Bayham, Jr. v Grosse Tete Well Service, Inc.

Filing 66

ORDER & REASONS that the Plaintiff's 58 Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Signed by Judge Eldon E. Fallon on 8/3/12. (dno, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CARY A BAYHAM, JR.

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VERSUS
GROSSE TETE WELL SERVICE,
INC., ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 11-1815
SECTION "L"(1)

ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration (Rec. Doc. No. 58) filed by
Plaintiff. The Court, having reviewed the submitted memoranda and the applicable law, is ready
to rule. For the following reasons, the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of injuries sustained by Plaintiff Carl A. Bayham, Jr., on December
1, 2010, while he was employed by Gross Tete Well Services ("Grosse Tete") as a floor hand,
assigned to a truck-mounted workover rig secured to a barge, the GROSSE TETE 1. Plaintiff
alleges that, on that date, he was advised that the well he was working on was "dead" (that is,
there were no combustible gases present). However, as he was using an acetylene torch to cut
bolts on the well, the well head exploded, causing him serious burns and injury to his low back
and other parts of his body. Plaintiff filed suit in this Court against Defendant Grosse Tete, his
employer, as well as Louisiana Delta Oil Company ("Louisiana Delta"), the well owner, and
B&B Oilfield Services ("B&B"), the site consultants. Plaintiff alleges that his injuries were a
direct result of Defendants' negligence, including their failure to provide a reasonably safe place
to work, negligently representing that the wellhead was free of combustible gases, and negligent
supervision. Plaintiff has filed suit under the Jones Act and general maritime law, seeking
damages for mental and physical pain and suffering, loss of wages, loss of earning capacity, past
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and future medical expenses, permanent disability, and loss of life's enjoyment, and additionally
seeks maintenance and cure.
Defendant Grosse Tete has filed an answer denying liability and asserting the affirmative
defense that Plaintiff was not a Jones Act seaman. Therefore, Grosse Tete contends,Plaintiff’s
claim against it is governed by workers’ compensation and not the Jones Act. Grosse Tete also
argues that the accident was the result of the negligence of Plaintiff and/or a third party. In
addition, Grosse Tete has filed a cross-claim against Defendants Louisiana Delta and B&B.
Grosse Tete asserts that the damages it sustained as a result of the explosion were caused by the
negligence of Louisiana Delta and B&B. According to Grosse Tete, Louisiana Delta and B&B
are responsible because they provided false information regarding the nature of the production
tree, failed to determine the true nature of the production tree, failed to properly train their
employees, and failed to properly protect Grosse Tete's property.
Defendant Louisiana Delta has filed an answer denying liability and asserting affirmative
defenses, including comparative negligence, negligence of a third-party, and failure to mitigate
damages. Louisiana Delta has also filed cross-claims against Grosse Tete and B&B, asserting
that the explosion and damage to Louisiana Delta's property was caused by the negligence of
Grosse Tete and B&B, including failure to adequately plug the well, failure to train their
employees, and failure to take sufficient precautionary measures. Finally, Louisiana Delta has
filed a counter-claim against Mr. Bayham, contending that the explosion and property damage
were a result of his negligence.
Defendant B&B has filed an answer denying liability and asserting affirmative defenses.
B&B denies that the work was directed and/or supervised by its representatives and denies that it
made any claims about the status of the wellhead.
On February 27, 2012, and March 27, 2012, the parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary
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Judgment on the issue of Jones Act seaman status. On May 22, 2012, the Court granted
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, ruling that the Plaintiff qualified as a Jones Act seaman.
On June 20, 2012, Defendant filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal (Rec. Doc. No. 55) the
Court’s Order and Reasons denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. No.
53). Defendant argued that because the Court was sitting in admiralty, Defendant had the right to
appeal the Court’s interlocutory order on the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). The Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Appeal and stayed
the case pending the Fifth Circuit’s resolution of Defendant’s appeal.
II. PRESENT MOTIONS
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Rec. Doc. No. 58), arguing that the
Court’s Order denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is neither “appealable as a
matter of right” nor appropriate for certification for immediate appeal. Plaintiff cites In Re the
Complaint of Patton-Tully Transportation Company, 715 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1983), in which the
Fifth Circuit held that the determination that the plaintiff was a Jones Act seaman was not
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).
Defendant has filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion. First, Defendant argues that
because the Notice of Appeal has been filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction in this case. Second,
Defendant asserts that the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Patton-Tully is distinguishable because the
plaintiff in that case had not filed his Jones Act suit pursuant to Rule 9(h), and therefore the
plaintiff did not have a right to an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). As a result,
Defendant contends, the court’s ruling in Patton-Tully is inapplicable to this case, which was
filed pursuant to Rule 9(h).
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
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Motions asking a court to reconsider an order are generally analyzed under the standards
for a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or a motion for relief from a
judgment or order pursuant to Rule 60(b). See Hamilton Plaintiffs v. Williams Plaintiffs, 147
F.3d 367, 371 n. 10 (5th Cir.1998). Rule 59(e) governs when the motion is filed within 28 days
of the challenged order. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Because Plaintiff’s Motion seeks
reconsideration of the Court's Order of June 21, 2012, and was filed within 28 days of entry of
this Order, the Court treats the Motion as one pursuant to Rule 59(e).
A Rule 59(e) motion “is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or
arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.” Templet v.
HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir.2004) (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d
1154, 1159 (5th Cir.1990)). Rather, Rule 59(e) serves the narrow purpose of correcting manifest
errors or law or fact, or presenting newly discovered evidence. Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. &
Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 1667, 174 (5th Cir.1990); Templet, 367 F.3d at 479 (quoting
Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir.1989)). “‘Manifest error’ is one that ‘is
plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law.’” Guy v.
Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Venegas–Hernandez v. Sonolux
Records, 370 F.3d 183, 195 (1st Cir 2004)). In the Fifth Circuit, altering, amending, or
reconsidering a judgment under Rule 59(e) “is an extraordinary remedy that should be used
sparingly.” Templet, 367 F.3d at 479 (citing Clancy v. Empl'rs Health Ins. Co., 101 F.Supp.2d
463, 465 (E.D.La. 2000)). “A Rule 59(e) motion should not be used to re-litigate prior matters
that ... simply have been resolved to the movant's dissatisfaction.” Voisin v. Tetra Technologies,
Inc., 2010 WL 3943522, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 2010). District courts have “considerable
discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to alter a judgment.” Hale v. Townley,
45 F.3d 914, 921 (5th Cir.1995). Yet at the same time, the Rule 59(e) standard “favors denial of
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motions to alter or amend.” S. Constructors Group, Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th
Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff requests the Court to reconsider its Order granting Defendant’s Motion Leave to
Appeal. According to the United States Supreme Court, “[t]he filing of a notice of appeal is an
event of jurisdictional significance – it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests
the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v.
Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). In the case of a Notice of Appeal under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) in admiralty, where the order appealed from is interlocutory and not
certified as final, the only thing the district court retains jurisdiction over is whether to also
certify under Rule 54(b). See Gabarick v. Laurin Maritime (America), Inc., 650 F.3d 545, 551
(5th Cir. 2011).
In the instant case, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Appeal on June
21, 2012. A Notice of Interlocutory Appeal has been filed. Therefore, the Court only retains
jurisdiction in this matter for the purposes of a decision to certify under Rule 54(b). The Court
does not have jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion must be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
(Rec. Doc. No. 58) is hereby DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 3rd day of August, 2012.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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