Manton et al v. Strain et al

Filing 98

ORDER AND REASONS denying 91 MOTION for relief from an order and to recuse the Court and to transfer this case to another district. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 9/24/2014.(blg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHERRIE BURAS MANTON and
INDEPENDENT FIREARM OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 11-785

RODNEY “JACK” STRAIN, JR., ET AL.

SECTION: R

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiffs' motion for relief from an
order and to recuse the Court and to transfer this case to another
district.1 For the following reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiffs'
motion.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sherrie Buras Manton, along with the Independent

Firearm Owners Association, filed suit against multiple defendants,
contending that employees of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s
Office violated her right to keep and bear arms, her right to due
process and equal protection, and her right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, in violation of the United
States and Louisiana Constitutions. Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment, and on December 27, 2012, the Court issued a

1

R. Doc. 91.
1

judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims.2 Plaintiffs then filed a
motion

to

alter

or

amend

judgment,

which

the

Court

denied.3

Plaintiffs moved again for the Court to alter or amend judgment and
to reopen the case.4 The Court denied this motion as well.5
After the Court dismissed all claims against defendants,
defendants moved to Tax Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and the Court
referred the motion to the Magistrate Judge. After reviewing the
Magistrate

Judge's

Report

and

Recommendation

("R&R")6

and

Supplemental Report and Recommendation ("SR&R"),7 the Court adopted
the R&R and SR&R as its opinion and ordered plaintiffs Manton and
IFOA and their counsel of record, Daniel G. Abel and Richard J.
Feldman, jointly and severally liable to defendants in the amount
of $22,382.00 in reasonable attorneys' fees.8
Plaintiffs now move once more for relief from the Court's
order of dismissal, and also move the Court to vacate its order
awarding attorneys' fees to defendants. In addition, plaintiffs
request that this matter be transferred to another district.

2

R. Doc. 50.

3

R. Doc. 62.

4

R. Doc. 63.

5

R. Doc. 66.

6

R. Doc. 67.

7

R. Doc. 74.

8

R. Doc. 76.
2

II.

STANDARD
Under Rule 60(b), the Court may relieve a party from a final

judgment for one of the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has
been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The burden of establishing at least one of
these reasons is on the moving party, and the district court enjoys
broad discretion in assessing whether any of these reasons are
present in a given case. Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc., 933 F.2d 341,
347 (5th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiffs do not state which subsection of Rule 60 provides
relief from judgment in this case.

Although plaintiffs contend at

one point that "newly discovered evidence" regarding a conflict of
interest on the part of the Court merits relief, this reference to
"newly discovered evidence" is not the type of merits evidence to
which Rule 60(b)(2) refers. Thus, after reviewing the six bases for
relief under Rule 60(b), the Court finds that Rule 60(b)(6) is the
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most apposite.

Under Rule 60(b)(6), a court may grant relief from

a final judgment or order for "any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
This relief is extraordinary, and the movant bears the burden of
demonstrating the exceptional circumstances that warrant relief.
See Heirs of H.P. Guerra v. United States, 207 F.3d 763, 767 (5th
Cir. 2000) (citing Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601,
613-14, 69 S. Ct. 384, 390 (1949)); Pease v. Pakhoed Corp., 980
F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1993).
To determine whether Rule 60(b) relief is appropriate, a
district court considers the following factors:
(1) final judgments should not be lightly disturbed; (2)
a Rule 60(b) motion is not to be used as a substitute for
appeal; (3) the rule should be liberally construed in
order to achieve substantial justice; (4) whether the
motion was filed within a reasonable time; (5) whether—if
the judgment was a default or a dismissal in which there
was no consideration of the merits—the interest in
deciding cases on the merits outweighs, in the particular
case, the interest in the finality of judgments, and
there is merit in the movant's claim or defense; (6)
whether—if the judgment was rendered after a trial on the
merits—the movant had a fair opportunity to present his
claim or defense; (7) whether there are intervening
equities that would make it inequitable to grant relief;
and (8) any other factors relevant to the justice of the
judgment under attack.
Crutcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 746 F.2d 1076, 1082 (5th Cir.
1984) (citing United States v. Gould, 301 F.2d 353, 355-56 (5th
Cir. 1962). The Court accordingly considers plaintiffs' arguments
in the context of these factors.

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III. DISCUSSION
The Court finds that plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that
relief from final judgment is appropriate. Plaintiffs argue that
new evidence regarding a "conflict with the presiding judges"
requires the Court to vacate its prior judgments and reopen this
matter.9

Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the Court's recusal

in "another related St. Tammany Parish civil case" "call[s] into
question the impartiality" of the Court in this case.10 Plaintiffs
provide no support for their contention that the two cases are
related save for the observation that both cases involve St.
Tammany Parish defendants. Plaintiffs thus fail to provide any
support for their argument that the Court's recusal in a separate
case establishes the "extraordinary circumstances" necessary to
warrant vacating any of the Court's orders in this case. For the
same reason, plaintiffs have also failed to establish grounds for
a transfer of this closed matter to another jurisdiction.
In addition, plaintiffs summarily assert that the Court has
"manifest[ly] err[ed]" in law and fact in its earlier order
dismissing

plaintiffs'

claims

and

its

orders

denying

reconsideration of the dismissal.11 Plaintiffs do not, however,

9

R. Doc. 91-1 at 10

10

Id. at

11

Id. at 10.

2-3.

5

provide any new evidence or argument that would establish a
manifest error of law or fact.
Finally, although the relevance to this motion is unclear,
plaintiffs also contend that the Court has "prevented [plaintiffs]
from appealing any of these matters to the appellate courts"
because the Court has not entered a "final judgment" in the entire
matter.12 On this point plaintiffs are mistaken. "A final decision
is one that 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
more for the court to do but execute the judgment.'" S. Louisiana
Cement, Inc. v. Van Aalst Bulk Handling, B.V., 383 F.3d 297, 300
(5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph,
531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000)). "Under this definition, a dismissal is a
final decision." Id. Thus, the Court's order dismissing plaintiffs'
claims is plainly appealable. So too is the Court's order award of
attorneys' fees to defendants. See Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co.,
849

F.2d

955,

957

(5th

Cir.

1988)

("Denials

and

awards

of

attorney's fees may be appealed separately as final orders after a
final determination of liability on the merits."). Accordingly, the
Court has not prevented plaintiffs from appealing its final orders
in this matter.
In sum, Rule 60(b) clearly establishes the grounds for relief
from judgment by the Court. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate

12

R. Doc. 91-1 at 2.
6

that a permissible ground is present here. Accordingly, the Court
DENIES plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 24th day of September, 2014.
__

_________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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