United States of America v. Bright

Filing 35

ORDER AND REASONS denying 30 Motion for New Trial. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 2/22/2012. (tsf, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 11-1518

RAY A. BRIGHT

SECTION “F”

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Ray A. Bright’s motion for new
trial.

For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
Background

The

facts

of

this

student

loan

default

case

are

more

completely summarized in this Court’s December 21, 2011 Order and
Reasons, in which the Court granted the United States’ motion for
summary judgment.
On September 24, 2004 Ray Bright applied for a student loan
and signed a promissory note to secure a direct consolidation loan
from the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) in the amount of
$108,206.15; the note provided for interest at the rate of 8.25%
per year.

The loan was made by the DOE under the William D. Ford

Federal Direct Loan Program under Title IV, Part D of the Higher
Education Act of 1965.
685.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1087a, et seq.; 34 C.F.R. Part

Some time after the DOE made the loan, the United States made

1

demand for payment.

Bright defaulted on the repayment of the note

and his unpaid interest was capitalized and added to the principal
balance. The United States sued Bright on June 27, 2011 to recover
the

debt,

asserting

that

Bright

is

indebted

to

it

for

the

promissory note in the amount of $172,224.44, interest at the daily
rate of $34.22 from April 19, 2011 to the date of judgment, plus
post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, and the costs of
these proceedings.1
The United States filed its motion for summary judgment on the
defaulted promissory note; the Court granted the motion on December
21, 2011.
2011.

Judgement was entered against Bright on December 29,

Bright now seeks a new trial.
I.
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that a motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later
than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).

Rule 60(b), on the other hand, applies to motions filed after the
28-day

period,

requirements.”

but

demands

more

“exacting

substantive

See Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 910

F.2d 167, 173-74 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds,
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1078 (5th Cir. 1994)(en
1

According to the record, Bright was in default beginning
on June 18, 2010 and his loan was referred to litigation almost one
year later on May 9, 2011. Since the time Bright’s loan was made
until litigation began, Bright did not pay anything towards his
outstanding balance.
2

banc).
“A Rule 59(e) motion ‘calls into question the correctness of
a judgment.’”

Templet v. Hydrochem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478 (5th

Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Transtexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581
(5th Cir. 2002)).

Because of the interest in finality, Rule 59(e)

motions may only be granted if the moving party shows there was a
mistake of law or fact or presents newly discovered evidence that
could

not

have

been

discovered

previously.

Id.

at

478-79.

Moreover, Rule 59 motions should not be used to relitigate old
matters, raise new arguments, or submit evidence that could have
been presented earlier in the proceedings.

See id. at 479;

Rosenblatt v. United Way of Greater Houston, 607 F.3d 413, 419 (5th
Cir. 2010)(“a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule
59(e) ‘must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or
fact or must present newly discovered evidence’ and ‘cannot be used
to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before
the judgment issued’”)(citing Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d
854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d
1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)).

The grant of such a motion is an

“extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.” Indep. CocaCola Employees’ Union of Lake Charles, No. 1060 v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. United, Inc., 114 Fed.Appx. 137, 143 (5th Cir. Nov.
11, 2004) (citing Templet, 367 F.3d at 479).

The Court must

balance two important judicial imperatives in deciding whether to

3

reopen a case in response to a motion for reconsideration: “(1) the
need to bring the litigation to an end; and (2) the need to render
just decisions on the basis of all the facts.”

Templet, 367 F.3d

at 479.
Because the Court entered the challenged Judgment on December
29, 2011, and the plaintiff filed his motion for new trial 25 days
later on January 23, 2012, the motion for new trial is timely under
Rule 59(e)’s 28-day deadline.
II.
As this Court previously noted, “suits to enforce promissory
notes are among the most suitable classes of cases for summary
judgment.”

Colony Creek, Ltd. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 941 F.2d

1323, 1325 (5th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Salaiden Builders, Inc., 973
F.2d

1249,

1253-54

(5th

Cir.

1992)(suits

on

promissory

notes

“provide fit grist for the summary judgment mill”).
In determining that the United States was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, the Court found that the United States
established that that: (1) Bright signed the note; (2) the United
States is the current owner or holder of the note; and (3) the note
is in default.

United States v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 197 (5th

Cir. 2001); FDIC v. McCrary, 977 F.2d 192, 194 n.5 (5th Cir. 1992).
Where,

as

here,

the

United

States

4

submitted

record

evidence

discharging its summary judgment burden on its prima facie case,2
the

burden

shifted

to

Bright

to

establish

the

nonexistence,

extinguishment or variance in payment of the obligation.

United

States v. Irby, 517 F.2d 1042, 1043 (5th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Ward, No. 92-1786, 1992 WL 373557, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 7,
1992)(Clement, J.); United States v. Bertucci, No. 00-78, 2000 WL
1234560, at *2 (E.D. La. May 30, 2000).

Because Bright failed to

carry his burden, summary judgment in favor of the United States
was appropriate.3
Bright now contends that he is entitled to a new trial because
he “has been medically found total[ly] and permanent[ly] disabled
because of inability to engage in substantial gainful activitiy.”
In support of this contention, Bright submits a completed discharge
application for total and permanent disability; the application was

2

The United States submitted the sworn certificate of
indebtedness, as well as the promissory note signed by Ray Bright.
3

As this Court previously noted:

Bright has not demonstrated that he can carry
his burden to show either that his debt has
been rehabilitated or discharged; he argues
only that the debt “should be” or “should have
been” rehabilitated because of his financial
hardship, or “should be” or “should have been”
discharged because of his disability.
This
falls far short of submitting evidence that a
genuine dispute remains as to whether Bright’s
debt has, in fact, been rehabilitated or
discharged.
See Order and Reasons, dated 12/21/11.
5

completed on January 17, 2012.4
The

United

States

suggests

that,

upon

receiving

the

application, counsel transmitted a copy of the application to the
Department of Education.

However, the United States contends that

Bright is not entitled to relief because has not satisfied the
standards of Rule 59(e) or 60(b).

The Court agrees.

First, Bright could have (and should have) completed and
submitted the application for total and permanent disability at any
time after defaulting on his loans; instead, he waited until 19
days after this Court entered final judgment against him and just
nine days before the 28-day deadline to file a motion under Rule
59(e).

Bright has not presented newly discovered evidence that

4

In that application, Dr. Camalyn W. Gaines, M.D.
indicates that Bright has a “physical or mental impairment that
prevents [him] from engaging in any substantial gainful activity in
any field of work and can be expected to result in death or has
lasted for a continuous period of not less than 60 months or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 60
months.”
The United States suggests that the doctor’s conclusion
is “questionable”, given that Bright has proven himself capable of
filing a number of motions in these proceedings. The United States
also points out that Bright is counsel of record in an active
personal-injury suit in this Court; that Bright has been counsel of
record in 19 matters filed in the Civil District Court for the
Parish of Orleans in the past five years, and 86 matters since
1987; that Bright touted his professional experience and work ethic
when he ran for political office in 2005; and that Bright touted
his work experience in 2009 when he ran for traffic court judge in
New Orleans. The Court need not resolve the merits of Bright’s
disability claims, however; that is for the Department of Education
to consider and determine.
6

could not have been discovered previously.5
Second, even if the tardy application somehow constituted
newly-discovered evidence, the evidence is not material to the
issues

before

this

Court:

Bright’s

post-judgment

application

seeking a prospective discharge is immaterial to the issue of his
past default on his loans.

As this Court has previously noted,

“only the Secretary of Education, not the Court, has the discretion
to discharge a loan.”

United States v. Bright, No. 11-1518, 2011

WL 6652504, *2 n.6 (E.D.La. Dec. 21, 2011)(citations omitted).
Furthermore, Bright’s submission of a discharge application does
not guarantee that the Department of Education will grant Bright a
discharge.6

Bright has failed to show that there was a mistake of

fact or law, or that the Court otherwise erred, in granting the

5

The untimely application does not meet the definition of
newly discovered evidence under the federal rules. See Nat’l Labor
Relations Bd. v. Jacob E. Decker and Sons, 569 F.2d 357, 364 (5th
Cir. 1978)(“There can be no Rule 60(b)(2) relief for evidence which
has only come into existence after the trial is over, for the
obvious reason that to allow such a procedure could mean the
perpetual continuation of all trials”); Johnson v. Offshore Exp.,
Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1358 (5th Cir. 1988)(holding that newly
discovered evidence “must be evidence of facts existing at the time
of the original trial”).
6

While Bright’s submission of a discharge application is
a necessary precondition to a grant of discharge for total
disability, merely submitting the application is not sufficient,
standing alone. It should be noted that, as the United States has
pointed out in its papers, this Court’s entry of judgment does not
divest the Department of Education from evaluating and taking
action on Bright’s discharge application.
The Department of
Education has the power to instruct the Department of Justice to
discontinue collection on student-loan judgments if disability
discharges are granted.
7

United States’ motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, Bright’s

motion for a new trial is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, February 22, 2012
______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8