Nguyen et al v. American Commercial Lines, Inc. et al

Filing 221

ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to partially reconsider order [#214] and to extend deadline (Rec. Doc. 216 ) is GRANTED in part as follows: (1) to allow plaintiffs an additional sixty (60) days to produce their 2008 and 2009 tax returns. Self-authenticated tax transcripts shall be produced in the event tax returns are unavailable but only with affidavits from taxpayers explaining under oath why their tax returns are unavailable; and (2) the twenty-eight plaint iffs listed on plaintiffs' Exhibits E and F, who were not served with requests for production for their 2008 tax returns, will not be subject to dismissal for failure to provide a 2008 tax return. In all other respects, plaintiffs' motion is DENIED. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 11/21/2024. (Reference: 11-1799) (dw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHUC NGUYEN ET AL

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 11-1799

AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LINES,
INC. ET AL

SECTION “B”(4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are plaintiffs’ 1 motion to partially reconsider order [#214] and to extend
deadline (Rec. Doc. 216), defendant American Commercial Lines LLC’s (“ACL”) response (Rec.
Doc. 217), and plaintiffs’ reply (Rec. Doc. 218). For the following reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to partially reconsider order [#214] and to extend
deadline (Rec. Doc. 216) is GRANTED in part as follows: (1) to allow plaintiffs an additional
sixty (60) days to produce their 2008 and 2009 tax returns. Self-authenticated tax transcripts shall
be produced in the event tax returns are unavailable but only with affidavits from taxpayers
explaining under oath why their tax returns are unavailable; and (2) the twenty-eight plaintiffs
listed on plaintiffs’ Exhibits E (Rec. Doc. 216-6, yellow highlighted names) and F (Rec. Doc. 2167, listing 28 names), who were not served with requests for production for their 2008 tax returns,
will not be subject to dismissal for failure to provide a 2008 tax return. In all other respects,
plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action arises out of the aftermath of a collision between Barge DM-932, a tank barge
owned by defendant American Commercial Lines LLC (“ACL”), and the M/V TINTOMARA.
Rec. Doc. 1 at 4. As a result of the collision on July 23, 2008, oil spilled from Barge DM-93,

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Except those plaintiffs represented by Vladmir Thomas (collectively “Thomas plaintiffs”).

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closing the Mississippi River to vessel traffic from July 23, 2008 to July 28, 2008. Rec. Doc. 17811 at 8 (ACL statement of uncontested material facts). ACL was designated the “Responsible
Party” under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., meaning regardless of fault,
ACL must resolve various third-party claims related to the oil spill. Rec. Doc. 175-1 at 1–2 (ACL
statement of uncontested material facts).
Filers were two hundred sixty-nine (269) plaintiffs, including seafood wholesalers and
individual commercial fishers—all who harvest and sell seafood in and around the waters off the
lower Mississippi River. Rec. Doc. 1 at 5. They asserted claims against defendants for: (1) damages
to real or personal property, (2) loss of subsistence use of natural resources, and (3) loss of profits
or impairment of earning capacity. Rec. Doc. 1 at 6.
In December of 2015, parties jointly moved for the matter to be statistically closed, while
discovery proceeded according to an agreed schedule. See Rec. Doc. 77. The Court so ordered.
See Rec. Doc. 81. Later, in February of 2020, this Court received notice of an automatic stay of
proceedings when ACL filed for bankruptcy. Rec. Doc. 174. Without providing any notice of the
dissolution of the stay, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, see Rec. Doc. 175, and two motions
for summary judgment, see Rec. Docs. 177 and 178, in March 2021. 2
On November 3, 2021, this Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss eighty-one (81)
plaintiffs for failure to produce tax returns. See Rec. Doc. 196. Debate centered around Magistrate
Judge Roby’s aforementioned Order, wherein she required discovery production within forty (40)
days of her August 30, 2016 ruling. See Rec. Doc. 99. Defendant based its motion to dismiss on
the missing tax returns, at that point five years late. We rejected the argument, finding no evidence
for plaintiffs’ willful or bad faith actions, much less that to warrant case dismissal. See Rec. Doc.
Defendant’s bankruptcy was terminated in July 2020. See In re American Commercial Lines, No. 20-30981, (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2020).
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196 at 4. Moreover, defendant’s motion was deemed untimely:
[D]efendants waited almost five years to file this motion seeking sanctions for
plaintiffs’ perceived failure to comply with the August 30, 2016 discovery order.
See Rec. Doc. 175-1 at 3. Defendants provide no explanation for why they waited
so long to seek relief after the Magistrate Judge’s forty-day deadline expired. Even
if this Court considers that the proceedings in this case were stayed on February 11,
2020, defendants did not further petition the court for plaintiffs’ tax returns at any
time between August 2016 and February 2020.
Id. at 6. To resolve the tax-return impasse, this Court ordered that “plaintiffs shall provide
defendants with written authorization for defendants to obtain plaintiff’s state and federal
tax returns no later than November 19, 2021.” Id. at 7. We concluded that providing a tax return
authorization form, rather than the tax return itself, would meet the needs of discovery. Id. at 4–5
(citing EEOC v. Columbia Sussex Corp., No. 07-701, 2009 WL 10679322, at *4 (M.D. La. Aug.
3, 2009)). Subsequently, upon plaintiffs’ motion, the Court extended the production deadline to
December 10, 2021. Rec. Doc. 199. In our Order and Reasons, we specified the consequences of
non-compliance: “Failure to timely comply with the latter directive will lead to dismissal of
claims by non-compliant plaintiffs.” Rec. Doc. 196 at 7 (emphasis in original).
Two years and four months after the expiration of the deadline, defendant moved to dismiss
for plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute, as a general matter, and for seventy-nine (79) plaintiffs’ failure
to provide 2008–2009 tax returns specifically. 3 Rec. Doc. 201. However, five plaintiffs—Chuc
Defendant states “there are 235 plaintiffs in this action” subject to dismissal. Rec. Doc. 201 at 1–4. Its list, although
well-intentioned, needs clarification. First, its description of the constellation of claimants is at odds with its last
dispositive submission to the Court. See Rec. Doc. 178 at 1 (describing 225 claimants). Second, and more significantly,
the list is at odds with the docket sheet. A series of plaintiffs are duplicated on defendant’s list:
63., 129. Hien V Vo
64., 133. Thich Van Tran
65., 185 Berlin Moreau, Jr.
67., 222. Krol Sode
68., 134. Nhieu Tran
69., 150. Hoang V Huynh
70., 197 Nathan Creppel
71., 221. Thanh V Vo
72., 225. Mike P Tran
73., 154. Henry T. Nguyen

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Nguyen, Dien Nguyen, Ky Le, Hoang Phan, and Son V. Le (collectively “Thomas plaintiffs”)—
were excepted from defendant’s motion, because “these plaintiffs have recently appointed new
counsel to represent them.” Id. at 4. Remaining plaintiffs so opposed.
On June 12, 2024, this Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss claims for failure to
prosecute without prejudice. Rec. Doc. 214. The Court ordered that subject plaintiffs submit 2008
and 2009 federal and state tax returns no later than August 12, 2024, cautioning, “[f]ailure to
timely comply with the latter directive will lead to dismissal of claims by non-compliant
plaintiffs.” Rec. Doc. 214 at 1 (emphasis in original).
On June 24, 2024, parties submitted joint memorandum regarding whether this case should
be reopened and set for pre-trial conference and trial dates. Rec. Doc. 215. The Thomas plaintiffs
indicated that “they have completed discovery and are ready for trial.” Rec. Doc. 215 at 1. All
other plaintiffs indicated the same. Id. at 2. On the other hand, defendant ACL averred that
discovery is not complete and that to reopen the case is premature until those plaintiffs identified
in Order #214 submitted tax-related discovery, namely, any outstanding 2008 and 2009 federal
and state tax returns. Id. On August 9, 2024, the eve of the deadline for subject plaintiffs to produce

74., 210. Helen Drury
75., 211. Patrick Hue
76., 126. Nuong Nguyen
77., 144. Hua Nguyen
78., 235. Matthew Lepetich
79., 233. Jerome Jones
See Rec. Doc. 201 at 1–4. Further, although “Thanh V. Nguyen” is listed twice as a plaintiff on the docket sheet, the
entry is produced three times on defendant’s list. Id. at 2–3 (numbers 66., 117., and 205.). Defendant’s list also contains
various misspellings, which the Court attempted to associate with named plaintiffs:
3. Lanh V Phan, likely intended as plaintiff Linh V Phan
183. Van II. Nguyen, likely Van H. Nguyen
189. Than Van, likely Than Van Do
213. kyCuong Nguyen, likely Cuong Nguyen
Id. at 1–3. Finally, defendant lists “181. True T Nguyen.” Id. at 3. Unlike other possible misspellings, no named
plaintiff is narrowly missed by defendant’s naming. Perhaps defendant intends “Truc Trung Nguyen,” who is a named
plaintiff absent from the 235-name listing. Regardless, the many mistakes are concerning in a thirteen-year-old
litigation currently engaged in a discovery dispute.

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2008 and 2009 federal and state tax returns, plaintiffs filed the instant motion for the Court to
partially reconsider Order #214 and to extend the deadline for subject plaintiffs to produce 2008
federal tax returns or transcripts. See Rec. Doc. 216.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motion for Reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), Generally
“Federal Rule of Procedure 60(b) permits ‘a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and
request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances.’” Kemp v. United States, 596
U.S. 528, 533 (2022) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005)). “Under Rule
60(b)(1), a party may seek relief based on ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.’”
Id. “Rules 60(b)(2) through (b)(5) supply other grounds for reopening a judgment.” Id. “Finally,
Rule 60(b)(6) provides a catchall for ‘any other reason that justifies relief.’” Id. “To that end, relief
under Rule 60(b) ‘requires a showing of manifest injustice and will not be used to relieve a party
from the free, calculated, and deliberate choices he has made.’” Dillon v. Martin, No. 23-1727,
2024 WL 2110130, at *4 (E.D. La. May 10, 2024) (citing Gabriel v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., No. 231333, 2023 WL 6160915, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2023)).
In addition to the aforementioned grounds for relief, the Fifth Circuit has “delineated factors
that should inform the district court's consideration of a motion under Rule 60(b):
(1) That final judgments should not lightly be disturbed;
(2) that the Rule 60(b) motion is not to be used as a substitute for appeal;
(3) that the rule should be liberally construed in order to achieve substantial justice;
(4) whether the motion was made within a reasonable time;
(5) whether if the judgment was a default or a dismissal in which there was no
consideration of the merits the interest in deciding cases on the merits outweighs,
in the particular case, the interest in the finality of judgments, and there is merit in
the movant's claim or defense;
(6) whether if the judgment was rendered after a trial on the merits the movant had
a fair opportunity to present his claim or defense;
(7) whether there are intervening equities that would make it inequitable to grant
relief; and
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(8) any other factors relevant to the justice of the judgment under attack.”
Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). “These factors are to be
considered in the light of the great desirability of preserving the principle of the finality of
judgments.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gould, 301 F.2d 353, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1962)).
B. Motion for Reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)
Rule 60(b)(6) is an omnibus clause designed “to cover unforeseen contingencies—a means
to accomplish justice under exceptional circumstances.” In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde
Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 07–1873, 2012 WL 27673, at *5 (E.D. La. Jan. 5, 2012)
(citing Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir. 1993)). To justify
relief under this clause, “a party must show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ suggesting that the party
is faultless in the delay. See id. (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd.
Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993)). If a party is partly to blame for the delay, relief must be
sought under Rule 60(b)(1) and subsection (6) will not afford relief. See id. (citing same).
However, “[t]he Fifth Circuit has stated that where a party submits previously undisclosed
evidence that is ‘so central to the litigation that it shows the initial judgment to have been
manifestly unjust,’ relief under [R]ule 60(b)(6) may be proper ‘even though the original failure to
present that information was inexcusable.’” Id. (quoting Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris,
636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citation omitted)). Nevertheless, “[t]he last reason under Rule
60(b)(6) is available only when Rules 60(b)(1) through (b)(5) are inapplicable.” Dillon v. Martin,
No. 23-1727, 2024 WL 2110130 (E.D. La. May 10, 2024) (first citing Gabriel v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co.,
No. 23-1333, 2023 WL 6160915, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2023); then citing Kemp v. United
States, 596 U.S. 528, 533 (2022)).

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Here, plaintiffs request the Court to modify Order #214 in four respects pursuant to Rule
60(b)(1) and (6). See Rec. Doc. 216-1 at 5. Alternatively, plaintiffs request relief under Rule
60(d)(1), which allows a court to “entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order, proceeding[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1). Based on parties’ record of delay
regarding discovery in this matter, the Court forgoes entertaining an independent action. More
specifically, the Court evaluates the motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(1) rather than
60(b)(6) due to plaintiffs themselves being partly to blame for the delay in producing discovery in
this matter. Plaintiffs’ arguments rely upon “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”
and fail to present new evidence that is “so central to the litigation that it shows the initial judgment
to have been manifestly unjust,” therefore, Rule 60(b)(6) is inapplicable. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(1); see Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc., 636 F.2d at 577.
C. Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)
“Rule 60(b)(1) allows relief for ‘mistake, inadvertence . . . or excusable neglect,’ however,
these terms are not ‘wholly open-ended.’” Pryor v. U.S. Postal Service, 769 F.2d 218, 287 (5th
Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). Gross carelessness, ignorance of the rules, nor is ignorance of the
law sufficient to satisfy Rule 60(b)(1). See id. “[A] party has a duty of diligence to inquire about
the status of a case, and Rule 60(b) relief will be afforded only in ‘unique circumstances.’” Id.
(citation omitted). To the extent plaintiffs seek reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(1), the Fifth
Circuit has held that plaintiffs “must make some showing of why [they were] justified in failing to
avoid the mistake or inadvertence.” Ford v. British Petroleum, No. 12-965, 2014 WL 6389974, at
*7 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2014) (quoting Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 699 F.2d 693, 695 (5th
Cir. 1983) (citation omitted)). “Insufficient showings for relief . . . include when the party or
attorney did not act diligently to discover the purported mistake, did not proceed with the case, did

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not keep track of its progress, or failed to comply with an order of the court, all of which are viewed
as culpable conduct of the party.” Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., 11 Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2858 (3d. Ed. 2024)).
D. Modification of Order #214 as to only require production of plaintiffs’ 2008 tax
returns or tax transcripts
First, plaintiffs contend that Order #214 should be modified as to only require the
production of plaintiffs’ 2008 tax returns or tax transcripts, rather than plaintiffs’ 2008 and 2009
federal and state tax returns. See Rec. Doc. 216-1 at 5-7. Plaintiffs aver that defendant ACL failed
to seek production of 2009 tax records from any plaintiff in its discovery requests or motions to
compel prior to March 2024. See id. at 5-6. Plaintiffs distinguish the instant tax-impasse with the
circumstances found in Coane v. Ferrara Pan Candy Company. Id. at 6 (citing 898 F.2d 1030,
1032-33 (5th Cir. 1990)). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d), the Coane court dismissed plaintiff’s
claims with prejudice, in part due to plaintiff’s willful refusal to produce tax returns. Id. However,
the Coane court recognized that “a failure to provide discovery need not be willful in order to
trigger Rule 37(d) sanctions.” Id. at 1032. “[I]n view of the possibility of light sanctions, even a
negligent failure should come within Rule 37(d).” Id. (first citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, Advisory
Committee Notes to 1970 Amendment); then citing Basch v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 777
F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986).
Further, subject plaintiffs “assume” that defendant was “mistaken,” when it sought to
dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for failing to produce 2009 tax records. See id. at 6. Plaintiffs’ new
counsel concedes that the “error was not caught until [he] had sufficient time to digest the
voluminous pleadings and discovery in this case.” Rec. Doc. 216-1 at 6. Counsel urges that
dismissal of subject plaintiffs’ claims for “failing to produce that which has not been requested
during discovery would be unjust and contrary to the spirit of such a sanction.” Id. In response,
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defendant ACL admits that “the 2009 federal tax returns and state tax returns were not requested
in a [r]equest for [p]roduction” and that “they were requested via the tax authorization forms which
were provided by the [p]laintiffs themselves.” See Rec. Doc. 217 at 3.
On September 6, 2016, parties filed a joint status report (Rec. Doc. 102) expressly stating
“[p]laintiffs have offered to provide authorizations to defendant to obtain any additional dock
receipts from the Louisiana Department of Wildlife & Fisheries and authorization for any other
tax returns they may wish from the IRS.” Rec. Doc. 102 at 2. Thus, plaintiffs consented to the
production of tax returns beyond plaintiffs’ 2008 federal tax return. While the Court acknowledges
that this allowance may have constituted error on the part of plaintiffs’ previous counsel, plaintiffs
undoubtedly consented to the production of the tax documents beyond the year of 2008. Nor can
defendant’s request for 2008 and 2009 tax returns be characterized as overly broad or overly
burdensome as to constitute an abuse of discovery. Argument to the contrary is stale and
unwarranted.
Further, this Court issued Order #214 on June 12, 2024, which ordered the production of
subject plaintiffs’ 2008 and 2009 federal and state tax returns. Rec. Doc. 214. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(1) permits the court to order discovery regarding “any nonprivileged matter that
is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering
the importance of the issues at stake in the action[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Moreover, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37 empowers the court with the authority to compel production of
documents that are properly discoverable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v). Importantly,
“[i]ncome tax returns are relevant to claims for damages that include lost profits and business
income.” LBC Fixed Income Fund I 2020, LLC v. Watkins Healthcare Group, LLC, No. 2024-008,
2024 WL 3317758, at *3 (E.D. La. June 21, 2024) (citing United States ex rel. Univ. Loft Co. v.

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AGS Enterprises, Inc., No. SA-14-CA-528-OLG, 2016 WL 9462335, at *10 (W.D. Tex. June 29,
2016) (“[I]ncome tax returns, accounting records and other financial information would appear to
be crucial to an expert reviewing a claim for damages based on lost profits.”). “Nor have [plaintiffs]
identified any category of documents that would ‘reflect the substantial equivalent of the
information contained in their tax returns and financial statements.’” Id. (citing Torsh, Inc. v. Audio
Enhancement, Inc., No. CV 22-2862, 2023 WL 7688583, at *13 (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2023)).
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that requiring the production of their 2008 and 2009 federal
and state tax returns is overly broad or burdensome. Moreover, “[i]t is well-settled that recovery
of lost profits will only be permitted where profits have actually been lost and the amount of such
profits is proven with ‘reasonable certainty.’” Boudreaux v. U.S. Flood Control Corporation, No.
07-3211, 2008 WL 11354971, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 2008).
Here, plaintiffs have asserted claims for loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity
wherein the subject incident occurred on July 23, 2008. Therefore, plaintiffs’ federal and state tax
returns for the years 2008 and 2009, are “manifestly relevant.” See Rec. Doc. 214 at 9. The mere
production of plaintiffs’ 2008 tax returns is insufficient to establish their entitlement to relief for
their loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity claims. Further, the Court acknowledges
that the delay associated in obtaining plaintiffs’ tax records may indeed be solely attributable to
counsel. However, based on some plaintiffs’ failure to produce tax returns or any other evidentiary
support to substantiate their claims for loss of profit or impairment of earning capacity, it is evident
that some plaintiffs have failed to make themselves available and are unwilling to prosecute this
matter. Additionally, by providing defendant with tax authorization forms, plaintiffs essentially
placed the onus on defendant to obtain plaintiffs’ tax records from the IRS, rather than obtaining
them on their own. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ request to amend Order #214 on this ground is denied.

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E. Modification of Order #214 as to only require subject plaintiffs to produce federal tax
returns or tax transcripts
Second, plaintiffs request the Court to modify Order #214 as to only require subject
plaintiffs to produce federal tax returns or tax transcripts, rather than requiring the production of
both federal and state tax returns. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs contend that “[n]o state tax returns are listed
in any of [defendant’s] requests that seek the production of tax returns.” Id. Plaintiffs indicate that
some of them have produced both federal and state returns, although ACL did not indicate state
tax returns in its discovery requests. See id. On this ground, plaintiffs who have not produced state
tax returns request the Court to not dismiss their claims. See id. Notably, in opposition to defendant
ACL’s motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, counsel for plaintiffs failed to address ACL’s
failure to request state tax returns during discovery, and instead focused argument on plaintiffs’
compliance with providing tax authorizations to ACL pursuant to this Court’s order (Rec. Doc.
196) and the illness and withdrawal of plaintiffs’ previous counsel. See generally Rec. Doc. 212.
The Court denies plaintiffs’ request for reconsideration on this ground for the previously stated
reasons but will allow production of self-authenticating tax transcripts with sworn affidavits from
taxpayers in the event tax returns are unavailable, as directed earlier.
F. Modification of Order #214 as to twenty-eight (28) subject plaintiffs whom did not
receive a written request from defendant to produce 2008 federal tax returns
Third, plaintiffs contend that at least twenty-eight (28) subject plaintiffs never received a
request for production for any tax returns from defendant, and therefore, those plaintiffs should
not be subject to dismissal. See Rec. Doc. 212 at 7-8. In response, defendant ACL concedes that it
failed to serve those specific twenty-eight plaintiffs and agrees that those plaintiffs should not be
subject to dismissal for failing to provide a 2008 tax return. See Rec. Doc. 217 at 1-2. As previously
stated, Rules 26(b)(1) and 37(b)(2)(A)(v) empower the Court to order the production of relevant

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discovery. That has been done here. However, we will forgo dismissal of claims by those specific
twenty-eight plaintiffs at this juncture to allow their compliance with noted production orders.
G. Plaintiffs’ request to extend deadline to produce 2008 tax returns or transcripts
Additionally, subject plaintiffs request a sixty (60) day continuance to produce 2008 federal
tax returns or tax transcripts. Plaintiffs aver that counsel “is still in the process of contacting the
remaining [s]ubject [p]laintiffs, personally or through an interpreter, and having them sign requests
for tax returns or transcripts and mailing them to the IRS.” See Rec. Doc. 216-1 at 8.
Over the course of thirteen (13) years of litigation, this Court has granted plaintiffs several
opportunities to facilitate the production of discovery. See e.g., Rec. Doc. 99 (ordering plaintiffs’
discovery responses within forty days of issuance of order granting defendant’s motions to
compel); see, e.g., Rec. Doc. 119 (granting plaintiffs additional thirty days to produce written
discovery); see, e.g., Rec. Doc. 187 (granting plaintiffs fourteen-day continuance); see, e.g., Rec.
Doc. 196 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss and ordering plaintiffs to provide defendants
written authorization to obtain state and federal tax returns, and cautioning dismissal if noncompliant); see, e.g., Rec. Doc. 199 (granting plaintiffs twenty-one day extension to provide signed
state and federal tax authorization forms); see, e.g., Rec. Doc. 214 (denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss and ordering plaintiffs to submit tax return-related discovery, namely 2008 and 2009
federal and state tax returns, and cautioning dismissal if non-compliant). Here, plaintiffs’ motion
fails to satisfy the standard under Rule 60(b)(1).
Plaintiffs and their prior counsel share blame for the delay in complying with the Court’s
orders, and the proffered reasons for delay and reconsideration do not show Order #214 to have
been manifestly unjust. The reasons stated in plaintiffs’ motion fail to suggest adequate grounds
for reconsideration. However, plaintiffs’ new counsel and counsel for defendant appear to be

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working together in good faith efforts to achieve FRCP Rule 1’s mandate for case resolution—
albeit later than expected.
Therefore, while retaining consideration of repetitive violations of court orders designed
to facilitate timely advancement of this action and to consider any future violations, the imposition
of sanctions against noncompliant parties at this time is withheld. Subject to the aforementioned
modifications to Order #214, that Order remains in effect for reasons as ordered above.
Given the totality of described circumstances here, other than the instant extensions ordered
above, there will be no further extensions for production of tax returns or transcripts. We
again warn that “Failure to timely comply with the latter directives will lead to the
dismissal of claims by noncompliant plaintiffs.” See Rec. Doc. 214.
Further, until compliance with noted production directives or failure to timely comply
occurs, this action remains on the inactive docket.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 21st day of November, 2024

____________________________
Senior United States District Judge

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