added). An “employee” is an individual

This Court would have also dismissed the parallel § 1983 claims against the City that
were preserved under the prior rulings. Under § 1983 a municipality is not vicariously liable for
the constitutional torts of any of its employees, which is really a moot point because the OPJC
judges were not City employees. Thus, the fatal problem with the § 1983 claim against the City is
that Monell requires that the alleged constitutional violation have occurred as a result of a policy
of the municipality. See Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). But in this
case, the injuries that Plaintiffs complain about occurred at the hands of the judges of the OPJC,
none of whom acted pursuant to a policy of the City of New Orleans.
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employed by an employer. Id. § 23:302(1).
Even though Louisiana law normally applies a right to control test for determining
employer-employee relationship, in order to be an employer for purposes of the LEDL one
must 1) receive services from an employee, and 2) in return give compensation to that
employee. Dejoie v. Medley, 9 So. 3d 826, 830 (La. 2009). Moreover, for purposes of the
LEDL, the source of the funds is crucial to determining whether a given defendant is the
plaintiff’s employer for purposes of the LEDL. Id. at 831. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s
decision in Dejoie makes clear that entity whose agent effected the adverse employment
decision, and received the plaintiff’s services, will not be the plaintiff’s employer for
purposes of the LEDL if that entity did not fund the plaintiff’s compensation. Thus,
“employer” status under the LEDL stands in stark contrast to the same term under Title VII.
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Dejoie in support of their argument that they were City
employees is misplaced. Dejoie may preclude employer status where an entity does not fund
the plaintiff’s compensation, but it does not stand for the converse proposition that the
entity that pays for compensation is ipso facto the LEDL employer. Under the LEDL, an
entity is not an employer unless it pays compensation and receives services from the
employee in return. La. R.S. § 23:302(2).
In this case, both Plaintiffs were hired by the OPJC to provide services to that state
agency and to the State’s judges on that court. The work that they performed was for the
court, not the City. Plaintiffs can point to no specific services that they provided to the City
in return for compensation but they assert that the City clearly receives benefits from OPJC
because of all the troubled youth in the local community. (Rec. Doc. 308-1 at 4). The local
community surely benefits from the existence of the OPJC just as it surely benefits from the
federal court in this district. But the LEDL requires compensation in exchange for services

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rendered by the individual seeking recovery and in this case Plaintiffs provided no services
to the City of New Orleans.7 This case is similar to Dejoie in that it presents a scenario where
Plaintiffs have no employer that they can sue for violations of the LEDL.8 The motion to
reconsider is therefore DENIED as to the LEDL claims against the City or any of the other
defendants.
Motion to Reconsider Prior [Dismissals] (Rec. Doc. 307)—Title VII
In reconsidering prior dismissals pertaining to the issue of the Title VII employer, the
Court begins with two ground rules: 1) the City of New Orleans was not Plaintiffs’ employer
or joint employer for purposes of Title VII, and 2) given the broad, remedial nature of Title
VII, Plaintiffs do in fact have a Title VII employer. This Court is persuaded, for the reasons it
gave when it granted the City’s motion to reconsider and for the additional reasons given
above, that Plaintiffs’ employer for purposes of Title VII is the State in one of its many
forms—either the State of Louisiana, or if not the State proper, the OPJC, as an agency of the
State of Louisiana, which it unarguably is, or the judges of the OPJC in their official
capacities, see Oden, 246 F.3d at 465 (recognizing that the plaintiff’s employer for purposes
of Title VII was the sheriff in his official capacity). All of these defendants were named in
Plaintiffs’ complaint. Therefore, the motion to reconsider the prior dismissal of defendants
David Bell, Ernestine Gray, Tammy Stewart, Mark Doherty, Lawrence Lagarde, Tracey
Flemings-Davillier, and Candace Bates Anderson (Rec. Doc. 307) in their official capacities

In Dejoie, the State had not contested the services aspect of LEDL employer status so
the majority did not address the issue of whether the State received plaintiff’s services. 9 So. 3d
at 830 n.4 & 832. However, Chief Justice Johnson, who believed that the State was the plaintiff’s
LEDL employer, explained why the plaintiff, who provided services to a state court judge,
provided services to the State. 9 So. 3d at 833 (Johnson, C.J., dissenting).
7

Justice Victory noted in his dissent that a situation may very well arise where the
plaintiff has no employer under the LEDL and therefore can never sue anyone for discrimination
under state law. Dejoie, 9 So.3d at 833 (Victory, J., dissenting).
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only as judges of the OPJC is GRANTED as to the Title VII claims. The motion is likewise
GRANTED as to the State of Louisiana and the OPJC, as an agency of the State of Louisiana,
again as to the Title VII claims only.9
Motion to Amend Complaint (2nd Amended Complaint) (Rec. Doc. 306)
and Motion to Reconsider Prior [Dismissals] (Rec. Doc. 307)—§ 1983
The motion to file the Second Amended complaint (Rec. Doc. 306) is GRANTED to
the extent that Plaintiffs are relying on this amended version of their complaint to clarify the
Title VII employer issue that the Court addressed above, and to the extent that they are now
expressly invoking equal protection as a Fourteenth Amendment violation for purposes of a
parallel § 1983 claim.10 The Second Amended complaint does not provide a basis to
reconsider the prior judge’s ruling as to the state law tort claims against any individual
defendant so those claims remain dismissed. Thus, the sole issue that remains for
consideration is what effect the Second Amended complaint has on the § 1983 claims against
the judges of OPJC in their individual or personal capacities.
Title VII does not subsume a § 1983 cause of action when a public employer’s conduct

The Court does not suggest that all of these defendants must be in the case, only that
the State in one of its forms is the employer for purposes of Title VII. The Court is aware of the
various other decisions, although none controlling or specifically involving OPJC, that have
found that similar court entities lack capacity to be sued. But this Court cannot dismiss Beevers
v. Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, 552 So. 2d 1317 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990), which implicitly
recognizes that capacity of a juvenile court to be a defendant, so easily. The Court notes evidence
in this record that OPJC acted as a juridical entity, issuing checks, entering into contracts,
purchasing equipment, etc. in its own name. This entity may very well have liability insurance in
its name that covers acts taken by the judges of the Court in their official capacities.
9

The Second Amended complaint is so prolix and contains so many allegations that are
not actionable under any law that the Court cannot possibly traverse the document paragraph by
paragraph to ensure that Plaintiffs are not adding in “new” claims or causes of action other than
the equal protection claim. The Court stresses that leave to file the Second Amended complaint
is being granted to cure the Title VII employer issue, and to provide the underlying basis (equal
protection) for the parallel § 1983 claim.
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violates both Title VII and a separate federal right. Johnston v. Harris County Flood
Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1573 (5th Cir. 1989). Section 1983 does not create any
substantive rights but rather provides a remedy for the violation of a federally secured right.
Id. at 1574. Thus, an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability
under § 1983. Id. But the underlying federal right must be separate from the federal rights
created by Title VII. Id. In other words, § 1983 is not merely an alternative legal basis upon
which a public sector employee can rely to recover for employment practices rendered
unlawful by Title VII. Further, unlike Title VII which limits liability only to the “employer,” §
1983 provides a means to sue personally the official alleged of having violated the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.
The only underlying constitutional violation to support a § 1983 claim against any
defendant is under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.11 The only
defendant whose conduct toward Plaintiffs was discriminatory in a manner potentially
violative of equal protection was David Bell’s. Bell is alleged to have personally harassed
Plaintiffs in a manner that altered their conditions of employment and for reasons solely
attributable to their gender. Plaintiffs complain about various other occurrences at the OPJC
that they perceive to be unfair or inequitable but the constitution does not guarantee
absolute fairness in the workplace. It does, however, guarantee that Plaintiffs not suffer
unequal treatment because of their gender. Again, the only defendant who personally
subjected Plaintiffs to unequal treatment in light of their gender was Bell. Plaintiffs have not
alleged facts sufficient to hold any other judge of the court personally liable for disparate

The prior judge concluded that Plaintiffs had not stated a claim for a Fourteenth
Amendment violation of the right to privacy, liberty, and substantive/procedural due process.
This Court agrees with that conclusion and the Second Amended complaint does nothing to
resuscitate those dead-on-arrival claims.
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treatment attributable to gender. Plaintiffs motion to reconsider is therefore GRANTED as
to the § 1983 claims against Bell in his individual capacity only.
In sum, all claims against the City of New Orleans remain dismissed. The Title VII
claims against the State of Louisiana, the OPJC, as an agency of the State of Louisiana, and
the judges of the OPJC in their official capacities are reinstated. Those Title VII claims are
for retaliatory discharge (Griffith), constructive discharge (Guichard), and hostile work
environment grounded on gender discrimination and harassment (Griffith and Guichard).
The § 1983 claim for violations of equal protection are reinstated against David Bell in his
individual capacity. The foregoing claims are the only claims pending in this action
notwithstanding anything else that Plaintiffs have included in the Second Amended
complaint. See note 10, supra.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Reconsider (Rec. Doc. 308) filed by
Plaintiffs Tammy Griffith and Stacey Guichard is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Amend Complaint (2nd
Amended Complaint) (Rec. Doc. 306) filed by Plaintiffs Tammy Griffith and Stacey
Guichard is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Reconsider Prior
[Dismissals] (Rec. Doc. 307) filed by Plaintiffs Tammy Griffith and Stacey Guichard is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to the Title
VII claims against the State of Louisiana, the OPJC, as an agency of the State of Louisiana,
and the judges of the OPJC in their official capacities, and as to the § 1983 Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claims against David Bell in his individual capacity. The
attorneys for these defendants shall appear at the status conference scheduled for June 17,

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2013, at 10:15 a.m. in chambers. The motion is DENIED in all other respects.
June 4, 2013
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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