Jeffery v. Noranda Alumina, LLC

Filing 12

ORDER AND REASONS granting 5 Motion to Dismiss Case. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 8/10/11. (mmv, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

BRAD JEFFERY

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 11-1131

NORANDA ALUMINA, LLC

SECTION "B"(4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is
GRANTED for the below reasons.
The

first

issue

the

court

must

resolve

is

whether

the

pleadings are legal conclusions. The Supreme Court held that legal
conclusions must be supported by factual allegations and that
recitals

of

the

elements

of

a

cause

of

action

supported

by

conclusory statements do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009); Gonzales v. Kay, 577 F. 3d 600, 603 (5th. Cir.
2009).
Assuming the veracity of the pleaded factual allegations, the
court must determine which factual allegations plausibly give rise
to an entitlement of relief.

Id. at 1950.

The Supreme Court held

that a claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 1949.

This requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense and the plaintiffs must
“nudge[]

their

claims

across

the

line

from

conceivable

to

plausible.”
Here,

Twombley, 550 U.S. at 570.
viewing

the

facts

in

a

manner

most

favorable

to

Plaintiff, Plaintiff has not shown any set of facts that would
entitle Plaintiff to relief. Although it is possible for Plaintiff
to qualify as a disabled person under the Louisiana statute,
Plaintiff

ultimately

concedes

that

Section

301

of

the

Labor

Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) preempts the disability claims.1
(Rec. Doc. 11 at 11).

Because Plaintiff’s state law claims are

preempted by federal law, his only course of action is a breach of
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) claim under Section 301 of
the LMRA.

However, this course of action is barred by the

applicable six-month statute of limitations, which expired in
December 2010.

(Rec. Doc. 5-1 at 10-11).

The cause of action arises from Plaintiff’s termination from
his employment with the Defendant on or around June 8, 2010. (Rec.
Doc. 1-1 at 5-6). Prior to his termination, Plaintiff was screened
for drug and alcohol use by the Defendant on May 25, 2010. (Rec.
Doc. 1-1 at 4).

After being notified of his impending drug

screening, Plaintiff informed his union president that he was
“dirty,” and asked about drug treatment. (Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 4).
After speaking with his union president, Plaintiff informed a co1

Plaintiff admits that the resolution of the claims depends on the interpretation
of the CBA and further requests a stay pending the result of Arbitration under
the CBA. (Rec. Doc. 8 at 3-5). Defendant proved in its motion to dismiss that
when the interpretation of a CBA is at issue, the applicable state law is
preempted in favor of Section 301 of the LMRA. (Rec. Doc. 5-1 at 6-8).

2

worker that he was going to seek a urine sample of someone else for
the screening. (Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 4-5).

Plaintiff found a coworker

to supply a sample of urine and he provided the sample at the drug
test.

(Rec. Doc. at 4-5).

According to the complaint and the

instant motion, Plaintiff was required to provide a second urine
sample because of a problem with the first sample; however,
according to the complaint, Plaintiff believed he was already
discharged when the second sample was requested. (Rec. Doc. 1-1 at
5).

Following the drug screening, Plaintiff was contacted by the

union president and attended a meeting on June 8, 2010 where
Plaintiff
addiction.

announced

that

he

was

seeking

(Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 5).

treatment

for

drug

Prior to his request for

treatment before the drug screen, Plaintiff had requested and been
granted treatment for drugs by the Defendant.

(Rec. Doc. 8 at 2).

Following the June 8 meeting, the union president told Plaintiff he
would be in touch, however, Plaintiff was not contacted and found
new employment in June 2010.

(Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 6).

Plaintiff claims he was wrongfully terminated in retaliation
after reporting his disability to his employers. (Rec. Doc. 1-1 at
6). Plaintiff seeks relief for disability discrimination under La.
R.S.

23:322,

intentional

infliction

of

emotional

distress,

harassment, retaliation, and all damages arising therefrom.
Doc. 1-1 at 6).

(Rec.

Alternatively, Plaintiff claims he is entitled to

arbitration under the Union Agreement.

3

(Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 7).

Plaintiff seeks lost back pay and front pay as well as all other
lost

employment

benefits,

damages

for

emotional

and

mental

distress, pain and suffering, humiliation, embarrassment and loss
of

employment

opportunity,

past

and

present

medical

and

pharmaceutical bills, cost of litigation, and attorneys fees and
costs.

(Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 7).

Under the LMRA, the six-month statute of limitations begins to
run once the plaintiff is on notice of his injuries; the plaintiff
has six months to file a complaint.

See Lee v. Cytec Indus., Inc.,

460 F.3d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff received notice of

his injuries on June 8, 2010 when he was terminated.
file a claim expired on December 8, 2010.

His time to

Since Plaintiff did not

file his claim until April 4, 2011, his Section 301 claims are
barred under the statute of limitations.

See 29 U.S.C.A. §185.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10TH day of August, 2011.

________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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