Manton et al v. Strain et al

Filing 66

ORDER AND REASONS denying 63 Motion to Alter Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 6/17/13. (jjs, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHERRIE BURAS MANTON and
INDEPENDENT FIREARM OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 11-785

RODNEY “JACK” STRAIN, JR., ET AL.

SECTION: R

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend
judgment and to reopen and stay the action.1 For the following
reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiffs' motion and DENIES
defendants' request for sanctions.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sherrie Buras Manton, along with the Independent

Firearm Owners Association, filed suit against multiple
defendants, contending that employees of the St. Tammany Parish
Sheriff’s Office violated her right to keep and bear arms, her
right to due process and equal protection, and her right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, in violation of the
United States and Louisiana Constitutions. Defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment, and on December 27, 2012, the Court
issued a judgment, dismissing plaintiffs' claims.2 Plaintiffs
then filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, which the Court
1

R. Doc. 63.

2

R. Doc. 50.

denied.3 Plaintiffs now move again for the Court to alter or
amend its judgment and to reopen the case.
II.

STANDARD
A motion to alter or amend judgment must be filed within 28

days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Motions
to reconsider are typically treated as motions to alter or amend
judgment, but if filed after this 28-day period, motions to
reconsider are generally decided under Rule 60(b). See Stangel v.
United States, 68 F.3d 857, 859 (5th Cir. 1995).
Under Rule 60(b), the Court may relieve a party from a final
judgment for one of the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has
been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The district court enjoys broad discretion
in assessing whether any of these reasons are present in a given
3

R. Doc. 62.
2

case. Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc., 933 F.2d 341, 347 (5th Cir.
1991).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Reconsider
The Court finds that plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that
relief from final judgment is appropriate. First, plaintiffs'
arguments do not address the basis for the Court's dismissal of
their claims. In granting defendants' motion for summary
judgment, the Court held that Sherrie Manton could have brought
her causes of action in her earlier suit and dismissed the claims
under the doctrine of res judicata.4 The Court thus did not
consider the legality of a firearm in the Manton home in
dismissing Manton's claims.
The Court then held that, to the extent that the Independent
Firearm Owners Association could maintain a claim independently,
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that a question of material fact
existed as to whether Mr. Manton could possess a firearm during
his term of probation.5 Defendants submitted an affidavit from
Mr. Manton’s probation officer, Jessica Hutchinson-Blue, in which
she attested to her belief that the terms of Mr. Manton’s
probation did not allow him to have a firearm in the house and

4

R. Doc. 49.

5

Id.
3

described the steps she took to seek a hearing on the revocation
of Mr. Manton’s probation.6 Although plaintiffs argued that Mr.
Manton's probation contained no such term, they offered no
evidence in support of this contention, and therefore the Court
held that they failed to establish a genuine issue of material
fact as to the legality of defendants' seizure of the firearm.
In their present motion, plaintiffs mischaracterize the
Court's action as permitting a probation officer to state the
law.

But, Hutchinson-Blue's affidavit presented only an account

of her understanding of Mr. Manton's probation terms and the
actions that she took, and the Court considered her affidavit as
evidence, not as a legal conclusion. Further, the Court was not
required to examine the evidence presented by defendants with
"strict scrutiny" as plaintiffs argue. The amendment to the
Louisiana Constitution requiring that courts apply strict
scrutiny to laws limiting a person's right to bear or keep arms
does not provide a standard for the Court to apply in considering
evidence on summary judgment. Therefore, the constitutional
amendment does not demonstrate that the Court incorrectly
considered the parties' evidence. Moreover, that several state
courts have since held that the statute forbidding certain felons
from possessing firearms is unconstitutional does not affect the

6

R. Doc. 41-7; see also Case No. 09-339: R. Doc. 112-6
at 18 (motion and order for hearing to revoke probation filed by
Hutchinson-Blue).
4

Court's analysis. The statute at issue, Louisiana Revised Statute
14:95.1, does not address the right to bear arms of individuals
on probation. Thus, the Court is confronted once again with
defendants' evidence that the terms of Mr. Manton's probation did
not permit him to have a firearm and unsupported allegations by
plaintiffs that such terms of probation are not possible.
Plaintiffs also argue that new evidence demonstrates that
the case should be reopened. According to plaintiffs, in April
2013, Mark Hebert, of the St. Tammany Parish and Jefferson Parish
Sheriff's Offices, was indicted and implicated in the death of
Albert Bloch. Plaintiffs argue that the arrest of Mr. Manton and
seizure of his possessions arose from the attempt of the St.
Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office to blame Manton for Bloch's death
and that action was taken against Mr. Manton for the sole purpose
of covering up the crimes of Mark Hebert. Plaintiffs state that
they believe new evidence is available, but this assertion is too
vague to establish that new evidence actually exists or to
suggest fraud on the part of defendants. The Court cannot relieve
plaintiffs from its judgment on the basis of speculation, for
Rule 60(b) clearly establishes the grounds for such action by the
Court. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that a permissible

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ground is present here, and accordingly, the Court DENIES
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.7
B. Sanctions
Defendants argue that plaintiffs should be sanctioned under
Rule 11 for filing repetitive motions intended to harass
defendants. But, defendants did not comply with the mandates of
Rule 11(c)(2) in requesting sanctions. Rule 11(c)(2) provides:
A motion for sanctions must be made separately from
any other motion and must describe the specific
conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b). The motion
must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed
or be presented to the court if the challenged paper,
claim, defense, contention or denial is withdrawn or
appropriately corrected within 21 days after service
or within another time the court sets. . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Defendants did not file a separate
motion for sanctions that was served on plaintiffs. Therefore,
because defendants did not comply with the strict notice
requirements of Rule 11, the Court denies defendants' request for
sanctions. See, e.g., Richardson v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assoc., No.
09-7383, 2010 WL 4553673, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 29, 2010).

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To the extent that plaintiffs also seek to alter or
amend the Court's order denying their first motion to alter or
amend, the Court denies such a motion. Motions to alter or amend
a judgment must clearly establish a manifest error of law or fact
or present newly discovered evidence. Simon v. United States,
891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990). As discussed above,
plaintiffs discuss only the possibility of new evidence rather
than any actual evidence impacting the Court's judgment, and they
have failed to establish a manifest error of law or fact.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiffs'
motion for reconsideration and DENIES defendants' request for
sanctions.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 17th day of June, 2013.
__

_________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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