Doe, et al v. Dantin et al

Filing 117

ORDER granting 82 Motion for Summary Judgment. All federal law claims against David Carmadelle, Euris Dubois and Town of Grand Isle are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The remaining claims against any defendants all arise under state law and are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Jay C. Zainey. (jrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JANE DOE, individually and
on behalf of her minor son,
JOHN DOE

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 11-467

JERRY DANTIN, ET AL

SECTION: "A" (1)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc.
82) filed by defendants David Camardelle, Euris Dubois, and the
Town of Grand Isle.

Plaintiffs, Jane Doe, and her minor son, John

Doe, oppose the motion.1

The motion, set for hearing on May 1,

2015, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument.2
For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND
This case concerns an alleged cover-up by the mayor of Grand

Isle, the chief of police of Grand Isle, and the Grand Isle Police
Department / Town of Grand Isle in investigating a possible felony.
Defendant David Camardelle (“Camardelle”) is the mayor of the Town
1

Plaintiffs identify themselves by these pseudonyms in order to
protect their identities given that this case concerns allegations of
child molestation. All Defendants are aware of Plaintiffs’ true
identities.
2

The Court has received the supplemental briefing from both
parties.

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of Grand Isle and a neighbor of John Doe’s father.

At the time of

the incident, defendant Jerry Dantin (“Dantin”) had been dating
Camardelle’s mother.

Plaintiffs allege that on March 30, 2010,

Jane Doe’s son, John Doe, informed her that Dantin had sexually
molested him by allowing him / instructing him to put cream on
Dantin's penis and in Dantin's anus.

In response, Jane Doe told

John Doe’s father about the sexual molestation.
called

Camardelle

allegations.

on

March

31,

2010

to

John Doe’s father

inform

him

of

the

Camardelle and John Doe’s father discussed getting

more information before taking further action, and John Doe's
father agreed to give Camardelle until April 5, 2010, due to the
upcoming Easter weekend.
Jane Doe and John Doe's father called Camardelle on April 5,
2010, but were unable to reach him.

Jane Doe also called the

Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office that day to ask where to report
a molestation, but she did not divulge any further details.

On

April 6, 2010, Jane Doe reported the matter in person to an officer
at the Grand Isle Police Department.

During this visit, Defendant

Euris Dubois (“Dubois”), the Chief of the Grand Isle Police
Department, allegedly accused Jane Doe of lying.

Camardelle then

arrived at the police station and apologized to Jane Doe for not
returning her call. Camardelle offered to pick up Dantin and drive
him to the station, which Dubois allowed.
2

Upon his return, Dantin

was questioned by Dubois and Jane Doe. Camardelle was also present
during the questioning.
During questioning, Dantin initially denied molesting John
Doe, but eventually stated that he would tell the truth.
point, Dubois read Dantin his Miranda rights.

At this

Dubois attempted to

record Dantin’s statement, but the tape recorder would not work.
A second tape recorder also would not work.

Dubois allegedly

decided against getting new batteries and instead instructed his
secretary to handwrite the statement.

According to Plaintiffs,

Dubois ordered Dantin to continue with his statement even after his
secretary

informed

him

that

she

could

not

keep

up

with

the

dialogue.
In his statement, Dantin confessed to molesting John Doe.
then threatened to kill himself.

He

While Dantin was providing his

statement, Camardelle allegedly began crying hysterically and
complained of having a heart attack.

An EMS was called to examine

Camardelle while Jane Doe was left alone with Dantin.

Camardelle

did not suffer a heart attack.
Dubois did not have any video or audio of the confession.

He

did not ask Dantin to handwrite his confession nor did he present
a written confession for Dantin to sign.

The police report does

state that Dantin confessed to molesting John Doe.
Dantin was arrested and transported to a hospital for suicide
3

watch.

He was then released into the custody of the Grand Isle

Police Department for booking.

On April 7, 2010, Dantin was

transferred to the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office.

On August

20, 2010, the District Attorney’s Office instituted charges against
Dantin for sexual battery of a juvenile.
In the criminal proceedings, Dantin filed a motion to suppress
his oral confession, which the trial court denied.

The trial

court's denial of Dantin's motion was subsequently upheld by the
appellate court. Dantin’s criminal jury trial was held on July 13,
2011, resulting in a hung jury.

The matter was again tried to a

jury on September 22, 2011, concluding with the same result.
On February 25, 2011, Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit
against Camardelle, Dubois, Dantin, and the Town of Grand Isle,
asserting constitutional violations under § 1983 and state law
claims for intentional torts.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary

judgment

is

appropriate

only

if

"the

pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-movant, "show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact."

TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James,

276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)).
4

A dispute about a

material

fact

is

"genuine"

if

the

evidence

is

such

that

a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The court must draw all

justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

Once the moving party has

initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support
the non-moving party's cause," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must come forward with "specific
facts" showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Id. (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

Conclusional allegations and denials,

speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and
legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific
facts showing a genuine issue for trial.

Id. (citing SEC v.

Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993)).
II. DISCUSSION
In response to the instant motion, Plaintiffs have produced
several record document items in an effort to create disputed
issues of fact.

However, the inquiry does not stop at whether

there are disputed issues of fact; the contested issues must be
material – a legal question.
Cir. 1994).

Cf. McKee v. Brimmer, 39 F.3d 94 (5th

This Court finds that Plaintiffs have neither stated

nor supported a claim for violation of Plaintiffs' First Amendment
5

right of access to the courts as held by the Fifth Circuit.

A

brief review of the relevant precedent supports this finding.
In Ryland v. Shapiro, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded
a district court's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint
claiming that the defendants had violated their right of access to
the court.

708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983).

The plaintiffs had

alleged that their daughter was murdered by a prosecutor who, with
the aid of another prosecutor, delayed the performance of an
autopsy,

falsified

a

coroner's

report,

and

investigation into the cause of her death.

stymied

a

Id. at 969.

police
As a

result, they alleged that this "cover-up" of their daughter's
murder prevented their filing of a wrongful death lawsuit for
eleven months.

Id. at 969-70.

The Fifth Circuit, noting that

access to the courts must be "adequate, effective, and meaningful,"
found that such alleged intentional interference with the related
proceedings, if it is the cause of a delay in a plaintiff's ability
to file his civil suit, may unconstitutionally impede a right of
access to the courts.

Id. at 974-75.

The Fifth Circuit refined its delineation of this right in
Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, explaining that Ryland should not
be read to give this right a broad scope.3
3

28 F.3d 425 (1994).

In 1989, the Fifth Circuit opined that "the current contours of
the right can best be described as nebulous." Crowder v. Sinyard, 884
F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 1989).

6

Foster held that the right protects against officially-created
barriers to filing an action on the underlying claim (e.g., in
Ryland, the wrongful death suit); it does not protect against an
individual or entity's actions that might decrease the chance of
success on the underlying action.

Id. at 430.

Thus, in Ryland,

the alleged cover-up created by the defendants suggesting that the
victim's cause of death was a suicide, not a homicide, created the
possibility that the plaintiffs were deprived of their right to
file a wrongful death suit for eleven months – the time between the
incident and the exposure of the cover-up.
Ryland, 708 F.2d at 972-73).

Id. at 429-30 (citing

In Crowder, the defendants' removal

of the plaintiffs' property from Texas "destroyed or impaired the
rightful jurisdiction of Texas courts over the seized items, thus
interfering with [the plaintiffs'] ability to litigate ownership of
the property in Texas."
813).4

Id. at 430 (quoting Crowder, 884 F.2d at

Contrast these with Foster, in which the Fifth Circuit

accepted as true the allegations that the defendants (the city and

4

In footnote 7 of its opinion, the Foster court reviewed a case
from the Seventh Circuit that cited Ryland in finding a claim stated
where the police officer defendants concocted a story prior to the
plaintiffs' filing of a wrongful death lawsuit that "rendered hollow
[the plaintiff's] right to seek redress." Bell v. City of Milwaukee,
746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd in part, Russ v. Watts, 414
F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005). The Foster court noted, "We question Bell's
reliance on Ryland for any broader definition of right of access than
one encompassing the right to institute suit." Foster, 28 F.3d at
430, n.7.

7

several of its officials) concealed and suppressed evidence during
discovery.

Id. at 427, 430-31. Nonetheless, it found that no such

right was clearly established even though "[a] public official who
concealed

or

destroyed

evidence,

or

gave

false

deposition

testimony, surely would have known that was improper . . . ."
at 431.5

Id.

Thus, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that even egregious

conduct potentially affecting the outcome of a case does not
violate the right of access unless that conduct can be shown to
have also affected the actual filing of the underlying lawsuit.
The

district

distinction
plaintiffs

in

courts

several

alleged

that

of

this

cases.
the

circuit

In

police

have

LaBarbara
and

applied

v.

university

Angel,

this
the

personnel

conspired to cover up the fault of the university's head football
coach in a car collision resulting in the death of the plaintiffs'
son.

95 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659 (E.D. Tx. 2000).

That court found

that "[i]n order to establish damages on a denial of access claim,
the cover-up must to some extent be successful in preventing the
plaintiffs from instituting a suit – something this alleged cover-

5

Although Foster addressed this matter in the context of a
qualified immunity claim, and thus limited its review to the right as
defined in 1985-88, it noted elsewhere that the right has continued to
be defined in terms of the right to institute suit. Foster, 28 F.3d
at 430, n.8. The Fifth Circuit has recently confirmed the limits of
the right. Smart v. Holder, 368 F. Appx. 591, 593 (5th Cir. 2010)("We
have not extended that right of access beyond the ability to institute
suit; in this case, Smart was able to institute both his Title VII
suit and the present claims.").

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up failed to do."

Id. at 665.

The court went on to note that

remedies for evidence abuses lie elsewhere.
&

Devereux,

the

court

dismissed

the

Id.

In Ellis v. Magee

complaint,

finding

that

although "courts in other circuits have expanded Ryland's holding
to cases where plaintiff had in fact filed suit but deceptive
conduct on the part of government officials jeopardized plaintiff's
chance of success at trial," the Fifth Circuit has only found the
right of access "implicated when government officials take actions
that either delay or block plaintiff's ability to file suit
altogether." No. 00-3145, 2001 WL 167744, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 15,
2001).

Finally, in Clayton v. Columbia Cas. Co., the plaintiffs

alleged that the defendant sheriff refused to disclose the identity
of the officer involved in the shooting of the victim unless the
plaintiffs agreed to not file a lawsuit.

No. 11-0845, 2012 WL

2952531, at *8-9 (E.D. La. July 19, 2012). The court dismissed the
claim, stating "[e]ven if Sheriff Graves refused to disclose Deputy
Johnson's identity unless Deidra Clayton gave up her right to file
a lawsuit over Jonathan Clayton's death, plaintiffs have not
alleged that such conduct impaired or delayed their ability to file
this lawsuit."

Id. at 9.

The gravamen of Plaintiffs' allegations, and the focus of the
evidence presented in response to the motion for summary judgment,
is that Movants' actions made the prosecution of the criminal
9

charges and the litigation of the current claims more difficult.
See, e.g., (Rec. Doc. 87; Pls. Opp. at 2, 3, 15, 18).

In other

words, the issues of fact presented by Plaintiffs focus on actions
that might have undermined their chance of success at trial.

Such

issues are not material to whether Movants interfered with their
right to institute suit.
As held in Foster, the fact that one has committed a wrong, or
has acted in a manner that is "deplorable . . . , indecisive,
insensitive, inattentive, incompetent, stupid, and weak-kneed," is
not sufficient to give rise to a constitutional violation. Foster,
28 F.3d at 430-31; Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443,
465 (5th Cir. 1994) (Garwood, J., dissenting), as quoted in Foster,
28 F.3d at 431.

Fifth Circuit precedent makes clear that a claim

for violation of the First Amendment right of access cannot be
supported in this case.
Turning to the remaining claims, it is well established that
"every

Monell

violation.'"

claim

requires

an

'underlying

constitutional

Kitchen v. Dallas Cty., TX, 759 F.3d 468, 483 (5th

Cir. 2014) (citing Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 648 (5th Cir.
2013) ("[I]nadequate supervision, failure to train, and policy,
practice,

or

custom

claims

fail

without

an

underlying

constitutional violation."); Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty.
Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 866-67 (5th Cir. 2012)).
10

Similarly, a cognizable claim for conspiracy under § 1983 requires
not

only

the

existence

of

deprivation of civil rights.

a

conspiracy

but

also

a

related

Thompson v. Johnson, 348 F. Appx.

919, 922 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920
(5th Cir. 1995)); Winn v. City of New Orleans, 919 F. Supp. 2d 743,
756 (E.D. La. 2013) (quoting Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d
1311, 1313 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[I]n order to state a claim for
conspiracy 'under § 1983, it remains necessary to prove an actual
deprivation of a constitutional right; a conspiracy to deprive is
insufficient.'"). Thus, the finding that Plaintiffs have failed to
support a claim for a deprivation of the First Amendment right of
access to the courts necessarily requires dismissal of these
derivative claims as well.
The Court expresses no opinion as to any state law claims that
might exist against Movants or as to the claims (also under state
law) against Dantin.

The Court will not exercise its supplemental

jurisdiction over these claims.

See Brim v. ExxonMobil Pipeline

Co., 213 F. Appx. 303, 305 (5th Cir. 2007) ("A federal court should
decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state claims when all
federal claims are disposed of prior to trial.").
IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc.
11

82) filed by defendants David Camardelle, Euris Dubois, and the
Town of Grand Isle is GRANTED.

All federal law claims against

these defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The remaining

claims against any defendants all arise under state law and are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
This 17th day of June 2015.

________________________________
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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