Marcella v. Ochsner Health System

Filing 14

ORDER AND REASONS granting 10 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 10/19/2011. (tsf, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RONALD MARCELLA

CIVIL ACTION

Versus

NO. 11-00487

OCHSNER HEALTH SYSTEM

SECTION “F”
ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is defendant Ochsner Health System’s motion
for summary judgment.

For the reasons that follow, the motion is

GRANTED.
Background
Plaintiff Ronald Marcella worked as a biomedical technician
for Ochsner Health System.

In spring 2009, plaintiff’s job was

outsourced to General Electric, and he received a memorandum from
Ochsner saying that his employment with Ochsner was terminated.
Ochsner told Mr. Marcella that General Electric would be making
offers to all Ochsner biomedical technician employees who met
background screening requirements.

General Electric hired Mr.

Marcella to work as a biomedical technician, and he continued to
receive a comparable salary.
Following his departure from Ochsner, Mr. Marcella made
numerous requests to Ochsner for severance payments.

After being

denied severance pay, plaintiff filed suit against Ochsner in
Louisiana state court, pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.

Ochsner removed the case to federal court,
1

invoking the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
I. Standard for Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs that summary
judgment is proper if the record discloses no genuine issue as to
any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

No genuine issue of fact exists if

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party.

See Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

A genuine

issue of fact exists only "if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Court emphasizes that the mere argued existence of a
factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion.

See id.

Therefore, "[i]f the evidence is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment
is appropriate.

Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

Summary

judgment is also proper if the party opposing the motion fails to
establish an essential element of his case.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

See Celotex Corp. v.

In this regard, the non-

moving party must do more than simply deny the allegations raised
by the moving party.

See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling &

Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992).

Rather, he

must come forward with competent evidence, such as affidavits or

2

depositions, to buttress his claims.

Id.

Hearsay evidence and

unsworn documents do not qualify as competent opposing evidence.
Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549
(5th Cir. 1987).

Finally, in evaluating the summary judgment

motion, the Court must read the facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
II.

Defendant contends that under its Plan Documents, the
benefits committee, “as the Plan administrator, has the
discretionary authority to interpret all Plan provisions and
determine whether a participant or beneficiary is entitled to any
benefit pursuant to the terms of the Plan.”

Further, Ochsner

points out that the committee’s decision is only reviewable by
this Court if it is without rational basis.

The Court agrees.

Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d
211, 213 (5th Cir. 1999).

As the Fifth Circuit instructs,

Unless the terms of the plan give the
administrator ‘discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the terms of the plan,’ an
administrator's decision to deny benefits is
also reviewed de novo. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 103
L. Ed. 2d 80, 109 S. Ct. 948 (1989). If the
language of the plan grants such discretion,
a court will reverse an administrator's
decision only for abuse of discretion.”
Id.

Plaintiff presents no evidence to suggest that the

committee’s decision was an abuse of discretion.

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As the minutes

of the Health and Welfare Plan Committee provide, the Committee
denied plaintiff severance pay because he continued to be
employed by General Electric for a comparable salary after his
employment with Ochsner ended.

This decision is rationally

related to the stated purpose of Ochsner’s severance pay plan,
which is designed “to help minimize financial hardships for
employees who leave Ochsner due to a reduction in force.”1
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, October 19, 2011
______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1

The plaintiff’s contention that other, terminated
employees received severance pay does not defeat summary
judgment. Those individuals, as plaintiff admits, did not go on
to receive employment with General Electric.
4