Doe, et al v. Dantin et al
Filing
43
ORDER AND REASONS granting in part and denying in part 34 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, as stated herein. Signed by Judge Jay C. Zainey on 5/16/2014. (caa)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JANE DOE, individually and
on behalf of her minor son,
JOHN DOE
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 11-467
JERRY DANTIN, ET AL
SECTION: "A" (1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 34) filed
by Defendants, the Town of Grand Isle, David Carmadelle, and Euris
Dubois.
Plaintiffs, Jane Doe, and her minor son, John Doe, oppose
the motion.1
The motion, set for hearing on February 26, 2014, is
before the Court on the briefs without oral argument.
For the
reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case concerns an alleged cover-up by the mayor of Grand
Isle and the Grand Isle Police Department in investigating a
felony.
Defendant David Carmadelle (“Carmadelle”) is the mayor of
the Town of Grand Isle and a neighbor of John Doe’s father.
1
At the
Plaintiffs identify themselves by these pseudonyms in order
to protect their identities given that this case concerns
allegations of child molestation. All Defendants are aware of
Plaintiffs’ true identities.
1
time of the incident, Defendant Jerry Dantin (“Dantin”) had been
dating Carmadelle’s mother.
The complaint alleges that on March
30, 2010, Jane Doe’s son, John Doe, informed her that Dantin had
sexually molested him while visiting his father. In response, Jane
Doe told John Doe’s father about the sexual molestation.
John
Doe’s father called Carmadelle on March 31, 2010 to inform him of
the allegations.
Carmadelle allegedly told John Doe’s father that
he would report the incident to the Grand Isle Police Department,
but pleaded with John Doe’s father to wait until after Easter.
By Monday, April 5, 2010, following Easter, Carmadelle still
had not reported the incident. Jane Doe called Carmadelle on April
5, 2010, but was unable to reach him.
The next day, Jane Doe
reported the matter to the Grand Isle Police Department. Defendant
Euris Dubois (“Dubois”), the Chief of the Grand Isle Police
Department, allegedly accused Jane Doe of lying.
Carmadelle then
arrived at the police station and apologized to Jane Doe for not
returning her call. Carmadelle offered to pick up Dantin and drive
him to the station, which Dubois allowed.
Upon his return, Dantin
was questioned by Dubois and another police officer.
Carmadelle
and Jane Doe also were present during the questioning.
During questioning, Dantin initially denied molesting John
Doe, but eventually stated that he would tell the truth.
point, Dubois read Dantin his Miranda rights.
2
At this
Dubois attempted to
record Dantin’s statement, but the tape recorder would not work.
Dubois
allegedly
decided
against
getting
new
batteries
and
instructed another person in the police department to handwrite the
statement.
According to Plaintiffs, Dubois ordered Dantin to
continue with his statement even though the person handwriting the
statement was having difficulty keeping up with Dantin.
In his statement, Dantin confessed to molesting John Doe.
then threatened to kill himself.
He
While Dantin was providing his
statement, Carmadelle allegedly began crying hysterically and
complained of having a heart attack.
An EMS was called to examine
Carmadelle while Jane Doe was left alone with Dantin.
Carmadelle
did not suffer a heart attack.
Dantin was arrested and transported to a hospital for suicide
watch.
He was then released into the custody of the Grand Isle
Police Department for booking.
transferred
to
the
Jefferson
On April 7, 2010, Dantin was
Parish
Sheriff’s
Office
jail.
Plaintiffs contend that Dantin was later bailed out of jail by
Carmadelle.
Plaintiffs state that they waited four months for charges
against Dantin to be accepted by the Jefferson Parish District
Attorney's Office.
The District Attorney’s Office repeatedly
informed Jane Doe that it was waiting for the Grand Isle Police
Department
to
provide
the
information
3
necessary
for
them
to
institute charges against Dantin. On August 20, 2010, the District
Attorney’s Office instituted charges against Dantin for sexual
battery of a juvenile.
In the criminal proceedings, Dantin filed a motion to suppress
his oral confession, which the trial court denied.
The trial
court's denial of Dantin's motion was subsequently upheld by the
appellate court. Dantin’s criminal jury trial was held on July 13,
2011, resulting in a hung jury.
The matter was again tried to a
jury on September 22, 2011, concluding with the same result.
On February 25, 2011, Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit
against Carmadelle, Dubois, Dantin, and the Town of Grand Isle,
asserting constitutional violations under § 1983 and state law
claims for intentional torts. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that
Carmadelle, Dubois, and Dantin violated their constitutional rights
by willfully obstructing the investigation for four months and by
refusing to cooperate with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office.
Plaintiffs further allege that Dubois and the Grand Isle Police
Department failed to preserve Dantin’s confession in violation of
their constitutional rights.
Defendants Carmadelle, Dubois, and the Town of Grand Isle
filed the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Carmadelle and Dubois argue that the complaint should be dismissed
4
because Plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable cause of
action and because they are entitled to qualified immunity.
In
addition, Carmadelle and Dubois assert that Plaintiffs have failed
to identify which constitutional rights have been violated.
The
Town of Grand Isle also moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell claim,
arguing that no municipal officer or employee of the Town of Grand
Isle violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights pursuant to an
official policy of the police department or the Town of Grand Isle.
In their opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they have pled
sufficient facts to demonstrate that Carmadelle and Dubois violated
their
First
Amendment
right
of
access
to
the
courts
by
intentionally failing to preserve evidence for Plaintiffs’ civil
claims.
Plaintiffs also contend that they have pled sufficient
facts to show that Carmadelle and Dubois violated their right to
Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to the
“class of one” doctrine.
Plaintiffs also assert a claim for civil conspiracy under §
1983, arguing that Carmadelle and Dubois intentionally deprived
them of their constitutional rights given Carmadelle’s connection
to Dantin.
Plaintiffs argue that Carmadelle and Dubois are not
entitled to qualified immunity because they knowingly violated the
law by failing to report a felony and failing to preserve Dantin’s
confession. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that the Town of Grand Isle
5
is subject to municipal liability because Carmadelle, as the mayor,
was
a
moving
force
behind
the
deprivation
of
Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all
well-pleaded facts and must draw all reasonable inferences from
those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.2
In order to survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”3
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all allegations
in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”4
Plausible
grounds “simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support the
claim.5
“However, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a
2
Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
3
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007).
4
Id. at 555. (parenthetical in original) (quotations,
citations, and footnote omitted).
5
Id. at 545.
6
motion to dismiss.”6
Nevertheless, a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) is viewed with “disfavor and is rarely granted.”7
III. DISCUSSION
A. Failure to State a Claim Against Defendants Carmadelle and
Dubois
The Court first must decide whether Plaintiffs have alleged
sufficient facts to demonstrate violations of their constitutional
rights and whether Defendants Carmadelle and Dubois are entitled to
qualified immunity.
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a complaint must include only “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”8 “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on
liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define the
disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”9
In order to assert a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show
that he was “deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was
6
Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284
(5th Cir. 1993).
7
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th
Cir. 1999) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales v. Avondale
Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)).
8
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
9
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
7
committed under the color of state law.”10
However, the doctrine
of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established
statutory
or
constitutional
rights
of
which
a
reasonable person would have known.”11 Courts conduct a two-pronged
qualified immunity inquiry, determining whether (1) defendant's
conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) that right was
clearly established at the time of the misconduct.12
In the instant case, Plaintiffs allege that their First
Amendment
and
Fourteenth
Amendment
rights
were
violated.
Plaintiffs also contend that defendants are liable for civil
conspiracy
under
§
1983.
The
parties
do
not
dispute
that
Defendants Carmadelle and Dubois were acting under the color of
state law for purposes of § 1983.
dispute
whether
Plaintiffs
have
Nevertheless, the parties
alleged
sufficient
facts
to
demonstrate that Carmadelle and Dubois deprived Plaintiffs of their
constitutional rights under § 1983.
Initially, Carmadelle and Dubois move to dismiss Plaintiffs’
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs have failed to
10
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50
(1999).
11
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
12
Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 2009).
8
identify which specific constitutional rights were violated by
Carmadelle and Dubois.
Although it is difficult to discern which
constitutional
were
sufficient
rights
facts
to
Plaintiffs’ claims.
Carmadelle
and
put
violated,
Carmadelle
the
and
complaint
Dubois
on
provides
notice
of
Specifically, the complaint alleges that
Dubois
deliberately
hindered
the
arrest
and
prosecution of Dantin and intentionally failed to preserve Dantin’s
confession in violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
These facts are sufficient to apprise Carmardelle and Dubois of
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim concerning access to the courts,
as well as their civil conspiracy claim.
Regarding Plaintiffs’ “class of one” Equal Protection claim,
the complaint alleges sufficient facts to suggest that Plaintiffs
were
treated
differently
than
others
because
of
position as mayor and his connection to Dantin.
Carmadelle’s
Furthermore,
Plaintiffs’ opposition expands on their claims for relief and
identifies the specific constitutional rights which they allege to
have been violated.
Given the simplified and liberal pleading
standard under Rule 8, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have pled
sufficient facts to place Carmadelle and Dubois on notice of the
claims against them.
The Court now must decide whether Carmadelle
and Dubois are entitled to qualified immunity for the alleged
constitutional violations.
9
1. First Amendment Access to the Courts Claim
Plaintiffs contend that Carmadelle and Dubois violated their
First Amendment right of access to the courts by destroying
evidence and by hindering the investigation into Dantin’s sexual
misconduct. “The right of access to the courts is basic to our
system of government, and it is well established . . . that it is
one of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.”13 The
Fifth Circuit has recognized the first amendment right of access to
the courts, stating that it is "well established that access to the
courts is protected by the First Amendment right to petition for
redress of grievances."14
The right of access to the courts must
be “adequate, effective, and meaningful.”15
Thus, “[i]nterference
with the right of access to the courts gives rise to a claim for
relief under section 1983.”16
In
Ryland v. Shapiro, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the
plaintiffs had sufficiently pled a claim against state prosecutors
for a violation of the right of access to the courts based on
allegations that the state prosecutors had intentionally delayed
13
Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1983).
14
Id. at 972 (quoting Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1387
(5th Cir. 1979)).
15
Id. (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977)).
16
Id.
10
and interfered with their right to institute a wrongful death suit
by
preventing
a
full
investigation
into
the
cause
of
their
daughter’s death and concealing the cause of her death for eleven
months.17
Moreover, in Crowder v. Sinyard, the Fifth Circuit
elaborated on the holding in Ryland as follows:
Ryland stands for the proposition that if state officials
wrongfully and intentionally conceal information crucial
to a person’s ability to obtain redress through the
courts, and do so for the purpose of frustrating that
right, and that concealment and the delay engendered by
it substantially reduce the likelihood of one’s obtaining
the relief to which one is otherwise entitled, they may
have committed a constitutional violation.18
Thus, in Ryland and Crowder, the Fifth Circuit recognized that the
right of access to the courts is implicated when the ability to
file suit is delayed or blocked entirely.19
In Chrissy F. v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, the
Fifth Circuit expanded on the reasoning in Ryland and Crowder and
found that the right of access to the courts is impaired when the
state fails to report allegations that a child has been sexually
17
Id. at 969, 973.
18
Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 812 (5th Cir. 1989),
abrogated by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
19
See Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 430 (5th
Cir. 1994) (discussing Fifth Circuit precedent from Ryland and
Crowder).
11
abused.20
In Chrissy F., a child, through her guardian ad litem,
filed suit against several state employees for failure to report,
investigate, or take any action in response to her allegations of
sexual abuse.21 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the alleged failure
to report allegations of sexual abuse, if proved, would violate the
plaintiff’s
constitutional
rights
given
that
such
conduct
effectively blocked the plaintiff’s access to the courts.22
The Court finds that Defendants Carmadelle and Dubois are not
entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment
claim. Pursuant to Ryland, Crowder, and Chrissy F., Plaintiffs’
First
Amendment
right
of
access
to
the
courts
was
clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation.
As in Ryland and Crowder, Plaintiffs allege that state actors,
Carmadelle and Dubois, intentionally delayed and interfered with
their right to bring a civil suit for damages by concealing
evidence
of
Dantin’s
confession.
Moreover,
Dantin’s
alleged
confession is crucial information that will impact Plaintiffs’
ability to seek redress in their civil suit and may reduce the
likelihood of obtaining relief on their civil claims.
20
As in
Chrissy F. v. Mississippi Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d
844, 851 (5th Cir. 1991).
21
Id. at 845.
22
Id. at 851.
12
Chrissy F., Plaintiffs’ right of access to the courts also was
violated when Carmadelle allegedly failed to report the allegations
of sexual abuse against John Doe.
The
conduct
alleged
by
Plaintiffs,
if
effectively block their access to the courts.
proven,
would
In addition, the
Court finds that reasonable state actors would have understood that
the concealment of evidence and the failure to report sexual abuse
allegations would violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right of
access to the courts. Thus, Carmadelle and Dubois are not entitled
to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection “Class of One” Claim
Plaintiffs contend that the actions of Carmadelle and Dubois
violated
Plaintiffs'
Fourteenth
Amendment
right
of
Equal
Protection. Plaintiffs assert a “class of one” claim, arguing that
their complaint would have been handled differently had Dantin not
been connected to Carmadelle and Dubois.
The
Equal
Protection
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
requires that the government treat all similarly situated people
alike.23
The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff may raise a
cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment on behalf of a “class of one” even if the plaintiff does
23
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
13
not belong to a protected class or group.24
In order to assert a
claim for a “class of one,” a plaintiff “must allege that an
illegitimate
animus
or
ill-will
motivated
his
intentionally
different treatment from others similarly situated and that no
rational basis existed for such treatment.”25
The Fifth Circuit has rarely extended “class of one” claims
beyond the context of zoning land use and assessment.26
In the
Fifth Circuit case of Shipp v. McMahon, the plaintiff asserted a
“class of one” claim arising out of the police context.27
The
Plaintiff in Shipp argued that she was treated differently from
other domestic violence victims because her mother-in-law, a deputy
in the police department, intentionally influenced the level of
protection that the plaintiff received from the police against the
plaintiff’s abusive husband.28
The Fifth Circuit in Shipp found that while there is no
general constitutional right to police protection, the state cannot
24
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
25
Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907, 916 (5th Cir. 2000),
overruled on other grounds, McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305
F.3d 314, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
26
See Nance v. New Orleans & Baton Rouge Steamship Pilots’
Ass’n, 174 F. App’x 849, 854 (5th Cir. 2006).
27
Shipp, 234 F.3d at 916-17.
28
Id.
14
discriminate in providing police protection.29
However, although
the Fifth Circuit recognized that the police cannot discriminate in
providing protection, it ruled that the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity because the “class of one” claim was not clearly
established in the police context at the time of the alleged
violation.30
The Court finds that Carmadelle and Dubois are entitled to
qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ “class of one” claim because the
right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged
constitutional violation.
Even though the Supreme Court has
recognized a “class of one” claim, the Fifth Circuit has primarily
confined this right to the land use and assessment context.31
The
only Fifth Circuit case to discuss “class of one” claims in the
police
context
was
Shipp,
which
involved
allegations
of
discriminatory police protection.
In
the
instant
case,
Plaintiffs
have
not
alleged
that
Carmadelle and Dubois discriminated against them in failing to
provide police protection. In fact, Plaintiffs concede that Dantin
29
Id. at 916.
30
Shipp v. McMahon, No. 02-30420, 54 F. App'x 413, 2002 WL
31718085, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 7, 2002) (noting that neither the
Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit had extended “class of one”
claims beyond the land use and assessment context as of 1996).
31
See Nance, 174 F. App'x at 854.
15
was arrested following his confession.
that
Carmadelle
and
Dubois
Rather, Plaintiffs allege
treated
them
differently
in
investigating their complaint and in preserving evidence.
Plaintiffs’ “class of one” claim clearly was not established
at the time of the alleged violation.
As a result, Carmadelle and
Dubois are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Equal
Protection claim.
3. § 1983 Civil Conspiracy Claim
Plaintiffs allege that Carmadelle, Dubois, and Dantin are
liable for civil conspiracy pursuant to § 1983. An action for
conspiracy may be brought under § 1983.32
“A private party may be
held liable under § 1983 if he or she is a ‘willful participant in
joint activity with the State or its agents.’”33 In order to assert
a claim for civil conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must
establish (1) an actual violation of a right protected under § 1983
and (2) an agreement between the private and public defendants to
commit an illegal act.34
32
An agreement to commit an illegal act may
Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 974 (5th Cir. 1983).
33
Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970);
see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980) (“Private
persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged
action, are acting [under the color of state law] for purposes of
§ 1983 actions.”).
34
Id.
16
be proved by indirect or circumstantial evidence.35
Here, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a civil conspiracy
claim under § 1983 because they have alleged an actual violation of
their First Amendment right of access to the courts.
As evidence
of
Plaintiffs'
an
agreement
between
Defendants
to
violate
constitutional rights, Plaintiffs raise several instances in which
Defendants allegedly attempted to cover up Dantin’s misconduct.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Carmadelle failed to report
Dantin’s
sexual
misconduct
and
that
Dubois
initially
accused
Plaintiffs of lying. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that Dubois
allowed Carmadelle to be present during Dantin's interrogation,
which Carmadelle disrupted by claiming a heart attack.
Plaintiffs
claim that Carmadelle and Dubois attempted to cover up Dantin's
misconduct because Dantin was a long-time friend of Dubois and the
boyfriend of Carmadelle's mother.
The Court finds that these facts are sufficient to allege an
agreement
between
Defendants
to
cover
up
Dantin’s
alleged
misconduct. In addition, Carmadelle and Dubois are not entitled to
qualified immunity because the Fifth Circuit has recognized a claim
for civil conspiracy, which, if proven, was clearly established at
the
time
of
Dantin’s
arrest.36
Presuming
that
Plaintiffs’
35
Mack v. Newton, 737 F.2d 708, 711 (5th Cir. 1986).
36
See Ryland, 708 F.2d at 974.
17
allegations are true, the Court also finds that Defendants' actions
were not objectively reasonable.
Accordingly, Defendants' motion
to dismiss Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim is denied.
B. The Town of Grand Isle’s Municipal Liability
Plaintiffs have filed claims against the Town of Grand Isle
for municipal liability.
Services,
the
United
In
States
Monell v. Department of Social
Supreme
Court
held
that
local
municipalities are "persons" subject to liability under § 1983.37
Imposition of § 1983 liability against a municipality is
appropriate in the limited circumstance of when a constitutional
deprivation is caused by the execution of a policy or custom of the
municipality.38
“This requirement was intended to distinguish acts
of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and
thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action
for which the municipality is actually responsible.”39
In other
words, respondeat superior does not apply to municipal liability
37
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
38
Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 989 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
39
Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 471 (5th Cir.
1999) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479
(1986)).
18
under § 1983.40
Simply said, “the unconstitutional conduct must be
directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of
[official policy].”41
An “official policy” is (1) a policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated
by the government entity or by an official to whom the entity has
delegated policy-making authority, or (2) a persistent, widespread
practice of officials or employees which although not authorized by
officially adopted and promulgated policy is so common and wellsettled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents the
entity’s policy.42
The municipal policy or “official policy”
requirement may be met “when the appropriate officer or entity
promulgates a generally applicable statement of policy and the
40
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 664 n.7. A lawsuit against a
government official in his official capacity is the equivalent of
an action against the governmental entity he serves. Ashe v.
Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 541 n.1 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Will v.
Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). Therefore, a
defendant found liable in his official capacity faces no personal
liability. Burge, 187 F.3d at 466-67. Rather, any judgment
rendered against the defendant in his official capacity is in
effect a judgment against the entity he serves. See id. And given
that the qualified immunity defense is unavailable to a
governmental entity, a defendant sued only in his official
capacity likewise cannot avail himself of the defense. Id.
41
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir.
2001).
42
Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 279 F.3d 273, 289 (5th
Cir. 2002) (citing Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.
1992)).
19
subsequent act complained of is simply an implementation of that
policy.”43
Because a municipality necessarily acts through its agents,
the policy at issue must be set by a “policy maker,” i.e., the
government’s lawmakers, “or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy.”44
When an official
has final authority in a matter involving the selection of goals or
of the means of achieving goals, his choices represent governmental
policy.45
Whether a particular official is a policy maker is a
question of state law.46
On the policy making inquiry, the court's
task is to "identify those officials or governmental bodies who
speak with final policymaking authority for the local government
actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular
constitutional or statutory violation at issue."47
Given
execution
that
of
municipal
a
policy
liability
or
is
custom,
imposed
a
pursuant
single,
to
isolated
43
Burge, 187 F.3d at 471 (quoting Bryan Cnty. Comm’r v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
44
Id. at 468 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; McMillian v.
Monroe Cnty, Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 784-85 (1997)).
45
Id. (citing Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915, 920
(5th Cir. 1980); Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell,
79 Colum. L. Rev. 213, 213-21 (1979)).
46
Id. (citing McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786).
47
Burge, 187 F.3d at 468 (citing McMillian, 520 U.S. 781).
20
unconstitutional action by “rogue” employees of the municipality
almost
never
will
trigger
municipal
liability
under
§1983.48
However, a plaintiff may establish a custom or policy based on a
single isolated decision made in the context of a particular
situation if the decision was made by an authorized policy maker in
whom final authority rested regarding the action ordered.49 In sum,
municipal liability under § 1983 requires proof of three elements:
(1) a policy maker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a violation of
constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom,
i.e., causation.50
Before addressing Plaintiffs’ Monell claim, the Court must
determine who is the official policy maker under Louisiana law
regarding the preservation of evidence.
Turning to Louisiana law,
“[t]he chief of police, an elected official, is responsible for law
enforcement in the municipality and is charged with the enforcement
48
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir.
2001) (citing Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n.3
(5th Cir. 1984); McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 415
(5th Cir. 1989)).
49
Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 279 F.3d 273, 289 (5th
Cir. 2002) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112
(1988); Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 586 (5th Cir. 1996)).
50
Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at
694).
21
of all local ordinances and applicable state laws.”51
Thus, under
Louisiana law, the chief of police is the chief law enforcement
officer of a municipality.52
Pursuant to Louisiana law, Dubois
qualifies as an official policy maker for preservation of evidence
because he is the Chief of Police for the Town of Grand Isle.
As
a result, policies adopted and promulgated by Dubois are “official”
for purposes of § 1983.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to
state a Monell claim based on Dubois’ conduct as an official policy
maker.
Although Plaintiffs do not use the words “custom” or
“policy” in their complaint, the complaint does identify the Town
of Grand Isle as a defendant and indicates that Dubois was the
Chief
of
Police
for
the
Grand
Isle
Police
Department
and
responsible for ensuring compliance with the law. In addition, the
complaint states that Dubois acted with deliberate indifference to
Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
These facts are sufficient to
plead a claim for municipality liability under Monell.
The allegations in the complaint suggest that Dubois, in his
capacity as chief of police, established an official policy of
51
Dugas v. City of Breaux Bridge Police Dep’t, 99-1320 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 2/2/00); 757 So.2d 741, 743 (citing La. Rev. Stat. §
33:423).
52
See id; see also Cogswell v. Town of Logansport, 321 So.2d
774, 778 (La. Ct. App. 2d. Cir. 1975); La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 97484, Dec. 22, 1997.
22
destroying
official
and
concealing
responsible
confession.53
under
confessions
state
law
given
for
that
he
preserving
was
the
Dantin’s
While it is highly unlikely that this conduct is
sufficient to place Monell liability on the Town of Grand Isle,
this alleged conduct is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.54
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 34) filed
by Defendants, the Town of Grand Isle, David Carmadelle, and Euris
Dubois is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is granted
with respect to Plaintiffs’ “class of one” Equal Protection claim.
The motion is denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment,
civil conspiracy, and Monell claims.
This 16th day of May 2014.
________________________________
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
53
See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)
(“[M]unicipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by
municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.”).
54
See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993) (holding that
federal courts cannot impose a pleading requirement more
stringent in Monell cases than that imposed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)).
23
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