Chiasson v. Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. et al

Filing 67

ORDER & REASONS denying 60 MOTION for APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Court. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown on 5/24/2012. (caa, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SAMUEL P. CHIASSON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 11-0959

HEXION SPECIALTY CHEMICALS, INC. n/k/a
MOMENTIVE SPECIALTY CHEMICALS, INC. and
MOMENTIVE SPECIALTY CHEMICALS, INC.

SECTION: “G”(3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Appeal/Review of Magistrate Judge Decision
(“Motion for Review”).1 Therein, Defendant seeks review of Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles’s
decision to grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (“Motion for
Leave”),2 which order was made from the bench following oral argument on the Motion for Leave.3
Having considered the Motion for Review, the opposition, the recording of oral argument, Magistrate
Judge Knowles’s reasons stated on the record, the full record, and the applicable law, for the
following reasons, the Court will deny the Motion for Review and will affirm Magistrate Judge
Knowles’s ruling on the Motion for Leave.

I. Background
A. Factual Background
This diversity action is a personal injury case, involving injury to Samuel P. Chiasson

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Rec. Doc. 60.

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Rec. Doc. 43.

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Rec. Doc. 54.

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(“Plaintiff”) while working at the chemical plant of Defendant, Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc.,
now known as Momentive Specialty Chemicals, Inc. (“Momentive” or “Defendant”), in Norco,
Louisiana.4 At the time of the alleged incident, Plaintiff was employed as a welder by Turner
Industries Group, LLC, which had entered into a maintenance contract with Momentive. On April
22, 2010, Plaintiff was assigned to cut a door into the side of a chemical storage tank so that the tank
could be cleaned. Plaintiff was swept under a scaffold and buried in the chemical waste product,
resulting in injuries.
Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant did not discuss with Plaintiff, nor did Defendant follow,
the plan or procedure previously developed and utilized by Defendant for this type of operation. In
Plaintiff’s original complaint, he set forth a cause of action solely for negligence. However, by his
amended complaint, Plaintiff has alleged an intentional tort in Defendant’s failure to ensure that
Plaintiff complied with the protocol for cleaning the tank.

B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed his original complaint in this matter, asserting only a cause of action for
negligence, on April 21, 2011,5 which complaint he then amended the next day to include a jury
demand.6 Defendant filed its Amended Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on June 10,
2011.7 The case was initially assigned to Section “N”, Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt, but was reassigned

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On October 1, 2010, Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. (“Hexion”) changed its name to Momentive. For
clarity, the parties refer to the defendant as “Momentive” rather than “Hexion” throughout their filings.
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Rec. Doc. 1.

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Rec. Doc. 3.

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Rec. Doc. 10.

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to Section “G” of this Court on October 7, 2011.8
On December 9, 2011, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,9 which sought to
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the basis that Louisiana law precludes Plaintiff’s negligence claims in
that the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act provides that workers’ compensation is the exclusive
remedy under the statutory employer doctrine, unless injury was intentional.10
Under the governing Scheduling Order in this case, the deadline for amendment of pleadings
was March 1, 2012.11 However, on March 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave,12 which
was set for submission before Magistrate Judge Knowles. On April 4, 2012, Defendant filed its
opposition.13 Following leave of court, Plaintiff then filed his reply on April 9, 201214 and Defendant
filed its surreply on April 11, 2012.15 Oral argument was held before Magistrate Judge Knowles on
April 11, 2012, and the motion was granted from the bench.16 Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint, which added the intentional tort claim, was filed into the record that same day.17

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Rec. Doc. 25.

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Rec. Doc. 28.

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Rec. Doc. 28-1 at pp. 6-7 (citing La. R.S. § 1061).

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Rec. Doc. 40.

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Rec. Doc. 43.

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Rec. Doc. 46.

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Rec. Doc. 50.

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Rec. Doc. 53.

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Rec. Doc. 54.

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Rec. Doc. 55.

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Defendant filed its answer to the Second Amended Complaint on April 19, 2012.18 Defendant has
since filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment,19 which attacks the intentional tort claim added
by Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.
On April 25, 2012, Defendant filed the pending motion, seeking review of Magistrate Judge
Knowles’s decision on the Motion for Leave. Plaintiff filed his response in opposition on May 15,
2012.20

II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
In the resolution of non-dispositive disputes, a magistrate judge is afforded broad discretion.21
If a party objects to the magistrate judge’s ruling on a non-dispositive issue, the district court is to
consider the party’s objections and “shall modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly
erroneous or is contrary to law.”22 The district court should not undertake a de novo review of the
magistrate judge’s decision,23 and should affirm the decision of the magistrate judge unless the court
“is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”24

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Rec. Doc. 56.

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Rec. Doc. 58.

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Rec. Doc. 66.

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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

22

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

23

Merritt v. Int’l Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d 1013, 1017 (5th Cir. 1981).

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United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).

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B. Amendment of Pleadings
Amendment of pleadings is generally governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, which
provides that “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” However,
once a scheduling order has been entered, it is instead Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) that
governs.25 The Rule provides that “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the
judge’s consent.”26 Four factors are relevant to a determination of good cause: “(1) the explanation
for the failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential
prejudice in allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such
prejudice.”27

C. Analysis
In ruling on the Motion for Leave, Magistrate Judge Knowles determined that the
requirements of the “good cause” test had been met. According to the reasons stated on the record,
he made this determination based upon: (1) Plaintiff’s explanation that he was unable timely to
amend because he was unable to depose Defendant’s 30(b)(6) representative prior to the deadline;
(2) the importance of the amendment in providing Plaintiff with a cause of action excepted from the
workers’ compensation rule, given that Plaintiff’s case likely would not survive summary judgment
without the intentional tort claim; (3) the lack of prejudice to Defendant given that the discovery

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S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., N.A., 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003) (“W e take this
opportunity to make clear that Rule 16(b) governs amendment of pleadings after a scheduling order deadline has
expired.”).
26

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b).

27

Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at

536).

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deadlines and the trial date were several months away; and (4) the fact that allowing Plaintiff to
amend his complaint would not necessitate a continuance given the September 17, 2012 trial date.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s explanation for the failure to timely amend does not support
a finding of good cause because (1) Plaintiff was long aware of Defendant’s statutory employer
defense and earlier could have sought leave to amend and (2) because Plaintiff could have sought
an extension to the deadline in advance once it was clear that the corporate representative would be
deposed after the deadline to amend had passed. Additionally, Defendant argues that this
amendment greatly prejudiced the Defendant by allowing Plaintiff to add a claim that might survive
the statutory employer defense asserted in Defendant’s original motion for summary judgment. The
importance of the amendment is uncontested, as is the fact that amendment would not necessitate
continuance.
Although the Court finds that Defendant has presented colorable arguments that the good
cause standard has not been met, the Court cannot and will not undertake de novo review of the
Motion for Leave. The standard here is one of clear error, and the Court is not “left with a definite
and firm conviction”28 that Magistrate Judge Knowles was wrong to conclude that good cause
existed here. Therefore, finding no clear error in Magistrate Judge Knowles’s decision, the Court
must affirm.

III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Appeal/Review of Magistrate
28

Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395.

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Judge Decision29 is DENIED and that Magistrate Judge Knowles’s Order,30 which granted Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, is AFFIRMED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this ____ day of May, 2012.
24th

_________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Rec. Doc. 60.

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Rec. Doc. 54.

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