World Fuel Services, Inc. v. Magdalena Green M/V

Filing 34

ORDER AND OPINION denying 22 MOTION for Reconsideration re 21 Order on Motion to Vacate, Order on Motion to Dismiss filed by World Fuel Services, Inc. Signed by Judge Stanwood R. Duval, Jr on 7/8/2011.(blg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

WORLD FUEL SERVICES, INC.,
trading as WORLD FUEL SERVICES

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 11-452

M/V MAGDALENA GREEN, Official
No. 9232462, her engines, machinery,
appurtenances, etc., in rem

SECTION “K”(2)

ORDER AND OPINION

Before the Court is the “Motion for Reconsideration” filed on behalf of plaintiff World Fuel
Services, Inc. (WFS) )(Doc. 22). Having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, and relevant law, the
Court, for the reasons assigned, DENIES the motion.
Plaintiff urges the Court to reconsider its order granting defendant Magdalena Green, B.V.’s
motion to dismiss to the extent that it sought to dismiss WFS’s arrest claim against the M/V
MAGDALENA GREEN. Plaintiff contends that “[t]he facts show that WFS’s maritime lien against
the M/V MAGDALENA GREEN . . . was never extinguished.” Doc. 22-1, p. 1.
“Motions requesting reconsideration of court orders generally fall under Rule 59(e) or Rule
60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Maronge v. Hunt Petroleum Company, 2011 WL
39028 (E.D. La. January 4, 2011). Because plaintiff filed its motion for reconsideration within
twenty-eight days of the date the Court ruled upon WFS’s “Motion to Dismiss/Vacate Arrest,” the
Court construes the motion for reconsideration as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule
59(e).
This Court has recognized four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted:
(1) to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which judgment is based, (2) the availability of new

evidence, (3) the need to prevent manifest injustice, (4) or an intervening change in controlling law.
In Re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, 2009 WL 5216897 at 1(E.D. La. December
29, 2009).

The Court has further recognized that “[r]econsideration of a judgment is an

extraordinary remedy which courts should use sparingly.” Id. (see Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal
Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d §2810.1, p. 124, Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., 1998 WL 43217 (E.D.
La. Feb. 3, 1998); Bardwell v. Sharp, 1995 WL 517120, at 1 (E.D. La. Aug. 30, 1995). The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that the standard for Rule 59(e) “favors denial of motion to
alter or amend a judgment.” Southern Contractors Group, Inc. v. Dynalectric Company, 2 F.3d 606,
611 (5th Cir. 1993).
Contrary to the WFS’s contention, the Court’s prior ruling granting defendant’s motion to
dismiss, in part, did not contain a manifest error of fact or law. The following facts which occurred
on September 16, 2010, are undisputed:
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•
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Geoff Williamson, a WFS manager, acknowledged in an
email to Jiten Mehra, an employee of S.E. Shipping Lines,
(“SESL”) the receipt of $241,490.24 stating “UTA and
MAGDALENA GREEN paid today - 9/16/2010 Incoming
Money Transfer (195) $241,490.24.
Jiten Mehra emailed Mr. Williamson the remittance slips and
stated “[a]ll payments are made. Please reconfirm thanks.”
Mr. Williamson responded by email to Mr. Mehra stating
“[t]hanks- confirmed all paid.”
WFS generated a document entitled “Payment
25900COPRK3 Details” confirming a payment of
$241,520.24 and identifying the “Payment Details” as UTA
usd 74180.56 and . . . MAGDALENA GREEN USD
167339.68.

Doc. 14-4, Ex. C , Doc. 14-5, Ex. D (emphasis added).
The Court acknowledges that the general fuel purchase agreement between SESL and WFS
provides, in pertinent part that:
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All payments received from Buyer after an invoice is overdue shall
first be applied to interest, legal collection costs and administrative
fees incurred before they will be applied to the principal amounts on
a subsequent delivery. Buyer may not designate application of funds
to a newer invoice so long as there are any unpaid charges, interest,
collection costs or administrative fees on a previous one.
Doc. 1, Ex. B. However, despite that provision, WFS clearly allocated $167,339.68 of SESL’s
September 16, 2010 payment to the account of the MAGDALENA GREEN and the rest to UTA
and then confirmed that allocation as well as a statement of “all paid” via email to SESL. That
specific allocation of funds and representation of “all paid” by WFS to the MAGDALENA GREEN
extinguished the maritime lien on the MAGDALENA GREEN at the time of payment. Deposition
testimony and other evidence indicating post-payment decisions concerning the allocation of the
amount paid by SESL cannot resurrect the maritime lien on the MAGDALENA GREEN after it has
been extinguished by payment. It is simply too late to put the proverbial “toothpaste back into the
tube” given WFS’s representations to SESL on September 16, 2010. Plaintiff has failed to satisfy
the high standard necessary to grant a Rule 59(e) motion. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of July, 2011.

STANWOOD R. DUVAL, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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