Griffith v. Louisiana State et al

Filing 496

ORDER denying 460 Motion in Limine; denying 461 Motion in Limine; denying 488 Motion for Sanctions. Signed by Judge Jay C. Zainey on 9/12/14. (Reference: 11-245, 11-535)(jrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TAMMY GRIFFITH & STACEY
GUICHARD

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 11-245 C/W 11-535

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL.

SECTION: "A" (1)

ORDER AND REASONS
[REF: All cases]
The following motions in limine are before the Court: Motion in Limine (1) Exclude
Character Evidence (Rec. Doc. 460), Motion in Limine (2) Judicial Notice (Rec.
Doc. 461), and Motion for Sanctions (Rec. Doc. 488) filed by plaintiffs Tammy Griffith
and Stacey Guichard. The motions are opposed and are before the Court on the briefs without
oral argument.1
This case arises out of allegations of gender-based discrimination and harassment by
former Orleans Parish Juvenile Court (“OPJC”) Judge David Bell, and other alleged retaliatory
conduct by the other judges on the court. A jury trial in this case is scheduled to commence on
November 3, 2014.
Motion in Limine (1) Exclude Character Evidence (Rec. Doc. 460)
DENIED.
Via this motion plaintiff Stacey Guichard seeks to exclude any evidence of a relationship
that she had with a former OPJC employee named Sean Johnson. Guichard contends that

The Motion for Sanctions is noticed for submission on September 24, 2014. The Court has
elected to take up the motion at this time prior to receiving an opposition.
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Defendants seek to use evidence of this past relationship as character evidence in violation of
Federal Rule of Evidence 404. According to Guichard, this past relationship is not relevant to
any pending causes of action.
Guichard does not make a persuasive argument grounded on Rule 404, which is not
implicated by evidence pertaining to a past relationship with Johnson. The precise issue is
relevance. Although Plaintiff does not describe Mr. Johnson's exact role at the OPJC, the Court
surmises from the opposition memoranda that Johnson is "the process server boyfriend" that
Guichard herself referred to several times in pleading her own case.2 (Rec. Doc. 354, SAC ¶¶
38, 87-90). The relationship with Johnson is alleged to have been a violation of the OPJC's
personnel policies and whether or not that is the case, it is the Court's understanding that the
judges of the OPJC were considering discipline, including termination, against Guichard for
that relationship. In fact, the issue of disciplining Guichard for the alleged infraction was
mentioned by one of the other OPJC judges who testified before the Judiciary Commission.
In this lawsuit, Guichard is claiming retaliatory constructive discharge and she
complains about having been denied a promotion to the judicial administrator's position. The
Court is not persuaded that the past relationship with Johnson, which might have been
conducted in violation of court policy, is irrelevant to the Defendants' defenses in this matter.

Motion in Limine (2) Judicial Notice (Rec. Doc. 461)
DENIED.

Because Guichard provided no explanation to the Court regarding Johnson, the Court
assumes that he is not the employee with whom Guichard had been living when she was hired as
clerk of court. (See Rec. Doc. 483, Bell's Oppo at 2 n.1, discussing Keith Claiborne). In other words,
there are two former process servers in Guichard's past. If the Court has mistaken Johnson for "the
process server boyfriend" referenced in the complaint then this is attributable to Guichard's
uncharacteristic lack of detail in her motion in limine.
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Via this motion Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of sealed document 67-2,
which is the Judiciary Commission's June 2, 2010 Recommendation to the Louisiana Supreme
Court regarding Bell's disqualification. On July 19, 2011, the former district judge ordered the
document placed under seal. Plaintiffs want this Court to lift the seal, make the document
public, and to take judicial notice of it.
The JC's Recommendation has also spawned two other related motions: Bell's Motion
in Limine to exclude any evidence of the Recommendation (Rec. Doc. 490), which is not
currently before the Court, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions (Rec. Doc. 488).
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows a court to judicially notice an adjudicative "fact"
that is not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court, or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2). The court must
take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary
information. Id. 201(c). In a civil jury case, the court must instruct the jury to accept the fact as
conclusive. Id. 201(f).
Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, the 18 page Recommendation and the related
Louisiana Supreme Court opinions are not appropriate for judicial notice simply because they
are relevant to this proceeding or publically available. Rule 201 deals in "facts" not "subjects."
(Rec. Doc. 461-1, Plaintiffs' Memo at 1). These documents do not constitute "facts," much less
undisputed ones, and therefore do not satisfy Rule 201's requirements. Moreover, the law in
this circuit recognizes that a court generally cannot take notice of the findings of fact from
other proceedings. Taylor v. Charter Med. Corp., 162 F.3d 827, 830 (5th Cir. 1998).
The important issue surrounding the Recommendation and the Supreme Court rulings
is their admissibility vel non as trial exhibits, not whether notice is appropriate. The

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admissibility issue has been raised by Bell in his motion in limine. Out of fairness, the Court
will not enter a final ruling as to admissibility until Plaintiffs have had the opportunity to file
their opposition.
The admissibility issue is not affected one way or the other by the fact that the former
district judge placed the Recommendation under seal over three years ago. If the document is
in fact already publically available then anyone who has an interest in obtaining a copy can
request one from the appropriate state authority. The seal order in this case affects nothing and
the Court sees no reason to disturb it now.
Motion for Sanctions (Rec. Doc. 488)
DENIED.
The Court will not sanction Bell's counsel regarding assertions about the nature of the
Recommendation, i.e., whether it remains confidential, and about the date that Bell resigned
from office. Whether the Recommendation is or is not confidential, and whether Bell resigned
from office on June 15, 2010 versus June 17, 2010—two days later—are not material facts in
this case. To the extent that Plaintiffs believe otherwise, the Court warns Plaintiffs that they
must prove their federal claims to a federal jury in this Court. That the Judiciary Commission
has already heard much of the evidence and found it credible for purposes of recommending
disqualification does not lessen Plaintiffs' burden of proof in this Court.
September 12, 2014
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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