Richards v. British Petroleum et al

Filing 51

ORDER AND REASONS: ORDERED that Plainitff's 21 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED; Cameron International Corporation's 10 Motion to Dismiss, BP Exploration & Production Inc.'s 9 Motion to Dismiss, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc's 18 Motion to Dismiss, Gulf Coast Claims Facility's 43 Motion to Dismiss are GRANTED; and that the case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier. (gec, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RICHARDS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 11-1096

BRITISH PETROLEUM ET AL.

SECTION: “J”(1)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Rec. Doc. 21) and oppositions by BP Exploration &
Production Inc. (“BP”) (Rec. Doc. 32), Halliburton Energy
Services, Inc. (“Halliburton”) (Rec. Doc. 33), and the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility (the “GCCF”) (Rec. Doc. 44); and Motions to
Dismiss filed by Cameron International Corporation (“Cameron”)
(Rec. Doc. 10), BP (Rec. Doc. 9), Halliburton (Rec. Doc. 18), and
the GCCF (Rec. Doc. 43), oppositions by Plaintiff (Rec. Docs. 12,
13, 37, 38, & 49), and replies by BP (Rec. Doc. 20), Cameron
(Rec. Doc. 16), and Halliburton (Rec. Doc. 40).

Having

considered the motions and legal memoranda, the record, and the
applicable law, the Court is prepared to issue its ruling.

1

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS
Plaintiff, Velma Jean Richards, filed the instant complaint
pro se on May 12, 2011, concerning her alleged submission to BP
of ideas for containing the flow of oil and cleaning up oil
released in the aftermath of the blowout on the Deepwater Horizon
in April 2010.

The complaint is captioned “Claims of Theft of

Intellectual Property.”

Rec. Doc. 1, at 1.

Although this matter

was initially consolidated with MDL 2179, In Re: Oil Spill by the
Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20,
2010, the Court subsequently ordered that this matter be severed
from the MDL.

Rec. Doc. 5.1

Plaintiff’s complaint contains an amalgamation of
Plaintiff’s biographical information, alleged records of
telephone calls and email correspondence with certain defendants
concerning submissions of proposals concerning oil spill relief
efforts, apparent quotations of documentation indicating statuses
of claims filed by Plaintiff with the GCCF, a listing of various
journals and written documents, and allegations with respect to
what Plaintiff claims is her intellectual property.

The thrust

of the complaint concerns several submissions she made to BP

1
Citations to record documents are to Civil Action No. 11-1096, unless
noted otherwise.

2

during May through July 2010 of Alternate Response Technology
(“ART”) proposals for how to address the oil spill:

(1) plugging

the leak using a combination of materials, (2) placing a giant
plunger on the well, (3) using a vinegar solution to clean up the
spill, (4) the use by BP of spiritual terms to inspire confidence
and respect for the American people, (5) a combination of use of
a large tanker, cutting the riser pipe with giant scissors, and
other matters, (6) a re-urging of the plunger idea and a
submission concerning a hinge, and (7) an email to Kenneth
Feinberg concerning the drilling of a hole and siphoning of oil.
Plaintiff, in her complaint, mainly discusses her second
proposal, the use of a giant plunger device to contain the oil
flow.

She avers that on June 6, 2010, she “observed media

pictures of [her] (ART) proposal #2, a giant plunger device.”
Rec. Doc. 1, at 2.

She states that she telephoned BP regarding

her proposal that BP was using and was told someone would get in
touch with her.

She avers that she engaged in a series of email

communications with BP concerning the matter.

She also discusses

at length communications with the GCCF concerning her claim with
the GCCF.

She avers that she emailed Feinberg requesting that he

ask BP to “cease and desist from using my ideas - intellectual
property.”

Rec. Doc. 1, at 3.

Plaintiff avers that Feinberg

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should have disclosed to her that he worked for BP, when she
first contacted his office.

She also alleges that she filed a

provisional patent application with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”).
In addition to styling her complaint as an action concerning
theft of intellectual property, she makes allegations of theft
within the complaint.

She “alleges the Defendants Tacit Plans-

are for the Historical and Systematic Theft of Intellectual
Property Globally.”

Rec. Doc. 1, at 6.

She ascribes “Theft of

Intellectual Property” to the “Defendant,” who “perpetuate[s] a
Id. at 8.

high stake- high risk business.”

She avers that her

“ART has been in the possession of BP since May 29, 2010, who
integrated it with the OIL Industry.”

Id.

Her allegations with

regard to individual defendants are as follows:
BP- Oil well operators.
Transocean- Oil drillers and operates the RIG.
Cameron International- builders of Equipments, i.e.,
blowout preventers.
Haliburton- cement, and clean- up oil spill.
They are all alleged in Plaintiff- Theft of
Intellectual Property. Defendants have exhibited the
new technology that stop the Disaster in the Gulf.
Plaintiff - OIL RETRIEVING SYSTEM, patent
pending#61408961. Plaintiff alleges Defendants each
stole parts of Plaintiff ART- invention.
Rec. Doc. 1, at 8.

Plaintiff avers that she is disabled, will

amend claims if asked to do so by the Court, is pro se, requests
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a transfer to the Court of Claims if necessary, requests
attorney’s fees, asks for summary judgment, and asks for any
other relief she is due.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 27, 2011.
Action No. 10-md-2179, Rec. Doc. 2596.

Civil

Near the end of this 98-

page filing, Plaintiff states that there are “13 pages of claim”
and “76 pages of affidavit.”

Id. at 97.

The latter contains an

assortment of emails between BP and her, emails between the GCCF
and her, a proof of confirmation from the PTO of the filing of a
patent application, a letter from a BP attorney, the title page
of a law journal article, a Privacy Act Statement, an application
to proceed in forma pauperis, and additional correspondence from
the GCCF.

The thrust of the amendment to the complaint is to

include five pages that were omitted from the initial complaint.
See id. at 2.

These five pages mainly add more biographical

information, court opinion citations, and randomized phrases.
More germane to the relief sought, the amended complaint states
that Plaintiff “kept track of ART through the use of ‘emails’ and
telephone communications.

This indicates the Individuals,

Plaintiff communicated with about Plaintiff ART.”

Id. at 7.

amended complaint also states that “Defendants allegedly used
Plaintiff ART for new technology, that both stop the oil spill

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The

and cleaned it, up in the Gulf of Mexico.”

Id.

The amended

complaint further states that a defendant had come up with a
“Cofferdome” that failed the week before Plaintiff submitted her
proposal to the defendants.

Id.

All defendants, with the

exception of the Transocean entities, have filed motions to
dismiss.

Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
In her motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff
states that the defendants do not deny any of her allegations,
and that therefore her allegations should be regarded as true.
She states that there are no issues of fact, the defendants have
waived all future appearances, and she is entitled to relief.
The defendants argue that they do contest Plaintiff’s
allegations, and that their arguments are set forth in their
motions to dismiss.
With respect to the motions to dismiss, BP’s first argument
is that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for copyright
infringement.

BP states that Plaintiff has failed to allege that

BP has reproduced, performed, displayed, published, or publically
distributed her submission regarding the “giant plunger” device.
Instead, Plaintiff has stated that BP “used” the ideas from her

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submission.

BP contends that functional use is outside the scope

of actionable copyright infringement.

BP also argues that

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for patent infringement because
she has not obtained a patent.

Additionally, BP argues that the

complaint does not plausibly allege any theft of Plaintiff’s
intellectual property.

BP contends that Plaintiff has not, and

cannot, allege facts establishing that BP has used her submission
in any form, other than BP’s review and rejection of her idea in
the screening phase.

The other defendants raise arguments

similar to BP’s in their motions to dismiss.
Cameron contends that Plaintiff does not make any
allegations as to how or when Cameron stole a part of her
invention, nor has she alleged how Cameron is currently utilizing
her invention.

Additionally, Cameron argues that Plaintiff has

not shown that Cameron was involved with her invention or that BP
and Cameron communicated regarding Plaintiff’s intellectual
property.

Cameron also argues that Plaintiff’s single allegation

against it does not permit the Court to reasonably infer that
Cameron is liable for theft of Plaintiff’s intellectual property.
Halliburton argues that Plaintiff’s complaint lacks
sufficient factual material, accepted as true, to state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face.

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It alleges that

Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any factual allegations and
that it fails to establish a claim upon which relief may be
granted.

Halliburton argues that Plaintiff’s complaint does not

allege how Halliburton obtained Plaintiff’s property.

It also

argues that the complaint lacks any allegations in support of
personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction.
The GCCF argues that the complaint fails to state a claim
for copyright infringement because there are no allegations
establishing ownership of a valid copyright or infringement of
any copyright.

It also argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails

to state a claim for patent infringement because Plaintiff does
not allege that a patent was ever granted.

Finally, the GCCF

argues that Plaintiff cannot pursue a remedy against it because
the GCCF and Feinberg acted for and on behalf of BP to fulfill’s
BP’s statutory obligations under the Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”) as
the responsible party for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.

The

GCCF contends that because it is not the “responsible party” as
defined by OPA, Plaintiff cannot sue it for the denial of her
claim.
Plaintiff’s opposition memoranda largely consist of
restatements of allegations made in the complaint, combined with
citations to literary works and other items of no apparent

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relevance.

Plaintiff suggests that her patent is in its “final .

. . stage for application” and that she is a copyright owner.
Rec. Doc. 12, at 2.

She states that she came up with the

invention, in which she has a copyright that she owns.

She

reiterates her allegation that from looking at a media screen,
she knows that her intellectual property was used by the
defendants; and that the defendants have integrated her
submission into the worldwide oil industry.
was in control of the property.

She alleges that BP

She avers that she has been hurt

by this, and by the hacking into of her Blackberry.

She asserts

that she has stated a copyright infringement claim, a claim for
“patent pending,” and a plausible claim for use of her
submission.

She alleges the “straight-out stealing” of her

property, id. at 38, and that the defendants continue to actively
engage in the “sale and distribution of the assets which are the
subject of the present matter,”

Rec. Doc. 49, at 18.

She argues

that there is jurisdiction under “Amount in Controversy,”
“Admiralty, Maritime Law(Federal Question),” “Copyright,” and
“Proof of Summon Service.”

Rec. Doc. 12, at 9.2

2

In a separate opposition memorandum, Plaintiff appears to assert
diversity jurisdiction. See Rec. Doc. 38, at 2 (“Federal Question( Diversity
Jurisdiction). Plaintiff lives in NY . . . Place of occurrence is
Louisiana.”).

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DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard
In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “the
district court is ‘free to weigh the evidence and resolve factual
disputes in order to satisfy itself that it has the power to hear
the case.’”

Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 494 (5th

Cir. 2005).

The party asserting jurisdiction must carry the

burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.

Randall

D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir.
2011).

The standard of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(1) is the same as that for a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6).

United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 02-

3618, 2003 WL 22208578, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2003).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
must plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __U.S.__, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).

A claim is facially plausible when the

plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

10

A court must

accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

Lormand v. U.S.

Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232-33 (5th Cir. 2009); Baker v.
Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).

The court is not,

however, bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations.
B.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.

Jurisdiction
Halliburton raises an issue as to whether this Court has

subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims and personal
jurisdiction over Halliburton.

It has moved under Federal Rules

12(b)(1) and (b)(2) with respect to jurisdiction, and (b)(6) with
respect to whether Plaintiff states a claim upon which relief may
be granted.

The Court addresses the jurisdictional issue

initially because “[w]hen a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in
conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider
the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any
attack on the merits.”
Cir. 2001).

Ramming v. U.S., 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th

A federal district court has exclusive jurisdiction

over a case “‘in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes
either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or
that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in

11

that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded
claims.’”

Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss

Hauer & Feld, L.L.P, 504 F.3d 1262, 1267-68 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S.
800, 809 (1988)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (“The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant
variety protection, copyrights, and trademarks.”).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint states that the “Nature of
Suit” is “Copyright#160358157” and “Patent Pending#61408961,” as
well as the “Individual with Disabilities Education Act(‘IDEA’).”
Civil Action No. 10-md-2179, Rec. Doc. 2596, at 1-2.

The Court

finds that Plaintiff carries her burden of establishing subject
matter jurisdiction through invoking patent law, and alleging the
theft of her intellectual property.

She alleges that the

defendants have used her “giant plunger” idea and avers that she
has a patent application pending for at least one of her
submissions to BP.

Her right to relief necessarily depends on

the invocation of patent law.

Additionally, as noted previously,

she asserts diversity jurisdiction, although the assertion is in
an opposition memorandum, rather than in the complaint.
Doc. 38, at 2.

See Rec.

The defendants have made no contrary argument in

12

their several memoranda concerning diversity jurisdiction.
With respect to personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears
the burden of proof, but she need not establish personal
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.

Kelly v. Syria

Shell Petroleum Development B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 854 (5th Cir.
2000).

Prima facie evidence is sufficient, and the court accepts

uncontroverted allegations and resolves in the plaintiff’s favor
all conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’
affidavits and other documentation.

Id.

The Court can find

nothing in the complaint or amended complaint speaking to the
issue of personal jurisdiction over Halliburton.

Halliburton

elaborates not at all on its personal jurisdiction argument other
than to point out that Plaintiff must establish the existence of
such jurisdiction and has not.

There are no affidavits

concerning the issue of personal jurisdiction, but Plaintiff in
an opposition memorandum states, “Place of occurrence is
Louisiana.”

Rec. Doc. 38, at 2.

Halliburton, in its reply

memorandum, does not comment on this assertion.

Generic as

Plaintiff’s allegation is, because Halliburton does not make any
specific argument to the contrary, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has made a prima facie showing that the Court has personal
jurisdiction over Halliburton under the facts of this case.

13

To

the extent the alleged theft of intellectual property, in which
Halliburton is alleged to be a participant, occurred in
Louisiana, this supports a finding of personal jurisdiction over
Halliburton.
C.

Merits of the Claims
Plaintiff filed her complaint pro se.

The Supreme Court has

stated that “[a] document filed pro se ‘is to be liberally
construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(internal citation omitted).

At the same time, “even when a

plaintiff is proceeding pro se, ‘“the complaint must contain
either direct allegations on every material point necessary to
sustain a recovery ... or contain allegations from which an
inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material
points will be introduced at trial.”’ [A] court need not
‘“conjure up unpled allegations or construe elaborately arcane
scripts to” save a complaint.’”

Govea v. ATF, 207 F. App’x 369,

372 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). Having
considered the complaint and amended complaint, the Court is
persuaded that Plaintiff’s claims are implausible due to the
dearth of factual matter therein.

14

The Court is unable to draw an

inference that any of the named defendants are liable for the
alleged patent and copyright infringement and theft of
intellectual property.
To establish a copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff
must prove that “(1) he owns a valid copyright and (2) the
defendant copied constituent elements of the plaintiff’s work
that are original.”

Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage,

608 F.3d 225, 251 (5th Cir. 2010).

To prove the second element,

“‘a plaintiff must prove: (1) factual copying and (2) substantial
similarity.’” Id.

To establish a patent infringement claim, a

plaintiff must prove that the defendant, without authority, has
made, used, offered to sell, or sold the patented invention.
U.S.C. § 271(a).

35

Concerning Plaintiff’s general allegation of

“theft” of her intellectual property, presumably she purports to
invoke state law.

Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff has pleaded

ownership of a valid copyright and/or patent—a doubtful
proposition3—Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that the

3

Copyright law does not protect ideas, but rather protects the
particular expression of ideas. Computer Mgmt. Assistance Co. v. Robert F.
DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s submissions,
including her “giant plunger” concept, constitute ideas, which are not
protected under copyright law, unless she expressed the ideas in tangible
form. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance
with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression . . . .”). Furthermore, as to Plaintiff’s patent claim,
“[p]atent rights are created only upon the formal issuance of the patent;
thus, disputes concerning patent validity and infringement are necessarily
hypothetical before patent issuance.” GAF Building Materials Corp. v. Elk

15

defendants copied any original work of authorship by Plaintiff or
that they have made, used, or sold any patented invention owned
by her.

Nor has she plausibly alleged the theft of her

intellectual property under any other legal theory.
In Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, the Supreme Court held that in
the context of proof of a contract or conspiracy in restraint of
trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the claim “requires a
complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest
that an agreement was made.”

In Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, the

Supreme Court expounded that a claim is facially plausible and
thus well-pleaded “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Pleaded facts

“merely consistent” with liability do not make a claim plausible.
Id.

The few relevant allegations in the complaint in this case

are little more than conclusory assertions that the defendants
stole Plaintiff’s intellectual property:

that the defendants

have planned to steal intellectual property on a global scale,
that each defendant stole parts of Plaintiff’s invention, and
that they used her property as technology to clean up the oil

Corp. of Dallas, 90 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has only alleged
that she filed an application for a patent, not that a patent has been
granted.

16

spill.

Rec. Doc. 1, at 6-8.

To the extent these allegations of

theft and use can even equate to “copying” within the
contemplation of copyright law, they are bare allegations that do
not permit the Court to draw a reasonable inference of copying of
her putative work.

Nor under a patent theory do they permit the

reasonable inference of use, sale, or making of her invention.
Rather, the bare allegations of theft and use are legal
conclusions, which are not entitled to any presumption of truth.
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (the court is not bound to
accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations).
See also Richards v. Duke University, 480 F. Supp. 2d. 222, 242
(D.D.C. 2007) (where the plaintiff simply alleged that the
defendants stole her ideas and nothing more, the “claim for theft
of intellectual property [was] dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6)”).
Although Plaintiff does plead some facts that may receive
the benefit of the presumption of truth, those facts do not raise
her right to relief above anything other than speculation.

She

avers—and the apparent foundation of her grievance is—that she
“observed media pictures” of her “giant plunger” device.
Doc. 1, at 2.

Rec.

Although this allegation may be consistent with a

17

finding of copying or use by the defendants, it does not push the
claim beyond the realm of possibility into plausibility.

See

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that
are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
“entitlement to relief.”’”).

The Court cannot reasonably infer

that any defendant copied her alleged work of authorship or used
her idea based on the fact that she saw “media pictures” of what
she alleges was her work/idea.

The allegations that BP has

possessed her intellectual property and integrated it into the
oil and gas industry, that the defendants have “exhibited” her
property, and that they have used her property to stop the oil
spill do not contain sufficient factual matter for the Court to
reasonably infer that the defendants appropriated her property
through any sort of use or copying.

Rec. Doc. 1, at 7-8.

As to Halliburton, Transocean, Cameron, and the GCCF,
Plaintiff alleges no circumstances concerning how these
defendants could have come into possession of her intellectual
property.

As to BP, although, accepting Plaintiff’s allegations

as true, BP came into possession of her idea/work through the ART
submission program through which Plaintiff submitted her ideas to
BP, Plaintiff does not provide any particulars concerning how BP

18

thereafter copied, used, made, or sold her works or ideas.
Namely, there are no allegations concerning the “medium” on which
she viewed pictures of her submission, that BP was in some way
connected with whatever technology she viewed on that medium, or
concerning how the subject matter she viewed bore a resemblance
to her intellectual property.

Other than seeing media pictures,

Plaintiff alleges no other facts from which the Court could infer
a non-consensual taking of her intellectual property.

Indeed,

Plaintiff alleges that she submitted her ideas/works to BP, and
therefore that BP initially possessed these ideas and/or works of
authorship with her permission.

She has pleaded no other facts

permitting a reasonable inference that BP proceeded to
appropriate these ideas/works in some way that exceeded the scope
of the permission she initially extended to BP.
Outside of having viewed media images, she scarcely alleges
any other circumstantial facts, except that the week prior to the
submission of her proposal, a defendant’s implementation of a
“Cofferdome” idea had failed.

Rec. Doc. 1, at 7.

Perhaps the

implication is that the failure of other oil containment ideas
such as the “Cofferdome” provided a motive for BP or some other
defendant to use Plaintiff’s idea, which hopefully would prove
more successful than the Cofferdome.

19

However, this, too, is

speculative.

The defendants would have had the motive to

implement a potentially successful idea taken from the multitude
of ART proposals submitted by members of the public, and thus
Plaintiff’s potential implication via the Cofferdome allegation
does not plausibly state the use or copying of her intellectual
property.
Whether under a patent infringement, copyright infringement,
or general “theft of intellectual property” rubric, the complaint
fails to state a claim because it is “an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
S. Ct. at 1949.

See Iqbal, 129

Setting aside the legal conclusion of theft of

intellectual property, the few factual allegations made do not
show that Plaintiff is entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Rec. Doc. 21) is DENIED;
that the Motions to Dismiss filed by Cameron (Rec. Doc. 10), BP
(Rec. Doc. 9), Halliburton (Rec. Doc. 18), and the GCCF (Rec.
Doc. 43) are GRANTED; and that the above-captioned case is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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New Orleans, Louisiana, this 23rd day of April, 2012.

____________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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